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This dissertation investigates the strategies and forms of Uzbek ethno-political
mobilization in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In particular, the research
asks why Uzbek communities in those two countries did not resort to ethnically
motivated violence as many either predicted or feared, but have instead turned to a
"quiet politics" of identity and ethnicity.
Reconciling state and national identities has proved remarkably complex in
Central Asia, given that all the five republics in the region are home to a largely
heterogeneous population. Understanding what place state elites have allocated to
non titular groups, and how these relate themselves to the new polity offers an
interesting vantage point on the process of post-Soviet transformation. This is
particularly the case as ethnic minority mobilization represents a relatively
unexplored field of research in scholarship on post-communist Eurasia. This
dissertation seeks to fill the gap in this area by developing a focused comparison of
Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from 1991 until 2003.
Through a combination of various quantitative (small-scale surveys) and
qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis)
structural, ideational, and agential factors are taken into account. It is the contention
of this thesis that Uzbek political behaviour can be explained as a product of a
strategic calculation by the leaders of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan that any change in the administration would leave them "worse off',
despite existing and un-addressed political and cultural demands. This has shaped a
counter-intuitive type of mobilization, supportive of the status quo in the state
structure of power. A focus on ideas and agency also accounts for variations between
the two cases. In particular group leadership appears more articulate and vocal in
Kyrgyzstan, whereas it lies in a state of virtual collapse in Tajikistan. A change-
adverse strategy among Uzbeks should not be seen as a permanent condition, though.
Especially if grievances are not met, Uzbek loyalty should no longer be taken for
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The Quiet Dynamics of Uzbek Ethno-political mobilization in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan: Are Uzbeks "at a cusp"1 or at home abroad?
This study investigates Uzbek ethno-political mobilization in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. Despite initial predictions (Olcott, 1992a and 1992b; Carlisle, 1995;
Rumer and Rumer, 1992) and later warnings (Lubin and Rubin, 1999; Khamidov,
2000; Tabyshalieva et ah, 1998 and 1999) that un-addressed political and economic
grievances and the presence of ethnic minorities spanning contested borders
constituted a potentially explosive combination in the heart of Central Asia2, Uzbek
communities in those two countries have not resorted to violence, but turned to a
•3
"quiet politics" of identity and ethnicity.
In particular the study seeks to understand how Uzbeks living outwith
Uzbekistan have adjusted to being "at home abroad" and how their condition of
marginality living "at a cusp" between polities embarked in competing state- and
nation-building processes has affected their participation in political life. In order to
do so the identities and strategies that Uzbeks abroad have adopted, the forms of
their participation, and the way they react to and interact with the surrounding
context within which they operate are examined in the following chapters.
All these aspects come to define and identify the process of Uzbek ethno-
political mobilization. Political mobilization here refers to "the actors' effort to
influence the existing distribution of power" (Nedelman 1987, p.181). What is
'in his study of Osh Uzbeks Morgan Liu refers to the Uzbek condition of "non-belonging", at a cusp
between the nationalising policies of Kyrgyzstan who sees them with suspicion out of fear that they
may act as Uzbekistan's fifth colum and hence marginalises them, and the latter state, which does not
regard them as part of the self (2002).
2Nick Megoran was one of the rare observers in counter-tendency at the time. In his brief essay
appropriately titled Calming the Ferghana Valley Experts Megoran (2000c) notes how emphasis on
the conflict potential of the region - parallel to a downplaying of positive developments - risks
turning into a self-fulling prophecy.
3By quiet I mean both non-violent and characterised by low mobilizational level. I return to this
question later in this chapter.
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crucial is that action in this case comprises the actors' efforts to legitimise the
existing distribution of power, and also encompasses activities aiming to redistribute
power or reshape the basis of the power structure within a society. A particular type
of mobilization is of interest here: ethno-political mobilization, a form of
mobilization where group identity (here, ethnic) is used as a base for collective
action (Tilly 1991, p.574). The study compares and contrasts two case studies, those
of Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani Uzbeks through an in-depth focused comparison.
1.1 The new others: Identity transformation among post-Soviet co-
ethnics
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought with it the stranding of millions of
co-ethnics, large communities of people sharing a common ethnic bond with others
living "on the wrong side of the border". Over seventy million people (out of nearly
three hundred million), nearly one in four Soviet citizens4, found themselves in a
country where they constituted new minorities. The driving force behind this
phenomenon was a mismatch between borders and peoples: these new "beached
diasporas" as Pal Kolstp labelled this new category of peoples, were not the product
of mass migrations (movement of peoples across borders), but, of the "movement of
borders across settlements" (1999).
A question that arose in the early stages of this research and indeed was
echoed in academic circles is how to refer to such communities. Diaspora was the
term that met with consensus among post-Soviet authorities (ie state administration,
the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan and media alike) as well as within
academic circles abroad (Bohr, 1998; Melvin, 2000; Horsman, 1999a). International
organizations (OSCE, UN) seemed to prefer "national minority", whereas others
(Olimov and Olimova, 2002) suggested they should be referred to as irredenta,
distinguishable from diasporas proper by the lack of forcible migration and history of
settlement in a particular area. I have found concepts such as transnationalism and,
especially "hybridity" appropriate to grasp the process of re-definition, re-negotiation
and contestation of identity/-ies taking place in the new states of Eurasia. In
"According to the 1989 Soviet census the number of people residing outside the borders of their
alleged homeland (internal or external to the Soviet Union) amounted to a stunning 71,191,055
(Vestnik Statistiki, 1990-1991).
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particular I have been influenced by Clifford (1994), Anthias (1998, 2001), and
Stuart Hall's re-conceptualisation of diasporas and diasporic identities (1990).
Crucial in their analysis is the rejection of that essentialism typical of mainstream
diaspora studies (Sheffer, 1986 and 2003) which ultimately reifies these groups on
the basis of their fitting into a category. What matters is whether the group perceives
itself and constructs its identity as diasporic, or whether it is constructed as such by
the "external homeland" 5 (here, Uzbekistan) or the country of residence (Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan). Equally important is the emphasis of "new diaspora studies" on the
fragmentation, overlapping, and multiplicity of identities.
The archetypical example of these "new diasporas" is represented by those
Russian communities scattered all across the fourteen non Russian former Soviet
republics. Neil Melvin (1995, p.9) correctly emphasises that that this broad group of
peoples does not include ethnic Russians only. It comprises Belarusians, Ukrainians,
Germans, Poles, and Koreans, that with time have abandoned their native tongue to
become linguistically and culturally Russified. In most cases the group includes
communites of non indigenous populations that have forcibly or voluntarily re¬
settled away from their region of origin. Hence the more appropriate terminology of
"Russified settler communities" (ibid.). Literature on the topic is understandably
expanding6 given the size of these communities (twenty-five million, located in all
the fourteen non Russian republics) and the identity of the external homeland (the
Russian Federation). Scholars have alternatively focused on the significance of the
emergence of these new minorities for the newly formed state (Smith, 1997; Smith
and Wilson, 1997; Chinn and Kaiser, 1996) and its importance for the domestic
politics of the external homeland (Melvin, 1995), and a number of authors have
thoroughly analysed the multiplicity of trajectories in the process of identity
transformation of the Russian-speaking population, and the implications thereof for
the relations between the state of residence and minority group (Commercio, 2003;
5The term external homeland, popularised by Rogers Brubaker in his "triadic nexus" model (1996) is
used here for analytical purposes to identify one key actor in a potential, though not necessary and not
assumed, triadic relationship (the nexus being between minority, nationalising state and external
homeland). That the homeland perceives itself as such vis-a-vis the co-ethnics living abroad, or that
the latter construct their identity as diasporic and look at the country on the other side of the border is
something that has to be determined empirically, rather than assumed theoretically.
6Chinn and Kaiser (1996), Laitin (1998), King and Melvin (1998 and 2000), Kolstp (1996, 1999,
2000, 2001), Melvin (1995, 1998), Smith and Wilson (1997), Zevelev (2001), and Commercio (2003).
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Kolst0, 1996). This has meant recognising in turn the agency of the group (Kolstp
again, but also Zevelev, 2001 and Melvin, 1995), and on other occasions the over¬
arching structural externalities of state policies (nationalising policies, homeland's
diaspora policy, as in the case of Smith and Wilson, 1997; and Smith et al., 1998).
Russified settler communities are by far the most visible, though not the only
examples of post-Soviet diasporas. Armenians, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Tatars,
among others also existed in the Soviet Union as officially recognised titular nations
and un-recognised "internal diasporas" (internal to the Soviet Union)7. The absence
of "real borders" between Union republics made the geographical distribution of
ethnic groups somewhat irrelevant in Soviet times, but particularly problematic in the
post-Soviet era. The changes that have affected these communities are far-ranging
and have impacted upon their identity self-perception, legal status, psychological
conditions, and also their political and economic situations in the new countries. In
most cases all the individuals residing in a given Union republic were granted
citizenship. This was not the norm everywhere, though. In a radical act of redress of
perceived past injustices Latvia and Estonia denied the large Russian-speaking
communities living in their territory the status of citizen and the political and civil
rights entailed by this status (Galbreath, forthcoming; Melvin, 1995 and 1998).
Thousands of people were turned from citizens into denizens, allowed to reside, but
deprived of certain political and civil rights. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have
granted their Russian-speaking populations the possibility of dual citizenship (the
country of residence and Russia's8). Uzbekistan has pushed for its ethnic Tajik
citizens to enter "Uzbek nationality" in the passport's apposite entry and census,
thereby forcibly shrinking the otherwise large Tajik presence in the country (Foltz,
1996; Horsman, 2001). Elsewhere all individuals residing in the republic at the time
of independence were granted citizen status.
Legal parity did not secure absolute equality in practice, though, and this
constitutes the starting point of this study: understanding how the profound changes
in boundaries, status, policies and practices brought about by the collapse of the
'External diasporas included, for example, Uzbeks living in Turkey or Saudi Arabia, Ukrainians in
Canada, and so forth.
8In June 2003 Turkmenistan has not renewed the ten-year agreement with Russia and the few
Russians that had remained in the country were given the option to choose between leaving the
country (for Russia, presumably) or staying with Turkmen citizenship only (Torbakov, 2003).
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Soviet order have affected those who overnight became the "new others", those
against whom the new polities defined themselves in search of their own post-Soviet
identity. Furthermore, the creation of new education systems and curricula, the
radical changes in language policy and the establishment of barb-wired borders put a
halt to the regular flow of bureaucrats, politicians, tradesmen, students and
academics across republican borders9. If being Uzbek in Turkmenistan or in
Uzbekistan mattered only to some extent in Soviet times, being part of a non titular
group in a post-Soviet state carried significant consequences in terms of status as
well as employment opportunities and even just communication possibilities. At first
glance it appears that the new Central Asian polities could be referred to as
"nationalising states" (Smith et al, 1998), which Rogers Brubaker defines as polities,
established as the. states of and for the nations after which they were named (1996
p.9). This study shows that neat categorizations tend to be rather misleading as they
conceal more than they reveal. When policies appeared to be enhancing the status of
the titular group such as in the case of language laws in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
practices intervened to moderate them (as Russian remained widely spoken in those
countries). On other occasions, policies were introduced to safeguard the position of
non titular groups, as in the case of land distribution in Kyrgyzstan, when the then
president Akaev vetoed a proposal to ensure that land be distributed by privileging
Kyrgyz over Uzbeks, Russians and other non titular groups. Regardless of how the
newly independent states might be categorised, they all faced a similarly crucial
dilemma: defining what the nation was, who belonged to it and who did not. Were
minority groups expected to become part of the nation's new post-Soviet self,
assimilate, integrate, or were they unwelcome temporary guests?
The dissertation discusses this question by looking at the perspectives of
minority groups themselves and exploring how, within the context they found
themselves, they adjusted to their new condition of being "at home abroad". What
matters is not just the process of identity transformation that these communities have
undertaken, but also the implications of this identity re-positioning in terms of the
political status and behaviour of the group.
'However, I am not suggesting that the flow entirely stopped. In fact, not only shuttle trade continues,
but so does cross-border human trafficking. Despite a tightened visa regime I managed to rely on local
expediencies and practices to pass through Uzbekistan's various borders on more than one occasion.
16
1.2 Mobilization in post-Soviet Central Asia: Dogs that bark, dogs that
bite, and silent dogs
Scholars have become increasingly interested in explaining the various cases of
nationalist mobilization in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet era in post-
communist Central Eurasia (Beissinger, 2002; Critchlow, 1991; Schatz, 1999; Smith
and Wilson, 1997). Whilst nationalist mobilization led to mass demonstrations and
street protests throughout the former Soviet Union, Central Asia hardly witnessed
any such activity. In striking contrast to what happened in Central-Eastern Europe
where the fall of state socialism "paved the way for political participation and
contentious collective action" (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998 p.545), public participation in
Central Asia, already low in Soviet times, continued to be so in the post-
independence period. The case of enviro-nationalist movements such as the Nevada-
Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan shows that some form of popular mobilization did take
place (Schatz, 1999). Environmental protection and language revival became the foci
of intellectual attention and the frames through which the wider population became
mobilised in Central Asia. Indeed from the 1986 Alma-Ata riots to the 1990 June
events in Osh and Uzgen small-scale violent episodes took place in the region (see
table below). Though these could be seen as manifestations of socio-economic
grievances (with ethnicity being the way the conflict manifested itself rather than the
root cause thereof), they did not appear to bode well for Central Asian republics and
societies.
Table 1.1. Riots in 1989-1990: Bleak prospects for Central Asia?
Year Location
February and May 1989 Dushanbe, TJK
May 1989 Ashkhabad and Nebit Dag, TKM
May and June 1989 Ferghana Valley, UZB
June 1989 Noviy Uzen', KZ
February 1990 Dushanbe, TJK
February 1990 Buk, UZB
March 1990 Parkent, UZB
May 1990 Andijan, UZB
December 1990 Namangan, UZB
June 1990 Osh and Uzgen, KG
Source: Ro'i (1995 p.23).
Overall, however, Central Asia remained at the margins of the various waves
of mobilization and as a consequence so did research on mobilizational processes in
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the region. I do not dispute the fact that a study of successful examples of
mobilization (the Gellnerian "dogs of nationalism" biting or barking) is heuristically
useful, and perhaps even of more immediate interest than the case of the so-called
"silent dogs", all those groups who, expectedly or unexpectedly, did not mobilize and
remained inertial, passive or who sought to mobilize, but failed. However, I fully
agree with Pauline Jones Luong that a study of mobilization should account for cases
where it occurs and for those where it does not (2002): the "silent dogs". Mis¬
predicted or unexpected cases of mobilization/failure thereof can shed significant
insight as to how the mobilizational process works. In a seminal work on nationalist
mobilization in the late Soviet era, Mark Beissinger considers both successes and
failures of nationalist mobilization, although he primarily discusses the former. None
the less, Beissinger acknowledges that an explanatory and predictive model cannot
neglect the "anomalous or mis-predicted cases" (ibid., p.203 and 222). These
include cases of unpredicted successful mobilization (i.e. Abkhaz, Gagauz, Bashkir,
Tuvans, and Turkmen), but also the "failures", examples of groups expected to
mobilise that actually did not (Belarusians, Uzbeks and Volga Tatars). As
Beissinger's research shows, Central Asia remained by and large quiet on the eve of
the Soviet collapse and in the early post-independence phase. The tides of
nationalism that had spread across other areas of the former Soviet space barely
touched the region. However, this should not be read, Beissinger suggests, as an
indication that mobilization did not occur at all in Central Asia. Rather, to follow
Beissinger's typology, the Central Asian movements would constitute examples of
"mobilizational failure, but political issue success" because the issues raised by the
small intellectual circles were later appropriated by the ruling elite and incorporated
in state policy.
The problem here is that scholarly attention has thus far concentrated almost
exclusively - with the notable exception of the Russian diasporas - on the
mobilization of titular groups: Kazakhs in Kazakhstan (Akiner, 1997; Schatz, 1999),
Uzbeks in Uzbekistan (Carlisle, 1991; Critchlow, 1991) and so forth. Ethnic
minorities have remained at the periphery of scholarship on post-Soviet mobilization
and this can be ascribed to the low mobilizational level of these communities.
Although partly correct, this does not explain one crucial gap in the literature: if
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minority groups such as Uzbeks and Tajiks, were expected to mobilize, but did not,
what did they do? They did not seem to develop mass forms of mobilization against
the state. Neither did they gather in mass street demonstrations in defense of cultural
rights or to advance political and economic demands. This does not mean that post-
Soviet minority mobilization in Central Asia necessarily represented a case of "silent
dogs". Though fortunately large scale violence did not occur this dissertation argues
that minority mobilization did take place. It was however a quiet politics of identity
and ethnicity. Episodes of inter-ethnic clashes did occur, but remained limited to
specific cases. Minority groups typically sought to advance their demands by co¬
operating with authorities rather than by confronting or antagonising them. The
means of claim-making were non violent, and their attitude towards state authorities
amicable, and hence the label "quiet".
1.3 Rationale and research questions
As noted in the previous section, ethnic minority mobilization has been a neglected
area of study with regard to post-Soviet transformation in Central Asia (Foltz, 1996;
Kolstp, 1996, 1999, 2000; Schatz, 1999). This dissertation seeks to fill in this gap by
looking at the dynamics of ethnic mobilization among one particular ethnic minority
group, the Uzbeks, in two states of former Soviet Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan since independence (1991-2003).
Unlike the Russian diasporas, Uzbeks have not been "diasporised" by either
voluntary or forcible migration, but by the movement of borders across settlements.
The Soviet discourse which emphasised how each nation had one and only one
historical homeland served the post-Soviet elites well in their process of
othering/diasporization of Uzbeks. Given that Kyrgyzstan was created as the
homeland of Kyrgyz (and the Tajik case likewise) all the other communities must
have come from elsewhere. Koreans from Korea, Russians from Russia, Uzbeks
from Uzbekistan.
The case of Uzbeks is significant in a number of other ways. Uzbeks
constituted the largest Muslim and also the largest non Slavic community in the
former Soviet Union. In post-Soviet Central Asia, they are the most populous ethnic
group and their political behaviour and the way Uzbek co-ethnics relate themselves
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to the country where the majority of kins live (Uzbekistan) ultimately affects the
whole region, its stability and the process of state- and nation-building there. It is not
merely about demographics though, but also about geopolitics. Should Uzbekistan
adopt a pro-active stance towards Uzbeks abroad, seeking to re-unite them with the
mainland or even just to act on their behalf to protect them, this could potentially
enflame the region.
Map 1.1 Uzbekistan and Uzbeks abroad
Source: Original Uzbekistan map available at www.o/.odlik.org and later modified by the author. Uzbek
settlements outwith Uzbekistan are marked with green dots. These are not in scale and do not indicate the density
of such settlements.
Uzbekistan matters because it is demographically the stronger state in the region and
has the largest army, which the Uzbekistani authorities have not refrained from using
whenever Uzbekistani strategic interests are stake. This has included military support
alongside political backing to pro-government factions in the Tajik civil war
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(Horsman, 1999a), conducting police operations in foreign territory un-authorised10,
and unilaterally demarcating and mining state borders. As Uzbekistan is militarily
stronger than all its neighbours, a state dispute could potentially lead the region into a
domino effect of violence and instability (would Uzbekistan's neighbours retaliate by
supporting its minorities?).
The Ferghana Valley well illustrates the complexity of these issues. The
region, spanning the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is home to a
significant number of enclaves, portions of territory under the formal sovereignty of
a neighbouring state (the largest of which are Sox, Shax-i-Mardan, under Uzbekistani
sovereignty, and Vorukh, part of Tajikistan). The valley has become the object of
international attention because of its conflict potential arising from widespread social
and economic deprivation, political repression, competition for scarce resources and
lack of institutional mechanism to voice, let alone address, popular demands.
Understanding how Uzbeks perceive themselves and where their cultural and
political loyalties lie has implications that go well beyond the domestic politics of
one particular Central Asian country and affects the wider region and beyond.
Uzbekistan's shift towards active support for Uzbek co-ethnics or the latters' choice
for rebellion may ignite the region by unleashing a domino effect on the region's
cross-border ethnic groups.
Because this scenario has not materialised during the post-independence
period, the empirical puzzle this dissertation aims to explain is the following: if
Uzbek co-ethnics did not seem to mobilize en masse, what exactly did they do and
why? In order to solve this puzzle this study intends to answer the following
questions:
(1) What explans the trajectory of Uzbek ethno-political mobilization in
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?
(2) How do the two cases compare in terms of activities, forms of organization
and action, objectives and strategies?
10Naumkin (2003). Since summer 1999 (when militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
organised incursions from Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstani territory into Uzbekistan) this type of
operations has intensified. Also, until very recently it was not infrequent for Uzbek troops to spill over
into Kyrgyz territory to arrest elements allegedly belonging to the Uzbek opposition.
1.4. Combining social movement research and nationalism studies
Susan Olzak has correctly noted (2004, p.665) that social movement research and
nationalism studies have developed as separate fields of inquiry. This needs not be
so, she argues, as important theoretical and methodological insights can be drawn
from both. In fact, what this dissertation attempts to do is to draw on the
contributions of both of these areas of research and attempt a comprehensive
explanation of the mobilizational trajectories of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan.
Studies on state- and nation-building have traditionally emphasised the
importance of the elites as the main actors shaping the course of post-Soviet
transformation (Adams, 1999a and 1999b; Brubaker, 1996; Cummings, 2002a;
Melvin, 1998 and 2000; Jones Luong, 2002; Taras, 2001). I share the view that elites
are the main actors in the political process. Their choices and strategies crucially
shape the form that post-Soviet transformation takes, particularly so in the case of
ethnic political mobilization. Elites matter because of their status and position in the
system, but also because they possess the resources, tangible and intangible, to
mobilise the rank and file. Two concepts are particularly relevant here: leadership
and strategy. Leaders are understood as "strategic decision-makers who inspire and
organize others to participate to social and political movements" (Morris and
Staggenborg, 2004), while strategy involves "the selection of objectives and the
search for the most appropriate means to achieve those objectives within a particular
context at a particular moment in time" (Hay, 1995 p. 190).
This study emphasises elites' strategies without neglecting popular
perceptions at grassroots level. In order to do so it builds on the numerous
contributions from social movement research which have traditionally looked more
at mass perceptions and processes (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; McAdam,
Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1998). The two fields of research well integrate
because of the traditional neglect within social movement studies of elites and
specifically leaders, their types and strategies in shaping the mobilizational process
(Morris and Staggenborg, 2004, and Barker et ah, 2001 being two noteworthy
exceptions). An additional contribution of social movement research lies in the
importance assigned to ideas (understood in this context as "frames") in connecting
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leaders - and potential followers. The concept of frames, originally introduced in
social psychology by Erving Goffman (1974) and later developed further by Snow
(Snow and Benford, 1992; Snow et ah, 1986), has been widely used in social
movement research (Zald, 1996, but also Tarrow, 1998 and Tilly, 1995) and more
recently from scholars investigating national mobilization in the late Soviet and early
post-Soviet period (Adams, 1999a and 1999b; Gorenburg, 2003; Ukudeeva-Freeman,
2003). Frames can be defined as "interpretive schemes that condense and simplify a
person's experience by selectively highlighting and encoding certain situations,
objects, events and experiences" (Gorenburg 2003, p. 11). Understanding the extent
to which a particular frame (i.e. secession, autonomy, indigenousness, diasporic
identity, anti-state sentiment, pro-government activism) resonates across the
population has allowed Dmitry Gorenburg (2003) and Jamilya Ukudeeva-Freeman
(2003) to explain the dynamics of mobilization among ethnic minorities in Russia
and the rise and demise of the national-democratic movements in late Soviet
Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan respectively.
1.5. Uzbek mobilization and the structure and agency question:
Towards a strategic-relational approach to ethno-political mobilization
By combining insights from studies on elites and frames I seek to develop a working
theoretical framework (outlined in chapter 3) that accounts for strategies and forms
of ethnic minority mobilization among post-Soviet Uzbek co-ethnics. This allows me
to locate the issue of Uzbek mobilization within the broader structure and agency
question, arguably a "central question of political analysis" (Giddens, 1984; Hay,
2002; McAnulla, 2002). Only rarely has this question been openly addressed in
studies on the post-Soviet space. Sally Cummings has looked at how divergent forms
of authoritarianism have emerged from initial common paths in Central Asia,
acknowledging the role of both elite choices and structural factors (2002a). Pauline
Jones Luong has developed a bargaining game model to study the pacted transitions
in Central Asia and has noted how looking at the role of structural factors and
preconditions as well as the choices and bargains of the Soviet/post-Soviet elites is
crucial to understand why from initial starting points three Central Asian states have
developed three different electoral systems and, more broadly, different political
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trajectories of transformation (2002). Again a divide has emerged here between
social movement research and political studies on the former Soviet space, with the
former adopting - I argue - an excessively structural approach, and the latter over¬
emphasising the centrality of elites, and forgetting about the followers - those who, in
the end, have to be mobilised for a successful mobilization to occur.
I do not deny the importance of context, most notably of the legacies
(political, economic, and cultural) of the Soviet experience, in shaping the course of
Uzbek mobilization. In fact, this study shows how structural factors have constrained
as well as provided opportunities to Uzbek actors to mobilise. However, context does
not (pre-)determine political action, but defines the range of strategies available to
political agents who would then choose among them. In this respect, Mark
Beissinger's work on late Soviet nationalist mobilization is invaluable as it takes into
account structural, agential, and ideational factors in shaping the various tides of
nationalist mobilization (2002). At the same time, this dissertation departs from
Beissinger's research in two crucial and significantly related areas. Firstly, by
looking at how a "strategic-relational approach" can be used to make sense of ethno-
political mobilization in post-Soviet Central Asia, rather than drawing on Margaret
Archer's "morphogenetic approach" (1988; 1996)11, as Beissinger did, to make sense
of national mobilization. I do not argue that these two approaches are mutually
exclusive - in fact both build on critical realist epistemology and advance our
understanding of the structure and agency question by seeking to overcome the
traditional dualism existing in political analysis. Time and events occupy a central
stage in Beissinger's analysis. This is necessary in a study on waves of nationalism,
and especially when the general aim is to make sense of the level of mobilization
(how much mobilization or how many mobilizational events?). Second, while I
accept the significance of events (the Osh conflict and the Tajik civil war, electoral
campaigns, meetings of Uzbek organizations) and time (noting how strategies
developed over the post-independence years) I argue that a "strategic-relational
"in short, Archer's approach (and by extension, Beissinger's) focuses on the temporal dimension in
distinguishing between structure and agency. The two are not only analytically distinct, but
empirically as well: one pre-dates the other. Archer also crucially places culture (the ideational
dimension) alongside structure and agency as a third meta-theoretical concept in the explanation of
political phenomena. The advantages of adopting a strategic-relational approach over a morphogenetic
one are discussed in chapter 3.
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approach", a framework originally conceived by Bob Jessop (1990) and later
developed further by Colin Hay (2002) - with the emphasis on the strategic
selectivity of context and the relational nature of structure and agency - is better
suited to explain how structure, agency, and ideas interact in a non-eventful process
of mobilization. The SRA is outlined in detail in chapter 3.
METHODS
1.6. Comparative strategy and case selection: Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan
This study adopts a comparative research strategy. Cases were selected on the
grounds of a "most similar systems" design (MSSD, Przeworski and Teune 1970),
where variation is observed in the dependent variable. This consists of keeping as
many independent variables as possible constant which would then make it easier to
locate the variables that do differ and which would then be considered as explanatory
(Pennings, Keman, Kleinnijenhuis 1999, p. 12). The logic of the MSSD is therefore to
isolate the effect of one (or more) independent variable(s) by controlling for the
effects of spurious or intervening ones, which include "everything that makes up the
social, economic and political context and backdrop of the dependent and
independent variables" (Burnham et al. 2004, p. 63-64).
This study controls for context (Soviet legacies and the political opportunity
structure, chapters 4 and 5) and explores variations in the other two theoretically
relevant sets of viariables: ideas and agency. In so doing it hopes to partly address
one of the "pathological" conditions of comparative research, that of "too many
variables, not enough studies" (Lijphart 1971; Ragin 1987). A two case comparative
study does not have ambitions to generate statistically relevant conclusions, but can
offer insights deriving from an in-depth focused comparison and contextualised
knowledge of the cases. Strong similarities exist between the two cases under
investigation. First and foremost the Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan share a
legacy of seventy or more years of Soviet history. A brief digression on how the
Soviet experience was central to Uzbek nation-making is necessary.
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A common Soviet legacy
The importance of the national delimitation process and of the Soviet nationality
policies for understanding contemporary dynamics in post-Soviet Central Asia can
12
hardly be over-rated . Soon after re-establishing control over the territories formerly
belonging to the Tsarist Empire, the Soviets introduced a comprehensive program of
political and social re-organization of Central Asia: the "national delimitation"
(,natsional'noe razmezhevanie, 1924-1936). The process marks the beginning of the
nation-making process under Soviet rule. Ethnographers, official representatives,
scholars as well as the local population were mobilised in a comprehensive process
of re-organization, not just of territory and institutions, but of the peoples that
inhabited those lands. Border making, the use of census as a policy tool, the
promotion of national languages, and an indigenization policy aimed at creating
national cadres were the instruments used by the Soviet authorities to promote
nationhood (as opposed to nationalism, a reactionary phenomenon to be
eradicated)13. For both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and all the Central Asian republics
for that matter, modern state formation originates in the Soviet period, with the
establishment within their current boundaries of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics
in 1929 and the Kyrgyz SSR equivalent in 1936. Both polities underwent various
phases of Soviet nationality policies (Hirsch, 1997; Martin 2002; Suny and Martin
2001), including similar approaches to cadre and indigenization policies, re-writing
of history according to Soviet ideological precepts, and economic and social
modernization. In this sense Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are typical cases in the
Central Asian region and likewise Uzbek co-ethnics residing there encounter
representative issues affecting co-ethnics (Uzbeks and non) living in Central Asia.
12For various studies on this complex process of societal re-organization and its consequences see
Hirsch (2005), Martin (2002), Sabol (1994) and Suny and Martin (2001).
13These will be examined in depth in the following chapter.
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Map 1.2 The Ferghana Valley
Source: International Crisis Group.
Similarities
Indeed, one could go as far as to argue that they constitute two sub-cases of a single
case study: the Ferghana Valley, a region which extends over about 20,000 square
kilometres straddling Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Each of these countries
reproduces within its own boundaries the problematics that the region is typically
associated with, most notably the mismatch between borders and ethnic groups, but
also the potential for unrest deriving from social and economic deprivation and
political alienation. Valerie Bunce has noted that conducting comparative research on
the former Soviet Union is particularly fruitful because of the large amount of
variation out of a common starting point (2003). The same holds true on a smaller
scale in the Ferghana Valley. Historically a cultural and economic unit, the Ferghana
Valley experienced a phase of political unity under the Kokand Khanate until this
unity fell under the national delimitation process and was divided between the three
newly established Union Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
Owing to topographic reasons, the regions located in the Ferghana Valley are better
integrated with the Republic of Uzbekistan, towards which they gravitated in Soviet
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times. Were it not for hassles at the border, a trip from Khujand or Osh to Tashkent
would take only a few hours, whereas a journey to Bishkek and Dushanbe would
take more than half a day. Kyrgyz and Tajik societies are particularly fragmented and
sub-national allegiances have long been stronger than national affiliations.
Additionally, clan and/or regional politics have traditionally dominated Tajik and
Kyrgyz politics, and the Uzbek minorities in both countries have often played and
been played in the intra-ethnic power struggles (Jones Luong, 2002; Collins, 2002
and 2003). It is because of the structural similarity of areas situated in the Ferghana
Valley that attention focuses primarily (though not exclusively) on southern
Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan. Uzbeks are located in other areas of those
countries as well, particularly so in Tajikistan where sizeable Uzbek communities
can be found in the central districts and the capital Dushanbe, as well as the south¬
western province of Khatlon. As will become clear in the next chapter, the dynamics
characterising these other areas are distinct per culture, history of settlement,
integration with neighbouring country and role played in the republic from those in
the Ferghana Valley. For reasons of simplicity whenever I mention Uzbeks in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan I hereafter refer to those living in the southern provinces
(Osh, Batken, Jalalabat) of the former and the northern province (Sughd) of the
latter.
What both case studies also share is the recent demographic dominance
acquired by the titular groups. While Tajiks already represented the majority of the
population in the Soviet times, the share of the titular group has risen further since
independence. The case of Kyrgyzstan is even more striking with Kyrgyz presence
increasing form a bare majority to about 65%. In both countries Uzbeks now
represent the largest non titular group, having outnumbered all other ethnic
communities.
Finally, even the political development of the two countries since the late
Soviet period is similar. In fact, before the Soviet collapse the Tajikistani and
Kyrgyzstani societies were among the more pluralistic in Central Asia. Some degree
of political competition was allowed, informal organizations proliferated and
different candidates competed in different elections. This trend continued in
Kyrgyzstan for the first part of the following decade, to the point that in an excess of
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hyperbole the country came to be referred to as "Central Asia's island of
democracy". After initial reforms, however, state authorities in both countries have
resorted to authoritarian practices to consolidate their position in power, relying less
on democratic procedures of accountability and responsibility or participatory
governance. Both Presidents Akaev and Rakhmonov have tended to rely on an ever
narrower power base, with allegiance personal rather than political.
Differences
Obviously, one should not overlook the differences that exist between the two cases,
most notably the fact that Tajikistan descended in a bloody civil war from 1992 until
1997 and that is has only recently begun a process of institutional and societal
reconstruction. Kyrgyzstan also experienced its brief, but bloody phase of communal
infighting during the 1990 Osh conflict, but state and societal breakdown have been
prevented despite the fact that the odds were stacked against it (regional, ethnic sub-
regional and clan cleavages, social and economic deprivation).
While I am aware of the limitations inherent to a comparative research
strategy, most notably the question of causal inference (King, Keohane, and Verba,
1994), causal over-determination (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) and that of "too
many variables, too few countries" (Lijphart, 1971)14, I believe that a focused
comparison can make a significant contribution to theory-building by contextualizing
the knowledge (Hague and Harrop, 2001) of the processes of ethno-political
mobilization, thereby escaping the ethnocentrism that has often characterised this
field of research (for example relying on electoral data as the main measure of the
mobilizational process and on Western case studies) and the tendency to be overly
reliant on some methodological tools (event analysis, a quantitative technique which
looks at the number of forms of protest to determine the presence or absence of
mobilization).
In this study I focus on the post-independence period (1991-2003), athough it
is inevitable that events and processes unfolding from the eve of the Soviet collapse
will come under examination. I refer particularly to the 1990 Osh conflict in
Kyrgyzstan and its legacy (the shadow cast on inter-ethnic relations in the country)
14I address these and other questions in the methodological appendix.
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and the shifting political opportunity structure in Tajikistan, with the balance of
power tilting away from the northern faction of Leninabad, until then de facto ruling
the country for most of the Soviet era. The research adopts the year 2003 as the cut¬
off point. This means that the recent events that have led to the ousting Askar Akaev
on the 24th of March 2005 fall outwith the present enquiry, and so does the electoral
campaign that has led up to the contested parliamentary elections of February and
March 2005. While I do not discuss these events, wherever appropriate the
implications that a change in context may or may not cause on the strategies of
Uzbek mobilization (or vice versa, how a change in strategy may affect the context)
are considered.
1.7. Techniques of data collection
In order to answer the questions outlined in section 1.3,1 rely on the combination of
different research techniques. As this dissertation operates at different levels of
analysis and looks at different actors and institutions, adopting only one method
would have been impracticable. Quantitative methods, for example, do not represent
the most suitable way of investigating what particular kind of frames were adopted
by ethno-political entrepreneurs and the rationale behind their adoption. Similarly,
the strengths of attachment to various forms of cultural and/or political loyalties are
better investigated through survey methods (where the aim is to measure the extent to
which a form of identity is widespread) or through interviews (where one is
interested in how different forms of identity are accommodated).
The combined use ofmultiple research methods (also known as "triangulation"15)
constitutes an extremely valuable device to balance the weaknesses and strengths of
each method. As no method is error-proof, the weaknesses or dimensions that one
technique cannot explore because of its very nature (see later), a second method can
compensate for. This is particularly the case in studies of identity and identity
transformation. An established method in nationalism studies, survey research
measures the strength of collective identity and constitutes a solid (and less time-
consuming) device to gather large quantities of data. On account of its own nature
quantitative research on identity issues risks overlooking nuances. This weakness of
15Blaikie (2000).
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survey methods can be addressed and balanced by the conduct of parallel (or follow-
up) individual interviews and/or focus groups. As a matter of fact the strength of the
claim does not lie in numbers only. There are issues that the ranking, ordering, and
measuring of survey methods cannot grasp. These are the nuances that emerge and
are discussed in individual or group interviews, where the respondent re-engages - at
times - with his or her answers from the survey and qualifies them. That these
qualifications are not lost in the amount of data gathered in the survey is crucial and
allows us to understand the internal dynamics and complexities of what would
otherwise appear as a monolithic community.
It is also important to note that Uzbek political mobilization cannot be studied
in the same way that, for example, Estonian, Georgian, or Ukrainian or even Kazakh
mobilization were approached in the late Soviet era, let alone mobilization in open
political systems (i.e. Basque, Catalunyan, Scottish, Flemish, north-Italian ethno-
national mobilization). The former represented instances of collapsing polities
opening windows of political opportunity, whereas the latter are in fact examples of
(however imperfect) open societies. This leads to two considerations. On a
theoretical level the main difference to be taken into account lies in the authoritarian
nature of the Central Asian states. The structure of political opportunities is subject
to stricter controls than that of countries like Spain, Scotland, or the late Soviet Baltic
republics. A closed or semi-closed opportunity structure means also a more
controlled flow of information. Reliable information, as emphasised by Horsman
(1999b) is a "rare commodity" in former Soviet Central Asia. This clearly affects the
type and quantity of information available on such a sensitive issue as ethnic
minority mobilization and has obvious methodological implications. An event
approach to nationalist mobilization such as Beissinger's or a political claims
analysis (relying on the number and type of claims made by a group, ie petitions,
letters, etc., as in Giugni and Passy, 2004) are impractical in this case. Episodes such
as demonstrations or other episodes of contention have been sporadic since
independence and a coding and analysis thereof would not capture the complexity of
the process of Uzbek mobilization, which would appear as being in inertial state. As
a consequence this study does not set out to measure the level of mobilization, but
seeks to measure the strategies (what type of political behaviour have Uzbeks
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adopted and why?) and forms of Uzbek political mobilization (how do Uzbeks
mobilize? Through what organizations?). An investigation of strategies and forms of
mobilization is therefore more effectively undertaken by means of the following
techniques of data collection:
small-scale surveys, to investigate the various levels of attachment to cultural
and political loyalties, political interest and participation;
semi-structured individual interviews, to identify salient or recurrent themes
emerged from the surveys and to understand particular historical
contingencies and choices of elites and non-elite actors;
documentary analysis, which includes a study of official documents (state
policies or laws, presidential publications/conceptualisations of state
ideologies) and regional reports, and an analysis of local media, print or web-
based, to supplement information collected through the previous two
techniques.
Field research has been conducted over several visits to the region, beginning in
2001 when, before starting my doctoral program in Edinburgh I stayed for three
months in Samarkand to undertake Uzbek and Tajik language training. It was on this
occasion that the question of co-ethnics (Uzbeks and Tajiks) first came to my
attention. I then returned to the region during the winter of 2002 to visit Uzbekistan
and again over the summer of 2003 in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
While key methodological issues have been addressed in these pages and are
also discussed throughout the chapters that follow, I opted to leave a methodological
chapter to the end of the dissertation. This should not be read as downplaying the
importance of methodological issues. The reason for this lies mainly in my decision
not to overload the narrative of Uzbek mobilization with issues that, however crucial
for the conduct of research, would temporarily divert attention from the dynamics of
the mobilizational process. Although I acknowledge the advantages that
incorporating a standard methodological chapter within the main body of the
dissertation carries, I opted for a different path, which I hope adequately suits the
structure of the study.
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1.8. Limitations of the study
There are some natural limitations as to what this study can achieve. First is the main
focus of analysis being concentrated on the domestic level, within Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, namely on how Uzbeks organize and mobilise within those polities and
how they interact with the surrounding context (state authorities). I am well aware
that international organizations have played an increasing role in the region, but their
action is not treated here. In recent years the United Nations (particularly, but not
only) through its Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (again, particularly through the action of the
High Commissioner on National Minorities) have promoted and advised on the
adoption of inclusive policies towards national minorities, i.e. in the sectors of
education (curricula, textbooks), media (outlets in languages other that states ones),
and more generally on the responsibilities that states have towards minority groups
and such groups towards state authorities16. However, because attention is here paid
to the interaction between state and group, the role of external players is not
discussed. The only exception to this is Uzbekistan because of the particular nature
of the country, where the possibilities that it may behave as the group's ethnic patron
directly and crucially affects the relations between state and Uzbek community.
Second, and partly overlapping with the previous point, is the emergence of
civil society remains at the margins of discussion. This is certainly not to neglect its
importance, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. Whenever appropriate, namely in chapter 7,1
refer to how the closure of spaces for autonomous political action have "pushed"
some within the Uzbek community to opt for involvement in activities and
organizations that escape - to some extent17 - state attention and intervention. The
establishment as well as the problems encountered by civil society in Central Asia is
such a complex topic of research worth a separate study. Findings in chapter 7
suggest that more needs to be done to explore the way minority groups activate
through NGOs and IGOs in non democratic settings.
^Insightful contributions on the topic are Hoynick (2004) and Sabahi and Warner (2004).
17One should not overestimate the freedom of action of NGOs in the region. In her study on the civic
realm in Kyrgyzstan Kelly McMann correctly notes how members of local NGOs do not seek
separation from the state, but rather its support and do not view close association with the authorities
as a threat to their autonomy (2004).
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A third topic that remains outside the scope of this analysis is the relationship
between Uzbeks and Islamic radicalism. This does not mean that the role of religion
and religious allegiances are downplayed. Religion is clearly a marker of Uzbek
identity. However, discussing the extent to which organizations such as Hizb-ut
Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan appeal to an Uzbek constituency lies
outside the scope of this research for the simple reason that recruitment strategies
emphasise religious rhetoric over discourses of ethnic marginalization18.
1.9. Chapters breakdown
Chapter 2 ("The Central Asian Uzbeks") provides a brief historical background to
the study. There I look at the question of Uzbek identity formation and patterns of
settlement in Central Asia and pay special attention to the critical phase of the
national delimitation process (1924-1936) and more broadly the Soviet nationality
policies. Chapter 3 ("A strategic-relational approach to ethno-political mobilization")
develops some of the themes only hinted at in this chapter. It seeks to develop an
operational model to examine the dynamics of Uzbek mobilization. The chapter is
divided into two sections. First the main approaches to the study of ethno-political
mobilization are discussed. Second, I outline the theoretical framework adopted to
investigate Uzbek mobilization: the "strategic-relational approach".
The remaining part of the dissertation is structured thematically, with each
chapter (or set of chapters) examining structural, ideational, and agential factors in
shaping Uzbek political behaviour. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the role of context in
shaping the spaces available to Uzbek action. Chapter 4 ("The Soviet legacies")
assesses the structural preconditions for mobilization. Drawing on the main bodies of
literature on ethnic mobilization (role of institutions, identity and economic
deprivation) it discusses the significance of the Soviet legacy in the political,
economic and cultural realms. Chapter 5 ("Political opportunity structure") discusses
the impact of domestic and external actors and institutions upon group behaviour.
The state of residence and Uzbekistan are considered here. The primary aim of the
chapter is to explore the extent to which the state has provided the group with the
spaces necessary to pursue some form of political action and the degree to which this
18For an analysis that is both theoretically informed and based on empirical evidence see Naumkin's
study of the emergence of the IMU in Central Asia (2003).
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action is also subject to factors originating outwith the borders of the country by the
hand of a "third party", namely the country where the majority of fellow kins live
(Uzbekistan).
Chapter 6 ("Framing the Uzbek question") investigates the significance of
non tangible factors for understanding Uzbek politics. Building on the role that
framing theory has played in social movement research, the chapter explores the way
Uzbek problems and demands (the "Uzbek question") have been framed and the
extent to which they have resonated across the wider community. Finally, in Chapter
7 ("Uzbek actors: Leadership, elites fragmentation and popular perceptions") I look
at the role played by organizations and individual actors. First the main Uzbek
organizations are outlined, and attention paid to their structure and general aims. I
then discuss individual agency by looking at the following: who are the leaders?
What are their strategies? How do they relate to state authorities and the wider Uzbek
community? The final section of the chapter discusses the popular perceptions of
state and group leadership. The study is concluded by Chapter 8 ("Conclusion")
which ties the different chapters together and locates the contributions within the
larger fields of ethnic mobilization studies and post-Soviet research, and an
additional "methodological appendix" (Chapter 9).
CHAPTER 2
The Central Asian Uzbeks: A brief introduction
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O'zbekka o'xshashni topmoq muammo
O'xshasa o'ziga o'xshaydi O'zbek
Qiyosi yo'q uning bag'ri bir daryo
Dunyoda bolam deb yashaydi 0 'zbek
(M. Yusuf)
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief background to the study of "Uzbeks
abroad" by looking at the process of Uzbek identity formation. First, I discuss the
process of Uzbek group formation and the emergence of Uzbek identity. Second, the
role of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter UzSSR) as a nation-making
political formation is discussed within the Soviet attempts to remake Central Asian
societies along national lines. The chapter leads up to the Soviet demise and
independence, while Soviet legacies in contemporary Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
explored in chapter 4.
2.1. The Uzbeks: Dynamics of group formation
The ethnonym "Uzbek" made its appearance in the region in the sixteenth century,
when the Dasht-i Kipchak nomadic tribes migrated to the Central Asian region and
settled there under the Shaybanid dynasty (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1996 p. 14, Ilkhamov,
2003 p.270). However, the extent to which today's Uzbeks are direct descendants of
those tribes is disputed. Since independence the country's leadership has emphasized
the historical continuity between pre-modern and modern Uzbek people. Central to
the regime's project appear to be two concepts: the ancient origins of Uzbek
90
statehood and its historical greatness" . Connecting the past to the present or, better,
rewriting the past in service of the present, has been a central tool of the Uzbekistani
elites' self-legitimising effort, the goal being the construction of (the current
19"It is difficult to find someone who looks like an Uzbek. Uzbeks look like themselves. They are
unique. Uzbeks live for their children".
20For a discussion of the role of ideology in the Uzbek state-building process see March (2002a and
2002b).
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president) Islam Karimov as a modern-day Amir Temur. Establishing whether Uzbek
presence in the region dates back to the times of the Shaybanids, Timurids, or even
Alexander the Great is not a matter for historians only21, but lies at the very centre of
the project of state and nation-building.
In his "Archaeology of Uzbek identity" Alisher Ilkhamov (2003 and 2004)
correctly - though contrary to most contemporary Uzbek historiography22 - argues
that it is necessary to operate a distinction between contemporary Uzbeks, who owe
much of their group consciousness (ong) to the Soviet efforts of nation-making over
more than seven decades, and Uzbeks of the fifteenth to nineteenth century (2003
p.270). Ilkhamov also contends that the origins of today's Uzbeks he in fact in the
encounter between (at least) three "ethnic groups" (obshchnosti): Dasht-i Kipchak
nomadic tribes, local Turkic tribes, and Sarts23.
The label Uzbek originates in the fourteenth century from the name of Uzbek
khan (1312-1340), a descendant of Chinggis Khan and ruler of the Golden Horde
(ibid.). The ethnonym began to be associated with the subjects of the Golden Horde,
not simply to Turkic-speaking, but also to Turkic-Mongolic tribes. Charismatic
leaders such as Uzbek Khan, Abulkhair Khan or Shaybany Khan played a major role
in the unification of their subjects under a centralized political formation, combining
adherence to Islam and customary law inherited from Chinggis Khan. After the
sixteenth century, when other local Uzbek tribes joined forces with the ruler
Shaybany Khan, Uzbek khans came to reign over a large territory of today's Central
Asia (ibid.). There allegiance was personal and tribal rather than ethnic, and loyalty
to a dynasty defined the sense of belonging of the subjects. Gradually Uzbek
nomadic tribes shifted from a nomadic to a settled life style.
While Dasht-i Kipchak tribes formed the core of the Shaybanid dynasty around
which other tribes coalesced, other tribes (Mongol and Oghuz, among others) also
joined the Uzbek tribes. Contextually to the formation of the Uzbek tribal
confederation under the Shaybanid, a separate dynasty (the Timurids) emerged
21I occasionally met respondents, typically employed at university departments of history, who linked
Uzbek ethnogenesis to the era of Alexander the Great (Tashkent and Samarkand, December 2002).
22See Ersanli (2002, especially p.342-348) for a brief review of post-independence Uzbek
historiography embarked on a "formulation of the past as an official political enterprise" (ibid., p. 337)
and the methodological and political dilemmas encountered by Uzbek historians (see also Adams,
2003).
230n Sarts and their eradication see Schoeberlein (1994 and 1996).
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within the Chagatay "ulus"24. Similarly to the case of the Golden Horde where the
subjects came to identify themselves as Uzbeks regardless of their ethnic or tribal
affiliation after the Uzbek Khan rule, the Turko-Mongol conqueror Tamerlane's
defeat of the Chagatay ulus and the establishment of the Timurid dynasty brought an
analogous process, where a new collective label, Chagatay, was introduced to refer to
all those who were not Uzbeks (later the boundaries between Uzbek and Chagatay
identity became blurred, but originally the terms referred to distinct forms of
identification).
The category of Sarts constitutes the third large element out of which modern
Uzbek identity was formed. Similarly to "Chagatay" and "Uzbek", the term "Sart"
never implied an ethnic substratum. Instead, it referred to the urban sedentary
population of Central Asia, mostly bilingual in Persian/Tajik and Turkic languages.
The boundary sedentary/settled in pre-Soviet Central Asia was of much more
significance than any attempt to look for ethnic loyalties. In sum, as John
Schoeberlein notes (1996), when approaching the study of Uzbeks and Uzbek
identity one should be wary of assuming it constitutes a cohesive whole. Rather, an
approach which acknowledges the internal heterogeneity of the Uzbek community is
required, as noted by Laura Adams with regard to the regional variations and
understandings of Uzbekness in Uzbekistan (Adams, 1999a and 1999b) and by
Shirin Akiner with reference to Tajikistani Uzbeks (2001). This does not lead to the
denial of the existence of an Uzbek ethno-national community. However, the label
Uzbek should be treated more as an umbrella term rather than as indicating a
cohesive and homogenous group.
Central Asia was incorporated into the Russian Empire at various stages in the
second half of the nineteenth century25. At the time, the southern regions of Central
Asia - the areas of Uzbek settlement today - were divided into three pre-modern
types of political formations, the khanates of Khiva and Kokand and one emirate,
Bukhara. Kokand, which extended over large part of the Ferghana Valley had been
established in 1709 when it was carved out of the Bukharan emirate. After being
24Ulus refers to the allotment of territory in which Cingghis Khan's empire was divided following his
death.
25What is now northern Kazakhstan had come into contact with the Russian Empire since the early
eighteenth century.
abolished in 1876, it was annexed to the Turkestan Governatorate-General of the
Russian empire as part of the Ferghana oblast' (Soucek, 2000 p. 201-202). At the
same time Bukhara and Khiva continued their formally distinct existence as Russian
protectorates (Haugen, 2003 p.2), while losing sections of their territories, transferred
to the Syrdarya and Samarkand provinces of the Governatorate (Soucek, 2000 p.
202). Further adjustments were made at the easternmost edges of the Bukharan
emirate as well, which came to include most of contemporary Tajikistan, excluding
Badakhshan, annexed to the Ferghana province, and the area around Khujand,
divided between Ferghana and Samarkand (ibid.)
2.2. The Soviet formative period, from "national delimitation" to
independence (1924-1991)
The tumultuous period between the collapse of the Tsarist empire in the region
(1916) and the emergence of Soviet rule (1920) saw the Governatorate of Turkestan
being replaced by the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a sub-unit
of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1918 and Khiva (then renamed
Khorezm) and Bukhara being established as "People's Republics" in 1918 and 1920
respectively. Anti-Soviet resistence coalesced in the eastern areas of Central Asia
and particularly following the proclamation of a short-lived autonomous government
in Kokand in 1918 (abolished in 1919). Episodic insurgencies from the so-called
Basmachi (bandits) continued until the late 1920s26.
A comprehensive program of political and social re-organization of Central
Asia was then launched under the label of "national delimitation" (natsional'noe
razmezhevanie) in 1924, a date which constitutes a watershed in the modern history
of the region. The logic behind this process is followed by a discussion of how the
making of Soviet Central Asia was carried out in practice.
The Soviet Union embarked upon one of the greatest nation-building
enterprises in modern human history. This did not simply involve re-organizing
Central Asia in five Union Republics (which came to completion in 1936), but more
comprehensively it consisted of a complex process of categorization of the Soviet
people. The Soviet Union took form, Hirsch maintains (2005 p.312), "through a
26In this rather chaotic period of disintegration of political order and subsequent re-integration,
especially in Tashkent and the Ferghana Valley, see Buttino (2002).
39
process of double assimilation". The diverse population of the former Tsarist Empire
would develop into nations (corresponding to the official nationality categories), and
then later into a Soviet whole (the Soviet narod, greater than the sum of its parts27).
Though the final stage would be the merger or fusion (slianie) of all nations into a
unified Soviet people, this would be preceded by a coming together of nations
(,sblizhenie), where inequalities between nations would be eradicated and national
cultures allowed to flourish (Hirsch, 2005 p. 317-318). The language and rhetoric of
friendship of peoples (druzhba narodov) used by the Uzbek elites in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan builds on this Soviet theory of historical development.
The transformation of the state and by extension of the peoples that lived in
those territories, began with a complex categorization of all those populations. Key
to this was the concept of "ethnos" (Bromley, 1973; Kandiyoti, 2002 p.290). Ethnos
became the basic unit of ethnic classification (Hirsch, 2005 p.313). Ethnos was
defined as an "ethno-social formation with a complex of historical and cultural traits"
(Rudenko quoted in Hirsch, ibid.)28. Ethnoses evolved over time. At the earliest
possible stages of development were tribes (plemena): the tribe was the
"predominant form of ethnosocial organization for primitive social formations"
(Bromley quoted in Hirsch, ibid.). Narodnost was the form for "slave-owning feudal
formation", and the nation (natsionalnost) for "capitalist and socialist formations"
(ibid.).
According to the Soviet classification, Uzbeks fell in the more "developed"
category: that of nations {national'nosti). While it is beyond doubt that the ethnonym
Uzbek pre-existed the creation of the eponymous republic and that a (small) number
of inhabitants of what is roughly encompassed by Uzbekistan's borders perceived
themselves as Uzbek in the pre-Soviet era (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1996, p. 15-16;
Ilkhamov, 2003), at the time there was no widespread sense of Uzbek group
consciousness. The creation of such link between territory (whereupon Uzbek
statehood could be established) and (Uzbek national) identity constitutes one of the
most enduring examples of Soviet legacies. As Ilkhamov argues, "the formation of
Uzbek identity should be seen in close connection with the formation of the Uzbek
SSR" (2003 p.288). This process was multi-dimensional and comprised the
27Hirsch (2005 p.317).
280n Soviet ethnogenesis see Slezkine (1996).
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establishment and commitment to four forms of nationhood: national territories,
languages, elites, cultures. Framed in the language of national self-determination,
Soviet nation-building was compensatory with regard to non Russian nationalities, as
they were constructed as victims of "Great-Russian Chauvinism" during the Tsarist
era. While Terry Martin's thesis that the Soviet Union was an "affirmative action
empire" (2001 and 2002) can be shared with regard to titular groups, communities
enjoying an enhanced status within the national territory named after them, the thesis
deserves qualification when looking at national minorities, even if these belonged to
groups that had an alleged historical homeland within the Soviet state. In fact, while
Uzbeks occupied a privileged position in Soviet Uzbekistan, they played a secondary
role in the life of the republics where they found themselves. As Kamp argues,
Uzbeks "could expect access to positions and opportunities within Uzbekistan but
did not find doors opened wide within the larger boundaries of the Soviet Union"
(ibid., p. 273), not even if this meant next door, in Kyrgyzstan or to a minor extent
Tajikistan29.
As Francine Hirsch contends, the "national delimitation remains at the heart
of a debate about the nature of Soviet rule" (2000 p. 202). Its peculiarity lies in its
being at the same time a nation-making enterprise and an attempt to define "a new
(and presumably nonimperialistic) model of colonization" (ibid. p.202-203). The two
went hand in hand, Hirsch argues. Khorezm, Bukhara and the Turkestan ASSR were
abolished and replaced with national-territorial political formations, the Soviet
republics. Initially, the Uzbek and the Turkmen SSRs were established in 1924. At a
lower level in the Soviet hierarchical ethno-federal structure was the Kyrgyz
autonomous province (AO), part of the RSFSR (in 1925 renamed Kazakh
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, ASSR), the Kara-Kirgiz AO (later Kirgiz)
and the Tajik ASSR. The latter was established in the easternmost regions of the
territory of the UzSSR in 1924.
A first major border adjustment took place in 1929, when the Tajikistan
ASSR was detached from the UzSSR and upgraded to full republican status (SSR).
In that year it was agreed that 26,100 sq. km (and a population of around 250,000)
would be allocated to the Tajikistan SSR. This comprised what is now the
29I return to this qualification in the next section.
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Leninabad/Sughd province (then okrug) (Akiner, 2001: 15). The process entailed a
significant land swap with the area around Khujand in the western Ferghana Valley,
previously in Uzbekistan, becoming incorporated into the TaSSR. The reason for this
boundary change lay in the precarious existence of the Tajik Soviet republic,
otherwise comprising the remote and mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan province in
the Pamiri region and a few valleys in central Tajikistan, but no real urban and
industrial, or even cultural centre. Cities such as Samarkand and Bukhara as well as
the Surkhandarya region where Tajik/Persian culture was particularly concentrated
Of)
were left in Uzbekistan" . This sparked numerous controversies between intellectuals
and party officials in the two republics over territory and, more crucially, the cultural
heritage of the region (Akiner, 2001 p. 14; Haugen, 2003; Schoeberlein 1994; and
Masov, 1991 and 1995, for a view that sees in the national-delimitation an explicit
Soviet design to enhance the position of Uzbeks over that of Tajiks).
Similar - though less charged with symbolic attachment - was the
contestation of borders that accompanied the formation of the Kyrgyz ASSR in 1926
(previously Autonomous Province, AO). Uzbekistan SSR and Kyrgyz ASSR
advanced conflicting claims to sovereignty over sections of territory located in the
Ferghana Valley (Koichiev, 2003). In particular Uzbekistan laid claim to the city of
Osh and other settlements around the Aravan, Bazaar-Kurgan, and Ayim (Osh
volost') and others around Jalalabad volosts' (ibid., p. 50-56). Claims, through
petitions and letters to Moscow, were justified on both economic (the extent to which
the area was economically integrated to the surrounding territory) and ethnic (where
different census data were presented to support one group or another's demographic
majority) grounds (ibid.). Fragments of territory, and the peoples inhabiting them,
were transferred from one republic to the other, each time meeting fierce opposition
from the ceding side. Finally, a commission was set up in 1926 to settle these ethno-
territorial claims. In the end Uzbekistan's claim to Osh was rejected because of the
importance the city played at the economic and administrative level in southern
Kyrgyzstan (ibid., p.52). Under Uzbekistan's sovereignty fell also the enclaves of
Sox and Shax-i-Mardan, whereas Kyrgyzstan retained, among the others, the areas
around Aravan and Uch-Kurgan.
'"Samarkand was the first capital of the Uzbek SSR until it was demoted to the benefit of Tashkent in
1929.
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For the first thirty years of Soviet rule southern Kyrgyzstan experienced
continuous administrative re-organization, with the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions first
established as separate administrative units (okrug) in 1924, then merged in the Osh
okrug in 1928, only to be divided again in 1938. The situation stabilized in 1956 with
the creation of the Osh province (oblast') which extended over all of southern
Kyrgyzstan. The situation lasted until 1990, when the Jalal-Abad province was
established (Jones Luong, 2002 p. 77). The complex process of re-organization
started in 1924 was by and large complete in 1936 with the establishment of five
Union Republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan.
Much has been said about the rationale behind the national border
delimitation in Central Asia. Scholarship has divided between those arguing that the
mismatch between ethnic groups and borders in Central Asia was deliberate and led
by a "divide et impera" logic (Olcott, 1994; Roy, 1995) and those contending that
national delimitation was the product, not always fortunate, but as accurate as
possible, of Soviet ethnographers and officials who after years of field research
sought to create national territories which more or less reflected the reality on the
ground (Slezkine, 1994; Hirsch, 1997 and 2000; Megoran, 2002d). I do share the
view that Soviet national delimitation in Central Asia was not an arbitrary and
ruthless project aimed at dividing ethnic groups for mere power politics purposes.
Delimitation was not just super-imposed, but was a negotiated as well as contested
effort (Haugen, 2003). However, arbitrariness did play a role when it came to
deciding which groups be given titular status and which should instead be subsumed
in larger nations. Uzbeks, Turkmen and to some extent Kazakhs31 were recognized as
having reached a more advanced stage in the development of national consciousness.
Others, most notably Tajiks and Kyrgyz, were given official recognition as titular
and full-fledged nations only at a later stage, in 1929 (when the Tajik SSR was
established) and 1936 (year of creation of the Kyrgyz SSR).
The government organ responsible for shaping and controlling Soviet Central
Asia was not the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow or the
Communist Party of Turkestan, but the Central Asian Bureau of the Central
""initially mistakenly called "Kirghiz".
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Committee (SredazBureau, CAB hereafter), which existed from 1922 until 1934
(Keller, 2003, p.281, Haugen, 2003, p.3). As Keller argues, the CAB was never just a
tool for imposing Bolshevik will (Keller, 2003 p.282). Rather it was caught between
competing power interests in Moscow and in then Turkestan. Haugen (2003) goes
even further in arguing that not only was there a competition and negotiation of
interests between centre and periphery ("fostering national autonomy while never
allowing European Bolshevik control to slip", Keller, 2003, p.282), but that to some
extent it also corresponded to the national aspiration of the populations of the region.
The emergence of a national form of consciousness had perhaps reached a more
advanced stage in the case of Uzbeks on the eve of the establishment of Soviet rule
in the region. While it is beyond doubt that the ethnonym Uzbek pre-existed the
creation of the eponymous republic and that a (small) number of inhabitants of what
is roughly encompassed by Uzbekistan's borders perceived themselves as Uzbek in
the pre-Soviet era (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1996, p. 15-16; Ilkhamov, 2003), at the time
there was no widespread sense of Uzbek group consciousness. The creation of such
link between territory (whereupon Uzbek statehood could be established) and (Uzbek
national) identity constitutes one of the most enduring examples of Soviet legacy. As
Ilkhamov argues, "the formation of Uzbek identity should be seen in close
connection with the formation of the Uzbek SSR" (2003 p.288).
Soviet rule had a profound transformative effect on Central Asia, and on
Uzbeks in particular. Border-making was certainly fundamental stage in the creation
of modern Central Asia, although it would be impossible to understand how radical
its impact was without taking into account other distinct though related processes.
The first of these consisted of the use of census as a policy tool. Census in Central
Asia was never just about statistics. Deciding what categories were to disappear
between censuses was as important as determining which would remain and/or
emerge as new. While late Tsarist and early Soviet censuses showed that relatively
few peoples identified themselves as Uzbeks within the boundaries of what would
become Uzbekistan, the 1926 census became part of what Kipchaks, Lokays, but also
Tajiks and others regarded as a process of "Uzbekification" of Central Asia. Some
social groups such as the Sarts disappeared completely, as the category was deemed
unsuitable for census purposes - Sart not indicating any ethnic group, but rather
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urban dwellers. The role that Soviet authorities, institutions and ethnographers
played in defining the form and content of Uzbekness was crucial. Schoeberlein well
illustrates this by looking at how the creation of the Uzbekistan SSR introduced new
dynamics in the realm of identity, and generated a "spectacular explosion of the
number of people officially counted as Uzbeks" (1996 p. 15). According to 1915 data,
Samarkand's Tajiks represented 62% of the city's population, with Uzbeks and Sarts
accounting for just 1% (ibid., p. 20). By 1926 the number of Tajiks dropped to 10%
with Uzbeks increasing to 41%. As Schoeberlein emphasizes, this would amount to a
decrease of 82% for Tajiks and increase of 5,000% in the number of Uzbeks within
the same period of time (ibid.). Samarkand Tajiks are a case in point, but the process
applied to a whole range of other groups, within and outwith Uzbekistan. In
Tajikistan, in fact, groups such as Barlos and Lokays, among others, found
themselves subsumed within the larger and encompassing category of Uzbek
(Hirsch, 2000). An analogous process occurred with regard to Kipchaks in
Kyrgyzstan (Koichiev, 2003). Language became the criterion by which to distinguish
between groups (on gender, see below). This continued to present problems in areas
such as northern Tajikistan, Samarkand and Bukhara where the local population was
bilingual if not multilingual and where boundaries between Tajiks and Uzbeks
appeared particularly blurred.
Once the boundaries and therefore categories such as Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik,
had been set in place, their content had to be delineated. Though I do not argue that
these were "empty shells" in the early Soviet period, what the local population from
Osh, Khujand, Tashkent, and Andijan understood as "Uzbek" and how this
manifested itself in practice changed significantly. This made the standardization and
homogenization of Uzbekness necessary, with institutions such as theatres, curricula
at schools and folklore ensembles made available to create and reinforce Uzbekness.
What one should understand by Uzbek was in fact a top-down decision conforming
to (Soviet) ideological requirements. Ilkhamov notes that creating an Uzbek national
state, allocating adequate territory and securing an Uzbek majority among the
population was a "necessary but insufficient condition for forming a new Uzbek
identity" (2003 p.290).
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A second and equally critical factor that brought Uzbek identity into
existence was the process of othering, of setting up boundaries between Uzbeks and
non Uzbeks. This was performed by making women central to the process of Uzbek
nation-building (Kamp, 2002; Northrop, 2001 and 2004). The question of defining
the content of Uzbek identity was solved by defining who Uzbek women were.
"Women [...] became normative figures of each distinct nationality" (Northrop, 2001
p. 199), because they stood for the domains of family, home and spirituality, where
"the roots of cultural identity were taken to lie" (ibid.). In 1927 a campaign
("hujum", attack or onslaught) was launched by the Soviet authorities to eradicate
female seclusion and modernize the "backward nations" of Central Asia (ibid., p.
191). By so doing, Uzbek identity came to be defined "through its distinctive patterns
of gender relations and customs of female seclusion" (ibid., p. 192). Defining who
belonged to what nationality in border areas of mixed settlement (i.e. Osh) became
possible by looking at gender roles and family relations and the fact that a paranji as
opposed to other robes were worn.
The veil, or more precisely the paranji (a cotton robe with false sleeves) and
the chachvon (a mesh of woven horsehair hiding face and neck), became a symbol of
Uzbek identity. O'zbekchalar (Uzbek women) could be distinguished from Kazakh
or Turkmen women, for example, by their wearing the paranji. Uzbek, by extension,
in
were those men married to those Uzbek women . This process of othering between
women installed a sense of national consciousness that added a new dimension to an
already complex identity matrix, Northrop notes (ibid., p.203). The local population
did not stop to see itself as Muslim or women or men or Samarkandlik or Oshlik.
However, a "new component, that of the Uzbek nation" was added to their intricate
web of personal identity (ibid.). Though this goes beyond the focus of this study,
Soviet strategies backfired as the unveiling (and subsequent repression of those who
opposed to it) was met with widespread resistance by the population. Whether this
should be seen as a symbol of anti-Soviet resistance or as the persistence of
32Problems arose in areas of mixed Uzbek-Tajik settlement, where Tajik women also wore the paranji.
This was justified by referring to the fact that Tajik women not only did not know how to make their
own, but also wore them in predominantly Uzbek areas, where they bought them. This pointed to
Uzbek influence on Tajik society. Uzbek/Tajik distinctions did not present particular problems or
require urgent solutions as long as Tajikistan remained part of the Uzbek SSR (1929) (Northrop, 2001
p. 201).
46
patriarchal oppression is an object of scholarly debate (Northrop, 2001 and 2004 and
Kamp, 2002, for their respective positions).
A third dimension of nation-building is to be found in the indigenization
policy (korennizatsiya). The term "korennizatsiya", Terry Martin argues, was part of
the Soviet decolonizing rhetoric aimed at favouring the claims of indigenous peoples
over settlers (2001 p. 74). "Soviet policy systematically promoted the distinctive
national identity and national self-consciousness of its non-Russians populations"
(ibid.). This meant favouring the promotion of cadres belonging to the titular
nationality (after whom the republic was called), but also their national language
through the promotion of symbolic markers of identity, namely folklore, museums,
dress, food, literary works and historical events (ibid.). This resulted in the
Uzbekification of the Uzbek SSR and, similarly the Tajikification of Tajikistan, and
analogous processes in the contiguous republics. In Soviet times belonging to the
titular group was enshrined with privileges that non titular communities did not
benefit from. These manifested themselves in the fields of employment and career
opportunities and advancement in the administration, an informal quota system and
the establishment of institutions aimed at enhancing the position of the titular group.
As noted earlier in these pages, the national-delimitation process left sizeable
communities of co-ethnics within the borders of republics where they constituted
"minorities", rather than the titular and privileged group.
Inter-republican boundaries remained essentially transparent during the
Soviet period, and Uzbeks outside Uzbekistan performed "pilgrimages"33 to
Uzbekistan and by so doing they began to see themselves as Uzbeks (Kamp, 2002
p.264). Kamp observes that students, party members, government workers, came to
Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital, from the regions because studying in Tashkent
represented a channel to career advancement. Because of border transparency this
also meant that Uzbeks from border regions in the neighbouring countries (i.e. Osh,
Aravan, Kara-suu, Khujand, Penjikent, etc.) maintained closer links with Tashkent
than with their respective republican capitals. Parents were more likely to send their
children to receive Uzbek language education in Tashkent, rather than in the
33Kamp here borrows from Benedict Anderson's discussion of "pilgrimage of modern education" in
modern colonial systems, where "student-pilgrims" made their way through various school
institutions inward and upward from the periphery to the centre (Anderson, 1991).
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predominantly Tajik city of Dushanbe. Geography played its part too, as the two
mountain passes (Anzob and Ayni) make road transportation between northern ,
Tajikistan and the rest of the country impossible except for a few summer months.
Rail links were built in an awkward way, with the train leaving Leninabad in the
north reaching Dushanbe only two days and several border points later. In sum, while
each republic tended to promote the titular group and culture without much attention
being paid to national minorities unless they had their own federal institutions in
place, in practice members of nationalities settled in border regions could easily
receive education, work and have frequent ties with the neighbouring republic
(where co-ethnics lived) rather than interacting with the majority group. In other
words contacts between Osh and Andijan or Tashkent were as frequent (if not more
so) than those between Osh and Bishkek.
The second implication is that while Uzbeks occupied a privileged position in
Soviet Uzbekistan, they played a secondary role in the life of the republics where
they found themselves. In fact, as Kamp argues, Uzbeks "could expect access to
positions and opportunities within Uzbekistan but did not find doors opened wide
within the larger boundaries of the Soviet Union" (ibid., p. 273), not even if this
meant next door, in Kyrgyzstan or to a minor extent Tajikistan34. Because different
rules and practices applied outwith Uzbekistan, this suggests that in the end some
form of boundary existed between republics. Independence brought with it
significant change. If during the Soviet era "pilgrimages to Tashkent" represented a
relatively easy opportunity for Uzbek co-ethnics to escape to republics where other
groups were privileged, the establishment of five independent states in Central Asia
cut Uzbeks abroad off from this opportunity.
2.3. The Soviet demise and independence
In Soviet Central Asia Uzbeks represented the largest national group: about one in
three Central Asians (34%) declared Uzbek as his/her nationality in the 1989
census35. Uzbeks constituted the largest group in Uzbekistan (71.3%), and the largest
non titular community in Tajikistan (23.5%) and Turkmenistan (9%), and the second-
,JI return to this qualification in the next section.
35Vestnik Statistiki (10/1990). While not all the Central Asian republics have conducted new censuses,
the high birth rate of the Uzbek population suggests that the share might have increased.
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largest in Kazakhstan (2%) and Kyrgyzstan (12.9%), where they were outnumbered
by Russians and by the titular group (Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, respectively).
























Uzbekistan 19,810,077 14,142,475 71.3 24,430,192 18,959,577 78
Kazakhstan 16,464,464 332,017 2.0 14,953,126 370,663 2.4
Kyrgyzstan 4,257,755 550,096 12.9 4,822,938 664,953 13.8
Tajikistan 5,092,603 1,197,841 23.5 6,127,493 936,703 15.3





49,147,616 16,539,762 33.6 54,771,349 21,340,155 38.9
Elsewhere in
(F)SU
236,594,895 158,063 - - - -
Total 285,742,511 16,697,825 5.8 - - -
Source: Kazakhstan census data (1999), Tajikistan census (2000), Kyrgyzstan census (2000),
Turkmenistan census (1995) and Uzbekistan 2000 estimates.
The ethnic distribution in the Central Asian countries has changed
dramatically since independence (tables 2.1 and 2.2). Several factors have
contributed to this, including the outflow of European (Slav mainly) groups, the
migration of other smaller minority groups and especially the different growth rate of
some ethnic groups (e.g. Uzbeks and Tajiks having the highest in the region), and
state census policy. On the basis of the first census that four of the five countries
IT
have conducted after the Soviet collapse Uzbeks composed approximately 78% of
the population in Uzbekistan, 15.3% in Tajikistan, 13.8% in Kyrgyzstan, and 2.4% in
Kazakhstan and 9.2% Turkmenistan (table 2.2). In Uzbekistan Uzbeks are overall
equally distributed throughout the country, although the group's concentration
appears to be higher in the three Ferghana Valley provinces (Andijan, Namangan,
36Though there seems to be a certain degree of consensus on the percentage of the Uzbek population,
precise data on the exact number of Uzbek citizens living in the country are disputed. I rely on an
estimate derived from the percentage.
37Uzbekistan has not conducted one and I rely on estimates. This sets the country apart from the other
Central Asian republics, who have all conducted a post-independence census. One reason for this
could arguably lie in the purpose the post-independence census served in the other republics, namely
officially signalling the demographic dominance of the titular group, as in countries like Kazakhstan
and to a minor extent Kyrgyzstan these constituted either a plurality or a bare majority. Uzbekistan's
situation was remarkably different because Uzbeks have never faced the possibility of being
outnumbered by other ethnic groups.
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Ferghana), and the lowest in the autonomous region of Karakalpakstan (3% of
Uzbeks live there, which is still about 34% of the province population)48.
Table 2.2 Distribution of Uzbeks in Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia
Share over the overall Post-
Uzbek population in 1989 soviet
(%) period
(%)
Uzbekistan 85.5 88.85 (+)
Tajikistan 7.25 4.38 (-)
Kyrgyzstan 3.33 3.12 (-)
Kazakhstan 2.0 1.73 (-)
Turkmenistan 1.92 1.92 (=)
Total 100 100
Source: Natsional'nyi Sostav naseleniya (Soviet census 1989, in
Vestnik Statistiki, 10/90 to 7/91) and post-Soviet censuses of
Turkmenistan (1995), Kazakhstan (1999), Kyrgyzstan (1999),
and Tajikistan (2000).
The Ferghana Valley comprises just about 5% of the whole Central Asian region's
OQ
territory, but is home to 20% of the region's population . A few significant urban
centres aside, the region is home to a considerable rural population. Besides
Uzbekistani Uzbeks, nearly all Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks and a sizeable proportion of
Tajikistani Uzbeks are concentrated in the valley. 32% of Uzbekistani Uzbeks live in
the region (in the provinces of Ferghana, Namangan, and Andijan)40, Uzbeks in
Tajikistan are distributed more or less equally between Khatlon (35.2%) and Sughd
(38.1%), the remaining being settled in the central areas (districts under republic
subordination, mostly in the Hissar and Zarafshan valleys, and the capital
Dushanbe41).
Table 2.3. Ferghana Valley provinces - Composition by nationality
Uzbeks (%) Tajiks (%) Kyrgyz (%) Russians (%) Total (mln)
Uzbekistan 75.8 4.8 0.9 6.0 23.0
Ferghana
Valley
84.2 5.0 3.2 3.0 6.2
Andijan 85.0 1.4 4.2 3.9 2.0
Ferghana 83.6 5.5 2.1 4.9 2.4
Namangan 85.1 8.8 1.1 1.9 1.7
Tajikistan 24.8 68.4 1.3 3.2 5.9
FY - Sughd 31.3 56.9 1.2 6.5 1.8
38Ilkhamov (2003).
39Lubin and Rubin (1999).
40Ilkhamov (2003).
41NatsionaTnii sostav naseleniia Respubliki Tadzhikistan (2000).
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Kyrgyzstan 14.2 0.8 60.3 15.7 4.7
FV 26.7 1.6 73.5 2.7 2.4
Osh 28.0 2.1 63.8 2.4 1.5
Osh city 40.9 0.4 67.3 3.3 0.9
Jalalabat 24.5 0.6 29.1 n.a. 0.2
Source: Lubin and Rubin (1999 p.37).
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter has emphasised the centrality of the Soviet experience for the process of
Uzbek identity formation. As Ilkhamov correctly argues, the formation of Uzbek
identity should be viewed in close connection with the formation of the Uzbek SSR
(2003, p.288). The national delimitation process and the following nationality
policies defined the boundaries not just of the Uzbek SSR, but of Uzbek identity, as
well as its content. This process was multi-dimensional and involved border-making,
use of census, emphasis on language and gender, and indigenization policy.
Inter-republican boundaries, in particular, had a double effect. On the one
hand they existed only on paper and did not have a practical impact on the life of
people who could cross the border without today's hassles, send children to study in
Tashkent when living outside the Uzbekistan SSR or even embark on a career in the
Uzbekistan communist party. On the other hand living in one republic or another
mattered because Soviet authorites adopted what Martin has referred to as
affirmative action (2002), or positive discrimination in favour of titular groups. The
logical implication was that non titular groups did not enjoy analogous privileges. If
Uzbekistan was being Uzbekified in the Soviet period, likewise was Tajikistan or any
other Central Asian republic undergoing a similar process.
CHAPTER 3
A strategic-relational approach to Uzbek political mobilization
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This chapter outlines the theoretical framework used to investigate the dynamics of
Uzbek mobilization. Six (sets of) concepts lie at the core of this research: ethno-
political mobilization, collective identities, structural preconditions (the Soviet
legacies) and political opportunity structure (POS), mobilising and de-mobilizing
ideas, and the actor's strategic capacity. These represent the key analytical tools by
means of which I hereafter explain the dynamics of Uzbek political behaviour since
independence.
The chapter is structured as follows. First I define the concept of ethno-
political mobilization, and discuss competing definitions. The scope of the section is
to focus on a particular type of mobilization, that of ethnic minorities, as opposed to
national mobilization, that is of groups constituting the demographic majority in a
given region. While the contribution of cases on successful mobilization is beyond
question, and have been subject to thorough research, unsuccessful cases are far less
explored. This need not be so, as examples of the so-called "dogs that did not bark"
can shed light on the motivations of the agents as well as on the alternative strategies
used to voice demands. In the second section I critique the structuralist hegemony in
scholarship on ethno-political mobilization. While certainly providing valuable
insights into the internal dynamics of the environment within which the group
organizes and mobilizes, the political opportunity structure and the explanations built
around that concept (Eisinger, 1973; Kriesi, 2004; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1995) tend to
overshadow the value of ideational and agential explanations of political
mobilization. The group, the agent of mobilization, is rarely the subject of research
(Barany, 2002a and 2002b; Commercio, 2004, Smith and Wilson, 1997) rather than
an actor merely reacting to external stimuli. This study argues that a POS centred
approach is helpful in analysing contexts where the structure of political opportunity
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is shifting (opening) and therefore an intensification of mobilizational activities can
be expected, but its contribution is limited when the POS is closing, such as in the
Central Asian autocracies. Paying attention to structure only would induce one to
believe that a group has de-mobilized out of lack of opportunities. While structural
factors are undoubtedly important, as shown in chapters 4 and 5, it is only by looking
at the leaders' strategies, the frames used, and the way the rank and file relate to the
elites, that what initially appeared as mobilizational failure ("silent dog" or "dog that
did not bark") appears to be a case of the "master who would not hear".
A convincing theoretical framework which pays attention to agency and
ideas, as well as to structure is the strategic-relational approach (hereafter SRA),
which is outlined in the second section of this chapter. Originally conceptualised in
Bob Jessop's theory of the state (1990), and further developed by Colin Hay (2002),
the SRA offers a solid and dynamic framework which can be fruitfully applied to
explanations of Uzbek mobilization. Building on the contributions of Jessop and Hay
I propose a theoretical framework which emphasises the relational nature of
structural and agential factors; the strategically selective role of context, which both
enables and limits the options available to the agent; the strategic nature of agency,
and particularly that of political leadership in articulating frames, relating to the
wider population and interacting with the surrounding environment; and the role of
frames, particularly in mobilising and de-mobilizing ideas, as an interface between
structure and agency.
3.1. Defining ethno-political mobilization
Considering that the term political mobilization has been applied to a wide range of
political activities including riots, rebellions, demonstrations and electoral process,
Birgitta Nedelmann notes that the question of "conceptual stretching" has finally
affected mobilization (1987 p.185).
The origins of the concept can be traced back to the early 1960s, when Karl
Deutsch defined it as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic,
and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available
for new patterns of socialization and behaviour" (1961 p.494). According to Deutsch
mobilization is something occurring to "large numbers of people in areas which
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undergo modernization, i.e. where advanced non-traditional practices in culture,
technology, and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale"
(ibid., p.493). The concept, Deutsch continues, brackets together a series of processes
of change, among which is also "the need for new patterns of group affiliation and
new images of personal identity" (ibid.). In Deutsch's analysis, however, the
question of identity appears as a residual category - in particular modernization is
expected to make ethnic diversity irrelevant42. Deutsch's understanding is
predominantly economic. Mobilization is primarily seen as a function of indicators
such as (the expansion of) literacy, communications, voting participation, and per
capita income. Urbanization, commercialization and industrialization are necessary
preconditions for mobilization.
Karl Deutsch's economic approach to mobilization has been re-visited
through the years to take into account the importance of cultural factors and group
bonds in particular. According to Ragin's "ethnic re-active model" (1979 p.621),
ethnic mobilization is a consequence of a competition between ethnic groups over
roles and resources. Ragin maintains that no ethnic mobilization is likely to occur if
the groups are geographically and functionally separated (they occupy different
structural positions or economic niches). Equilibrium is disrupted by political and
economic modernization, which acts in two ways (ibid., p.622): on the one hand
modernization tends to reduce ethnic diversity, on the other it increases the
likelihood of large scale ethnic mobilization. Interdependence leads to resistance and
resistance develops around large scale identities. Ragin also suggests that individuals
possess multiple identities at once, and the one accorded primacy over others will be
used as basis for mobilization (ibid., p.623). What is interesting in Ragin's research
is the emphasis, later abandoned in mobilizations studies and only recently re¬
discovered with respect to intra-group variation among Russian diasporic
communities, on the level of variation of identity perceptions within the group itself
(see next section).
Deutsch's equation between mobilization and modernization has come under
increasing criticism in subsequent years. In fact, not only does the former not
42Walker Connor in his famous essay Nation-building or Nation-destroying? discusses thoroughly the
shortcomings and inconsistencies of Deutsch's teleological conception of identity and ethnic diversity
(1972).
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necessarily entail the latter (Etzioni, 1968 p.248-49), but what characterises
mobilization is not so much that it is a corollary of some other larger (macro) social
and/or economic process, but rather that it moves from a condition in which a social
unit is not in control of resources, to one where this control is somehow rapidly
achieved (ibid.)- Etzioni's critique to Deutsch contains two important additions to the
understanding of the mobilizational process: the change in the re-distribution of
power (from have-nots to haves) and the temporal dimension.
The centrality of power43, or the change in its distribution in a political
system, can hardly be overrated. Mobilization theory, Oberschall argues, refers "to
the process of forming crowds, groups, associations, and organization for the pursuit
of collective goals", [and] is concerned with how people with little individual power
collectively resist to organized groups that have a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo (1973 p. 102). Oberschall's definition entails an essentially confrontational
understanding of the term which tends to exclude all those activities that while
engaging the state are not confrontational with it. My understanding of mobilization
draws instead from Birgitta Nedelmann's sociological theory of mobilization (1987).
Nedelmann defines political mobilization as "the actors' effort to influence the
existing distribution of power" (1987 p.181). What is crucial here is that action in
this case comprises the actors' efforts to legitimise the existing distribution of power,
and also encompasses activities aiming to redistribute power or reshape the basis of
the power structure within a society.
Nedelmann identifies four key conceptual problems with the study of
mobilization (ibid., p. 183), which appear particularly pertinent to this study of Uzbek
ethnic mobilization: the identity of actors of mobilization; the direction of processes
of mobilization (which I discuss as part of actors' strategy); the definition of the
activities involved in mobilization efforts; and the theoretical framework within
which analysis of mobilization has been discussed. This chapter seeks to address
these problem areas in order to develop a distinctive approach to explaining Uzbek
political mobilization.
43I find Lukes's three-dimensional conception of power particularly useful, especially in his emphasis
(the "third dimension") on the control of the political agenda and the way some issues are kept out of
the political process (2005 p.25), which well applies to both the authoritarian tendencies of the Central
Asian elites as well as the attempts of the Uzbek leadership to achieve a hegemonic position within
the community.
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Before proceeding any further a terminological clarification is necessary here.
Ethnicity and nationality tend to be used interchangeably in the literature. This is not
surprising. Both nation and ethnic group, Conversi notes, refer to a group
characterised by common descent (2004a p.25). However, I do not distinguish
between the two on the basis of the degree of self-awareness achieved by the
members of the group (as instead Conversi, ibid., and Connor, 2004 do), but on the
basis of the "state-ness" question. A nation is therefore a group that has established a
separate political formation (typically, the state), whereas the ethnic group has not.
The degree of group identity is not in question here: nations are not superior to ethnic
groups. The difference between the two is political, not cultural. The two should not
be seen as incompatible or one as the natural evolution of the latter. The case of
Uzbeks well illustrates this. In this study I therefore refer to Uzbeks as an ethno-
national group, thereby including in the category both the Uzbek population
commonly referred to as the Uzbek nation (the group constituting Uzbekistan's
demographic majority) and those that are here referred to as Uzbek co-ethnics.
Hence, I refer to Uzbek ethnic identity or mobilization when speaking of Uzbek co-
ethnics, whereas by Uzbek national mobilization or identity I mean the analogous
process occurring in Uzbekistan. For the purpose of this study I then define ethno-
political mobilization as a form of mobilization where group identity [here, ethnic] is
used as a base for collective action (Esman, 1994 p.28; Olzak, 1983 p.355; Tilly,
1991 p.574).
3.2. Identities as explanans and identities as explanandum
Arguing that successful mobilization largely depends on the sense of common
belonging shared by the members of the group is nearly tautological (Giuliano,
2000). This is especially the case in respect of ethno-national mobilization, where
support for nationalism depends on the presence of a type of common identity and on
the strength of intra-group ties (Gorenburg, 2001 p.73). Identity, the "way
individuals think of themselves and their place in society" (Schoeberlein-Engel, 1994
p.l), contributes to defining the possible ranges of action. It does so in a strategically
selective way. As a matter of fact, not all identities are available at all times.
Identifying what identities are available, and especially which among them are more
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widely appropriated is therefore critical for understanding the path(s) actors would
choose and undertake when mobilizing.
Traditionally studies on identity(-ies) can be divided between those
considering identities as fixed and given (Geertz, 1973; Van Evera, 2001) and those
that see them as modern inventions (Gellner, 1983) or social constructs (Anderson,
1991). A more helpful categorization of approaches to identity formation is that of
Cole and Kandiyoti (2002 p. 189) who distinguish between studies of the material and
objective conditions for the rise of nationalism and those that look instead on how
collective consciousness emerges. This study falls within the second approach. What
matters here is not whether individuals meet some conditions (language, customs,
religion or else) that would allow them to be considered as "real" Uzbeks. The focus
of this study is not on the content of identity and of Uzbekness, but on the strength of
identity perceptions and how Uzbek ethnic identity emerges and is maintained. In
short, what is of interest here is not whether one is or is not Uzbek, but wheter one
perceives himself/herself as such.
The interest in identity and ethnicity and their impact on political
mobilization can be divided into two approaches: in the first identity constitutes the
dependent variable (the explanandum), whereas in the second it is one of the
explanatory variables of some other political phenomenon (the explanans). An
important insight of the first type of contribution (identity as explanandum) is the
emphasis on the variation, across groups and within groups of identity/-ies. The
question of the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics is a case
in point. Two important points should be noted with respect to this. One is the
importance of context in influencing which identity trajectory will dominate. In this
regard Pal Kolstp suggests that it would be more appropriate to speak about fourteen
diasporas rather than one (Russian) diaspora (2000). Kolstp has challenged the often
implicit assumption that a cross-border minority on account of being an in-between
category (divided territorially and culturally) might ipso facto become a bone of
inter-state contention. Evidence has demonstrated otherwise, and Kolsto argues that
diasporas should rather be seen as potential "bridge-builders" between different
polities and different levels of attachment (to a culture, or to a state or locale).
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A second point to be made regards intra-group variation, which has been
examined only very recently (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001; Gorenburg, 2001). Not
with one voice [Russians abroad speak], it is suggested (ibid.). The variation of
identity perception within the same ethno-national group represents a significant
contribution, considering the importance of the strength - perhaps even more than
the content - of identity as a pre-requisite for mobilization. This problematic has
been examined with regard to the Uzbek case. John Schoeberlein (1994, 1996) and
Laura Adams (1999a, 1999b) have discussed the formation of Uzbek national
identity and its internal heterogeneity and the many regional variations - some of
which despite the regime's claims can be considered separate regional identities.
Schoeberlein and Adams scratch the surface of the fapade of unity and look at the
plurality of identities. Adams locates the current national ideology of the Uzbek state
along a continuum where Soviet schemas are still used to frame national identity
(and national ideology, 1999a and 1999b). The content of or the emphasis on specific
elements of Uzbekness might have changed in the post-independence era, Adams
contends, but the modes by which national identity is portrayed and conveyed remain
in many respects Soviet in form. Schoeberlein instead discusses the way identities at
different levels (national, supra-national, sub-national, and local) are perceived and
constructed from a bottom-up perspective. Despite traditions of multiplicity and
overlapping identities, post-Soviet Central Asian regimes have by and large
continued the Soviet policy of homogenizing plurality and eradicating diversity. The
extent to which this policy has proved successful is tested empirically in the next
chapter.
Identity has also been investigated from a more instrumental point of view.
Research on cross-border communities in the former Soviet space (Bremmer, 1994;
Gorenburg, 1999, 2003; Kolstp, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001; Melvin, 1995 and 2000;
Smith and Wilson, 1997) has looked at the link between identity formation and
political mobilization, with particular attention paid to the security implications at
state or a regional level (Horsman, 1999b), the process of state-building and centre-
regions relations (Cummings, 2000), border disputes and inter-state relations
(Megoran, 2002d). Identity formation has been insightfully discussed within a neo-
institutionalist perspective from an increasing number of scholars interested in
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understanding how the ethno-federal structure of the Soviet Union impacted upon
nation-building among the various populations across the former Soviet space44.
Building on the shortcomings of "old structuralism" in predicting and explaining
change, the new institutionalist agenda has made transformation and political change
a primary concern (Peters, 1999; March and Olsen, 1996). The focus on identities
and institutions as agents of change reflects this shift. In his study of minority
mobilization among non-Russian communities in the Russian Federation Gorenburg
seeks to address two key questions: how minority mobilization has developed as a
political force, and how Soviet ethnic institutions affected the preference of the
actors, shaped the message in search of popular support, the form that mobilization
took, and the reaction from both elites and masses (2003: xi). Gorenburg argues that
institutional explanations account for variations across cases (he discusses four:
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, and Khakassia). Gorenburg challenges the
view that political elites can kindle ethnic grievances and mobilize the masses at
command. Rather it is cultural elites who spread the nationalist message from within
urban intellectual settings to rural areas. Political elites, at least in the early stages of
the mobilizational process, remain either passive or hostile. The importance of
institutions in shaping identities is not restricted to the post-Soviet space, of course.
Andre Lecours combines elitist and institutionalist explanations to account for the
emergence of national, regional, and local identities in Belgium (2001). He sees
institutional development and change as a crucial variable leading to the formation of
a territorial identity in that country (ibid., p.52). Institutions, Lecours contends (ibid.,
p.53), shape - both directly and indirectly - territorial identities by "fixing, altering,
or creating the boundaries of political communities".
3.3. The context of mobilization
Chandra's observation that identities have traditionally been treated as exogenous
(2004), fixed and unchanging variables particularly applicable to a large majority of
studies on mobilization, and especially to those adopting a structural approach, the
hegemonic paradigm in the field (Barany, 1998, 2002a and 2002b; Commercio,
44
On new institutionalism see Laitin (1998), Martin (2002), Suny and Martin (2001), and Slezkine
(1994).
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2003; Gorenburg, 1999, 2001, 2003; McAdam et al, 1996; Smith and Wilson, 1997,
Olzak, 1983; Tarrow, 1991 and 1998; Tarrow et al., 2001).
While the process of identity formation of the group in question certainly
matters, for those scholars the concept of political opportunity structure (POS)
constitutes the key pillar upon which the framework is built45. The concept of
political opportunity structure was first introduced by Peter Eisinger in his discussion
of the conditions under which revolts are more likely to occur (Eisinger, 1973 and
Tarrow, 1991 p. 14). According to Eisinger the political environment imposes
constraints on political action and/or facilitates it. The political opportunity structure
(POS) refers to the:
"dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure"
(Tarrow, 1996 p.41).
Tarrow points to the state's policies as a crucial factor in expanding or contracting
political opportunities for action. "States set the boundaries of this interaction by
defining the boundaries of the permissible; [...] by facilitating one group of
insurgents and repressing another; and by sometimes co-opting protesters, sometimes
pre-empting their demands, and -more rarely- giving up the ghost" (ibid.). The
importance of the state is beyond question, as it sets the stage for subsequent action,
and by conceptualising and implementing policies defines the limits of what is
legitimate and what is not (although this does not determine what is possible and
impossible). Tarrow offers a categorization of the conditions under which
opportunities are more likely to expand or contract (ibid., p. 15):
opening up of access to participation (relative openness or closure of the
institutionalized political system);
shiftings in ruling alignments;
the availability of influential allies (within the elite circle);
and the presence of cleavages within and among elites.
45A different type of structural factor is represented by the Soviet legacy, which constitutes the
background context to post-Soviet mobilization. The significance of the Soviet experience has been
discussed in chapters 1 (briefly) and 2 and its role in shaping Uzbek mobilization will be discussed
further in the next chapter.
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The main argument of this model is that mobilization occurs when changes (an
opening of the opportunity structure) render the political system more vulnerable or
receptive to challenge (Tarrow, 1991 p.8). Though I do not dispute the general
usefulness of the POS approach, I find its insights more applicable to polyarchies
than to authoritarian settings. The concept of POS is helpful to explain what happens
when a window of opportunity opens in the system, i.e. when the system is either
liberalising or collapsing. In cases where the system is either closed or semi-closed,
the heuristic usefulness of the POS is more limited.
This study departs from the POS approach in two main ways. First it critiques
the state-centric nature of the political opportunity structure. While this may be
appropriate to explaining state-based movements such as those concerning civil
rights or environmentalist issues in western settings, the heuristic potential is much
diminished when one tries to apply it to authoritarian settings and also to instances of
trans-nationalism and diaspora, as well as the specific case of co-ethnics. The four
dimensions of POS are all state-based and implicitly assume a clear inside-outside
divide between the domestic political process and the international environment.
A particularly successful attempt to combine different levels of analysis (state
and sub-state) as well as the dynamics interplay between different fields of action, is
that of Rogers Brubaker (1996). Brubaker's "triadic nexus" refers to the interplay
between the national minority, the host state, and the external homeland. With states
such as the Soviet successor republics undergoing comprehensive redefinition of
ideas of state and nation and with millions of stranded individuals on the "wrong"
side of the border with kins elsewhere, a state-oriented approach such as the POS is
of limited use. Horsman's (1999b) research on the interplay between inside and
outside in Central Asia suggests the POS should open up to include (f)actors that go
beyond the state, namely sub-state actors (ethnic communities). In this study I
propose it should include the role of the kin state (the alleged external homeland).
Naturally I do not assume it to play a critical role in the mobilizational process of a
minority group at all times. This has to be verified empirically.
Scholars have recently attempted to go beyond the inherent staticity of the
POS model. Tarrow correctly notes that political opportunity structures are
preconditions for action, but these are opportunities, and as such they need to be
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seized. In other words, context might not exert a deterministic influence over
conduct. What this approach suggests is that between structure and individual agency
operate "organizations" (vehicles of mobilization) through which groups seek to
mobilize. McCarthy (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996 p.3) defines mobilizing
structures as "the collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which
people mobilize and engage in collective action". McCarthy seeks to map different
organizational structures and relates them to different contexts (countries) and
different outcomes.
What counts as a mobilising structure has been an object of controversy
between two opposing approaches, with formally structured and instutionalised
organizations and loose movements with less rigid hierarchical structure at opposite
ends of an imaginary spectrum. Where parties are allowed to compete more or less
freely, present and challenge programs, formulate strategies, and have any chance to
win office, then an approach as the one conceived by Nettl (1967), with the exclusive
emphasis on parties as main political actors, would be adequate. Some contexts do
not allow for political organizations to compete freely for office or to challenge the
established regime. Spaces for independent political action can be narrow and hardly
any political action can be carried out without the knowledge, let alone the approval,
of the authorities. Ethnically-based political parties (parties whose membership is
based on ethnic criteria and whose agenda consists primarily of defending and
advancing the interests of a particular ethnic community), are banned in all the
Central Asian countries. In such cases, it might be preferable to shift attention away
from formal party structures, and look instead at other types of organizations that
may be available, typically the national-cultural centres. These are no marginal
phenomenon. Before the Soviet collapse nationalist movements originated within the
ranks of small intellectual circles and culture/language revivalist movements (i.e.
Birlik in Uzbekistan). Studies on nationalist mobilization have (Beissinger, 2002;
Gorenburg, 2003) underscored the role as initiators or agitators played by cultural
revivalist movements in the early stages of mobilization. These groups, originally
founded by small circles of intellectuals, campaigned in favour of language rights
and native language education.
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At the same time one should look at cultural centres with circumspection.
Because they are the most visible actors - often the only ones - or they have access
to authorities, does not make them the only intermediaries between the authorities
and the group. Nor are they necessarily perceived as legitimate actors by the
community itself. However, looking at their structure, their membership, leadership
and strategy offers a particularly interesting vantage point on the way the group
leaders relate with both the wider community and the state. By looking at national-
cultural centres, it is possible to learn more about the group and its programmes and
strategies. Noting that ethno-political mobilization has surprisingly received scant
attention in the field of ethnic politics studies (2002 p.278), Barany argues that
learning more about the mobilising group helps in assessing its chances for
successful mobilization. Comparing organizational structures, their adaptations to
changing context, their goals and strategies appears a particularly insightful
approach for accounting for variations in effects and influence on policies, as studies
on Roma in Eastern Europe have shown (Barany, 2002a and 2002b; Vermeersch,
2002). The choice activists make regarding the form the movement will take is
undoubtedly important. In this respect McCarthy notes that despite the large range of
organizational forms available to activists, they tend to adopt those more familiar to
them (1996 p.148).
3.4. Cultural framing and the role of ideas
The study of cultural framing (Snow et ah, 1986; Zald, 1996;) represents a refreshing
alternative to the structuralist hegemony, and privileges the "strategic framing of
injustice and grievances, their causes, motivations, and associated templates for
collective action" (Zald, 1996 p.261) over the political opportunity structure. The
rediscovery of the importance of cognitive factors can be ascribed partly to the
eponymous turn in social psychology in the 1970s. Goffman's work on the impact of
changes in socio-psychological context on (possibilities for) behaviour (1974) has
opened up a new way of approaching and investigating political behaviour and
participation. Snow (Snow et al, 1986) has drawn on Goffman and further elaborated
the concept of framing ("generation and diffusion by movement actors of mobilising
and counter-mobilising ideas and meanings", Snow and Benford, 1992) in a way that
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has allowed us to understand how processes of interpretation, classification and
characterization occur on both the individual and collective level.
The contribution of this perspective has been extremely valuable because it
seeks to bridge an overtly structural approach with an emphasis on social
psychological factors and investigates the alignment between individual and
movement interpretative schemas. Borrowing on Goffman's concept of framing
(1974), the proponents of this theoretical framework attempt to identify the link (the
frame alignment) between individual and collective interpretative orientations (Snow
et al., 1986 p.464). Zald critically suggests that the relationship between framing and
movements/political behaviour should not be imagined as uni-linear, but as
recursive, with frames structuring social action, and being structured by it (Zald,
1996 p.269).
Peter Vermeersch has applied the concept of framing to the study of ethnic
mobilization of the Roma population in Central Europe (2001). Vermeersch sees
ethnic mobilization as a crucial dimension of ethnic identity that deeply affects the
self-definition of the group and its boundaries (ibid., p. 16). He does not enter the
discussion of "what Roma identity is" (content of identity), but rather focuses on "the
process of how this ethnic identity functions as a cognitive frame for political
mobilization" (instrumental use of identity). Vermeersch's contributions are many-
fold. A first major insight from the broadly defined ideational approach is a
conception of the relation between social identification and collective action as a
two-way relationship. Identification constitutes the basis for collective action by
structurally defining the available range of identity options (since collective action
presupposed a shared identity among the members of the group). At the same time it
is structured by action. In other words, collective action feeds back into the structure,
by re-defining the boundaries between actors, and by creating and re-creating new
senses of belonging. A second contribution to be found in Vermeersch's research is
the discursive approach to ethnic mobilization. What is important is how the key
political actors construct ethnic identity in public discourse. The Central Asian
countries constitute a particularly interesting case to compare and contrast the use of
identity labels in the public discourse (do authorities refer to Uzbeks or Russias as
diasporas, and what are the consequences that should be drawn from this) with the
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self-categorization of ethno-national groups (how do Uzbeks think of themselves,
also with regard to the state of residence?).
Studies on national mobilization have emphasized how, for a movement to be
successful, "it is not enough for it to acquire organizational resources and a cadre of
dedicated activists" (Gorenburg, 2003 p. 11). In fact, while a focus on resources
(identities, grievances, demands) and structural constraints (environmental factors,
domestic and external institutional actors) may be sufficient to explain the emergence
or absence of a national movement (Ukudeeva-Freeman, 2003 p.99), it does not
provide convincing evidence to make sense of variations in levels of mobilization
across and within cases. What needs to be taken into account is first the extent to
which the movement (or its leadership) is able to create an idea or set of ideas among
its target population that it has been subject of past injustices, or that taking part in
the movement is worthwhile because of future positive payouts; second, the extent to
which the interpretation of ideas, perceptions and beliefs (frames) would resonate
across the group Frames can be defined as:
"interpretive schemes that condense and simplify a person's experience by selectively highlighting
and encoding certain situations, objects, events and experiences" (Gorenburg, 2003 p.l 1).
Scholars of framing theory have pointed to the fact that for political action to take
place, a previous change in ideas and frames has to take place. A change in action in
other words is preceded by a change in ideas. For an ideational change to manifest
itself, though, it is necessary that the set of ideas, perceptions or beliefs is articulated,
generally -though not exclusively - from movement leaders (who frame a question)
and make it resonate across the rest of the group. At that stage framing serves two
main purposes (Gorenburg, 2003):
to convince potential followers that their situation is intolerable;
and that political action can change their situation for the better, and that
participation in the movement is the most effective way of bringing about
such a change.
Drawing on the contributions of social movement research and from collective
action framing theory in particular, Jamilya Ukudeeva-Freeman has convincingly
developed the concept of a "mobilising idea" as a useful analytical tool to explore the
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extent to which an idea or a set of ideas are shared by members of a group, who are
then ready to mobilize around that very same idea. Given that the presence of
grievances or the opening of an opportunity in the structural context does not per se
generate political action, the leader has "to present a concept, vision, or an idea, that
resonates among the people and gets people to be sympathetic with the movement
goals" (2003 p.99). A mobilizing idea can be defined as:
"...an action-oriented set of beliefs that unifies people around itself for a common goal. [It] inspires
people for action, legitimates leaders' actions, and expresses conviction about how things should be",
(ibid.)
A mobilizing idea, Ukudeeva-Freeman continues, is both an action plan and also a
solution to problems (which makes it similar to Gorenburg's understanding of
cultural frames). The movement would be over, she contends, when leaders can no
longer recruit people because their ideas and goals do not resonate with them. The
case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks also shows, however, that the end of a movement is nigh
when a leader is perceived (by the rest of the group) to be articulating the idea
instrumentally, for his own ambitions and interests, rather than in the interests of the
group.
In this study I also seek to take the study of the development of core ideas among
potential mobilizers further through the concept of a de-mobilizing idea. By de¬
mobilizing idea I refer to:
a set of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes which shape the direction of mobilization towards
integration with the institutions and other groups of the country of residence, de facto going against
the commonly held expectation that political mobilization is in its own nature confrontational with
authorities.
The concept of a de-mobilizing idea emphasises how ideas and frames are
quintessentially relational. The same set of beliefs can simultaneously act as a
powerful "mobilizer" in one direction, and demobilize the very same group in a
different respect. The case of Islam and the relation between religion and nationality
experienced by the Uzbek population well illustrates this: on the one hand Islam
constitutes a potentially powerful mobilizing idea (as religion), and on the other it
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represents a constraining force for mobilization along national lines (as anti-national
or supra-national ideology). As Ukudeeva-Freeman, Schatz and Gorenburg have
shown in their research, these visions (mobilizing ideas) do not come out of nowhere.
Because they need to be popularized among the target population, they need to be
familiar to resonate (especially if mobilization aims to be a short term rather than a
longer term project). "To be successful, nationalist leaders had to frame their
demands in language and imagery that could resonate with the population"
(Gorenburg, 2003 p. 12). This means fully taking into account the legacy of seventy
and more years of Soviet political order which, throughout the twentieth century,
"decisively molded the perceptions, beliefs, and identities of minority ethnic group
members" (ibid.). The potentially successful nationalist leaders would be those who
crafted their message in a way to (cor)respond to the political ideas of the population.
This study explores the type of frames which throughout the post-independence
period have emerged in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and seeks to determine which
among those have been consolidated among the members of the group. It also
highlights how Uzbeks themselves have framed their own situation and their position
in the newly established polity. The following questions are therefore discussed:
What type of (mobilizing) ideas are developed by the Kyrgyzstani/Tajikistani
and Uzbek leadership? What types of repertoires offrames are available to
Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani Uzbeks?
How are they received? Are they appropriated by and do they resonate across
the larger Uzbek community?
3.5. Agents of mobilization: The elites and the masses
Frames do not emerge spontaneously, but require some degree of human agency, that
of elites actors who, because of their status or position in the political system, have
the material as well as ideational resources to frame a particular condition and
mobilise the wider community. With respect to ethno-political mobilization in the
former Soviet space, the role of elites as ethnic entrepreneurs - elite actors that frame
a grievance or demand in ethnic terms and mobilize the community around it - has
received particular attention by Melvin (1995, and 2001), Laitin (1998), Treisman
(1997), Tsypanov (2001), and Hale (2000), and Hechter (1975). Overall it seems that
67
scholarship concerned with other geographical areas has been more attentive to
organizations rather than individual actors as agents of mobilization.
Agency here refers to political action, and can be defined as "the ability or
capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to attempt to realise his or
her intentions" (Hay, 2002 p.94). As Hay observes, agency is a multi-dimensional
concept, and encompasses both individual and collective actors. I therefore adopt
here an inclusive definition of agency, which comprises both leaders and elites, as
well as the organization itself, here understood as the "collective vehicles, formal and
informal, through which people mobilise" (McCarthy, 1996 p.346), and the rank and
file, those whom the leaders are supposed to mobilise. This should take into account
both the role of leaders and the role of the followers.
The question of how structure and agency relate is one of the most debated
issues in political science and eventually boils down to the collective action problem.
"[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests" (Olson, 1971 p.2). In these terms, collective action and hence group
mobilization appear a mirage. After the publication of Mancur Olson's Logic of
collective action (1971), several authors, including Olson himself, have suggested
possible ways to overcoming the problem of collective action (of which free-riding is
but one) and of the provision/securing of the collective good, most notably selective
incentives (Olson, 1982; Frohlich and and Oppenheimer, 1975). Among the most
important contributions coming from intentional ism is the reminder that individual
behaviour is not entirely the product of social structures. Agents have interests,
preferences, motives, goals, and strategies to achieve them. Individuals can choose. It
is the extent of choice that is disputed. Overall, as it will be argued in the coming
section, it seems "implausible either that individuals are fully autonomous or that
their actions are determined completely by social structure" (ibid. p.83). The
intentionalist model has emphasised the role of political entrepreneurs, who for
personal gain, profit, or whatever other reason co-ordinate collective action. This
research does not share the view of individuals as motivated by self-interest and
46However, McCarthy tends to consider collective actors as mere mobilizing structures rather than
actors in their own right.
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capable of ranking outcomes, acting rationally and with emotional detachment
(Ward, 1995 p.79), but considers beliefs and perceptions as of critical importance
when it comes to making sense of the actors' behaviour. The question of the
collective action issue poses a particularly crucial problem for the study of
mobilization: the question of agency, which appears completely overshadowed by
context in mobilization studies.
Mark Beissinger notes that the vast majority of studies on nationalism are
essentially "teleological" (2002 p.9), relying on structural explanations. The
possibility of an agential explanation of nationalist mobilization has been largely
neglected. Or, as Beissinger puts it: "the ideas that identities could be defined in the
context of agency or that nationalism is both a structured and structuring
phenomenon has not received sufficient attention" (my italics). Discussing Miroslav
Hroch's work and tripartite division of nationalist mobilization in nineteenth century
Europe, Beissinger notes how the process from stage B (emergence of nationalist
elites) to phase C (mass movements) is largely ignored47. Beissinger is among the
few scholars dealing with nationalist mobilization who pay attention to
epistemological and ontological questions. Moreover, in spite of both instrumentalist
and primordialists on the one hand (for whom action follows from structurally pre¬
determined identities and interests), and constructivists on the other (with their
attention to the discursive processes of identity construction) have not "interrogated
the ways in which collective action itself may be constitutive of nationhood" (ibid,
p. 11). The view of nationalism as both a cause and product of action (ibid.) is a
major contribution from Beissinger, and opens new ways of looking at nationalist
mobilization beyond the view of structural lenses.
Closely related to the question of agency is the question of leadership. There
is a good degree of overlap between the categories of elites and leaders. Leaders are
generally part of the elite group. What distinguishes them is the fact that elites are
defined by their being in a position to influence the political process, whereas leaders
are actually key strategic decision-makers. In Barany's work (1998) leadership
comes into play as a triggering factor of mobilization. The importance of a leader is
hard to overestimate, notes Barany (ibid. p.310-11). In fact, a leader can determine
47 Phase A consists of cultural revivalism within intellectual circles (Hroch, 1985).
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the success or failure of the nationalist organization. Barany observes how a leader
might emerge from a formal process of selection, or alternatively be naturally
selected because of academic qualifications, social standing, or economic position,
(ibid.) Drawing on Breuilly, he points to the crucial role of the leader, which is to
"forge links with a population hitherto uninvolved in politics" (ibid.). March and
Olsen identify two possible roles for leaders: the broker and the educator (1984
p.739). A broker "provides information, [and] identifies possible coalitions" (ibid.) in
practice the role involves a process of coalition-building (ibid.)48. Alternatively a
leader operates as "educator", expected to manipulate worldviews, redefine meanings
and stimulate commitments (ibid.)49. Barany sees leadership as an indispensable
component for groups if they are to to make credible claims (2002a p.284).
3.6. What counts as mobilization? A "non-event" approach
In his seminal work on nationalist mobilization in the late Soviet period Mark
Beissinger considers both successes and failures of nationalist mobilization (2002),
though he primarily discusses the former. Anomalous or mis-predicted cases (ibid,
p.203 and 222) include unpredicted successful mobilization (i.e. Abkhaz, Gagauz,
Bashkir, Tuvans, and Turkmen), but also the failures, examples of groups expected
to mobilise that actually did not (i.e. Belarusians, Uzbeks and Volga Tatars).
Beissinger distinguishes between five types of political mobilization
according to the outcome of the mobilizational effort: irrelevancy; failure of action;
failure of mobilizational effect; mobilizational failure, but issue success; and
mobilizational success (205). In the case of irrelevancy, a nationalistic frame is
never contemplated, whereas in cases of failure it might be desirable, albeit
impossible. In order to establish whether a particular frame is actually successful,
Beissinger distinguishes between mobilizational success ("the wide resonance of
nationalist action within society"), issue success ("adoption of movement aims as
basis for state policy"), and political success ("gaining control over the state") (ibid.,
p.204).
48The capacity of the leader to build broad coalitions is equally important. The case of Roma in
Eastern Europe shows that a clear obstacle to a movement's success lies, along with a lack of leader,
in intra-elite competition and rifts as well.
49March and Olsen note that this view is more in line with the new institutionalist approach (1984
p.739).
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Alongside the five possible outcomes outlined by Beissinger, a sixth case is
also possible: de-mobilization. Discussing the policies of the authoritarian junta in
Chile during the 1970s, Karen Bremmer (1980) is among the few theorists that
concentrate on de-mobilization as a main object of study, rather than as a default
category. De-mobilization can be defined as the process through which subordinate
groups lose their capacity to pursue collective goals (ibid., p.276). Bremmer's
contribution is important as she focuses on authoritarian contexts (Latin America)
and does not assume mobilization as a one way irreversible process. Bremmer
correctly notes the mutability of participation, organization and consciousness within
a given group and contends that sudden shifts from passivity to activity (or vice
versa) occur in response to changing political conditions (ibid.). The study of de¬
mobilization is important as it underscores two important dimensions: social control
(Lustick, 2002), as operated by the state attempting to restrict channels of political
participation, and the costs of such an operation. De-mobilization is actually a
double-edged sword. Built on policies of repression and coercion by the Chilean
junta, one aim of the de-mobilizing strategy lies in eliminating potential sources of
political opposition. This, however, is just one side of the coin, Bremmer observes
(ibid., p.293-94). De-mobilization carries significant costs as well. The regime's base
of support is thereby narrowed and opportunities for channelling and
institutionalising political control limited (ibid., p.296). This can potentially lead to
further alienation and further resistance from the excluded or marginalised groups.
Where de-mobilization might appear as deliberate state policy to control opposition,
in the long term a by-product can potentially be increased mobilization and
instability.
Mobilization is more likely to occur in times of opening political
opportunities, as POS theorists argue. This lead a large number of authors to analyse
waves (Tarrow, 1998), cycles of protests (Tilly, 1991) and tides of nationalist
mobilization (Beissinger, 2002) as manifestations of mobilization. This is one way
(the most common) of approaching forms ofmobilization. It is also possible to focus
on a quiet politics of nationalism, opposed to a "noisy" one (Beissinger, 2002 p.26),
which focuses on a low volume voice as a channel for its demands and grievances,
and it is on this type ofmobilization that this research concentrates.
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Kathleen Collins defines this form of ethno-national mobilization as a "non
event" (2003 p. 172). Though perhaps the term non event may appear too stark and
suggest a lack of action and passivity, on the other hand it captures a form of
mobilization that escapes the traditional quantitative analysis of mobilization,
thereby requiring a different theoretical and methodological framework. Lack of
barking does not imply total inertia. Quite the contrary, perhaps more useful
activities are performed far from the centre of the political stage. Hence, a study of
authoritarian regimes can give important insights into what the dynamics of political
participation and mobilization are when opportunity structures are narrow or subject
to strong institutional constraints. It is in such circumstances that it appears more
useful to explore the everyday, routine, manifestations and practices of political
behaviour rather than focusing on exceptional events or more conventional
expressions of political mobilization. Of course I do not dispute the significance of
events or contentious episodes, such as the June 1990 Osh-Uzgen clashes in
Kyrgyzstan, or the 1992-97 civil war and the failed incursion of the former
Tajikistani Army Commander Mahmud Khudoyberdiev in 1997 in northern
Tajikistan. However, I find a focus on the strategies and forms of Uzbek mobilization
more suitable than a study of events and episodes.
On a methodological level one should note the limited insights that can be
drawn from electoral politics in semi-closed societies. Studies of voting patterns
among national minorities in East Central Europe (Hungarians, Roma, Russians,
Turks), and among non-Russian communities in the Russian Federation have built on
vast amounts of data, i.e. opinion polls, election surveys, and especially voting
patterns and electoral politics. This is not feasible in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (and
these represent no exception in the post-Soviet landscape). In fact, ethnically-based
political parties are not permitted in those countries, and minority groups have to
look at other forms of political organizations (cultural associations, as noted) to
channel their demands. The fact that in any case this might be one of the few, if not
the only official mobilising structure available in some polities calls for an inclusive
understanding of what constitutes a political organization. The practical difficulties
involved in collecting data on the topic deserve a further mention. This is due to both
the irregular nature of the publications in the region (missing issues, suspended
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publications), but also the politically sensitive nature of the topic (inter-ethnic
relations) that is less amenable to public discussion50.
3.7. A strategic-relational approach (SRA) to ethno-political mobilization
Explanations of ethno-political mobilization have rarely addressed the structure and
agency problem, though by relying on structural or agential explanatory variables
they have indirectly and implicitly touched on the problem. Mark Beissinger's study
of Nationalist Mobilization and the Soviet Collapse (2002) constitutes the most
notable exception to this. Beissinger draws from the "morphogenetic approach"
(MGA), as developed by Margaret Archer (1988 and 1996). One of the main
strengths of Archer's MGA lies in the importance it confers to ideational factors in
explaining social life. Culture becomes a meta-theoretical concept alongside
structure and agency. The concept of "sequencing" (temporality) occupies an equally
important place in the framework and is of course central to Beissinger's argument
on the tides of nationalism and the demonstrative effect that successful tides had on
other movements. Additionally, time does not appear as a medium through which
events take place, but as an important variable (McAnulla, 1998 p.8). "Structures, as
emergent entities are not only irreducible to people, they pre-exist them, and people
are not puppets of structures because they have their own emergent properties which
mean they either reproduce or transform social structures rather than create them"
(Archer, quoted in McAnulla, ibid.).According to the MGA structure and agency
should be seen as irreducible to one another and operating at different moments in
time.
This study builds on Beissinger's approach, but seeks to develop a strategic-
relational approach (SRA) to ethno-political mobilization. Building on Bob Jessop's
theory of the state where he seeks to overcome state-centred and societal
explanations of the state (1990, 2001) the SRA has been further developed by Colin
Hay (1995, 2002) into a comprehensive approach to political analysis. Conceived
within a critical realist ontology, the SRA argues for a dialectical understanding of
structure and agency. In other words, "layers of structure act to condition agency by
defining the range of strategies which might be deployed by agents in the attempt to
50See the methodological appendix for more on this.
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realise their intentions" (McAnulla, 1998 p.4). The strategic-relational approach
represents the most convincing explanatory framework conceived to go beyond the
dualism of structural and agential explanations in political analysis. Two concepts
appear crucial to the approach and also to the framework which I adopt to make
sense of Uzbek political mobilization: strategic action and the strategic selectivity of
context (Hay, 2002 p.127)51. Through the SRA Hay makes three main contributions
that advance our understanding of political processes. First, he contends that the
distinction between structure and agency is purely analytical. In contrast to Archer's
MGA which purports an ontological distinction between the two, Hay argues that not
only the two do exist simultaneously, but that they are in fact empirically interwoven.
This means, for example, that whether some process or actor is structure or agency
depends on one's vantage point, or better on what one is seeking to explain. This is
particularly relevant to explaining the dynamics of political transformation in Central
Asia. If, for example, one is searching for explanations of divergent trajectories of
authoritarianism given a similar regional context, a president's leadership would
appear as example of political agency reacting to and interacting with the context.
However, as is the case here, when one seeks to make sense of ethnic mobilization,
presidential leadership appears as a critical dimension of the context which enables
or constrains Uzbek political action. Though it is the choices of Akaev and
Rakhmonov that alter the political opportunity structure, from the perspectives of the
Uzbek community this in practice acts as structural change.
Second, if their existence is at the same time simultaneous and relational
(they are mutually constitutive), there is no need to emphasise the temporal
dimension in the same way as Archer or Beissinger do. Certainly the MGA suits
Beissinger better as he is interested in an event analysis of protests and
demonstrations across space (the whole former Soviet territory) and time (1986-
1991). However, given the different circumstances within which Uzbek mobilization
unfolds time does not appear as central to the explanatory framework. This does not
mean diminishing the importance of time. Time matters, because what appears as
structure at one time is a product of the transformative or reproductive effect of
previous action.
slHay uses context and structure, and conduct and agency interchangeably, and so does this study.
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The third contribution, which Hay actually shares with the MGA, relates to
the effects of conduct, particularly the feedback into structure. Here, action can yield
two distinct effects: it can either transform or reproduce context, generating change
(or what Archer calls morphogenesis) or maintain or even reinforce structure
(morphostasis). Again, this is particularly applicable to making sense of Uzbek
mobilization which is not necessarily directed at altering the context, but at
maintaining the status quo (preventing change). How does this take place? Here two
key concepts are of fundamental explanatory value: strategic action and strategically
selective context. Let us start with the latter. Context, or structure, is strategically
selective in that it favours certain strategies over others as a means to realise
intentions or preferences. As Hay notes, not all outcomes are possible in any given
situation, which means that context defines the range of possible strategies available
to the agent. It does not, however, determine conduct and ultimately the outcome.
"Outcomes", Hay observes, "are structurally undetermined" (2002 p. 129). This bears
resemblance to the political opportunity structure where opportunities need to be
recognised in order to be seized. Actors have preferences, beliefs and intentions, and
are "are presumed to be strategic, [...] capable of devising and revising means to
realise them" (ibid., p. 130). Actors are not just strategic, but are also reflexive, and
learn and adapt their behaviour on the basis of both the outcome of previous action
and perceptions (awareness) of context, in terms of the constraints and opportunities
this imposes. Actors, on the basis of the available knowledge (correct or incorrect,
tendentially incomplete), formulate their strategies and strive to overcome the
constraints posed by the context or to take the opportunities provided by context
itself. One note of caution is necessary. Strategic capacity or strategic selectivity
should not be equated with rational choice. As Hay clarifies, strategy involves:
"the selection of objectives and the search for the most appropriate means to achieve those
objectives within a particular context at a particular moment in time" (Hay, 1995 p. 190).
James Jasper makes the distinction between a strategic approach and rational choice
theory even clearer. Jasper rejects "[...] any kind of rationality independent of
cultural and institutional contexts [...] All of their factors'] intentions,
understandings, and actions are filtered through cultural and psychological lenses"
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(2004 p.6). It follows that if ''structured arenas shape players, players' decisions, and
the outcomes of interactions", one should not "assume effects without looking at the
choices made", choices that emerge from the "full panoply of goals, meanings, and
feelings" that actors have (ibid.).
Jasper also emphasises that strategic choices have to be made by someone,
hence the attention here to ethno-political entrepreneurs in the role of leaders, whom
Morris and Staggenborg define as "strategic decision-makers who inspire and
organize others to participate to social and political movements" in shaping the
group's strategy and the course of political action (2004). Scholarship on post-
communist Eurasia has dedicated increasing attention to the choices of elites. Less
explored is the extent to which leadership matters to the dynamics of collective
mobilization in the cases of marginal groups, such as ethno-national communities
who find themselves in newly established polities. A noteworthy exception to the
dearth of research available on the role leadership plays in the mobilization of
marginal groups is Zoltan Barany's comparative research into Roma "ethnic
mobilization without pre-requisites" in Central and Eastern Europe (1998; 2002a and
2002b). In order to understand mobilization and the causes for its success or failure,
it is important to "learn more about the mobilizing group itself'. An indispensable
element to the credibility of a group's political claim is the "availability of a pool of
leaders who enjoy some measure of authority in the ethnic community, who are
capable of furnishing the group with some organizational form" (Barany, 2002a
p.71-72).
Operationalising the SRA
It is now time to turn the theoretical concepts outlined above into operational ones.
The key dependent variable is Uzbek ethno-political mobilization, particularly the
forms and strategies adopted by Uzbek actors. The research proceeds thematically,
building on an analytical distinction between the concepts of structure, frames and
agency. As noted by Hay, this does not imply that one should also expect the various
factors to be empirically distinct as well. In practice they are intertwined, and feed
into each other. For purposes of analytical clarity, however, they are examined
separately.
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Structure. First, context is taken into consideration. Here I distinguish between
background and proximate factors, both in terms of the historical development of
such factors (when they take place) and of how swiftly they can change. The
background factors comprise what is generally referred to as the "Soviet legacy".
However, because this is not an easily measurable concept, I opted for operating a
practical distinction between the political, economic, and cultural realms. By so
doing, I hope the impact of each will be more easily observable. Furthermore, I also
chose to adopt the plural form, and hereafter refer to the structural pre-conditions as
"Soviet legacies". The different types of Soviet legacies are discussed with reference
to the ethnic mobilization literature. With regard to the political legacies the thesis
that the establishments of ethno-federal institutions constituted a crucial resource for
mobilization (Cornell, 2002; Gorenburg, 2003; Hale, 2000) will be subject to
scrutiny. Institutionalised autonomy has played a major role in the mobilizational
process during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet era. This section also introduces
the post-Soviet political developments in the two countries under investigation, thus
bridging between Soviet (chapter 2) and post-Soviet periods (chapter 4 and
following). Here the following questions are examined: What type of institutional
legacies did Uzbeks living in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan inherited from the Soviet
period? Did they benefit from institutionalised forms of autonomy? Does this make
mobilization more or less likely?
A discussion of economic factors highlights the extent to which Soviet
economic specialization and command economy have left a distorted effect on the
region's economic system. I do not enter here into the discussion of the legacy of
cotton monoculture and the distortions that this caused on Central Asian economies,
but look at how the areas of Uzbek settlement fit within the respective state
economic system. Building on literature on the economic causes of ethnic
mobilization, the section aims to establish whether, given that under Soviet times,
southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan gravitated around Uzbekistan's
economy, this is still the case. Scholars like Henry Hale (2000) view relative
economic wealth (compared to other areas in the polity) as a resource that can be
used to mobilize the population. The extent to which this may still be the case, but
also the level of development (or underdevelopment) will show whether insights
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from the literature on economic causes of ethnic mobilization are applicable to the
two cases. The indicators such as the degree of urbanization, share of women in
labour force and gross regional product are chosen here to measure a particular
region's level of development. While these indicators are far from flawless , they
are expected to show whether one region, that of high Uzbek concentration can be
considered as economically developed or backward.
Finally, the cultural legacy is explored. This is done by looking at the extent
to which seventy and more years of Soviet rule and nationality policies have
managed to create an Uzbek national consciousness or whether other forms of
identities are available. I do agree with most of the scholarship on Central Asia (and
in fact, similar opinions were voiced by local respondents as well) that identities are
contextual, overlapping, and changing. At the same time, I also believe that it is
possible for someone to identify a primary form of self-identification, and to choose
between a pool of identities. This should not be seen as a mechanistic exercise, but
rather to assess the robustness of a particular type of identity - here, ethnic - over
others. A discussion of the Soviet legacies does certainly not end here. In fact, the
importance of the Soviet experience permeates the whole study. This applies to
discussions of the role of agency, where leaders often adopt a language which is
rooted in the Soviet experience (socialist internationalism, inter-ethnic friendship,
cooperation with the state), as well as of ideas, where the choice of frames used to
mobilize (or de-mobilize) the population can only be understood if contextualised in
the language of the Soviet nationality policies (i.e. the rejection of a diasporic
identity because of the importance that concept of indigenousness had in Soviet
times for the way a group could be conceptualised and its implications in terms of
status, prestige and resources in the Soviet hierarchy of peoples).
Having delineated the background context, proximate structural factors are
examined. These can be distinguished from the former (structural pre-conditions) in
two ways. First, they take place in the post-Soviet period and, second, they can vary
more swiftly than the structural pre-conditions. The second dimension of the context
52I am aware that controlling for region is not the same as controlling for ethnicity, but the paucity of
data on the topic did not allow otherwise. Because Uzbeks are spatially concentrated in some areas,
one expects that the level of economic development of a region will give a good sense of the
economic conditions of the areas where the Uzbek populations live.
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is referred to here as the political opportunity structure. This cluster of factors
comprises two separate dimensions: the kin state (Uzbekistan) and the state of
residence of the Uzbek community. I discuss both by adopting a similar format,
comparing official policies and elite views with perspectives from below. First the
state of residence is taken into account. Here a whole range of policies is considered,
covering citizenship laws, language, census, media, and political organization. By
looking at these, it will be possible to understand the margins of autonomous
political action available to Uzbeks in both countries. A key factor that will also be
considered is that of the agency of the state leaders (Askar Akaev, who dominated
Kyrgyzstani politics from 1990 to 2005, and Rakhmonov, in power since 1994).
What matters is to determine how (and if, at all) they made a difference in shaping
the political environment in their respective countries. Finally, though by no means
less important, are the attitudes and perceptions of Uzbeks themselves. The
perceptions of effectiveness of various institutions in dealing with Uzbek issues are
discussed, as well as the questions deemed as most important for the Uzbek
community. I then discuss Uzbekistan's relations with Uzbek co-ethnics abroad by
examining state ideology and official documents in Uzbekistan as well as the
perspectives of Uzbekistani Uzbeks. Moving onto the other side of the border I look
at the attitudes of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan towards Uzbekistan.
Frames. Frames, here understood as a particular set of ideas, beliefs, and perceptions
that are used to mobilize the wider Uzbek community, are inevitably linked to
structure because, as Ukudeeva-Freeman notes (2003), a successful frame is more
likely to resonate with the population when it is familiar. Familiarity in this case
relates back to the Soviet period, as findings in chapter 6 show. This of course does
not prevent new frames from emerging (i.e. more nationalist ones), but that requires
an intensive work of frame construction by a particular actor. Here I am interested in
identifying what types of perceptions, attitudes, or beliefs are articulated and resonate
across the Uzbek population in order to explore identify the trajectory of Uzbek
mobilization. The creation of frames emphasising integration and accommodation is
expected to lead to a different type of attitude of the Uzbek community compared to
a situation where more antagonistic frames are developed, namely secession.
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Agency. Finally, political agency is examined. Following Hay (2002), I discuss both
individual and collective actors. This means taking into account the identity,
behaviour and choices of individual elite actors within the Uzbek community as well
as the organizations that act as vehicles for mobilization. First I discuss collective
actors: the organizations established to promote Uzbek interests, their agenda and
structure. Second, I move to individual actors, most notably the Uzbek elites. Their
identity, as well as thei relationship with both state authorities and potential
followers, as well as their tactics to pursue those ties, are explored. Their strategy is
outlined and discussed. The second part of chapter 7 moves beyond the elites, and
drawing on Gorenburg's work on ethnic minority mobilization in the Russian
Federation (2003) aims to examine the attitudes and beliefs of the rank and file. The
goal there is understand the extent to which elites and grassroots relate to each other.
Ordinary Uzbeks will be asked about their views of their leaders, the extent to which
they share their agenda and strategies, as well as their perceptions of state policy.




The scope of this chapter is to explore how the Soviet experience has shaped the
environment within which Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani Uzbeks have found
themselves following the Soviet demise. It examines what appear to be structural
preconditions, or the long-term structural context (as opposed to the short-term one,
such as the political opportunity structure, examined in chapter 5) which refer to
those resources over which the individual has no control at the moment of action.
The chapter is structured thematically and covers political, economic, and cultural
legacies.
Section I builds on chapter 2 and looks at the political implications of the
Soviet nationality policies in terms of the creation of resources for mobilization. In
particular it looks at the presence (or absence) of ethnic institutions set in place to
promote Uzbek identity. By doing so, the section provides an introduction to
contemporary developments in Uzbek ethnopolitics in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. Section II engages the literature on economic deprivation and argues that
the two cases, marked by constant economic underdevelopment (Southern
Kyrgyzstan) and economic decline (Sughd), ask for the qualification of economic
theories of ethnic mobilization. The chapter argues that regardless of a region's
initial position vis-a-vis the centre in terms of relative wealth or relative deprivation,
mobilization is expected to occur when the spiral of change in the region's economic
conditions turns downwards. In essence the chapter suggests that economic issues
have not played a great role in Uzbek mobilizational dynamics and explanations
should be sought elsewhere. It goes without saying that economic development can
be measured in different ways. In transitional societies this is likely to generate
controversies over the indicators and the methodologies adopted. In this respect I
share Kandiyoti's critique of the applicability of standard quantitative forms of
measurement of poverty to post-Soviet Central Asia (1999). Additionally the paucity
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of data and the question of comparability thereof across countries should be
considered as well. On this basis I opted for assessing the level of economic
development according to the following indicators: degree of urbanization (given the
centrality of urban centres to Soviet mode of development this should constitute a
reliable indicator of economic development), percentage of women in the
country/area's labour force and variations in gross regional product compared across
time and across regions.
Finally, section III shows that despite expectations of a resurgence of ethnic
identities following the Soviet collapse, ethnicity has been but one of the main
identities adopted by the Uzbek community. However important - as it certainly is -
for self-identification, the chapter argues that Uzbeks have accommodated their
ethnic identity with other forms of state, supra-state and sub-state identities, without
necessarily adopting one in an exclusive way. Additionally strength in group identity
(here, ethnic) and internal cohesion (attachment to ethnicity spread evenly across the
community) are essential factors for mobilization to occur. A caveat is necessary
here. Constructivist theories, which inform my approach to the study of identities, do
not regard them as given or fixed, but rather as fluid, multiple and overlapping. What
is presented in the following should therefore be seen as a series of portraits rather
than photographs mirroring the complexities of Uzbek self-perception. At the same
time because identities change this does not mean that the extent to which individuals
identify with them cannot be empirically grasped and measured. As a consequence
one should not infer from the following discussion a desire to reify processes of
identity formation, but rather an attempt to compare the degree of attachment to
particular types of loyalties.
4.1. Political legacies
The early 1990s did not seem to bode well for inter-ethnic relations in Central Asia.
The 1990 clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern Kyrgyzstani towns of
Osh and Uzgen3i, following other riots in Ferghana between Uzbeks and Meskhetian
Turks, and in Dushanbe between the local population and Armenian refugees from
the South Caucasus seemed to announce a season of bloody ethnic conflicts in the
53For a full account of the clashes see Tishkov (1995).
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region. Fortunately enough, this did not materialise, and the root causes of unrest
periodically occurring in the Ferghana Valley were primarily social and economic
(Tishkov, 1995). Whether or not Uzbek grievances will erupt is a question that has
defined the discourse over the role of Uzbek communities on the Kyrgyzstani side of
the Ferghana Valley (Khamidov 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; ICG 2001b,
2002a; Lubin and Rubin, 1999; Tabyshalieva et al., 1998).
4.1.1. Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan
The 1990 conflict has defined inter-ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan for the following
decade and beyond. Seeking to understand the Osh conflict and its implications
cannot transcend exploring the dynamics of Kyrgyzstani politics in the Soviet era.
Pauline Jones Luong has convincingly shown how "regional identities, regionally-
based actors, preferences, and conceptualizations of power and power relations"
characterised Soviet Kyrgyzstani politics (2002 p.2). Regionalism, Jones Luong
argues (ibid. p.56) manifested itself in two key ways: the development of regional -
as opposed to national - social movements and political organizations, and the power
struggle between regional and central elites. In Kyrgyzstan two parallel types of
competition took place: inter-regional, between northern and southern factions, and
intra-regional, between northern groups (ibid. p.76). Regional divisions were
reinforced by Soviet policies of economic specialization (with an industrial north and
an agricultural south) and cadre recruitment policies. This led to competition
between regional elites for the control of the centre and in return the dependency of
the centre on the periphery. In line with the logic of Soviet nationality policy the
titular group, Kyrgyz from various clans and regions, "competed for dominance"
(ibid. p.81). However, Kyrgyzstan was also home to dozens of ethnic groups some of
which like Russians in the north and Uzbeks in the south, were particularly sizeable,
and these came to expect shares in political and economic rewards in return for
support (ibid., see table 4.1). Uzbeks, Jones Luong observes, traditionally occupied
key places in the agriculture and water ministries, (ibid.). If on the one hand Soviet
authorities fostered inter-regional political conflict, they also made regional
solidarity possible, particularly in the south where Uzbeks and Kyrgyz shared not
83
only cultural traits, but also political and economic interests, such as limiting the
dominance of northern groups.
These commonalities did not prevent the outbreak of riots between Uzbeks
and Kyrgyz in the southern Kyrgyzstani towns of Osh and Uzgen in June 1990.
Towards the end of the 1980s a conjuncture of socio-economic crisis, decreasing
living standards, and political destabilization, led to the eruption of inter-group
tensions over the competition for resources (land lots), lack of housing and control
over power structures (Tishkov, 1995 p. 135). Mass riots broke out on 4th June and
were "extinguished" on 10th June 1990 only after armed forces intervened and a state
of emergency was declared in the republic (ibid.). The possible triggering factors
indicated as causes of the riot are multiple, including the KGB's covert role, links
between political factions and mafia-like economic groups. Perceptions of losses in
both socio-economic status, and in political influences resulting from the political
changes (related to the distribution of political positions between regional clans) '
probably played a bigger role as triggers for conflict (ibid.). One should also note the
absence of organized movements implicated in the preparation or unfolding of events
although loose and informal organizations were indeed agitating and inflaming
spirits (most notably "Osh Aimagy" - Osh Land - among Kyrgyz, and "Adolat" -
Justice - among Uzbeks). While the conflict had essentially socio-economic causes, it
manifested itself along ethnic lines, and demands started to take ethnic tones,
including requests for recognizing Uzbek as official language or even a request for
annexation of parts of territory to Uzbekistan (Spector, 2004 p.6).
What is certain is that, regardless of the real or imagined causes, the Osh
conflict left long-lasting scars among the local population, as is discussed in chapter
6. The Osh conflict inevitably brought to the attention of political elites the centrality
of inter-ethnic stability for the viability of the country. It also provided a window of
opportunity for a political outsider and compromise candidate to emerge as president
in October 1990: Askar Akaev. For large part of the post-independence period, and
certainly in the early years of his presidency, Akaev managed to build a broad
coalition, engaged in political and economic liberalization and was attentive to the
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demands of ethnic minorities, who felt under threat from nationalist organizations, on
which Akaev himself also depended54.
Table 4.1. Ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan
1926 1926 1959 1959 1989 1989 1999 (no.) 1999
(no.) (%) (no.) (%) (no.) (%) (%)
Kyrgyz 668,700 66.8 836,800 40.5 2,229,663 52.4 3128144 64.9
Russians 116,800 11.8 23,600 30.2 916,558 21.5 603198 12.5
Uzbeks 106,300 10.6 218,900 10.6 550,096 12.9 664953 13.8
Ukrainians 64,200 6.4 137,000 6.6 108,027 2.5 50441 1.0
Germans 4,300 0.4 39,900 1.9 101,309 2.4 21472 0.4
Tatars 4,900 0.5 56,300 2.7 70,068 1.6 45439 0.9
Uighurs 8,200 0.8 13,800 0.7 37,318 0.9 46733 1.0
Kazakhs 1,700 0.2 20,100 1.0 36,928 0.9 42657 0.9
Dungans 6,000 0.6 11,100 0.5 36, 779 0.9 51766 1.1
Tajiks 7,000 0.7 15,200 0.7 33,518 0.8 42636 0.9
Other 13,600 1.4 93,400 4.5 137,491 3.2 125499 2.6
TOTAL 1,001,700 100.0 2,066,100 100.0 4,257,755 100.0 4822938 100.0
Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kirgizskoi SSR (1982), quoted in Huskey (1997 p.247); Naselenie Kirgizskoi
Respubliki 1999 (Komitetpo Statistikoi 2000); Elebayeva, Abazov and Omuraliev (2000 p.307).
Akaev managed to defuse tensions and maintained a careful balance between
factions, ethnic groups and clans. In return for his role as guarantor of ethnic peace
he could count on the loyalty of minority groups, Uzbeks among them, which
manifested itself in both parliamentary and presidential elections. Though still
supportive of the Akaev regime, Uzbeks have grown increasingly discontented at the
lack of representation in governing bodies and the lack of response to cultural
demands (Spector, 2004 p. 12). A turn to authoritarian practices since 1993, Clearly
evident from 1994-1995, marked the changing of Akaev from outsider (and
reformer) to "insider" (ibid., p.19), interested in the consolidation of power and
relying on increasingly narrower power bases. Overall, the most visible legacy is
represented by the memory of the 1990 conflict (its salience will be examined in
more depth in chapter 6). In addition, one also notes that because Uzbeks already
enjoyed titular status in the Uzbek SSR, they were not given territorial autonomy in
4This paradox is illustrated by the emphasis given by Kyrgyzstani authorities to both Manas as
historical figure and hero of the Kyrgyz people and the inclusive concept of "Kyrgyzstan our common
home", which implies a non ethnic substratum in state ideology (Megoran, 2002d).
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the Soviet era. This has severely hampered the pool of resources on which Uzbeks
could have drawn to mobilize. There is an established consensus in the literature on
ethnic mobilization on the critical importance that ethnic institutions played as
resource for minority mobilization in the late Soviet and post-Soviet era (Adams,
1999a; Beissinger, 2002; Gorenburg, 2003; Hirsch, 2005; Roeder, 1991; Slezkine,
1994). Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks lacked such institutions which would guarantee acess to
a whole range of resources, including the presence of national cadres. While Uzbeks
could none the less enjoy cultural rights as individuals, they became politically
marginalized by the titular nation. As the section has shown, regional competition
has defined Kyrgyz politics in the Soviet era - and has continued to do so after
independence. Lacking institutions or clan affiliations, it has increasingly become
very difficult for Uzbeks to enter the Kyrgyz(stani) political game.
4.1.2. Uzbeks in Tajikistan
Uzbeks constitute the largest non Tajik group in Tajikistan (ca. 15-25%55, see table
4.2) and the largest settlement of Uzbeks in post-Soviet Central Asia outside
Uzbekistan. Shirin Akiner suggests that the enthonym Uzbek should be seen as an
umbrella term, and not as indicative of a cohesive community (2001 p.9). According
to Akiner (ibid.) it is possible to identify four clusters of Uzbek presence in
Tajikistan. Uzbeks living in the north of the country (Sughd province, formerly
Leninabad) constitute a fairly homogenous population who have traditionally
integrated with Tajik communities to the point that many among them refuse a clear-
cut distinction56. In the rest of the country the picture is more fragmented. Uzbeks in
the south-west (Khatlon province, formerly Kulyab and Qurghonteppa) are the
descendants of the first wave of invasion of Turkic tribes from the mid-sixth century
onwards. These are distinct from those living in the centre-west of Tajikistan. Until
recently semi-nomadic, the origins of these Uzbeks lie in the second wave of Turkic
cn
invasion before the thirteenth century. Finally, Lokays (or Lakays ) are located near
Hissar and Kulyab. Whether or not they can actually be considered Uzbek is a matter
of dispute. In most cases, they are not, whereas between Uzbeks and state institutions
5
Depending on the census considered (see chapter 5).
56As shown in chapter 4.
"^'Both spellings are commonly used in the literature.
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there are endless quarrels on whether Lakay should be considered a category in its
CO
own right in the census . Despite all this internal heterogeneity - remindful of the
regional differences of Uzbekistani Uzbeks, as explored by Adams (1999a) and
Schoeberlein (1996) - "[t]he Tajik population now tends to regard all Uzbeks,
whatever their origin, as one people", Akiner contends (ibid.), though recent state
policy favouring groups previously categorized as Uzbek to opt for Barlos, Lokay or
others, seems to suggest otherwise59.
In order to understand the dynamics of Uzbek mobilization in post-Soviet
Tajikistan it is important to emphasise three main processes that have defined
modern Tajikistan: the way the country emerged from the national-delimitation
process (1924-36), the pattern of centre-regions relations and the implications thereof
for elite recruitment and resource allocation, and finally the 1992-1997 civil war that
left the country on the brink of institutional and societal collapse.
The national-delimitation process played a defining role in shaping today's
Tajikistan. Not only did it define the boundaries which have remained unchanged
since 1929 - when the country's status changed from ASSR to SSR. It also
constituted the only experience Tajikistan had as a national-territorial state. The
creation of Soviet Tajikistan was not void of problems. Quite the contrary: the
decision to include strongly Uzbekified areas such as the western Ferghana Valley,
but to leave cities like Bukhara and Samarkand within Uzbekistan were highly
controversial and ultimately made Tajikistan an "incomplete country", strongly
dependent on its stronger western neighbour, and Russia. Soviet Tajikistan was a
country with a village as capital - though Dushanbe soon became a cosmopolitan
city - comprising regions that were at very best loosely interconnected with each
other and with no clear idea of what being Tajik meant.
Second, centre-regional relations were defined not just by inter-regional
competition, but by the unofficial regional stratification that assigned Leninabad a
hegemonic role. Though one should be careful not to reify regions as if they were
58In fact many Uzbek respondents have lamented the fact that during the recent 2000 census
Tajikistani authorities have promoted Lokay self-identification and the sense of distinctiveness of
Lokays from Uzbeks. This would have increased the proportion of Lokays and decreased that of
Uzbeks proper. Census figures, as in all other Central Asian states, are vehemently contested by
minority groups as they are seen as an instrument of state authorities.
590n census as tool of state policy see chapter 5.
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discrete units, regionalism and competition between regional factions for influence
and resources became defining elements in the making of modern Tajikistan. That
the Leninabad elite played a pivotal role in Soviet Tajikistan can hardly be disputed.
This could be ascribed to economic, socio-cultural and geographic reasons, including
the fact that the region was the only industrialized area in an otherwise rural or
inhospitable land. Its geographic location, integrated in the Ferghana Valley region
and with Uzbekistan, made Tajikistan's economic system viable, though in the end
the country depended on Moscow's subsidies. The north was also culturally more
exposed to contacts with Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union, compared to the
more provincial areas in the south. Sizeable Uzbek settlements in the north made co¬
operation between Uzbekistan's and Tajikistan's elite somewhat easier. There has
been a tendency among scholars, especially within Tajikistan, to exaggerate
Leninabad's influence, thereby contributing to the exacerbation of regional tensions
and ultimately assigning blame for the start of the civil war (Khudonazar, 1995;
Gretsky, 199560). By contrast, Akiner questions the dominant view that Ueninabadis
held exclusive power in Soviet times (2001 p. 19). Akiner maintains that while
political life was dominated by the north from the 1940s (particularly since 1946,
with Bobojon Ghafurov's ascent as party first secretary) until 1992, the other
provinces were also represented, with the only exception of the Kulyabis,
systematically marginalized in the country's political life and system of resource
allocation. Pamiris, Gharmis, Russians, and Uzbeks could be found in positions of
influence (ibid.). Even towards the end of the Soviet era when nationalist sentiments
became to emerge and occasional clashes sparked (i.e. Isfara with Kyrgyz over water
allocation, in Dushanbe against alleged Armenian refugees over housing, and in
Ganchi between Uzbeks and Tajiks), the position of minority groups was rarely
threatened. Muriel Atkin observes in fact that "the late Soviet regime in Tajikistan
made several conciliatory gestures towards the republic's Uzbek minority" (1997
p.299). Bookstores offering Uzbek language publications were opened in the south of
the country, a new Uzbek weekly launched - alongside two other newspapers already
publishing in Uzbek language and Uzbek broadcasts on the radio. Schools provided
Uzbek-language tuition in areas of compact Uzbek settlement (ibid.).
^This also emerged from interviews with the historians Kamoluddin Abdullayev and Rahim Masov in
Dushanbe, August 2003
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This positive environment, alongside Leninabad's traditional close links with
Tashkent, explain Uzbek behaviour in the third process that left an indelible scar in
Tajikistan's social fabric: the civil war (1992-97) The roots of the civil war are
complex and multi-faceted, and a monocausal explanation fails to capture the
different dynamics operating at different levels. Several cleavages divided Tajik
society and factions organised around them: regional and geographic, of course, but
also ideological (between Islamic and democratic factions and more Sovietized
ones), urban/rural. Though the war never took ethnic tones, it was also about
defining what being Tajik meant. However, a critical reason for the outbreak of
hostilities lay in the failure of government and opposition to moderate and
accommodate their respective demands. The conflict manifested itself in the form of
a challenge from previously excluded factions and Gretsky (1995), in particular, is
adamant that Soviet Tajikistan remained for large part of its history deprived of
autonomous agency as it acted as Tashkent's appendix through the action of the
Leninabadi faction. In their explanations Gretsky (1995) and Khudonazar (1995)
ascribe a destabilising role to the Leninabadi faction and by extension to Uzbekistan
who intervened to protect their clients that included ethnic Uzbeks. This argument
seems unconvincing as there is little evidence to support the thesis that Uzbekistan's
foreign policy has been animated by concerns for Uzbek co-ethnics. Additionally the
possibility that Uzbeks in the north may push for secession was also advanced
(Khujand remained outside of Dushanbe's writ for several months in 1992, but so did
the rest of the country), but rapidly dismissed; there was no political will to seek
secession nor to be incorporated in Uzbekistan amongst those in the northern
province (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Martin, 199761). Rather, Horsman (1999a)
and Akbarzadeh (2005) point to the security discourse that has defined Uzbekistan's
geopolitical orientation. Concern for Uzbeks abroad may have mattered to some
extent, Horsman concedes, but as chapter 5 discusses, Uzbekistan has never set in
place an active diaspora policy. Uzbekistan's aims in Tajikistan were directed at
protecting their traditional clients in the north. The sudden reversal of the power
balance in the country and Russia's overarching presence have de facto sidelined
Uzbekistan. The attempts to act by proxy (through the Tajik army renegade colonel
61This view was also confirmed by the Khujandi researcher Fatimakhon Ahmedova (August, 2003).
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Makhmud Khudoyberdiev) in 1997 and 1998 failed and Uzbekistan's role in
Tajikistan has become increasingly peripheral. Uzbeks, Akiner notes, have sided
with the "government" forces and in the southern areas have joined the Popular
Front, a pro-government militia. Again, the motivation was the will to protect of
existing privileges from the perceived threat from the Islamic and democratic
opposition. Tajikistan Uzbeks have predominantly supported the incumbent in
Tajikistan and Rakhmonov since 1994 for his role in stabilising the country. To be
sure, there were Uzbeks among the ranks of the opposition, particularly within the
ranks of the exiled Islamic opposition that had found refuge and some degree of
support when fleeing Uzbekistan in the early 1990s. Elements of the IMU (Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan) closely co-operated with factions of the Tajik opposition,
though this tactical alliance (anti-government and anti-Uzbekistani) between them
waned in the aftermath of the 1997 Peace Accords leading to power sharing between
government and opposition. The one faction that was not included in the agreement
was the so-called "third force", based in the north. However, the rationale behind the
political marginalization of the north seems to lie more within the Soviet patterns of
domination than out of any ethnically based policy. Similar to the case of
Kyrgyzstan, because of the Uzbek status as a titular nation in the Uzbek SSR, no
special autonomy was recognised to the Uzbek population in the country. Again, this
meant that although entitled to cultural rights as individuals, Uzbeks were not
"eligible" for claims to a national territory and hence autonomy.
Table 4.2. Ethnic composition of Tajikistan
Group 1979 (%) 1979 1989 (%) 1989 2000 (%) 2000
Tajiks 58.8 2237048 62.3 3172420 79.9 4898382
Uzbeks 23.0 873199 23.5 1197841 15.3 936703
Russians 10.4 395089 7.6 388481 1.1 68171
Kyrgyz 1.3 48376 1.3 63832 1.1 65515
Lakay - - - - 0.8 51001
Congrats - - - - 0.3 15102
Catagans - - - - 0.1 4888
Yuz - - - - 0.0 1053
Barlos - - - - 0.1 3743
Semiz - - - - 0.0 1
Kesamir - - - - 0.0 13
Others 6.5 252,508 5.3 270,029 0.1 148436
Total 100.0 3806220 100.0 5092603 100.0 6127493
Source: Naselenie Respubliki Tadzhikistan 2000 (2002).
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4.2. Economic legacies
Scholarship on ethnic mobilization has divided between those arguing that it is
economic deprivation that facilitates mobilization (Emizet and Hesli, 1995; Gurr,
1994 and 2000; Horowitz, 1985) and those maintaining that wealthier regions are
more politically active (Gourevitch, 1979; Hale, 2000). Because of the paucity of
data available the scope of the section is limited to exploring the extent to which a
clear trend can be detected in regions where Uzbeks are compactly present (hence
Sughd, Osh, and Jalalabat). What interests here is not just the attempt to examine the
region's economic performance in isolation, but also to place it in perspective with
other regions in the country. In this respect the two areas are specular. Sughd was
traditionally the wealthier region alongside the capital Dushanbe in Tajikistan,
whereas the economic divide between an industrialised northern (especially Chuy
and Bishkek) and a rural southern Kyrgyzstan (particularly Osh) has traditionally
been stark.
Table 4.3. Poverty and inequality in the late Soviet era
Dn»» oor* /2LTVTT> (1 OOAt Gin! olonPer cap GNP (1990) Gini coefficient62 Poverty (% of population)
(1989)
USSR 2870 0.289 11.1
Kazakhstan 2600 0.289 15.5
Kyrgyzstan 1570 0.287 32.9
Tajikistan 1130 0.308 51.2
Turkmenistan 1690 0.307 35.0
Uzbekistan 1340 0.304 43.6
Armenia 2380 0.259 14.3
Azerbaijan 1640 0.328 33.6
Georgia 2120 0.292 14.3
Belarus 3110 0.238 3.3
Moldova 2390 0.258 11.8
Russia 3430 0.278 5.0
Ukraine 2500 0.235 6.0
Estonia 4170 0.299 1.9
Latvia 3590 0.274 2.4
Lithuania 3110 0.278 2.3
Source: Pomfret (1999 p.9).
62The Gini coefficient (value between 0 and 1) is used to measure inequality.
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Table 4.4a Kyrgyzstan - Degree of urbanization (1999)
KR Bishkek Chuy Talas Ysyk-
Kul




199.9 127 20.2 11.4 43.1 45.2 29.2 33.7 17.0
% urban 34.8 99.5 22.0 16.8 30.4 18.3 23.2 23.1 19.2
Source: Kratkie Itogi pervoi perepisi naseleniia Kirgizskoi Respubliki (1999).
Table 4.4b Tajikistan - Degree of urbanization (2000)
Country
average
Sughd Dushanbe DRS Khatlon GBAO
Territory
(thou. km2)
143.1 25.4 0.1 28.6 24.8 64.22
% urban 26.6% 26.6% 100% 12.4% 17.3% 13.4%
Source: Naselenie Respubliki Tadzhikistan 2000 (2002).





Naryn Talas Osh Jalalabat Batken
%
(1998)
46w 46.7 45.2 44.1 43.5 44.5 46.5 45.9 46.9
%
(1996)
5164 47.6 45.5 44.1 45.2 49.0 45.8 48.4 -
Source: Kyrgyzstan: National Human Development Report (2000).
Table 4.5b Women in labour force (Tajikistan)
Country
average
Dushanbe Sughd Khatlon GBAO DRS
% 24.8 45.0 41.0 28.0 50.0 32.2
Source: Human Development Report Tajikistan (1995).
Table 4.6. Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Poverty Index65 (Kyrgyzstan)
Country
average
Bishkek Batken Jalalabat Ysyk-
kul
Naryn Osh Talas Chuy
HDI 0.723 0.767 0.677 0.707 0.752 0.696 0.682 0.715 0.720
HPI-
1
8.7 7.6 10.5 8.7 6.8 8.5 11.5 4.9 9.6
Source: Kyrgyzstan National Human Development Report (2001).
63Year 1999.
64Year 1999.
65The HDI is a composite indicator encompassing life expectancy, level of education, and welfare of
the population. The HPI-1 instead gives a sense of poverty levels by taking into account indicators
that include (and go beyond) income, also literacy among the adult population and an indicator of
material deprivation (HDR Kyrgyzstan, 2001 p. 18-23; HDR, 2002).
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As the tables above show in both countries the level of urbanization is extremely
low: 34.8% in Kyrgyzstan and 26.6% in Tajikistan, the lowest in the region
(compared to 37% in Uzbekistan, 45% in Turkmenistan, 56% in Kazakhstan)66. In
Kyrgyzstan urbanization in the southern provinces is lower than the national average
(23% in Osh and Jalalabat, 19% in Batken), although it is reasonable to say that but
for the obvious exception of the city of Bishkek, the whole country is rural. The same
can be said of Tajikistan, where the level of urbanization is even lower than in
Kyrgyzstan (26.6% compared to 34.8%). However, the degree of urbanization in the
Sughd region perfectly mirrors the national average for the republic and shows
higher levels of urbanization compared to other provinces. The Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region (GBAO) in the Pamir is scarcely inhabited, whereas the south¬
western province of Khatlon and the central districts (under republican
subordination) are distinctively more rural than the northern province. This is hardly
a surprise as the Sughd region has traditionally been home to the large majority of
industries and urban centers of the republic. Sughd is home to eight towns with a
population higher than 10,000 (Khujand being the largest with 149,000 inhabitants,
but also Istarafshan, Isfara, Kayrakum, Kanibadam, Penjikent, Tabowar and
Chkalovsk). Some districts are also home to a large rural population (Bobojon
Ghaffurov, Ganchi, Asht, Isfara, Kanibadam, and Penjikent).
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were among the poorest republics of the Soviet
Union. Tajikistan's per capita GNP was, at 1,130 USD, the lowest of the fifteen
Union Republics. Kyrgyzstan's at 1,570 USD did not fare much better. Between one
third and one half of the population were considered poor. The situation did not
improve after the collapse of the Soviet order, and generally got worse. It has been
estimated that in Tajikistan 83% of the population lies below the threshold of
poverty67, with 17% completely destitute. Olimov and Olimova (1996) emphasise the
distorting effect that regional policies in the Soviet period had on national unity. The
case of Leninabad is, according to Olimov, particularly illustrative of the complexity
of the region. Leninabad had two "special relationships": one as part of the Tajikistan
6673% in Russia, without mentioning data from Western European countries (67% in Italy and 89.5%
in the United Kingdom)
67Poverty is not evenly distributed in the country. In fact, half of the population categorised as poor
(45.7%) lives in Khatlon (province), one fourth (26.1%) in Sughd, and remainder in other areas
(19.2% DRS, 2.1% in Dushanbe, and 6.9% in GBAO) (HDR Tajikistan, 1996).
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SSR (of which it was the economic engine), and the other as part of the Ferghana
valley, of which Leninabad/Khujand constitutes the southern part and with which it
is economically complementary. Uzbekistan's border policies were in a way
beneficial to the state-building efforts of the national governments in Bishkek and
Dushanbe, as they forced the peripheral regions to focus on their relations (political,
economic, and cultural) with the centre. Being cut off from economic integration at
cross-border regional level, Leninabad/Khujand had no option but to turn to
Dushanbe. As said, this was beneficial to republican governments: the total tax
revenues from Sughd steadily increased in the 1990s. From 47.3% in 1996, for
example, the contribution increased to 61.2% in 1999. One third of the industrial
enterprises in the country remained based in the north. Relations between centre and
periphery were not mutually beneficial, though. In fact, state investment in the region
remained remarkably low during the 1990s (9.3% in 1995, 6% in 1996), reflecting a
shift in priorities by the government in Dushanbe (Ilolov and Khudoiyev, 2001
p.628). To summarise, Sughd experienced a radical shift in economic policies during
the transitional period. It found itself increasingly marginalized. Still, the overall
situation remains far better than other provinces (Dushanbe excluded).
Although it was spared from the fighting, it is impossible to ignore the impact
of the civil war on Leninabad/Sughd. In fact Sughd/Leninabad was hit the hardest
first by the crisis and later by the conflict. Regional markets were cut off and
government contracts were interrupted (Boymatov, 2004 p.51). At the same time
economic links with neighbouring Uzbekistan (especially) and Kyrgyzstan were
severed, and this also negatively affected the trade balance of the region (ibid., p.60).
The region used to be home to two thirds of Tajikistan's industrial enterprises and
before the war Leninabad alone contributed to the republic's economy 70% of the
republican budget68. In 1991 the region produced 37.5% of the country's GDP,
though this dropped to 16.3% in 1996 and only recovered towards pre-war levels in
2001 (21.2%) and 2002 (36.3) (Boymatov, 2004 p.48). In a very detailed review of
economic centre-regions relations in Tajikistan Alijon Boymatov captures the impact
of transition on the Sughd province (2004). Sughd's decline in Gross Regional
Product since independence reflected the country's general economic collapse. In
68Akiner (2001).
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1996 Sughd's GRP represented just a mere 14.1% of the 1991 level. The situation
started to improve as soon as the civil war ended in 1997. Production grew at 1.7%
nationwide, but at 5.8% in the region, with the northern province reporting a 5.8%
growth in 1998 (5.3% nationwide), and even better in following years, 17.6% in
2000 (8.5% nationwide), 86.5% in 2001 (10.8% nationwide), and 11.6% in 2002
(10.6% nationwide)69.
Contrary to Tajikistan where Sughd experienced a dramatic decline in
economic production areas of Uzbek settlement in Kyrgyzstan were and still are
lagging behind compared to the rest of the country. Large areas of the south are rural
and remote (Batken, but also Osh) and only Jalalabat - where industries are located
in the southern areas of the country - has shown signs of recovery. On the basis of
both the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human Poverty Index for
developing countries (HPI-1), Osh has regularly ranked bottom on all levels since
independence. In a study of the economic impact of transition on the different
regions of Kyrgyzstan Pomfret and Anderson have emphasised the strong correlation
between economic development and geography (2000). Northern regions have fared
better compared to those in the south. Helpfully in their study they also controlled for
ethnicity. No significant correlation between ethnicity and economic situation has
been detected (ibid.). Lack of growth and low consumption affect Osh, Jalalabat, and
Batken in a uniform way. Uzbeks are no poorer - or less poor, for that matter - than
other ethnic groups residing in the south (e.g. Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uyghurs) and this is
noted by Uzbeks themselves when interrogated about the nature of their grievances
(political, cultural, economic, in chapter 5).
To summarise, Sughd enjoyed a relatively prosperous economic situation
under Soviet times due to its integration with the Ferghana Valley economic and
transport system, both of which were interrupted in the course of the 1990s.
Additionally, isolation resulting from the war contributed to the general decline in
the region. However, since the late 1990s signs of recovery have been evident. This
suggests the presence of low economic incentives for Sughd to press for a
confrontational attitude towards the state. The case of southern Kyrgyzstan is
different because the area has traditionally trailed the north in terms of
69All data from Boymatov (2004 p.48).
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industrialization and urbanization levels. While some areas (Jalalabat and Batken)
have shown signs of mild improvement, Osh has shown constant levels of
underdevelopment (as shown by HDI and HPI-1). Though this certainly does not
bode well for economic centre-regions relations in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks are reported
to have been only marginally affected by the decline and therefore do not consider
economic grievances to be at the top of their agenda.
4.3. Cultural legacies: Uzbekness and beyond
Studies on Uzbek identity formation have traditionally focused on Uzbekistani
Uzbeks (Adams, 199a and 1999b; Djumaev, 2001; Markowitz, 1998; Schoeberlein,
1994 and 1996), and on how Uzbekistani institutions have promoted Uzbek identity.
Little has been said of how Uzbeks abroad have negotiated their being Uzbek while
not benefiting from similar institutional resources. If anything, independence has
accentuated their sense of otherness from the majority group. Assessing whether this
is actually the case and understanding what forms of identity Uzbeks in those
countries show strong attachment to constitute the scope of this section. In order to
do so I rely on survey data and individual interviews, used as follow-ups to the
former. Surveys are expected to produce more robust findings (giving a sense of how
many Uzbeks feel in a particular way), whereas interviews are likely to offer a more
nuanced understanding of the various forms of identification, often qualifying data
emerging from the survey. Firstly I discuss the findings related to national
identification. In the following sub-sections I compare it with attachment to state
identity and alternative loyalties, namely religious, regional and locality (city,
village).
Because the purpose of this section was to establish the degree of attachment
to various forms of identification in order to establish which among those, if any,
were accorded primacy, a small scale survey was deemed a particularly suitable
strategy. The survey, conducted through the use of a questionnaire70, comprised 136
respondents in Kyrgyzstan and 137 in Tajikistan. Because the sample is both too
small in size and sampling techniques were non-random no claim to statistical
representativeness is made here. However every effort was made to gather a sense of
70For a sample of the questionnaire see the methodological appendix (chapter 9).
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various social and geographical groups, so that it is possible to draw an impression of
broader trends. Survey data were then coded into and analysed through SPSS 11.5.
What mattered was not so much understanding how Uzbeks perceived their
identity, but to put attachment to different loyalties in perspective. There is a
consensus among scholars of nationalism studies and social movements alike that for
a group to act collectively the presence of some form of collective identification is
necessary. This creates a sort of social capital, a resource that political entrepreneurs
can use to mobilize the community. This does not mean that a quantitative
methodology provides an exhaustive tool for investigating all identity matters. I
found individual interviews extremely valuble tools to understand not so much
which form of identity Uzbeks felt closest to (this had already been done by means of
the survey), but rather to understand an equally crucial aspect of the process of post-
Soviet identity transformation among co-ethnics abroad, namely that identities are
multiple and overlapping, and Uzbeks have no problems in accommodating them. A
very common remark illustrating this point was made to me during my stay in
Uzbekistan in the winter of 2002, but perfectly applies to Uzbeks abroad as well:
"It [what identity prevails] all depends on context. I may be or say I am an Uzbek to you
because you are a foreigner, but I may not think of myself as 'Uzbek' if I am talking to my family or
friends, or even with someone from another region or city. I am from Tashkent and if I meet someone
from Ferghana, I say I am from Tashkent, not I am an Uzbek. Or I can say I am from this or that part
of Tashkent when speaking to someone from Tashkent".
4.3.1. Attachment to Uzbek identity
The first question respondents were asked was to indicate their ethnicity. "Uzbek"
was by far the most common answer (Kyrgyzstan: Uzbek 94.7%; Tajikistan: Uzbek
97.1%), alternative responses were also given: in Kyrgyzstan five per cent of
respondents identified themselves as either Kyrgyz (1.5%), Tajik (3%), or other
(0.8%). In Tajikistan identification among Uzbeks with other national groups was
also evident (Russian 1.5%, Kyrgyz 0.7%, other 0.7%). When asked how often they
identified as Kyrgyz, Uzbeks answered predominantly "never" (78.6%) or "rarely"
(14.3%). In Tajikistan a marginal minority of respondents indicated that they
"always" identify themselves as "Tajik" (5.1%), 15.2% "sometimes", about the same
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percentage answered "rarely" (15.2%), and 64.6% "never" identify themselves as
such.
Table 4.7. How important is nationality to you (%)?








31.1 52.6 22.6 22.9 34.3 33.3 36.1 50 27.3 30.2
Important 42.2 34.2 45.2 45.7 42.5 33.3 37.7 40 45.5 51.2
Indifferent 20.7 13.2 24.2 22.9 18.7 11.1 19.7 10 27.3 18.6
Not very
important




0.7 0 0 2.9 0.7 0 1.6 0 0 0
Total 100.0" 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
As table 4.7 shows, being Uzbek and defining oneself as such appear to be of
primary significance to most respondents. Country aggregate data show that three in
four Uzbeks consider their nationality as either important or very important.
Table 4.8 How often do you identify yourself as Uzbek?






Always 73.6 91.7 68.5 62.9 75.8 50.0 69.2 90.0 55.6 88.4
Sometimes 19.2 5.6 20.4 31.4 12.5 16.7 15.4 10.0 22.2 7.0
Rarely 5.6 2.8 7.4 5.7 6.7 0 11.5 0 11.1 2.3




0.7 0 0 2.9 0.7 0 1.6 0 0 0
Younger generations in Dushanbe and Khujand appear to consider nationality more
important than older generations. In Kyrgyzstan older generations in Batken seem by
contrast to consider nationality more important. Elite members in Osh region, and
female respondents in Bishkek and Jalalabat in Kyrgyzstan indicated nationality as
either important or very important.
7lBy province I mean here the areas of the Osh province excluding the provincial capital.
72The sum would be 99.9% but this is due to the fact that only decimals are reported in the table.
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4.3.2. Frequency of identification along ethnic lines
Frequency of identification along ethnic lines (table 4.8), despite large variations
across the countries in question, is high: three in four respondents identify
themselves on a regular basis (always/sometimes) as Uzbeks. Being Uzbek is
considered very important and people tend to identify themselves by their ethnicity
on a regular basis. Location is an important intervening variable when it comes to
establishing the variations in the strength of national sentiments. This is particularly
salient in Khujand as well as in rural southern Kyrgyzstani areas (Batken and Osh).
In line with the responses to the previous question, Uzbeks residing in urban settings
are less likely to identify themselves along national lines, suggesting that
urbanization contributes to a weakening of national forms of affiliation. Data seem to
confirm that Uzbeks in both countries owe strong allegiance to their ethnicity. About
three in four respondents considered nationality as important/very important, and
again three in four identify themselves along national lines on a regular basis.
However, strong variations exist with regard to both issues (strength and frequency)
across gender, region, and social status, but no significant association could be
found. Ethnic identification is strong among Uzbeks in both countries, but unevenly
distributed across regions.
4.3.3. Regions and locale
Scholars often observe that in Central Asia the local populations maintain
"situationally contingent, contradictory, and complexly articulating conceptions of
their simultaneous membership in multiple groups" (Schoeberlein, 1994). Despite
official efforts to create and institutionalise nationality, these identities have never
been perceived as exclusive (ibid.). Quite the contrary, "[m]any other overlapping
conceptions of descent, region, religion, and other cultural groups continue to
structure the lives of Central Asians" (ibid.). My experience in the region supports
Schoeberlein's view. I begin an overview of the degree of attachment to other (non
national) forms of identification by looking at regional identities, a form of loyalty
that scholars have recently indicated as particularly salient in both cultural and
political terms (Collins, 2003; Jones Luong, 2002 and 2004). I look here at two
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different meanings of region: transborder and cultural (Ferghana) and administrative
(oblast').
Ferghana valley identity
A short premise is necessary here. When asking respondents about their
identification with the Ferghana Valley I used the term Farg'onalik (meaning
someone from Ferghana). One should note however that this can be extremely
ambiguous. It entails two distinct forms of identification. It refers both to the city of
Ferghana (Farg'ona) in Uzbekistan, indicating a city-level loyalty. It also refers to
the whole Ferghana valley (Ferganskaya dolina in Russian, Farg'ona vodiy in
Uzbek). I strove to make the reference to this latter interpretation unmistakable:
whenever I was conducting surveys myself I explained this in an unequivocal way.
In cases when part of the survey was not administered by myself I instructed those
administering the questionnaire so that there would be no ambiguities as to what the
understanding of Ferghana was.
A Ferghana identity does not appear to be appropriated by local Uzbeks, for
whom other loyalties are more relevant. Data show that two to three respondents out
of ten in Kyrgyzstan (table 4.9a) associate themselves with the Ferghana Valley
(about 20% from the city of Osh, nearly 30% in Jalalabat, and almost 30% in the
Batken region). Surprisingly no-one identifies himself/herself with the Ferghana
valley in the rural (border) areas of the Osh province. The idea of a Ferghana valley
identity is perceived even less in Tajikistan (table 4.9b), where only a marginal
number of respondents in Khujand identify themselves as such. Though one should
recall that results should be taken as more indicative of trends, they do seem to
question a previously accepted finding: the existence of a sense of common
belonging to the Ferghana Valley. In Kyrgyzstan data confirm that Ferghana-based
loyalties are not as widespread as expected. Some degree of attachment to it is
traceable in rural border areas of the Batken region in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan this
is even more marginal, barely present in border areas of the Sughd region, though
more significant among Uzbeks who migrated to Dushanbe from the northern
province. Why is a Ferghana identity so marginal? While one could possibly assume
that the idea of a cross-border unity may be a myth, the lack of any meaningful
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border until very recently and the degree of integration of the region under pre- and
Soviet times, seems instead to suggest that fifteen years of post-Soviet nationalizing
policies and the tough visa regime from Tashkent may be generating the effect of
forcing the inhabitants of the valley to look towards the respective state capitals
rather than towards the other side of the border.
As said, this is an unexpected finding. Reports from the region have insisted on
the constructed character of nationality as a form of collective identification as
opposed to other, more rooted loyalties (though by no means given either), among
them regionalism (Schoeberlein, 1994; Jones Luong, 2002; Collins, 2003). With
regard to Uzbekistan Boris-Mathieu Petric (2002 p. 121) notes how regional-
administrative (i.e. Kashkadaryo, Syrdaryo) or geographical areas (i.e. Ferghana
Valley) are often evoked when locals are asked about their identity/-ies. According to
Petric, this applies to the Ferghana Valley as well. Farg'onalik, he contends, remains
a major expression of regional identity in Uzbekistan (ibid.). This is confirmed by
Lawrence Markowitz in his work on the effects of nationality policies on social
cohesion Uzbekistan (1998), where he explores identity formation among Ferghana
valley Uzbeks and notes how they perceive themselves as distinct from their brethren
in other parts of the country (ibid., p.2-5). Most importantly, Markowitz along with
other authors, argues that for centuries Uzbeks referred to themselves not as Uzbeks,
but "according to their locality or the common reference of Islam" (ibid., p.23).








Always 0 7.1 0 28.6 10.1 10.1
Sometimes 0 14.3 0 0 17.4 17.4
Rarely 0 7.1 28.6 14.3 17.4 17.4
Hardly
ever
100 7.1 71.4 57.1 55.1 55.1
Table 4.9b. How often do you identify yourself as a Ferghanalik? (Tajikistan)
Khujand Sughd Dushanbe Tajikistan
Always 7.1 5.6 5.7 6.1
Sometimes 7.1 0 2.9 3.0
Rarely 3.6 8.3 0 4.0
Hardly
ever
86.1 86.1 91.4 86.9
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Intra-republican regional identities
Having established that a cross-border regional identity is not widespread, I then
turned to regional-type identities along administrative and geographic lines. A
north/south rift has been noted as one of the main cleavages in both Tajikistan
(Akiner, 2001; Roy, 1997; Rubin, 1998) and Kyrgyzstan (Anderson, 1997, 1999;
Dukenbaev and Hansen, 2000; Jones Luong, 2002).








Always n.a. 22.6 0 33.3 16.7 18.8
Sometimes n.a. 25.8 33.3 33.3 11.1 21.2
Rarely n.a. 16.1 55.6 11.1 16.7 20.0
Hardly
ever
n.a. 35.5 11.1 22.2 55.6 40.0
Table 4.10b. How often do you identify yourself as a Leninabadi/northerner?
Khujand Sughd Dushanbe Tajikistan
Always 60.0 43.9 5.7 35.8
Sometimes 20.0 14.6 8.6 14.2
Rarely 10.0 14.6 0 8.5
Hardly
ever
10.0 26.8 85.7 41.5
Tables 4.10a and 4.10b show that intra-republican cleavages are considerable. A
significant percentage of Uzbeks in Jalalabat (ca. 66%), Osh city (ca. 48%) and
province (ca. 33%) identify themselves regularly as southerners, though this does
not appear to be the case of Batken, a more geographically and politically isolated
province, detached from the rest of the country from three large enclaves. In
Tajikistan a northern identity, broadly defined as Leninabadi (the former
denomination of the Sughd province) or less frequently referred to as Sughdi, is also
present. Around 80% of respondents in the city of Khujand and about 55% per cent
of those living in other areas of the province showed that this form of regional
loyalty is present. The finding appears of considerable relevance because it shows
that a potential for cross-ethnic regional identity exists. The implications of a
politicization of regional identity are potentially subversive of the balance of power
between regions. A coalition between southerners in Kyrgyzstan has not
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materialized, and quite on the contrary southern Kyrgyz have resented the support
that Uzbeks have thus far lent to the northern-based ruling elites73.
By contrast the situation is remarkably different in Tajikistan, where the
boundaries between Uzbeks and Tajiks in the north are not so clear-cut and a cross-
ethnic coalition of interests had traditionally dominated Tajikistan's political life
until 1992. Thereafter, all groups in the north have tended to coalesce around
candidates who represented northern as opposed to ethnic interests (i.e. Abdullajonov
obtained 95% of votes in Khujand in the 1994 presidential elections, a result he
would have never achieved without votes from non Tajiks). The main difference
between the two cases lies in the fact that despite sharing a regional identity, Uzbeks
in southern Kyrgyzstan have not sided with their fellow Kyrgyz southerners, among
which a southern identity is also as strong, whereas northerners in Tajikistan have
maintained a form of solidarity, with little practical results, however, given that the
northern elites are essentially shut out of the political process (ICG, 2003).
Local identities
Finally, I examined local identities, at city or village level. As table 4.11 below
shows, identity at local level is not widespread in Tajikistan, except for the case of
Khujand, where 28% of respondents identified themselves with their city on a
regular basis (always/sometimes). The situation in Kyrgyzstan is quite different as
town- (or village-)dwellers tend to identify with it, with Osh showing the largest
value at 78%. It is interesting to note that the values of Khujand appear to be - in
many respects - more in line with those from Kyrgyzstan, and from Osh in
particular, showing the urban dwellers tend to identify themselves with their locality
in a stronger way that those from rural areas. The reasons behind strong attachment
to the city can partly be explained by the fact that the two cities are the main
administrative centers of their respective provinces and therefore emerge as key
political, cultural, and economic "hubs" of the region. Living in Osh and Khujand is
often a matter of prestige as well, as they emerge as localities of opportunity to
younger generations and as alternatives to unemployment and under-employment in
the countryside.
73The strategic support from the Uzbeks to the Akaev administration will be elaborated in chapters 5
to 7.
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Table 4.11 How often do you identify with your city/village of origin?
Tajikistan Khujand Sughd Dushanbe Kyrgyzstan North Osh
city
Jalalabat
Always 12.4 28.1 10.5 0 66.7 20.0 78.6 28.6
Sometimes 7.1 43.8 10.5 0 9.3 20.0 9.5 0
Rarely 6.7 18.8 2.6 0 11.1 0 9.5 28.6
Hardly
ever
63.8 9.4 76.3 100.0 13.0 60.0 2.4 42.9
4.3.4. Primary form of identification
After exploring the degree of attachment to various forms of identity separately, I
asked respondents to opt for one only. I am aware that identities are contextual, and
indeed respondents often pointed this out, mentioning that whether they identified
themselves as Uzbeks, southerners, city-dwellers or else depended on their
interlocutor. Nevertheless I believe it is possible to identify an identity one owes
particular allegiance to and this is what this question aimed to highlight.
The striking result is that more Uzbeks tend to identify primarily with the
state of residence rather than with the nation of belonging. However, data (tables
4.12a and 4.12b) also show large discrepancies between the two countries. While
almost all Tajikistani Uzbeks indicate feeling closest to either state or nation (86%
overall), in the case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks only 53.5% of respondents identify
themselves with either state or nation. In Tajikistan half of respondents in Dushanbe
and the Sughd province feel closer to the state, whereas respondents in Khujand
tended to privilege nationality as a primary source of identification. In Kyrgyzstan
city-level identification obtained far from negligible results in the southern provinces
(Osh city and region, and Batken region), whereas respondents in Bishkek (and to a
minor extent in the city of Osh) tend to prioritise the state. Central Asia was a
popular choice in Jalalabat, a unique case in the survey.
The data suggest that considering one community as a cohesive whole is
misleading. Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001), Kolstp (1999) and Gorenburg (2002)
have all emphasized the importance of investigating the plurality of perceptions
within the community and not just across communities in different cases/countries.
In the case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks identification with the state is stronger in the
south, in contrast with the rate of the response in Bishkek (14.3%). Identification
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with the nation is stronger in the cities of Osh and Bishkek (one in four). Overall,
though it is noteworthy to point at the fact that half of the respondents chose not to
emphasize the attachment to nation or state, but opt for either localized forms of
identification such as city/village of origin, or larger than national ones, i.e. Central
Asia (in Bishkek, Osh and Jalalabat) or the Ferghana Valley (especially in Batken
and Jalalabat). Identification with the Ferghana Valley remained at marginal levels.


















14.3 36.1 55.6 45.5 32.6




14.3 14.8 0 27.3 0




0 0 0 0 23.3








34.4 59.5 19.6 31.4
My
City/village
6.3 0 10.7 5.7
State where
I live
51.6 27.0 66.1 54.3
Region 3.9 8.1 3.6 0
Ferghana
Valley
3.1 2.7 0 8.6
Other 0.8 2.7 0 0
I also tried to establish whether given a binary choice between state and ethnic
identities, respondents opted for one or the other in a decisive manner. Tables 4.13a
and 4.13b show a very significant finding: nearly two in three respondents consider
ethno-national and state identities equally important, with roughly the same
percentage considering only either of the two as important. This is in line with data
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from earlier studies conducted in the region (Ifes, 1996b and 2002; Abazov et al.,
1999; Bozrikova, 2003 and 2004), which also noted how civic identities are taking
root among minority groups. A related finding concerns the extent to which these
distinct identity foci are not considered as mutually incompatible, but co-existing
without particular problems.
Table 4.13a. Degree of attachment to nation and state (Kyrgyzstan)
%
Only Uzbek 13.6
More Uzbek than Kyrgyzstani 2.5
Equally Uzbek and Kyrgyzstani 63.0
More Kyrgyzstani than Uzbek 13.6
Neither 3.7
Other 3.7
Table 4.13b. Degree of attachment to nation and state (Tajikistan)
%
Only Uzbek 15.4
More Uzbek than Tajikistani 8.1
Equally Uzbek and Tajikistani 60.3
More Tajikistani than Uzbek 14.7
Neither 0.7
Other 0.7
4.3.5. What is homeland to you?
I conclude this discussion of what Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan consider as
their homeland (table 4.14). In both cases this turned out to be the state of residence,
though significant variations exist between and within the two cases. In Kyrgyzstan a
bare majority of respondents consider it their homeland74, whereas four Tajikistani
Uzbeks (76.9%) attach their primary identity to the state. Only a marginal percentage
of respondents seemed to consider Uzbekistan as their homeland (more so in
Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan). As previous data also suggest, city-level identities are
particularly strong. 36% of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan considered their city or village as
their homeland, while the percentage was significantly lower in Tajikistan (12.7%).
Interestingly a large majority of female respondents in both countries considered
Uzbekistan as their homeland, whereas male respondents looked at their state of
residence.
74I used different terms to refer to homeland (from rodina to otechestvo) with no variation in the type
of responses.
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Table 4.14 What is homeland to you?
Kyrgyzstan % Tajikistan %
Kyrgyzstan 50% Tajikistan 76.8
Uzbekistan 3.7% Uzbekistan 7.5
Region 36% Region 12.8
City/village 4.4% City/village 1.5
Other 5.9% Other 1.4
4.3.6. Summary
The general finding emerging from the previous discussion points to the very
variegated picture of Uzbeks living in those two countries. Identity perceptions
among Uzbeks are extremely fluid, with frequent overlapping between loyalties at
different levels. Context plays a fundamental role in explaining variations in the
answers: regional differences between the two countries are remarkable, but so are
within-country discrepancies as well.
Secondly, ethnic allegiance emerges as uniformly strong. About three in four
respondents in both countries identify strongly with their nation and consider their
ethnic identity (though in the survey the term used was nationality) as either
important or very important. Ethnic loyalties are particularly strong in rural areas of
southern Kyrgyzstan and in the city of Khujand in Tajikistan. Thirdly and contrary to
my own expectations at the start of fieldwork, identification with the cross-border
Ferghana valley is marginal. Instead, attachment to this form of transnational loyalty
is low, except for marginal and moderate attachment to it in Batken and Sughd
provinces and Jalalabat75. Finally, city and regions (expressed along north/south
cleavages), by contrast, provide stronger loci of allegiance: southern (in Kyrgyzstan)
and northern (in Tajikistan) identities are strong, and so also are city-level loyalties.
Attachment to cities such as Osh and Khujand nearly equals the strength of national
sentiment, and this might prove to have political implications. While cultural forms
of identification are strong to various degrees (with some notable exceptions, as
mentioned), state identity also appears of particular relevance to a strong majority of
Uzbeks in both cases. Three in five respondents seemed to consider themselves as
75Note that while 28% of respondents from Jalalabat identified themselves as Farg'onalik on a regular
basis, but none among them indicated it as a primary source of identification.
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equally Uzbek and citizens of the state of residence. What emerges is a diverse
picture of Uzbek communities, where heterogeneity is the norm rather than the
exception.
4.4. Conclusion
The chapter has presented a mixed picture of the structural preconditions for Uzbek
ethno-political mobilization. Uzbeks in Taijkistan and Kyrgyz Republic show a
strong attachment to ethnicity. The group presents a strong sense of cohesion and the
presence of this type of resource could facilitate mobilization. Allegiance along
ethnic lines is accompanied, but does not replace or supersede by other types of
loyalties, such as state, sub-state (regional and local) and supra-state (religion)
identities. Moreover, the strength of these loyalties varies according to context, and
other factors, namely the area where research was conducted, age or sex of
respondent, and even profession. Hence, the seemingly paradoxical situation where
ethnicity plays a great role in group identification, while at the same time the group
shows a high degree of internal heterogeneity, thereby making ethnic mobilization
more difficult. The lack of ethnic institutions which would promote Uzbek identity
through the creation of cadres, language, and schools, and especially territorial
autonomy contributed to affect negatively the pool of available resources for
mobilization. Economic factors seem to matter only up to an extent. In fact, while
they have also been affected by the decline in living standards following the Soviet
collapse, Uzbeks have manged to maintain their economic niche in some specific
sectors, namely the retail trade and the media. This has made transition somewhat
less painful compared for example to settler populations, employed either in the
public sector or in failing industrial complexes and with little knowledge of any
Central Asian language. Also, despite the obvious peculiarities of southern
Kyrgyzstan (rural and agricultural) and northern Tajikistan (more urbanized and
developed), the economic downturn has affected all regions in those countries,
meaning deprivation is spread all across them and not concentrated in one region.
Additionally, and this certainly bode well for the future, the long phase of economic
decline seems to have ended in around 1997-1998, as the following years have
reported some progress and economic growth.
CHAPTER 5
Political Opportunity Structure
Uzbeks, the State, and the Third Party
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In this chapter I discuss the structure of political opportunity, here understood as
"consistent - but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by
affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1998 p.85). The political
opportunity structure (hereafter, POS) should be seen as a context within which
Uzbek mobilization takes place in light of the constraints and/or opportunities this
poses or presents and with which it interacts. This chapter argues that the POS should
not be seen as a static or unitary concept, but rather as a cluster of variables in critical
interaction with agency as well as with those structural preconditions (examined in
chapter 4) which constitute the substratum within which mobilization occurs and is
influenced by the policies and practices of the state. This creates an ideal continuum
between chapters 4, 5, and 6 because the way Uzbeks identify themselves and relate
to the state is both a product of previous action (chapter 4) and framing by group
leaders (chapter 6). In this process the role of the state is crucial: the way policies,
inclusive or exclusive, and the practices that follow shape the role that minority
groups can play in the polity. The extent to which these will feel part of the citizenry
will greatly depend on whether it is product of othering from state and titular group.
Understanding how the Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani states have been conceptualised
(as civic states or nationalising ones) is the object of section I.
Section I discusses the domestic side of POS by looking at how the political
system has shaped the possibility for Uzbeks to mobilize. I explore this by looking at
three distinct though mutually interacting issues:
state policies as regards citizenship, language, education, political parties and
organizations;
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personalities, by assessing the importance of a particular kind of agency - the
president, arguably one of the central actors in the post-Soviet political
systems;
and finally the perceptions thereof from below, looking at how the previous
two are perceived by Tajikistani and Kyrgyztani Uzbeks.
Section II adopts a similar format and discusses the role of the third party
(besides group and state of residence), the Republic of Uzbekistan. The choice of
incorporating the third party within the POS builds on recent insights from
scholarship on Central Asia that have called for overcoming the limitations of an
analysis centred on seemingly water-proof compartments (inside and outside) in the
study of Central Asia (Horsman, 1999b and Megoran, 2002d).
This chapter shows that although the political opportunity structure has played a
significant role in shaping the form of Uzbek mobilization and setting its limits in
particular, a structural approach is less convincing when it comes to explaining
whether Uzbek mobilization would consider the state the referent object of its claims
(hence a more confrontational type of mobilization) or if it would rather engage in a
mobilizational process which eventually reinforces the POS, specifically its domestic
dimension. Second, the chapter also argues that common ethnic ties are not sufficient
for a state to act as patron in support of co-ethnics abroad. Other concerns, such as
power politics and the paramount importance of state security may take central role,
thereby sidelining the place of the "diaspora" in the eyes of the alleged external
homeland. This is ultimately stabilising as ethnic minorities are more likely to
mobilize in a confrontational way vis-a-vis the state of residence in circumstances of
explicit support from the kin country (Cetinyan, 2002; Jenne, 2004).
SECTION I: Policies, perceptions of opportunity and presidential
agency
The approach adopted by the state in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to deal with multi-
ethnicity is overall similar. Despite obvious country-related specificities, Tajikistani
and Kyrgyzstani authorities, at different speeds and at different moments in time,
have responded to the challenge brought about by weak national identity among the
titular group and the country's ethnic complexity with an apparent appreciation of
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diversity. Emphasis on the titular group's status in the present and re-construction of
a glorious past (with the new national heroes of Manas and Ismoil Somoni) have
been accompanied by a caution designed not to alienate minority groups. In both
countries state ideology has been carefully phrased and tentative accommodating
policies crafted. However, legislation and implementation have turned out to be
interpreted very differently and practices have often recalled Brubaker's concept of a
nationalising state (1996), though this chapter shows that this view requires
qualification.
The discussion in this chapter is based on the following sources:
state legislation (constitution, language and media laws, laws on public
associations, laws establishing associations for minority groups);
government and other official publications that may illustrate both policy
directives and embody state ideology;
survey and interview data from fieldwork conducted from June to August
2003 in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
5.1. Policies
5.1.1. Citizenship
In line with most other former Soviet states (and unlike Estonia and Latvia76)
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have adopted a "zero option" approach to citizenship. In
fact, the Tajikistani constitution (art. 15) declares that "a person will be regarded as
citizen of Tajikistan if he (sic) is a citizen of the Republic of Tajikistan on the day of
adoption of the constitution" [6th November, 1994], The question of who should be
considered as citizen is not explicitly addressed in the constitution of Kyrgyzstan77,
but is discussed in length in a separate law (Citizenship Law of Kyrgyzstan78).
76Galbreath (forthcoming).
77The constitution was adopted on May, 5th, 1993 and modified by referendum on February, 2nd, 2003,
implemented on February, 18th with the law "On the new wording of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan"
(Kyrgyz Respublikasynyn Konstitutsiyasy, 2003). Section I of chapter II enumerates rights and duties
of citizens (artt. 13 and 14).
78Available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal Affairs/Legal co¬
operation/Foreigners and citizens/Nationalitv/Documents/Bulletin and national legislation/Kyrgyzs
tan%20Law%20on%20Citizenship%20of%20the%20Kvrgyz%20Republic.asp#P129 8766.
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According to the Law on citizenship will be considered citizens of Kyrgyzstan those
persons who:
- "belonged to the citizenship of Kyrgyz Republic as at the date of its adoption of the
Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan (December 15, 1990) and have
not yet stated that they belong to citizen of another state;
- belonged to the citizenship of Kyrgyzstan according to the procedures established
with the Law upon the adoption of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of
Kyrgyzstan and have not lost it at the time when this Law is enforced;
- obtained the citizenship of Kyrgyzstan according to the provision of this Law (art.
1)".
Neither of the two countries has introduced language requirements, de facto
distinguishing between citizenship rights and the implications of knowing the state
language in terms of public life (i.e. employment in the public sector). It must also be
pointed out that while Kyrgyzstani authorities have ruled out any possibility of
allowing dual citizenship, Tajikistan has reached an agreement with Russia to allow
those eligible to have both. No such agreement exists in Uzbekistan, where residents
were asked to choose between citizenship of one country or another.
5.1.2. Language
The language issue is actually an umbrella category which in reality subsumes
distinct questions: the status of the language; access to information in minority
languages; and the possibility of receiving education in minority languages. The
Kyrgyz and Tajik SSR replaced Russian as a state language on the eve of the Soviet
collapse. The "Language Act of the Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic" (July, 22nd,
1989) defines the legal position of the Tadzhiki (Farsi) language79, the status of
which was upgraded to state language (art. 1). As a result, the Russian language lost
such status. This drew immediate protests at the time from minority groups, who
perceived the act as threatening their position in the country, especially in light of the
fact that Tajiks constituted just about 65% of the overall Tajikistani population at the
time. Conditions for the usage and developments of other languages, such as Pamiri
and Yaghnobi languages (art. 3), or Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Russian (art. 4)
7SThe ordering of the denomination changed a few times during the nineties. Originally the wording
was "forsi (tojiki)", then changed to "tojiki (forsi)", only to be later changed again into "tojiki" only.
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are defined by the Act. No legislative acts have been set in place to ensure that
practice would follow policy. Although Russian ceased to be the language for "doing
business" in 1992, the constitution adopted on November, 6th 1994, further modified
language policy. According to art. 2, "the state language of Tajikistan is Tajik.
Russian is a language of inter-ethnic communication". A generic protection for other
language is referred to in the same article ("[a] 11 nations and peoples residing in the
territory of the republic have the right to use freely their native languages"). Tajik
had become the sole state language by 1996. However, no legal framework exists to
guarantee the effective protection of minority languages, which appears very much
case-sensitive, i.e. depending on the concentration of the minority in one specific
area. The only exception to this lack of legal protection regards the educational
system, where classes - at least until university level - continue to be held in the
three languages, according to the territorial concentration of a particular community.
Official work, written and oral, is to be conducted in Tajik.
With regard to language the situation in Kyrgyzstan appears much more
convoluted and tense. In particular the state has failed to address the situation of the
Uzbek language (Dave, 2004 p. 122). On September 23rd, 1989 the "Law on the State
Language of the Kyrgyz SSR" replaced Russian as state language of the republic
(art. 1). After declaring that "Kyrgyz is the language of the indigenous population
and of the majority of the citizens of the Kyrgyz SSR", the preamble outlines the
restrictions in use that the Kyrgyz language has been subject to as a result of the
distortions of the Soviet nationality policy. For this reason "the adoption of special
measures for the development and protection of the Kyrgyz language with the help of
legal institutions and on a legislative basis" are considered necessary. This would
contribute to the development of the language and "the national culture of the
Kyrgyz people". The emphatic preamble constitutes the first of a series of attempts to
enhance the status of Kyrgyz, a language that many in the northern and highly
Russified regions spoke at the time of independence80.
Besides generic principles such as the right of every citizen to choose his/her
language of communication (art. 6), or the declaration that other languages would be
protected in the republic (art. 4), the only section where languages other than Kyrgyz
S0Khamidov (2004).
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and the interests of the people, that communicate in such languages, are taken into
account in chapter 5 (artt. 21-25, "Language in the sphere of education, science, and
culture"). However, it is only in the final article of the chapter that it is mentioned
that "[I]n places compactly settled by national and ethnic groups (Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Germans, Dungans, Uighurs), access to school education, distribution of printed
materials and information in the native language, and the development of national
cultures are guaranteed". The modalities and the extent to which this protection
would be not only guaranteed, but also implemented are not mentioned in the law.
A transitional period was initially set in place until December 31st, 1998, when
the actual replacement of Russian with Kyrgyz as sole state language would become
effective. The use of the Russian language was not expected to disappear overnight,
though. The 1993 constitution (later amended a first time in 1996 and more
comprehensively in 2003) granted Russian the status of language of inter-ethnic
communication (art. 5). The transitional period passed without leading to a
diminished use of Russian. With one in a hundred Slavs being fluent in Kyrgyz and
with an elite still predominantly Russian-speaking (Dave, 2004 p. 138 and 142), the
debate over the use and status of Russian remains central in Kyrgyzstani politics. In
2000 Russian was finally given official language status. Considering that the
constitution only allowed one state language, a different terminology ("official") was
introduced, although the distinction between state and official remains on the whole
undefined. This measure was meant to reassure ethnic minorities and emphasise the
multi-ethnic and harmonious nature of the country. On the other hand, it represented
the acknowledgement from the state leadership that measures aimed at enhancing the
position of Kyrgyz had simply failed. The majority of the population remained
comfortable with the use of Russian. The debate on language(s) in Kyrgyzstan
clearly shows that it has always been an "affaire a deux", between the Kyrgyz and
Russian languages. The demographic composition of the country has significantly
changed over the past decade or so, and while the Russian population has decreased
dramatically, demographic growth and the relative balance shift between groups has
made of Uzbek population the second largest community demographically in the
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republic . This created expectations among the Uzbek population that the Uzbek
language might also be elevated to the status of official language. However, as
Bhavna Dave notes (2004) not only this has never been the case, but the very idea of
elevating the status of Uzbek has never made it onto the negotiating agenda, leaving
the hopes of the Uzbek community dashed. The reason for this was the widespread
concern among Kyrgyz that an initial concession to the large Uzbek community may
usher in a series of further demands, possibly leading to calls for Uzbek cultural
autonomy or the establishment of an Uzbek region (ibid., p. 144). Language has
proved a very divisive and politicised issue in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeks demands have
primarily focused on access to information and education in Uzbek language (see
later in this chapter).
Alongside language status, equally important is the question over which script
the language should be written in. This is a particularly painful question as it carries
a highly emotional and symbolic dimension: the separation from other Uzbek
speakers. From 1940 until the early nineties , the Uzbek language in the whole
Soviet territory used to be written in Cyrillic script. However, in 1993 the Republic
of Uzbekistan suddenly shifted to Latin. The impact of this policy change was
dramatic and affected all Uzbeks, but especially those living in the neighbouring
countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were already facing problems of their own, by
replacing Russian with Tajik and Kyrgyz respectively as state languages, redefining
the role of Russian itself, with little resources let alone political will to be spent on
fostering what by any standard constitutes a comprehensive change (change in
textbooks, printing machines, re-training of large part of the population).
A proper debate on the Uzbek language has not taken place in either country,
arguably due to the sensitivity of the issue. Besides mere rhetorical statements of
state support for minority languages (itself a label rejected by the Uzbek
community ) no practical provision of material, support for typographical expenses
84
or else, has been provided . The questions ofwhether the state should play a role in
slThe balance shift is evident when one compares the ethnic composition of the country in 1989
(Uzbeks: 12.9%; Russians: 21.5%) with that of 1999 (1999 Census).
82 From 1929 to 1940 Uzbek was written using the Latin alphabet.
83I explore this question in chapter 6.
84Although an official at the Ministry of Higher Education in Tashkent declared that Uzbekistan "still
provides Uzbeks abroad with textbooks", he failed to mention any single place where I could go and
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this issue, who should take a decision (if any at all) on this, and how language
learning should be provided (by whom and with whose money) have not been
addressed so far, and the question lies suspended in a vacuum. Questions related to
language status and use are those of information and education in languages other
than the state one.
5.1.3. Education
According to official statistics of the Tajikistani Ministry of Education there are
55,501 schools (at secondary, secondary-special and higher education level) holding
classes in Tajik language (as of 2002). In addition 18,609 are held in Uzbek, 1,424 in
Russian, 902 in Kyrgyz, and 155 in Turkmen (Concept of the national policy of the
Republic of Tajikistan, 2002). If the situation at primary and secondary level (up to
the ninth level according to the local education structure) of Uzbek language
education does not present any additional problem to all those faced by any other
typical school in the country (ie shortage of funding, teachers and textbooks), no
university where tuition is provided entirely in Uzbek language has been established
in the country. The only option for students who wish to do so is to attend Uzbek
classes, which alongside classes in Tajik and Russian provide tuition in various
languages in the humanities.
Even in the case of Kyrgyzstan a distinction between primary and secondary
education on one side, and higher education on the other should be noted - though
the situation is reversed compared to Tajikistan. The prospects for Uzbek language
higher education are moderately positive. The opening of two universities in
Jalalabat (Batyrov University) and Osh (Kyrgyz-Uzbek University), in areas where
the Uzbek population is concentrated, constitutes therefore a remarkable
achievement. Along with the study of Russian and Kyrgyz languages (compulsory in
the state curricula), these institutions provide Uzbek students with the opportunity to
receive tuition in their native language. In addition Osh State University also offers
Uzbek language tuition for degrees in pedagogy, traditionally popular among Uzbek
female students, and Uzbek philology.
double-check. In no case I have found confirm of textbooks supply from Uzbekistan to the
neighbouring countries. Moreover, given the script change, it would not make any sense for
Uzbekistani authorities to send books that no-one would understand.
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The establishment of a University in Jalalabat is primarily due to the initiative
of Kadirjan Batyrov, a local businessman and chair of the Jalalabat branch of the
Uzbek national cultural centre. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in Osh is also the
result of the initiative of the Uzbek national-cultural centre, in particular of its
national president Mukhammadjan Mamasaidov (the university rektor). If the
situation overall bodes well for Uzbek language in the higher education sector, the
same cannot be said for primary and secondary level education. According to the
governor of the Osh province N. Kasiev (2003), there are 556 state schools in the
Osh province only. Of these 85 use Uzbek as the main language of instruction, 11
use Russian, and 56 adopted a mixed language system of education. According to
representatives of the Uzbek community, though, the problem lies in the quality of
teaching and the availability of textbooks for students. These are by no means
problems peculiar to Uzbek language schools, but the problem is more deeply felt
there since Uzbekistan's shift to the Latin alphabet, and the supply of textbooks from
Tashkent has come to a halt. In order to tackle the issue two publishing houses have
been established (one based at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University), although many more
will have to be established if the question of books supply is to be solved.
A key question concerns whether students living in a multi-ethnic area such
as the Ferghana Valley (where most people are tri-lingual), should receive education
in their mother tongue only. The Switzerland-based NGO Cimera and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have - separately - been at the forefront
of projects directly addressing two dimensions of the language issue: development of
oc
mass media and multi-lingual education . The field of education is a critical one for
minority and majority alike. Conscious of the centrality of language both in terms of
belonging and as a means of communication, this theme has received an increasing
degree of attention both from NGOs and, for example, the OSCE as well. Projects
such as the Cimera-funded and OSCE-supported "Multi-lingual Education and
Mother Tongue Education for National Minorities in Kyrgyzstan" are extremely
important. In a non-confrontational manner an extremely thorny issue has been
addressed in such a way that joint efforts from different actors (international
organizations, central government, local authorities, educational institutions) at
85See Cimera's website at www.cimera.org.
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different levels have started to deliver results: the creation of schools and
kindergartens throughout the country where students are taught in Russian, Kyrgyz,
and Uzbek. Multi-lingual education shifts the attention from an understanding of
language as a sign of ethnic identification to an approach that sees in language a
means of communication and an invaluable means of integration within multi-ethnic
societies.
5.1.4. Media
Uzbek-language media are moderately diverse:
foreign media: Uzbekistani newspapers - which are not delivered in
Kyrgyzstani territory except for Darakchi, the TV programme weekly- and
TV channels from Uzbekistan (Tv-l, Yo'shlar Telekanali, Namangan TV,
Andijon TV);
media of the local administration: the newspapers Jalalabad Tongi (Dawn of
Jalalabat) and O'sh Sadosi (Echo of Osh);
o/r
privately owned media: the newspapers Farg'ona , and Musulmon in
Jalalabat, the newspaper Demos Times in Osh87 and TV stations Osh TV,
Mezon TV, and DDD.
Uzbek language media are regionally based. Given the marginal presence of
Uzbeks in the northern provinces, it comes as no surprise that the Osh and Jalalabat
provinces are home to the totality of newspapers and TV stations in Uzbek language.
Private TV companies report constant problems with the authorities in respect of the
concession of licenses and the number of hours they are allowed to broadcast. Osh
oo
TV, has often been at the centre of the authorities' attention . Osh TV, the oldest
independent broadcasting company in the region (established in 1991), is an attempt
to provide an information channel to the local Uzbek population, and at the same
time establish a channel for the whole local population regardless of ethnic origins or
linguistic barriers (it broadcasts in Russian and Kyrgyz as well). There are two other
86Farg'ona used to be published until Summer 2003 in two editions, Uzbek and Kyrgyz. Due to lack
of funding the printing of the Uzbek edition has been suspended.
87Also currently suspended.
88Sukhov (2000) and interviews with the director of Osh TV Khudaiberdiev and the deputy director of
DDD (July, 2003).
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channels in southern Kyrgyzstan which broadcast in Uzbek language: Mezon TV and
DDD. Whereas DDD mostly broadcasts (Indian and Russian) films, Mezon TV
broadcasts news and documentaries alongside entertainment programs. In addition to
local channels in border regions it is possible to receive channels broadcast by
Uzbekistani TV, typically TV-1 and Yo'shlar, and depending on the location (the
signal is extremely weak) of Namangan TV and Andijon TV. Except for the
Uzbekistani channels TV-1 and Yo'shlar, the Kyrgyzstan-based ones are licensed to
broadcast only for a limited number of hours per day (from a minimum of two to a
maximum of six).
The means available to minority media are also scarce at best and some of them
can only employ a handful of journalists (the newspaper "Gazeta DDD" consists of
OQ
three journalists who also help with the printing and distribution of the newspaper ).
Content-wise Uzbek language media appear un-appealing to many: poems and
literary issues dominate the pages, leaving very little space to news, especially those
relevant to the Uzbek population (e.g. debates over language status, provision of
textbooks). A case in point is the coverage of the recent Assembly (Kurultai) of the
Uzbek people held in May 2003. Scant coverage has been given in the Uzbek
language newspapers, who have mostly focused on reporting the speeches of key
figures, without entering into the specifics of the issue on the table.
The situation of electronic media in Uzbek language is that it is almost non¬
existent. The websites are mostly in Russian, Kyrgyz language, and at times, English
language. Kyrgyzstan-based Uzbek language news sites are rare and their presence
on the web has been very erratic so far. The site "Fergana.org", a project funded by
international organizations launched in Autumn 2003, aims to bring together the
three areas of the Ferghana valley divided by state borders and create a source of
information for the valley-dwellers. Key to this project is the involvement of
journalists not just those based in the three republics, but especially of journalists
belonging to the various ethnic groups living in the valley. So far the website is
available in Russian only, although versions in other languages are expected in the
near future90. Additionally, the Russian language newspaper "Sosedy" (Neighbours)
89 Conversation with the editor of DDD, Osh, June 2003.
90Conversation with Almaz Kalet, January 2004.
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has been launched in the Spring of 2004 with the aim of bridging the different
communities living in the Ferghana Valley separated by state borders.
Similarly to Kyrgyzstan, there is no Uzbek language newspaper published
nation-wide in Tajikistan either. Though this can be ascribed to the regional
concentration of the Uzbek population in specific areas, a lack of even regionally-
based resources is illustrative of the dearth of information in the Uzbek language in
present-day Tajikistan. One could object that until now other priorities have
dominated Tajikistan's post-war reconstruction. However, the situation affects media
in the three main languages spoken in the country (Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek) in
different measure, as it is Uzbek language media that seem to encounter the most
serious difficulties.
Uzbek newspapers are published and distributed locally. They can be divided
in the state-owned and privately-owned newspapers97. The former include Sughd-
based Leninobod Khaqiqati (The Truth of Leninabad, also published in Russian as
Leninabadskaya Pravda and Tajik, Khaqiqati Leninobod), published by the local
provincial administration (Khukumat Viloiyati Sughd). The latter instead consist of
Tong (Dawn) only. Moreover, there are the publications of the Uzbek cultural
associations in the country:
Xalq Ovozi (The people's voice) newspaper/organ of the Dushanbe branch of
the Cultural Centre of Uzbeks;
Kadriyat, organ of the Khujand branch of the Cultural Centre of Uzbeks
('Tsentr Kul'tury Uzbekov Tadzhikistana'), with a circulation of eight
hundred and fifty copies;
Navruz, organ of the Society of Uzbeks in Penjikent.
In districts where the concentration of Uzbeks is higher, an additional four pages
in the Uzbek language are inserted in Tajik newspapers (Proletar Tongi and Qishloq
Xayoti in the Jabbor Rasulov district; Xalq So'zi in Nau) or publish one-two pages in
Tajik language newspapers (i.e. Ovozi Gonji, Ganji district). Uzbek language
information on television is rare and it is possible to note a tendency to decrease the
airtime where Uzbek language programs are aired (two hours per week on the main
state-owned TV channel). As in the case of Kyrgyzstan, regions closer to borders
91
Spravochnik SMI Sogdiiskoy Oblasti ( 2002).
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with Uzbekistan receive the signal from TV-1, the main channel from Tashkent, and
other local TV channels.
The Tong project
The case of the Tong newspaper well illustrates the situation of mass media in
Tajikistan. Tong is part of a project by the OSCE aiming at the establishment of three
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newspapers in the northern province of Sughd: one in Russian, "Varorud" , one in
Tajik, "Sughd', and one in Uzbek, "Tong". While the previous two have managed to
find a donor that would support the expenses incurred in the running of the
publications, Tong has failed to do so, leaving the Uzbek minority understandably
disappointed. The newspaper has been published since May 2002, but so far only six
issues have been published, the latest of which appeared on July 11th 2003. A point
of contention from the Uzbek community's perspective is that while the former two
projects have been accomplished and the newspapers established, the one concerning
the Uzbek project is still awaiting a donor. The six issues printed thus far had a
circulation of ca. 2,100 copies. The paper consisted of sixteen pages addressing a
range of issues including local, national, and international news, along with more
cultural questions (poetry, linguistic problems, etc). As mentioned above,
periodicals are - irregularly - published at town or village level. In most cases these
are four pages sheets with news printed in different languages (Tajik, Uzbek, and
Russian). As the proposal hints at, the goals of the newspaper are to provide the local
Uzbek speaking population with a source of information without being financially
and politically dependent on the city or provincial administration. The case of Tong
appears particularly interesting because it would represent the only independent
newspaper in the whole country to be printed in the Uzbek language.
5.1.5. Census policy and the "piataya grata"
The use of census as an instrument of nation-building has been investigated both
with regard to the early Soviet period and the Uzbek case in particular (Arel, 2002;
Hirsch, 1997; and Schoeberlein, 1994 and 1996; Abramson, 2002 respectively).
Identifying the actual size of an ethnic group has implications for the nation and
92Varorud's website is www.varorud.org.
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state-building process, as it entails greater rights for the minority for example. The
size of a group has implications that go beyond statistical interest. A large non titular
group can feel emboldened by census data and advance demands which it expects to
be met out of its numerical strength. From the perspective of the state, a sizeable
minority can be viewed with suspicion since it could threaten the identity of the state,
particularly when the state and national identities overlap. As noted in chapter 2, this
question is particularly thorny in Tajikistan, where the share of Uzbeks has dropped
from about 25% to just about 15% over just one decade. A sudden re-appearance of
categories previously subsumed in the Uzbek one has raised fears among the Uzbek
community that the state may be aiming at deliberately manipulating census
categories to Tajikify the country by de-creasing the Uzbek presence. Contentions
that figures regarding the number of Uzbeks living in the country may have been
downplayed have also been made in Kyrgyzstan.
Data from fieldwork reveal that there are no discrepancies between the
passport entry and the respondent's self-identification. In Tajikistan 97.7% of Uzbek
respondents also declare themselves as Uzbek in their passport. In Kyrgyzstan this is
slightly lower (88.9%), as part of the survey was conducted in areas of the Batken
province where Uzbek and Tajik population live closely intertwined (9.3% declared
themselves Tajik in the passport, but Uzbek in the questionnaire). No respondent in
either Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reported the "benefits" from changing one's own
passport nationality. The near total coincidence between passport entry and self-
identification appears to confirm this. In the case of Kyrgyzstan one notes a steady
increase in both the numbers and share of the Uzbek population. In Tajikistan
respondents were also asked to declare their nationality as stated in the passport to
check possible discrepancies between one's declared nationality and actual self-
perception. 97.7% of respondents stated that the passport nationality is also Uzbek
(1.5% Tajik, 0.8% Kyrgyz)93. The question of the nationality entry in passports
constitutes one of the very few cases where ethnic minorities - overcoming their
93These data should be considered with caution. In the case of Kyrgyzstan in 85 cases the question
was not posed. Of the remaining 28 respondents answered the question, but 37 did not and left the
space blank. In Tajikistan the no response rate was lower (38 cases), while 99 respondents did answer
the question.
collective action problems - joined efforts to have the nationality entry
abolished in 1996 - thereafter re-introduced94 on the basis that:
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- previously
"Canceling the entry would imply erasing all non Kyrgyz identities'. 'We would all have
become Kyrgyz". "You would not hear of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, Uyghurs, or even Russians
anymore".
5.1.6. Political representation and political parties
There are no official data as to the presence of ethnic minorities in state and local
institutions, which leaves too large a space for speculation, both from titular groups
and minorities as well. Neither is it clear what the appropriate level of representation
should be. In Tajikistan for example, Tajiks constitute about 80% of the population.
Does this mean that they are entitled to a similar proportion of seats, say in the
national and local majlises (assemblies)? According to Tajikistan's national policy
"concept" (2002) the state "provides the possibility for the national minorities to
participate in the public administration". In the 2000-2005 Majlisi Milli (higher
chamber of the parliament, Majlisi Oli) minorities accounted for 9% of the seats
(three seats out of thirty-four, one each for Russians, Uzbeks - from Nau district -
and Kyrgyz), despite the fact that one in five citizens are not ethnic Tajik.
Additionally, in the northern Sughd province non Tajik presence rises to ca. 40%, of
which the near totality is Uzbek. In local assemblies minority representation appears
higher, with chairs of district assemblies or deputies of city and province khukumat
in the Sughd province belonging to Uzbek ethnicity.
The situation in Kyrgyzstan is analogous. The Jogorku Kenesh (2000-2005)
included four Uzbek deputies, pointing to a decline from the previous parliamentary
elections (1995) saw eight Uzbek deputies, six Slavs, and six belonging to other
minority groups sitting alongside eighty-five Kyrgyz. Though less extreme, the 1995
Jogorku Kenesh hardly reflected the country's ethnic composition, where 41% of the
population (non Kyrgyz) won as little as 19% of seats (ibid., p. 137).
One should note that in 2000 all four deputies were elected in Osh electoral
districts, leaving Jalalabat Uzbeks without representation - for which the re-drawing
94Dave (2004, p. 142).
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of electoral boundaries was blamed95. At local level Uzbek representation appears
more problematic than in Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, though there are Uzbek deputies
in the city and provincial assemblies, no Uzbeks in senior positions (zamestiteT)
could be found in the southern provinces as of Summer 2003, though there are signs
that the situation may be changing. By the mid-1990s Uzbeks occupied less than 5%
of key posts in provincial administrations (Dave, 2004 p. 145).
The party system is still in its embryonic form in both Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. In fact it is not really possible to speak of political parties in the
traditional sense, with clear ideological platforms, programs, membership, internal
structure and institutionalization, and a capillary presence in the various regions. On
the contrary, political parties appear to be personalized, ideologically vaguely
defined and with a territorially weak presence (Abazov, 2003 p.559; Akiner, 2001
p.64-72).
There seems to be very little inclination among the Uzbek elite to join
political parties. Only about 15-20% of respondents admitted to having any party
affiliation. Uzbeks have progressively been sidelined from political and party life,
with political parties and organizations becoming progressively Kyrgyz
organizations (that is, with Kyrgyz having the only serious chances to acquire senior
positions), thus contributing to Uzbek frustration. The fact that no Uzbek party exists
should not suggest that representation of Uzbek interests is non existent. In fact,
Kyrgyzstanis tend to vote basing their preferences on personalities and
personal/family/clan links rather than on programmes or parties.
5.1.7. Summary
This section has outlined the official policy framework shaping Uzbek life in both
countries. While Uzbeks, and for that matter other ethnic minorities, have not
experienced an exclusivist legislation of the type implemented in Estonia and Latvia,
formal citizenship has failed to turn into equal citizenship with the titular population.
Census data and the debate surrounding them show that the state may be reluctant to
accept its minority groups as full-fledged citizens. Also, restrictions in the field of
political organization may well reflect genuine concerns that allowing ethnic parties
95Declaration of the Uzbek Kurultai in Jalalabat 2002 (Khamidov, 2002a).
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would establish an effective vehicle of mobilization. To conclude the legislative side
appears more satisfactory the then implementation one, or the perception thereof, as
the section below confirms.
5.2.1. Perceptions of political opportunity
The scope of this section is to examine Uzbek perceptions of state practices to
identify the main contentious areas and outline a typology of Uzbek grievances and
demands. The extent to which the main political actor in both countries (namely, the
president) has managed to bridge policies and practices will be examined in the final
section. General views with regard to the Uzbek situation are mixed in both
countries. As tables 5.1 (a to c) show, half of the respondents in Tajikistan (47.3%)
and less than a third in Kyrgyzstan (31.0%) expressed positive/very positive views of
the current situation in their respective countries with regard to political issues (table
5.1a). More positive views are expressed in respect of the economic and cultural
situation (5.1b and c), where nearly half of the Kyrgyzstani respondents considered
the economic situation as positive or very positive (47.6%) and about one in three
expressed a positive evaluation of the cultural situation (table 5.1c, 64%); nearly two
in three Uzbeks in Tajikistan had positive or very positive opinions in this regard
(62% and 62.8% respectively). Overall it seems that Tajikistani Uzbeks tend to have
a more positive view of the current situation specifically concerning their
community. This pictures emerges clearly from interviews with Uzbeks living in
northern Tajikistan, who emphasise that although serious questions that should be
addressed by the central government (lack of economic opportunities and finances in
general, under-representation of the north in the country's political life) do exist,
these do not affect Uzbeks only. Respondents in Tajikistan showed a clear difficulty
in operating a clear-cut difference between Uzbeks and Tajiks. In both Uzbekistan
and some areas of Tajikistan the two peoples have traditionally lived side by side,
intermingled, adopted similar customs and spoken each other's language. Northern
Tajikistan is arch-typical of this symbiosis between Uzbeks and Tajiks. Uzbekistan's
president Islam Karimov's reference to Uzbeks and Tajiks as "the same people
speaking two different languages" illustrates well, a view which is widely shared by
Uzbeks and Tajiks alike:
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"We [Uzbeks and Tajiks] always lived together here, there is no difference between us". "Nationality
is not important to us, we all understand both languages". "Customs are the same, we celebrate
weddings and funerals in similar ways". "Now we have a border that separates us from Uzbekistan,
but in fact there is no real difference between us and them". "Yes, I agree with him [Karimov], there is
no real difference between Uzbeks and Tajiks".
The impression that national differences were downplayed is consistent with other
studies conducted in Tajikistan96 and shows that especially in the Sughd province the
two groups are well integrated. Sughd Uzbeks emphasised how problems in
Tajikistan do not concern one nationality only, but rather the whole population.
"Yes, we have problems here, but who doesn't? 'Everyone has problems here, Tajiks, Uzbeks,
Russians". "Problems have nothing to do with nationality, there are no jobs here, whether you are
Uzbek or Tajik, it does not matter".
By contrast, respondents in Kyrgyzstan, did not qualify their views in the same way
in the same way Tajikistani Uzbeks did, and this could suggest a bigger social
distance between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks than between Uzbeks and Tajiks, as Faranda
and Nolle have noted (2003).




Very good 3.6 3.9
Good 27.4 43.4
Not good 54.8 45.7
Don't know 14.3 7.0
5.1b Economic
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Very good 9.5 0.8
Good 38.1 61.2
Not good 39.3 31.8
Don't know 13.1 6.2
%Roy (1995); Rubin (1998); Akiner (2001).
97In light of the Uzbek reluctance to express openly negative views about something as this might
eventually lead something negative to happen (on this see also). For this reason the term in the




Very good 14.5 6.2
Good 49.5 56.6
Not good 26.5 32.6
Don't know 9.6 4.7
In the case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks older generations seem to have more positive
views of the political and cultural situation, while younger respondents hold positive
perceptions of the economic situation, consistent with a view that younger
generations tend to express more radical view than older ones. Male respondents tend
to express positive views towards the cultural and economic situation compared to
female respondents. Also, respondents from rural areas as opposed to urban ones
evaluate the overall situation more positively. A similar urban/rural divide exists
with regard to the northern Sughd province, where negative views are prevalent in
Khujand. Respondents from Dushanbe tend to share similar (positive) perceptions
with rural respondents in Sughd, but not with those from Khujand, which means that
data aggregate per region conceal some critical differences. Interestingly, this might
reflect reported attempts from Dushanbe to divide (and rule) the northern province
and diminish Khujand's primacy by supporting competing power centres. Contrary
to the Kyrgyzstani case, female respondents assess the situation more positively than
male respondents, and older generations also display positive views overall in the
three questions. To summarise, in both countries Uzbeks have a more positive view
of the cultural situation, whereas pending political questions generate dissatisfaction
and negative assessments.
Having established that there are causes of dissatisfaction and grievance, I
then explored the content of such grievances and the type of demands Uzbeks
consider to be of more pressing concern. I then asked members of the titular group to
comment on those findings in order to find out what reactions these findings might
elicit among 'titulars' and especially whether they thought that such concerns were
justified.














Within the Uzbek population few (19% in Kyrgyzstan and 30.6% in Tajikistan)
think they are adequately represented at political level (table 5.2), including in high
positions of government or in state organs (security services, army, judiciary, state
and local administration). With regard to the economic sphere, it is often argued that
Uzbeks occupy a privileged economic niche (they are traditionally a more trade-
oriented people than Tajiks or Kyrgyz)98. The main bazaar in Osh is home to Uzbek
traders, and this also applies to the main market in Khujand. Although Uzbeks tend
to occupy niches in the labour market in both countries, one should wonder whether
this is the outcome of a deliberate choice or a product of the constraints imposed by
the structural environment that leads Uzbeks to insulate themselves from the political
realm and deal with trade. In June 2003 I contacted the office of the local mayor in
Osh. What I intended to find out was whether a record was being held of the
applicants for a job in the local 'Meri' (mayor). According to the information I was
given of the 2,200 applications received for positions at first and second level none
came from Uzbek applicants. When I presented this finding to Uzbek respondents,
the typical response pointed to the fact that "there is no real point in applying if one
already knows that the post will be given to a Kyrgyz".
At local level it is possible to find members of national minorities holding
offices at city level (town khokimiyat): in Kara-Tyube, Batken region, the khokim is
Uzbek, in Kyzylkya in Tajik and Tajik are his three deputies. In Nookat the khokim
is Kyrgyz and the deputy Uzbek. In Uch-Kurgan the local deputy khokim, herself a
Korean, noted that "there isn't any Uzbek in high positions at the khokimiyat", but
(rather concerned presumably about my interest in the topic) assured the colleague
that was working with me "there would soon be one". Overall, however, finding a
khokim belonging to a national minority is more the exception than the rule even in
9801imov and Olimova (2002), Tishkov (1995), Huskey (2002).
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areas of high Tajik and Uzbek concentration. It is more common, by contrast, to find
deputies (zamestitel') belonging to minority groups. This is a widespread practice in
the Sughd region, where in fact the issue of cadre is raised only with regard to
representation at the Oliy Majlis. Whether individuals in such positions hold real
power or whether the office is more ceremonial than anything else, remains an open
question. Overall, Uzbeks show a propensity not to make explicit use of the term
discrimination, preferring the term "tendency" to prefer members of the titular group
to those belonging to other communities. Tendency represents a sort of euphemism,
particularly suitable as it captures a phenomenon which is particularly fluid and very
hard to verify empirically (discrimination in job employment and career
advancement on national basis). Given the well-known divisions along regional lines
(in Tajikistan) and in light of the apparent lack of inter-ethnic tensions, I set out to
investigate this aspect further, to explore the extent to which discrimination might
follow instead regional rather than national lines.
Table 5.4a Do you think that northern Tajikistan is politically
discriminated/marginalized?
Total North Dushanbe
Yes 36.6 34.1 42.9
No 26.8 23.9 34.3
Don't know 35.8 40.9 22.9
Other 0.8 1.1 0.3
Table 5.4b If so, on what basis?
Total North Dushanbe
National" 45.5 30.8 81.3
Regional 36.4 48.7 6.3
Consequence of civil war 10.9 10.3 12.5
Other 7.3 10.3 0.0
Perhaps surprisingly, only about one third of respondents shared the view that
citizens from the Sughd regions suffer from political marginalization/exclusion
(34.1% in Sughd). What is more striking is that regional rather than national
motivations seem to be at the origins of such tendency, according to northern
Tajikistani Uzbeks (48.7%). This is in contrast with respondents from Dushanbe
(81.3%) who overwhelmingly suggested discrimination to be nationally motivated
(table 23).
""National" refers to the Uzbek/Tajik cleavage.
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Data from tables 5.2 to 5.4 (and follow-up interviews) lead to a series of
considerations. First negative perceptions are stronger among southern Kyrgyzstani
Uzbeks than among northern Tajikistanis. In general, concerns are stronger with
regard to the political sphere, where lack of political representation at national level
and perceptions of unfair cadre policies appear to dominate the Uzbek political
discourse. At the same time a more positive assessment of the cultural situation
should not be mistaken for satisfaction with the status quo. There are indeed serious
grievances and demands which have been raised: the language issue, understood in a
broad sense (textbooks in Uzbek, possibility of obtaining education in primary and
secondary schools in Uzbek language, language status) affects to a large extent the
whole Uzbek community and, as it will be shown in the next section, dominates the
agenda of Uzbek organizations. Predictably, perceptions from minority and majority
groups tend to differ with regard to employment policy, with the former noting
covert discrimination and the latter by contrast lamenting affirmative action policies
in distinct sectors.
5.2.2 Typology of demands and grievances
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100Data were collected by means of a survey conducted in four areas of Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek, and
Osh, Jalalabat and Batken provinces) among 85 respondents.
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As chart 5.1 shows, three issues appear of immediate concern to Kyrgyzstani
Uzbeks: the lack of cadres and of political representation (44 indications),
unemployment (41), and cultural/educational issues (education in Uzbek language,
37, and lack of textbooks in Uzbek, 36). Still relevant, but of less immediate concern
is the question of information available in native language (29). In the case of
Tajikistani Uzbeks (chart 5.2), questions of education (54), language (53) and
information (50) are considered more urgent. The lack of cadres, however relevant
(34) does not constitute a priority to Tajikistani Uzbeks. A note deserves to be
mentioned with regard to the influence that negative perceptions of the Uzbekistani
leadership play in this complex matrix. In this regard a recent International Crisis
group report (ICG, 2002b) has noted that the popularity of a separatist idea could
paradoxically increase with a higher degree of liberalization in Uzbekistan. In fact, as
long as the economic and political situation is perceived to be comparatively better in
Kyrgyzstan Uzbeks - the argument goes - will have no incentives to mobilize around
a separatist agenda101. Uzbek respondents tend to avoid taking openly such a
hypothesis into account, however remote it may appear. What appears evident,
,01How at that point the Uzbekistani leadership would react is quite another matter.
131
however is the importance of the way Uzbeks imagine Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani
leadership.
A few exceptions aside, I found representatives of the Uzbek elite in southern
Kyrgyzstan strongly critical of the Karimov administration. There is a whole
segment of the population (young males, especially among students and journalists)
that does not hide its fierce opposition to Karimov's policies vis-a-vis religious
freedom, border policies, and political freedom in general. As survey data have
shown, perceptions of Uzbekistan and of the Uzbekistani leadership among local
Uzbeks are not positive. Rather they reflect the often emphasized sensation of being
"at a cusp" between a kin country that treats them as foreigners (Uzbekistan) and
another which doubts its loyalty (Kyrgyzstan).
Perceptions of effectiveness











5.9 4.3 4.3 5.3 7.1 3.6
Effective 21.2 19.1 20.0 26.5 27.4 12.7
Not
effective
55.9 55.7 49.6 52.2 47.8 61.8
Don't
know
16.9 20.9 26.1 15.9 17.7 21.8
Table 5.5b How effective are the following institutions with dealing with issues





Very effective 9.9 8.8 0.8 5.5
Effective 45.0 32.8 33.3 52.0
Not effective 36.6 42.4 41.7 30.7
Don't know 8.4 16.0 24.2 11.8
I02Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan.
103Uzbek National-Cultural Centre.
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With respect to national policy and inter-ethnic relations opinions among the Uzbek
population are quite mixed. About one in two respondents found the Presidential
Administration (apparatus) effective or very effective (see table below). Presidential
and local/provincial administrations are - as shown in chapter 4 - among the
institutions which respondents found more effective in regard to managing ethnic
relations. Though deference may have played a role and respondents may have been
inclined to express more positive opinions, the overall picture appears quite
variegated with only a minor percentage considering the presidential administration
as dealing very effectively with ethnic questions (9.9%). Follow-up interviews
tended to qualify the opinions expressed in the survey. Respondents who had
previously expressed more critical views on leadership effectiveness confirmed that
state institutions did not appear particularly successful in dealing with the question of
ethnic relations. It is interesting to note how certain types of institutions fared
compared to others. The highest and the lowest level (president and local) of
aministration were indicated as the most effective in dealing with ethnic questions,
whereas intermediate level institutions (parliament) or organizations designed to deal
with issues (council, of national-cultural centres) did not meet equally positive
responses (again, see chapter 4). While there were no significant variation across
areas (the Sughd province and Dushanbe), disaggregating data between rural and
urban respondents, one notes how the presidential administration was perceived more
positively in the rural areas of the Sughd province than in the city of Khujand itself.
This constitutes only a limited surprise, though. During the early post-independence
period - indicatively until 1998 - Khujand was home to frequent disturbances and
uprisings against the central government in Dushanbe, culminating in the April 1997
assassination attempt on President Rakhmonov during a visit to the city. Ever since,
the region and the city of Khujand in particular has been substantially peaceful.
Perceptions of effectiveness aside, the near totality of Uzbek and Tajik respondents
emphasised how the national question was not a priority in the country and that
inter-ethnic relations (perhaps with the exception of the south-western areas) were
overall rather good104.
104This is confirmed by surveys conducted throughout the whole post-independence period (Ifes,
1996a; Bozrikova, 2003).
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5.3. The impact of presidential agency on shaping the political
opportunity structure
5.3.1. The role of Askar Akaev as guarantor of inter-ethnic stability
It would be impossible to discuss the evolution of the political opportunity structure
in Kyrgyzstan without without taking into account the crucial role of former
President Askar Akaev in shaping the republic's post-Soviet trajectory, most
crucially in the early formative years, when Kyrgyzstan embarked on a reform path
that made it distinctive from the other countries in the region105. Risen to central
stage in politics from an academic background and as a compromise candidate
between rivalling factions, Askar Akaev embarked upon the uneasy task of guiding
Kyrgyzstan through an independence which it did not long for.
Akaev's role in initiating and promoting political and economic reforms has
been recognised by many (Melvin, 2001; Dukenbayev and Hansen, 2003; Huskey,
1997 and 2002; Spector, 2004). Spector (2004) convincingly argues that paying
attention to the leadership factor helps us understand the particular liberalising and
reformist trajectory that the country followed from 1991 to the mid-1990s. Where
scholars disagree is in establishing exactly how much Akaev and his personality and
leadership mattered. On the one hand Eugene Huskey (1995, 1997a and 1997b,
2002), Bhavna Dave (2004) and again Regine Spector (2004) have recognised the
importance of agency and leadership specifically in shaping the course of events. On
the other, Pauline Jones Luong (2002) and Kathleen Collins (2003) have argued that
other factors - namely regionalism and perceptions of power shifts, and danism
respectively - have been critical and can aid the understanding of Kyrgyzstan's post-
Soviet political and economic transformation.
The formulation of a unifying state ideology has been central to Kyrgyzstan's
state-building project (Megoran, 2002d p.l 16). It has given purpose to an otherwise
fragmented people. Key has been the will of the political leadership to make inter-
ethnic peace a priority in the process of state- and nation-building of the country.
Due to the necessity of balancing between clans, regions, and ethnic groups it is
hardly surprising that Akaev attempted to present the country with a sort of
105When the regime started to resort to authoritarian tactics, by contrast, other variables become
equally ifnot more important to understand the Kyrgyz puzzle.
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ideological compromise. The problem is that, as Nick Megoran notes, the result was
a policy resting upon internal contradictions (ibid., p. 121). Along with the inclusive
"Kyrgyzstan is our common home" ideology came an equally important moral
guideline, this time "for Kyrgyz only": the re-discovery of the epos of Manas, the
legendary Kyrgyz hero. The country's ideological framework was actually
bifurcated, in an attempt by the state leadership to give concessions to both Kyrgyz
nationalists and representatives of national minorities.
Akaev's incidence on inter-ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan can be illustrated by
looking at his role in shaping two policies and establishing two institutions that
directly affected the situation of the Uzbek population in the country: the
establishment of the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan and national-cultural
centres; and land and language policies.
First, two institutions have been crucial in providing an institutional and
operational framework for the ideology to work: the Assembly of the People of
Kyrgyzstan and the national-cultural centres106. Given the centrality of the latter to
the study of processes of political mobilization among the Uzbek population, this
will be the object of a sepatate analysis in the next chapter, where its role will be
discussed as a mobilizing structure and an actor in its own right. As to the Assembly
of the People of Kyrgyzstan (APK), this institutional body was established in 1994
to advise the president on ethnic matters. The rationale behind the establishment of
the APK was the necessity to prevent Osh clashes or similar events from taking place
again, and provide a forum where demands and grievances could be voiced and
discussed. The goals of the APK are the:
"...realization and protection of interests of all ethnoses, populating Kyrgyzstan, and national
minorities of the KR, forming together with Kyrgyz people the nation of Kyrgyzstan; contribution to
everything that pulls together all ethnoses of Kyrgyzstan, their familiarization with universal
humanistic values; the prevention of the intense situations connected to multinational relations;
prevention of confrontation and extremism displayed in the international relations"107.
106 These have been briefly outlined in this chapter and will be discussed more in detail in chapter 7.
107Available at http://eng.president.kg/president/intpolicv/asemblvkrenv
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The APK comprises all the national-cultural associations registered in the country,
each of which has its own representative in the forum. The choice of the
denomination is already illustrative of the attempt of the Kyrgyzstani leadership to
define a nation based on the inclusive criteria of citizenship rather than in ethnic
terms. Rather than an Assembly of the Peoples of Kyrgyzstan, which would have
reflected the multi-national nature of the country, the choice of the singular form
emphasises the unity of purposes and the formation of one Kyrgyzstani people.
Akaev's policy of concessions confirms Megoran's argument that Akaev has
actually based his administration on a contradictory balance between nationalists and
the exigencies of including ethnic minorities. A concession to one side seemed to be
balanced by one in the opposite (such as changing the country's official name into a
more ethnically charged Kyrgyz Respublikasy). None the less, this should not
conceal the significant improvement made by the state administration to reform the
country and institutions. Two additional issues clearly illustrate Akaev's role: the
land and language issues.
First, land distribution arguably constituted one of the root causes of the 1990
Osh conflict, when tensions escalated into open confrontation between Uzbeks and
Kyrgyz. The question of land property and allocation was particularly (hotly)
debated in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period. Riding the wave of ethnic
revival, Kyrgyz authorities in 1991 passed a law which declared "land and natural
resources the wealth [dostoyanie] of the Kyrgyz people" (Huskey, 1997a p.254).
According to the law, ethnic groups were entitled to rights of use, possession and
alienation. The fact that property became a right of the titular group raised inter-
ethnic tensions which were soothed only after Akaev's intervention in vetoing the
law in April 1991 (Bohr and Crisp, 1996). The reference to the Kyrgyz nation was
later replaced as follows: '[ 1 ]and is the property of the peoples of Kyrgyzstan.
Akaev's timely action helped prevent a repetition of the May-June 1990 events,
when the re-allocation of 32 hectars originally belonging to an Uzbek collective farm
to ethnic Kyrgyz represented the spark which ignited the subsequent conflict
(Huskey, 1997a p.262).
Second, the language debate in Kyrgyzstan has been one of the defining
elements of the state- and nation-building project. Russians inhabit urban centres
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especially in the north, whereas Uzbeks are concentrated in the south. Strong
divisions exist between Kyrgyz, as the most Russified or them are not fluent in the
Kyrgyz language and tend to use Russian at work and home as well. Soon after
independence negotiations and discussion over the status of Russian began.
However, it was not until May 2000 that Russian was declared the state's second
official language. As noted earlier in the chapter, despite the requests of the Uzbek
community, the issue as to whether Uzbek should be also recognised as official
language, possibly in the south only, never appeared on the agenda owing to the fear
that granting Uzbek an official status might be the first step towards further demands.
Compared to the situation in other post-Soviet countries, where the debate involved
the status of the Russian language alongside that of the titular population, the
controversy over language (status) acquired a "triangular dimension" in Kyrgyzstan
(Dave, 2004), given that Uzbek population demanded that the Uzbek language be
recognised with official status at a national level, or at least in areas of greater Uzbek
concentration. This request, among the thorniest to be addressed by the country's
leadership, has thus far remained without following and therefore unresolved,
leaving the Uzbek population very much frustrated. The debate over the language(s)
which should and would be granted official status began well before the Soviet
collapse and is in fact not over yet. The situation of Kyrgyzstan is actually quite
peculiar, Dave observes (2004 p. 120), because it concerned the possibility or in fact
the "remedial" (ibid., p. 125) measures to be taken in order to redress the
Russification policies of the Soviet era which were perceived as the cause of the low
level of fluency in Kyrgyz by the titular population. Especially in urban centres and
in the north, Russian used to be the language in which most Kyrgyz expressed
themselves. What was the point then, of replacing it with a language very few spoke?
As Dave notes, there are widespread fears among the Kyrgyz population,
especially but not only in the south, that granting Uzbek a special (official) status
would sooner or later open the way to demands for an official recognition of the
status of the Uzbek population in the southern provinces. Rooted in the Soviet
mindset that federal institutions and devolution could be synonymous with future
secession, the possibility of an Uzbek autonomous region (which very few Uzbeks
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demand, though) is perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Kyrgyzstani
state and therefore does not even come onto the agenda.
Akaev's concessions did not stretch to the point of providing the Uzbek
language with a status equal to that granted to Russian. In fact, the Uzbek language
never figured in any official policy resolution or even draft. It looked at times as if
one seventh of the country's population were not Uzbek speakers. In sum, Akaev has
vetoed or rejected parliamentary attempts to legislate in a way that could have
threatened inter-ethnic stability. This has been successful overall, and certainly is to
Akaev's credit. However, the situation has progressively deteriorated throughout the
past decade, with increased signs of authoritarianism, reliance on a narrower circle of
1 AO
elites and marginalization not only of opposition but of minority group as well
Throughout his tenure in office, Akaev has constantly relied on the support
and loyalty of the country's ethnic minorities. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter,
this stems from very pragmatic considerations from both Akaev and the minority
groups themselves. Whether they actually like or trust each other is nearly irrelevant.
What matters is that Russian and especially Uzbek support for the current
administration arises from the consciousness that there are no alternatives (or put
differently, any alternative is expected to be worse - hence, the logic goes, better to
keep what one has already). Uzbek support appeared crucial in the 1995 elections, as
without the votes of the Uzbek population Akaev would have trailed the communist
candidate Absamat Masaliev in the south - which would have led to a completely
different electoral geography in Kyrgyzstan. The situation repeated itself in 2000
(presidential elections) and 2003 referendum, where again - though arguably less
enthusiastically - Uzbeks turned up en masse to bring their support to the incumbent
(2000) and the president's proposed constitutional amendments.
Why was this the case? After all, the Uzbek population has been reported as
disgruntled and increasingly isolated due to a lack of political representation and a
lack of possibilities of obtaining information and education in Uzbek language.
Besides the fact that most grievances have only been marginally addressed, Uzbeks
continue to consider the current administration and Akaev in particular as the "lesser
of two evils", the other being a more nationalist personality (though one can not
108The nomination of a Russian to the post of prime minister can be seen as a mere facade, if not
accompanied by real re-distribution of position and power sharing at both central and local level.
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speculate about the identity, as the opposition is so fragmented and divided itself).
Fear of change prevails over what is widely regarded as the unnecessary gambling of
one's own future (the Uzbek community's), and this explains the continued support
over the years. Rakhmonov in Tajikistan still enjoys similar political dividends due
to his stabilising role. Similarly one may wonder how long these dividends are going
to pay in Kyrgyzstan as recent unrest (the 2001-2003 period being the most violent in
the country since the Osh events) seemed to suggest a season of instability.
Neil Melvin (2001) points to the important role that regionalism and regional
networks (identities and interests and power groups) play in the country. One would
nevertheless miss an important element which crucially helped maintain Akaev's
grip on power if the uncoupling of regional divides from the Uzbek side were
neglected. This helps explain how the balance of power in Kyrgyzstan has (or has
not) shifted during the 1990s and how Akaev has managed to preserve and
consolidate his power. Uzbeks are seen as a sort of fifth column of northern Kyrgyz
actors. In fact, this seems to be a largely held perception among southern Kyrgyz
who represent the segment of society most discontent with the current regime. The
March 2002 riots in the southern village of Aksy were much more than a clash over
Beknazarov's fate or the country's leadership handling of the opposition. This was a
highly significant sign that the regional balance may be at risk or that at least it is far
from secure. Melvin underlines the significance of the shift in the balance of power
between regions and elite groups in late Soviet Kyrgyzstan (2001 p. 178), and notes
how during the Soviet era Uzbeks enjoyed the presence of open borders with
Uzbekistan and cultural and political privileges in the country. Higher birth rates
among the Kyrgyz and the effects of the elite replacement policy under the
perestroika profoundly affected the regional balance of power and put the Uzbek
position at risk. The importance of regional and clan-based divisions to understand
the potential for (in) stability in Kyrgyzstan has been emphasised by many authors
(Jones Luong, 2992; Dukenbayev and Hansen, 2003). Erosions of privileges pushed
for calls for autonomy in the early 1990s (Melvin, 2001 p. 178-182) following the
perception that deals between Kyrgyz regional leaders would eventually marginalize
Uzbeks from political life. That this did not happen is to the credit of Akaev's
strategy of balancing different regional groups and in particular relying on the
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support of ethnic minorities. This entailed the adoption of a divide and rule
approasch in the south, where Uzbek loyalty to the centre was rewarded with
concessions in the cultural realm. The policy of "un-coupling" Uzbeks from the
regional (southern) networks had long-lasting effects.
Until 1993-94 Uzbek support was critical to Akaev's rule, as he came to
power without having a power base of his own (being an outsider to Kyrgyz politics).
As soon as the president began consolidating his power by relying more and more on
regional governors (hakims), Uzbek support became less indispensable, though still
retained its centraliy in terms of the rhetoric of 'Kyrgyzstan is our common home'. A
new phase then began in the mid-1990s in the relationshisp between Akaev and the
Uzbek community, where the latter's support has become less a matter of "faith" or
trade-offs (something that critical viewers among local Uzbeks now blame the
official leadership for) and more of fear of the instability that may arise from
Akaev's exit from politics. In essence, 'who knows who will come after Akaev?' has
replaced trust and confidence in the president's ability in balancing different regional
and ethnic interests.
5.3.2. Emomali Rakhmonov and the "Dangharization"109 of the country
Rakhmonov's ascent to Tajikistan's presidency (and earlier chair of the national
parliament) derives much from his being a protege from a then warlord (Sanjak
Safarov, leader of the southern-based militia Popular Front) as well as the
widespread perception that his being alien to both the political establishment and any
other elite circle would make him easier to manoeuvre (Atkin, 2002). While these
may well have been the critical factors at the time, Rakhmonov has increasingly
carved for himself some autonomy from his patrons, and finally reversed the roles by
consolidating his power and power base, thus marginalizing the warlords he
previously relied on110.
109From the name of the president's village of origin, Danghara (near Kulyab). I prefer the term to
Kulyabization as this overlooks at the internal heterogeneity and disparity of access to power and
resources across the region.
110In this context can be situated the recent arrests of previously close allies (ICG, 2004).
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It is safe to argue that ethnic policy has not been a priority for the
Rakhmonov's administration, at least until very recently111. Muriel Atkin
characterises Rakhmonov's presidency as one of "ineffective authoritarianism"
(2002). Rakhmonov enjoyed no real power or authority, Atkin contends, as he was
chosen to rule a war-torn society from within a divided coalition (Cummings, 2002b
p.6). Starting from a position of "diminished agency", given his crucial reliance on
112Russian backing and dependence on his clients for support in the country, through
the years Rakhmonov consolidated his precarious hold on power, making use of it to
reward clients and deflect criticism (Atkin, 2002 p.97), although the extent to which
Dushanbe's writ applies to the whole country remains somewhat dubious. With the
post of president having been abolished in 1992, Rakhmonov became the country's
de facto acting president in those years. The post was re-established in 1994 and
Rakhmonov was elected in a very controversial election with about 60% of votes.
The challenger at that time, former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullajonov,
received a large degree of support from his native province of Sughd/Leninabad
(95% of the vote) but was eventually defeated. A feud began between the two which
eventually led to the exile of Abdullajonov (whom the president deemed too
resourceful, Akbarzadeh, 2001) and a series of uprisings, allegedly orchestrated by
him, against the Rakhmonov administration in 1996-98. Ever after Rakhmonov
adopted a stance which equated the so-called third force led by Abdullajonov (the
Movement for National Renewal, based in Khujand) with the whole northern region,
assuming that the province would follow Abdullajonov by default. This was not the
case, but Rakhmonov's position on the issue has not changed ever since, leaving the
north virtually out of the political process. Though on the one hand Rakhmonov has
established himself as a credible leader (Akiner, 2001 and ICG, 2003) out of his role
as guarantor of stability, he has increasingly relied on a narrow(er) elite group,
marginalizing real or imagined challengers, as was the case with the so-called "third
force" and generally isolated north.
"'Since 2000 the Dushanbe office of the OSCE has provided legal advice to the country's
administration in regard to the formulation of a national concept (nationality policy). Drafts have been
circulated thereafter, often meeting resistance or scepticism from minority groups (author's interviews
in Dushanbe August 2003).
""Tajikistan has from many been defined as nothing more than a Russian protectorate (i.e. Rubin,
1998).
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While Atkin and Akiner insightfully examine Rakhmonov's agency in the
complex process of state-building in a war-ridden country, they do not seem to
consider the impact that his reliance on a narrow power base (now restricted to his
113native Danghara valley, particularly the villages of Danghara and Farkhad ) has
had not only on intra-Tajik relations, but on inter-ethnic relations as well, given that
the Uzbek share in power structures has decreased sharply throughout the years.
Atkin also notes that in the late Soviet era Uzbeks enjoyed considerable protection,
which can partly be ascribed to the fact that the then ruling faction of Leninabad is in
fact quite Uzbekified (due to closer contacts with Tashkent than Dushanbe in Soviet
times), but also to the liberalising reforms that made Tajikistan among the most
pluralistic societies in pre-independence Central Asia. In ultimate analysis, while he
may not have defined his terms in office by the sign of inter-ethnic stability and
harmony in the same way Askar Akaev had, - arguably there are other priorities,
such as poverty reduction, reconstruction of institutions and infrastructures -, the
badly concealed process of monopolization of power positions from Dangharis
(causing dissatisfaction among other Kulyabis too) can potentially cause a fall-out on
the so far stable inter-ethnic relations.
As said, Rakhmonov's agency in ethnic matters has been limited for a
number of reasons, not least the existence of other priorities in the country's post-war
reconstruction. The establishment of cultural organizations has much in common
with the neighbouring Central Asian states and owes more to Soviet practices of
control than to individual agency in guaranteeing minority groups representation.
Only recently have Tajikistani authorities entered into a dialogue with
representatives of ethnic minorities under the pressure of international organizations.
Negotiations over the adoption of a national policy under the auspices of the OSCE
may represent an initial step in recognising the centrality of stable inter-ethnic
relations to the country' success in the state-building process. Another sign of
progress is perhaps less visible, but potentially more far reaching in that it affects the
crucial question of local government and decentralization of power (Olimov and
Olimova, 2002). This policy has no ethnic connotations or rationale, but the positive
implications of local communities empowerment can address part of the yet un-
"TCG (2001c).
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addressed question of representation of minority groups because strengthening local
self-government - through the creation of territorially defined institutions such as the
jamoat, organs of local of self-government - might eventually de-centralize power
and invite broader participation of the local population in local affairs (ibid, 2002
p.261).
Overall Rakhmonov's legacy is mixed. He has played a major role in
preserving peace and stability, but he has also failed to open a dialogue with whoever
did not sit in his restricted circle of allies, thereby exacerbating tensions, regional
and, more recently, intra-regional too. With regard to the specific question of ethnic
relations, Rakhmonov has played a less crucial role than his counterpart in
Kyrgyzstan. This can be ascribed to the fact that national differences do not
constitute the most significant cleavage in the country, particularly so during the civil
war. Rakhmonov enjoyed a significant level of support among the Uzbek population
(especially in the south-west) during the conflict, and the significance presence of
Uzbeks in the Popular Front (supporting the Kulyabi faction) tends to support this
claim. Rakhmonov's popularity in the north was less certain especially during the
civil war, but that had less to do with nationality and more with perceptions of
shifting the balance of power in the country. His role in bringing the conflict to an
end and maintaining stability is openly acknowledged by the population regardless of
ethnic belonging. There are signs none the less that his power, authority and
popularity are being eroded, as a recent report seems to suggest114. Should the
monopolization of power position in the hands of very restricted power factions, and
the subsequent marginalization of the north continue, Uzbek support for the current
leadership could be expected to decline sharply, although at the moment there is no
sign to indicate that such a tendency is already in place.
5.3.3. Summary
The impression is that Tajikistani and the Kyrgyzstani authorities have realised both
the potential for conflict if grievances are not properly addressed and the potential for
growth if non titular group are integrated in the country's social fabric as full
citizens. Critical to any improvement that there has been was the agency of both
114ICG (2004).
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presidents - and Akaev's in a more marked way. However, if policies have been
crafted with the general aim of inclusion in mind practices and perceptions thereof
that raise more concerns among the Uzbek population in Kyryzstan and Tajikistan. It
seems that the main concern for state authorities has been to channel or even funnel
possible voices of discontent through the creation of top-down organizations
(national-cultural centres, discussed in depth in chapter 7). While reports on inter-
ethnic relations and more generally on the perceptions of minority groups on the
overall situation of the respective country are promising (Ifes 1996a, Bozrijkova,
2003 and 2004 for Tajikistan; Ifes 1996b and 2001, Tabyshalieva et al., 1998,
Faranda and Nolle, 2003 for Kyrgyzstan), much remains to be done to allow full
participation of minority groups in public life which has certainly not been
encouraged by the authoritarian shift undertaken by both presidents.
SECTION II
5.4.1. Is Uzbekistan the ethnic patron of Uzbeks abroad?115
An attempt to understand the opportunity structure within which Uzbek communities
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have operated and with which they have interacted
cannot be complete without taking into account the policies of the Republic of
Uzbekistan toward them and the states they live in. How Uzbekistan and Uzbeks
living in close proximity to Uzbekistan's state boundaries interact has important
implications for the process of nation and state-building in the host countries, in
Uzbekistan itself, and for the way Uzbek co-ethnics abroad define themselves vis-a¬
vis the previous two states.
In a series of insightful contributions Brubaker (1992, 1994, 1996) has
conceptualised the type of relationship between national minorities, states of
residence and the country where the largest part of the minority's kins live (external
homeland) as a "triadic nexus", a dynamic interplay between three fields of action,
corresponding to the three above-mentioned actors. Brubaker's framework has been
undoubtedly successful and has been applied (at least part of it) to make sense of
115A preliminary discussion of some of the findings presented in this section has been published under
the title "Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan and their relationship with Uzbekistan", in the Central
Eurasian Studies Review, 3(2), 2004.
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analogous dynamics even in the nationalising states of post-communist Eurasia
(Smith et al., 1998). This section engages Brubaker's model and points to the
limitations inherent in conceptualising relations between kin and host state and co-
ethnics abroad within such a framework. This section seeks to look at the extent to
which the so-called "Uzbek diaspora" is (at all) an issue in Uzbekistan's national
ideology and asks whether this has played any role in the republic's foreign policy
(conception and action). In order to do so I proceed as follows. First I review the
salient moments of post-independence Uzbekistani policy towards two of its
neighbours (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and seek to understand whether "ethnic ties"
have in any way guided Uzbekistan's action or alternatively which other guiding
policy might have inspired the Uzbekistani leadership (in fact, a security discourse).
Secondly I look at the way Uzbeks abroad are perceived by Uzbekistani Uzbeks.
Drawing on data from a qualitative study conducted in Uzbekistan in Winter
2002 and Spring 2003 I show that Uzbeks abroad are not accorded a high priority in
Uzbekistan's state-building project or foreign policy agenda. Finally I turn to Uzbek
co-ethnics themselves and discuss how politically active members of the Uzbek
population in the neighbouring states relate to Uzbekistan and what, if anything, they
expect from the neighbour. I conclude that domestic concerns (fear of a chain effect
on its own minority groups, and a foreign policy discourse dominated by security
concerns) have thus far guided Uzbekistan's geopolitics. In this conception Uzbeks
abroad occupy only a marginal place. The lack of links with the ethnic homeland
calls into question all assumptions regarding the use of Uzbek minorities as a fifth
column of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
5.4.2. A "Geopolitics of fear"116? Building Uzbekistan
Nick Megoran critically notes (2002) how existing studies on Uzbekistan discuss its
foreign policy conduct separately from domestic affairs117. Understanding
Uzbekistan's geopolitics and relations with its neighbours, Megoran contends, cannot
116Megoran (2004b). Fear, as the section shows, refers to the creation of a security discourse, indeed a
securitization of domestic and foreign policy, as well as religion and more broadly political dissent,
who are constructed as posing an immediate security threat to the state and hence require urgent action
in response. On securitization in general see Buzan et al. (1998) and on the case of Uzbekistan within
the context of the war on terror see Horsman (2005).
"7Megoran essentially discusses three: Bohr (1998), Melvin (2000) and Yalcin (2001).
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be done in isolation from an analysis of the country's domestic politics. This entails a
study of the project of state-building and in particular of the role the ideology of
national independence has played in forging the country's new identity and
1 1 8
worldview .
Stability (the preservation of peace and order within the country's territorial
borders) has become the mantra of Uzbekistan's geopolitics. Uzbekistan's discourse
of stability has been constructed against a series of others (Islamic fundamentalism,
terrorism) which pose a threat to the security of the country. While the nature of
these threat is to a certain extent real, they have also become central to the strategy of
self-legitimation of the Uzbekistani political elite. The ideology of national
independence has provided the regime with the conceptual framework to locate these
real or imagined threats within the discourse of peace, order and stability within the
country. The opposition between inside and outside in Uzbekistan's geopolitics is
stark. Beyond the fences of "Fortress Uzbekistan" lies the realm of instability and
disorder which the current leadership has prevented from spilling over into
Uzbekistani territory. Tajikistan, with its tentative democratic openings in early
1990s, the formation of a coalition government with the Islamic opposition in the
second half of the decade and the collusive ignorance of IMU militants operating on
its territory, easily became Uzbekistan's significant and negative other.
This dimension of Uzbekistan's (security-centred) ideology should be
complemented with a second dimension which has more to do with the construction
of a state and national identity. Despite claims of the current leadership that
Uzbekistan-ness (O'zbekistonchilik) is the political identity and the counter claims
from ethnic minorities that in fact O'zbekchilik and O'zbekistonchilik are
coterminous, the reality appears more complex. As observed in chapter 2, Uzbek
national identity is a recent construct and, as the political formation within its current
boundaries, owes its historical development more to the Soviet nationality policy
than to Amir Temur. In the wake of independence the state leadership was forced to
look for political legitimacy, which it lacked also due to its passivity in the struggle
for independence. The Uzbekistani authorities were then faced with a challenge: to
118For an insightful study of Uzbekistan's ideology of national independence - which is rather
appropriately labelled "Karimovism" by the author - see the recent essays of Andrew March (2002a
and 2002b).
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privilege an inclusive and citizenship-based identity or to build an exclusive ethnic
Uzbek identity (itself to be constructed, due to the significant regional heterogeneity
of the country) and alienate minorities. In the end Uzbekistan eventually chose not to
choose and this explains the contradictory nature of its nation-building process. I
argue that the study of how Uzbekistan relates to Uzbek co-ethnics abroad best
illustrates the contradictory nature of its own nation-building process. Understanding
the significance that ethnic ties have in driving Uzbekistan's regional policy also
reveals what dimensions (ethnicity, territoriality or else) are being privileged as
criteria for defining the nation.
So far, caution if not denial has dominated Uzbekistan's relations with
Uzbeks abroad. The issue is indeed very sensitive as perceived support for Uzbeks in
Khujand, for example, might lead to unwanted domino effects within its
(Uzbekistan's) own territory. In light of the priority given to the discourse of stability
it comes as no surprise that whatever is perceived as a threat to it (directly or
indirectly) is "othered".
The theme of unity is also crucial. In this respect it is clear that between the
unity of the state and unity of the nation the Uzbekistani leadership has chosen the
former. This requires the integration of non-Uzbek groups into the larger Uzbekistani
nation (O'zbekistonlik as opposed to O'zbek). This is actually something different
from the traditional dichotomy between an ethnic and a civic conception of the
nation. As Aleksandr Djumev notes in an insightful study of how Uzbekness is being
constructed in the country (2001), the consolidation of the "great Uzbek(istani)
nation" builds on the acceptance, from minority groups, of the values of O 'zbekchilik
(Uzbekness). The combination of past and present is necessary to ensure the country
a great future (the theme figures everywhere in the country's iconography with the
slogan O'zbekiston - kelajagi buyuk davlat119). This can only be achieved if stability
is maintained. Stability in the country can only be achieved by gradual reforms and
i 2Qthe Uzbek model of development (Karimov's concise wording of "sekin, sekin"
captures the nature of this process). With this respect auhoritarianism is legitimised
as a necessary evil:
'''"Uzbekistan is a country with a great future".
l20'Slowly, slowly.
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"[...] perhaps in my actions there are signs of authoritarianism. But I explain as follows: in
certain periods of history, especially during the construction of statehood, strong executive
power is necessary. It is necessary in order to avoid bloodshed and conflict, to preserve in the
region inter-ethnic and civil harmony, peace and stability, for which I am prepared to pay any
price" [my italics] (Karimov, 1996 cited in March, 2002a p.372).
Stability is not only internal. In the case of Uzbekistan, in fact, preservation of
stability has often implied protection from spill-over from neighbouring countries.
This long premise is necessary to situate Uzbekistan's regional policy in perspective.
It does not take place in a vacuum, but rather it appears to be highly influenced by
the project of state-building. How does all this affect Uzbekistan's worldview and in
particular its relations with Uzbeks living in the other Central Asian republics?
121Outside threats have become increasingly " central to the country's political
discourse and ideology. Islam Karimov's Uzbekistan on the threshold of the twenty -
first century. Threats to security, conditions of stability and guarantees for progress
(1997) probably best exemplifies the Uzbekistani regime's preoccupation with fear
of instability. The outset of the volume sounds like a warning despite the father
figure-like image Karimov has often conveyed:
"[w]hat kind of period will the 21st century be for the inhabitants of Uzbekistan? [...] Are we
aware of difficulties on the road to reform [...]? [A]re we aware of the threats to our stability
and security?" (1997 p.4).
Karimov continues to outline his vision of security: ''the support for indivisibility of
security as a permanent process with no limits, the threat posed by ethnic, regional
and local conflicts and aggressive separatism, the lack of a collective security system
in Uzbekistan's proximate environment, terrorism, drug-trafficking, arms trade, and
ecological problems" (ibid., p.10-13). A separate mention is reserved to a particular
kind of threat: Uzbekistan's "encirclement by countries burdened with ethnic,
demographic, economic and other problems" (ibid., p.l 1). Uzbekistan's geopolitical
environment is elevated to the level of problem per se and Uzbekistan is the only
'"'in a study of how President Karimov's extensive work has changed in the post-independence era,
Megoran notes a progressively sombering of tones.
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bulwark against chaos122. What seems to worsen the situation is the fact that "these
[Afghanistan, Tajikistan] where the Uzbek diaspora are the most numerous among
foreign ones" (sic) (ibid.). Later in the volume Karimov outlines a way out of the
quagmire: the inviolability of borders (p. 25), the importance of a country's multi¬
ethnic character to stability and security (p. 59), and the significance assigned to the
links with Uzbek communities living outside Uzbekistan (p. 71): "[t]he unity of any
nation, the Uzbek nation included, implies close linkages with its ethnic brothers,
living in other sovereign states, including the Central Asian countries" (ibid.). The
question of cross-border minorities ("separated nations", p. 25) is primarily discussed
as a source of threat:
"the ongoing conflicts give some people a possibility to exaggerate the problems of 'separated
nations'. Often a deliberate selection of arguments in favour of, for example, the unification of Tadjiks
or Uzbeks and Pushtun tribes on both sides of the border with Afghanistan. It is terrible to imagine the
consequences of any attempt to change the existing borders using the ethnic principles of division".
Although the presence of Uzbek communities in the neighbouring countries has often
been highlighted as one of the possible tools in the hands of Tashkent to influence
the course of politics in the neighbouring countries, a review of a decade of
Uzbekistan's regional politics reveals its restraint in playing the 'Uzbek card'. A
reversion to more traditional instruments of power politics has been preferred. I
illustrate the way the significance (or lack thereof) of ethnic links in Uzbek self-
definition by drawing on a series of qualitative studies I conducted in Uzbekistan in
Winter 2002 and late Spring 2003123.
5.4.3. Elites' views on the diaspora
In Uzbekistan I sought to explore the way Uzbekistani Uzbek elites relate to those
co-ethnics living in the neighbouring countries. What I intended to uncover was the
mFor such a deterministic view of Uzbekistan as a "necessary hegemon" see Alimov (1995).
123I initially conducted seven focus groups (for a total of twenty-nine respondents) and seventeen
individual semi-structured in-depth interviews in Tashkent and Samarkand to test perspectives from
the periphery with those from the centre. The study essentially involved a small sample from the
Uzbek cultural elite that for its own profession and status in society is more likely to be familiar with
issues regarding nationality, the role of history in a nation's consciousness, etc. In the spring of 2003
I briefly returned to Tashkent for further testing of my initial findings. On that occasion I interviewed
a further twelve respondents.
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general attitude, the extent to which local respondents perceive other Uzbeks as part
of the same nation, and whether Uzbekistan should do more to maintain links with
them. The rationale behind this stage of the research lay in exploring an often under¬
studied dimension of Uzbek nation-building, that is the extent to which relations with
the diaspora affect identity formation in the "homeland". The small sample (fifty-
eight respondents) makes generalizable claims impossible; however it is possible to
draw any consideration on the small amount of data available.
Respondents pointed to the lack of information available on the topic. One
fourth of respondents admitted difficulty in providing any meaningful answer. If to
these are added those who argued that "there was no point for me to investigate what
Uzbeks in other republics did or thought" (ca. 8%) about one third of respondents did
not have sufficient information on which to ground an opinion or was not willing to
express it. Of those who answered, very few could go beyond phrases of
circumstance ("yes, we are all Uzbeks"; "Uzbeks are always Uzbeks", "Uzbeks are
Uzbeks everywhere", "blood is the same, so they are Uzbeks", "we speak the same
language"). Scarce information derives from a lack of public debate on the subject
(in Uzbekistan's strictly controlled media) which in turns is a product of the
sensitivity of the issue.
What responses from Uzbekistani Uzbeks seem to suggest is that they do not
regard Uzbeks living on the other side of the border as different. What instead
emerges is the effect that the increasing isolation of Uzbeks abroad from Uzbekistan
can have on their self-identification. This, I was repeatedly told, could lead them to
increasingly adopt the traditions of their place of residence. "If they live long in
Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, they will become more like Kyrgyz or Kazakh", a
researcher from Samarkand noted. This view is shared by most respondents. When I
asked about their reaction to this process of indigenisation, the response was
generally a positive one. "If that is the place where they [Uzbeks abroad] live it is
normal that they take up the customs of the place where they live. Like here, in
Uzbekistan, other groups are becoming Uzbek". Mutual expectations ("do not mess
up with your neighbour if you do not want him to mess up with you") seem to be a
tacit dogma.
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Officially Uzbekistan does not have a policy towards Uzbeks living abroad, and
does not have a diaspora policy either. This does not mean that "what happens to Osh
Uzbeks is of no interest to the Uzbekistani leadership", so the head of a research
institute in Tashkent told me124. The fact that Uzbeks, especially young males, are
the most likely recruits for underground movements such as Hizb-ut Tahrir and IMU
is a serious cause of concern for Uzbekistani authorities. As a consequence,
Uzbekistan maintains a form of informal control in cities like Osh through a network
of informants among the local population. Overall, the lack of a formulation on the
diaspora issue reflects two policy priorities. One the one hand the marginalization of
Uzbeks abroad from political discourse is part of the stability and security discourse,
which differentiates sharply between inside stability and outside disorder. Co-ethnics
abroad in this are a disturbing complication as they tend to blur the inside/outside
divide. Also, the lack of interest from the Uzbekistani side might well be part of tacit
accords between the Central Asian states not to back each other's minorities. In the
end, if Uzbeks in Osh are "expected to Kyrgyzify", Tajiks in Samarkand might be
expected to do the same. This discussion of the perceptions of Uzbekistani Uzbeks of
the "diaspora" was necessary to provide the context within which to locate
Uzbekistan's foreign policy and especially its relations with its neighbours.
5.4.4. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks
Despite the potential for conflict over resources or territory , relations between
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan throughout the 1990s have remained essentially good.
However, tensions have mounted towards the end of the decade resulting in the
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straining of bilateral relations , and Uzbekistan's tightening of border controls.
Causes for this have been the 16 February 1999 Tashkent bombing and the summer
1999 and 2000 incursions of Islamist militants -belonging to the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan- through Kyrgyz territory into Uzbekistan127. Blame fell on Kyrgyz
authorities for failing to stop the militants and that country's weakness has been
124Interview with Arslan Joldashev, June 2003, Tashkent.
125For a brief review of border disputes in Central Asia see ICG (2002a). Thorny issues include
territorial claims (each country has exclaves located within the other's territory) and controversies
over the supply and payment of natural resources (gas and water).
l26For an excellent study of the 1999-2000 Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border conflict see Nick
Megoran's The Border ofEternal Friendship? (2002d).
127Naumkin (2003).
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henceforth used to legitimise the closure of the border and the tightening of border
policy. In the past four years reports of casualties at the border (with both Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan) due to shootings by police guards or accidental deaths on landmines,
have become a common theme in the media of the region128.
Resentment among cross-border communities is due both to the perception of
the authorities to Kyrgyzify or Uzbekify the local population, and to the damage that
border closure and a tight visa regime cause to shuttle trade. At a state level two
sources of tension can be identified: territorial claims and energy-related disputes.
There are seven enclaves in the Ferghana Valley, the most known and problematic of
those being Sox and Shax-i-Mardan (belonging to Uzbekistan) and Vorux
(Tajikistan). Besides the fact that enclaves are often home to people whose
nationality is different from that of the state exerting sovereignty over the territory
(Sox), the problem actually has more to do with the exploitation of natural resources
and territorial delimitation. A further element of concern for Uzbekistan was that
enclaves, especially Sox, could be used by militants of organizations such as the
IMU as bases for incursions into Uzbekistani territory. At the moment Sox is a
highly militarised area, where staying is virtually impossible and even transit (it is on
the main route to the main centres of Batken province) is hampered. In February
2001 a secret memorandum was signed by the Uzbek prime minister U. Sultanov,
and his Kyrygz counterpart, K. Bakiev, agreeing on a land swap. Uzbekistan would
be given a land corridor to link Sox to the mainland, and in return Kyrgyzstan would
be given a portion of land around the exclave of Barak129. The document was leaked
to the press in Kyrgyzstan, and the prime minister was accused by the opposition and
the public that this "sell off' of the country brought "unsatisfactory
compensation"130.
As Megoran's study of the border dispute shows, Uzbekistan's preferred tool
has been a resort to power politics (closure of border post, posing of barbed wire
along the boundary, police operations within Kyrgyz territory) and economic forms
l28See for example Nazhmiddinova (2002), Mirsaidov (2002), Teshaev (2003), Sukohv (2002),
Khabibov (2002b), Mirsaidov (2003).
129ICG (2002b.
l30For an excellent discussion of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border conflict see Megoran (2002).
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of pressure (cutting gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan) rather than mobilizing Kyrgyzstani
Uzbeks.
5.4.5. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the "Leninabadi" faction
For the first half of the war (arguably until 1994) Uzbekistan played a significant and
stabilising role in leading the opposing sides to the negotiating table. The move was
not out of mere generosity, though. A crucial concern, detectable in some of
president Karimov's documents, was the fear that territorial claims on ethnic basis
would spread over to neighbouring targets, making the Uzbekistani cities of
Samarkand and Bukhara (but also the province of Surkhandarya) the targets of Tajik
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revisionists . Similar concerns over the possible spill-over of conflict into
Uzbekistani territory were paramount in Tashkent's decision to side with Russia in
brokering a cease fire and negotiating an end to the conflict. However, since 1994-
1996 Uzbekistan's role in the country has become increasingly peripheral (Akiner,
2001) and the relations between the two countries have soared.
In partial compensation for the loss of what Tajiks regarded as their cultural
centres (Samarkand and Bukhara), Tajikistan obtained the more developed northern
area around the city of Khujand (located in the Ferghana Valley). De facto the
northern city of Leninabad (as Khujand was been renamed in Soviet times) it
continued to gravitate around Tashkent's orbit132, from which it barely lies a hundred
kilometres away. Being the most Russified (culturally), located in the most advanced
area of the country (economically), and host to a significant Uzbek minority, it
appeared sensible to the Soviet authorities to back the political elite from the north as
their intermediary for ruling the country. This gave birth to an informal practice in
Tajikistani politics: the political domination by northern elite which according to
Olivier Roy has defined Tajikistan since 1945. Actually this practice has been
recently greatly exaggerated. Despite the fact that recent reports, academic (Gretsky,
1995) and not (Human Rights Watch, 1998) tend to assume a complete domination
131For an example of this kind of views with extreme nationalistic tones mixed with a virulent anti-
Uzbek rhetoric see the work of the otherwise well-respected Tajik academic Rakhim Masov (1991 and
especially 1995).
132Akiner (2001) somehow qualifies the support the Leninabadis obtained from Uzbekistan, as this is
Soviet times acted as pro-consul of Moscow. Sergey Gretsky instead considers the northerners as a
mere appendix of Uzbekistan (1995).
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of the Leninabadis. Shirin Akiner notes, by contrast, since the early seventies an
agreement for power and resources distribution was in place between Leninabadi and
southern (Kulyabi) political factions (2001).
As Olivier Roy notes (1997), it is worth recalling that in Tajikistani politics
patronage and personal loyalties count more than political or ethnic affiliations. This
meant, for example, that clans such as the Leninabadis or Kulyabi, Gharmis, Pamiris,
were in fact political factions or power centres, where kinship criss-crossed blood
ties and could instead comprise individuals belonging to different ethnic and sub-
ethnic groups. When Tajikistan became independent, a sudden and violent struggle to
reshuffle the power arrangements and distribution took place, the faction of the then
president Nabiev outplacing Leninabadis and Kulyabis from power. The conflict
degenerated and other dimensions were added to the conflict (ie regionalism, role of
Islam in political life, criminalization of politics, etc.).
Russia and Uzbekistan at this stage intervened to push the sides towards a
cessation of hostilities and negotiated an agreement for power distribution. Although
this was ultimately formalised in the 1997 Peace Accords, a power shift was already
in place in 1994, with one southern faction (from Danghara, near Kulyab) headed by
a former kolkhoz chair, Emomali Rakhmonov monopolising political and economic
power. Following what was perceived as the "Kulyabization" of the country and its
alignment with or reliance on Russia for support, Uzbekistan ceased to play a
significant role in Tajikistani affairs (Akiner, 2001 p.48). The withdrawal did not last
long, and Uzbekistan continued to play a less direct role in Tajikistan for a few years
(1996-1998). These essentially consisted of a series of uprisings from February 1996
until November 1998 (February 1996, August 1997, October 1997, and November
1998) in the northern province of Leninabad/Sughd. Although these intrusions have
been portrayed by the Tajikistani government as failed coups, it seems instead that
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more economic considerations were at the basis of these incursions . Allegations
from Dushanbe that Uzbekistan might be behind the intrusions (which involved the
former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullajonov and especially the former Tajik
army commander Mahmud Khudoyberdiev) have always been rejected by Tashkent.
133This, at least, seems to be the consensus of respondents from Khujand, Uzbeks and Tajiks alike,
who see in those intrusions nothing more than activities related to smuggling (interviews conducted in
August 2003).
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What is relevant here is that in most cases troops have been reported to have passed
through the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan border and there (Uzbekistan) to have retreated. In
any case collusion was required for troops to pass the border. Eventually Uzbekistan
paid a price for this: when the IMU militants entered Uzbek territory, they did so
from their Tajik bases (especially around Garm, in the Tavildera and Karategin
valleys, then out of government control). That Tajikistani authorities closed an eye
on those occasions can be interpreted as a vendetta for previous "rudeness".
After playing a direct role in Tajikistani politics for more than seventy years
and contributing to stopping the civil war, relations between Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan have become increasingly strained. However, the Uzbek factor is of little
help when one tries to make sense of the events. True, there is a large Uzbek
minority in the north and that region is traditionally more Uzbekified and better
connected with Uzbekistan than with the rest of the country. In addition
Khudoyberdiev is Uzbek - ethnic Lakay actually. However, the clashes between the
two neighbours should be seen through the lenses of power politics rather than as a
manifestation of ethnic tensions. Despite the controversial and often tense relations
between Tajikistan and Tajikistani Uzbeks on one side and Uzbekistan on the other,
it is perhaps surprising to note that according to a recent survey (conducted by the
author in 2003) a considerable minority of Uzbeks (about 40%) continue to imagine
Tajikistan's future somehow connected with Uzbekistan.
5.4.6. Tashkent has ignored the call [from Uzbeks abroad], but... was
anybody calling in the first place?
Theoretical models and field reports have suggested the possibility that Kyrgyzstani
Uzbeks might actually act as a "fifth column" of Uzbekistan - something which has
raised understandable concern in that country. In an insightful study of Osh Uzbeks
and their relation to political authority, Morgan Liu looks at their "discrimination and
disempowerment" as leading motives behind their articulation of a "vision of an
ideal authority and polity in discourses about their post-Soviet predicament" (2002
p.l). Uzbekistan's president is then idealised and "imagined" as a "benevolent
despot", looking after his people (ibid., p.2). Osh Uzbeks "recognise the khan" in
Islam Karimov. My study of members of political, economic, and cultural elites
among southern Kyrgyzstani and northern Tajikistani Uzbeks qualifies Liu's picture.
155
Attitude toward Uzbekistan
Opinions among respondents towards Uzbekistan tend to show a rather disenchanted
view of the neighbour. In some ways this is very similar to the views emerging from
the study conducted in Uzbekistan showing a trend toward mutual disinterest. In
Tajikistan seventy-three respondents out of one hundred and forty-seven (53%)
consider Uzbekistan as a neighbour/neighbouring state/sovereign country. Thirty-
five (25%) considered it as either their homeland (rodina), or the homeland of their
ancestors (rodina moykh predkov). About fifteen (ca 9%) declined to express any
opinion, whereas the remainder had more negative views of the neighbouring
country.
With regard to the situation in Kyrgyzstan, the sample was smaller (fifty-
four). Twenty-five respondents indicated that Uzbekistan to them is "a neighbour¬
ing country". Sixteen on the other hand consider Uzbekistan as their (ethnic)
homeland. Six respondents added other comments, some of which were remarkably
negative ("we [in Kyrgyzstan] have democracy, they [in Uzbekistan] have paper
democracy", "Uzbekistan is a dictatorship, a totalitarian state oppressing its own
people"), and other more positive ("it is a rich country, which I respect", "borders do
not have any meaning to me"). Respondents in the two case studies present similar
type of responses among those who tend to consider Uzbekistan as nothing more
than a neighbour. Only on rare occasions did respondents show enthusiasm toward
Uzbekistan; perhaps more surprising is the lack of widespread criticism of the Uzbek
authorities, (although this appears to confirm some of the findings of Morgan Liu's
(2002) research on cross-border (Osh) Uzbeks and their views of authority.
However, it should not be overlooked that about one in four respondents has
indicated Uzbekistan as his/her own homeland. The perceptions of Uzbekistani
Uzbeks and Uzbeks abroad present some similarities. It should be noted that the
more critical segment of the Uzbek population (toward Tashkent) can be found
among young males (predominantly students, journalists, or teachers). Only about
fifteen respondents expressed a less positive view of Uzbekistan. A common theme
was the reference to Uzbekistan's "lack of hospitality" (oclien' ne gostipriennoe
gosudarstvo) referring to the border policy and the visa regime. More open and
critical comments emerged in the follow-up interviews. Here those more likely to
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discuss the different sides of Uzbekistan's regional politics came from the younger
generation and this was especially so in Kyrgyzstan. Incidents between Uzbek border
guards and police and the latter's incursions in Kyrgyzstani territory are recurrent.
Shootings and more or less accidental deaths at the border are relatively frequent and
deeply felt by the local population. Most lament the impossibility of visiting relatives
on the other side of the border, attending weddings or funerals. The necessity of
acquiring a visa and therefore the expenses one would incur in going (flying in
winter time, with a cost of around 80 USD for a return flight) to Bishkek have had an
impact not only on the practicalities of living at the border, but on the perceptions of
so doing.
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Responses in the two countries again reflected a similar assessment of Uzbekistan's
policy towards Uzbeks abroad. Although partially overlapping, the two questions
address distinct issues: an overall evaluation of Uzbekistan's foreign policy, and an
opinion specifically focused on the extent to which Uzbekistan is seen to defend the
interests of the Uzbek population living abroad. In both cases a positive assessment
of Uzbekistan's foreign policy is rare (15% in Tajikistan and 17% in Kyrgyzstan). It
is especially the case in Tajikistan that a negative assessment appears strong (45%).
Uzbekistan's construction of Tajikistan as an "anti-model" against which
Uzbekistan's development is measured probably plays a role in this (otherwise only
25% of respondents in Kyrgyzstan assesses Uzbekistan's regional policy negatively).
Opinions become more homogenous when respondents are asked whether they think
Uzbekistan is defending (in whatever way, political, economic, cultural) the interests
of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A very strong majority (60-
70%) rejects this idea. Local Uzbek associations report the systematic refusal by
Uzbekistani authorities to intensify contacts with them. An Uzbek deputy of the
Jogorku Kenesh noted with regret that "...we [the local branch of the UNCC]
always invite him [Islam Karimov] to come and visit us; not only he never visits, but
we never receive any reply either". A major cause of grievance among elite and non
elites alike is Uzbekistan's refusal to open a consular office in southern Kyrgyzstan
(a similar demand is made in northern Tajikistan).
A negative assessment of Uzbekistan and its policies is reflected also in the
following question. Asked to indicate which institution(s) should address the
demands, concerns, and interests of Uzbeks, Uzbekistan is indicated by a mere 2.3%
in Tajikistan (no-one in Kyrgyzstan). What is surprising is that this is equal or less
than the percentage of respondents indicating international organizations. About
three out of four respondents by contrast indicate that it is the duty of all the citizens
of the republic and also of state institutions to look after the interests of non titular
groups.
5.4.7. Summary
Uzbekistan's record as regards its relations with its neighbours and with Uzbeks
abroad is mixed. Relations with Kyrgyzstan have been substantially good,
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particularly up until the end of the past decade, when land incursions from the
Kyrgyz side of the Ferghana Valley from IMU militants into Uzbekistani territory
have destabilised the relations between the two countries. Periodical tensions
(typically when Kyrgyzstan introduced its own national currency replacing the
Russian rouble in the early nineties, or when Uzbekistani police guards have violated
Kyrgystan's sovereignty by entering its territory) have alternated with moments of
calm. In addition border delimitation disputes and energy related controversies have
contributed to strain the relations between the two countries, particularly those
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
In light of the findings one can draw two conclusions. First, Uzbekistan has
adopted a policy which radically differs from the one of countries such as
Kazakhstan (Cummings, 1998) or the Russian Federation (Melvin, 1995, 1998,
2001). The rationale behind the adoption of such diaspora policies is different in the
two states. Kazakhstan's interest in the diaspora was primarily aimed at re¬
establishing demographic superiority in the country, whereas the Russian diaspora
has mainly been used as a tool in the domestic political debate. With regard to the
Uzbek diaspora, by contrast, an alternative consideration has dominated Uzbekistan's
agenda: the separation from the instability at its door by establishing an island of
stability. It is possible to argue that Uzbekistan's ideology of national independence
has aimed more at the self-reinforcing of the ruling elite than at the aggrandissement
of the Uzbek nation, which appears instrumental to the ideological design.
Second, Uzbekistan's policy towards its neighbours has focused more on
territorial and resource issues rather than ethnic ones. Immigration of Uzbeks from
Tajikistan, for instance, has not been preferred to that of Tajiks from the same area.
In fact both have been obstracised. Land mines affect mostly Uzbeks as they are
concentrated in border regions. Shuttle trade is also affected by a visa regime and
familiar links and communications in general have often been severed by the lack of
an Uzbekistani consulate in southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan.
The Uzbek elites in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, however, do not seem to look
to Tashkent for inspiration or support (Tashkent does not consider official Uzbek
associations as one of the channels to deal with neighbouring countries). When I
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asked the Jogorku Kenesh deputy Fattakhov if he thought that Karimov had forgotten
about Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, his immediate reply was:
"Karimov never forgot about us. In fact, he never remembered"134.
5.5. Conclusion
Findings suggest that while an approach focusing on the political opportunity
structure offers a convincing account of the institutional - domestic as well as
international - environment within which Uzbek mobilization has taken place, a
focus on both elite and non elite perspectives has allowed me to compare and
contrast the opportunities/constraints with the perceptions thereof. In this respect the
cases of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are similar. In both cases policies have been
crafted in a way to prevent an institutional divide between the favoured titular group
and marginalised others. However, in both cases Uzbeks have reported practices of
discrimination, though occasional rather than regular ("tendencies"). This of course
does not make them less significant, but confirms that at least at a policy level the
two countries have displayed an effort to integrate minority groups. Crucial to this
regard has been the agency of the two presidents, and particularly Akaev's in
Kyrgyzstan. As argued in chapter 3, structure and agency are relational concepts, so
that "someone's structure is some else's agency". This well illustrates the situation
where a study of Uzbek mobilization incorporates presidential agency within the
POS (constraining or enabling Uzbek mobilization), whereas for example a study of
Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet transformation would look at Akaev as a clear example of
human agency.
A second finding regards the vehicles for channelling dissent and demands.
These have not developed, and minority groups have been left without political
representation. Ethnic parties are banned, and little minority representation exists in
government structures at both central and local level. The only officially recognised
and legitimate (from the state's perspective) vehicle for mobilization is represented
by national-cultural centres, which are top-down organizations.
I34lnterview with Mr Fattakhov, Bishkek, June, 2003.
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Finally a study of Uzbekistan's attitude towards Uzbeks abroad shows that
the triadic nexus model is of limited use when accounting for kin-state and ethnic
minority in Central Asia. Rather than taking on the role of the ethnic patron
Uzbekistan has progressively developed a security-centred approach to security
combined with an emphasis on state over nation-building, thereby sidelining Uzbek
co-ethnics abroad from the public discourse. This in the end has proved stabilizing as
an element of almost certain tension - Uzbekistan's intereference with the domestic
affairs of a neighbouring country - has gradually waned after Tashkent's retreat
from Tajikistan's civil war and the securitization of its regional and border policy. In
Central Asia, Brubaker's tradic nexus seems to have developed into a dyadic one,
where the third party has called itself off the game.
CHAPTER 6
Framing the "Uzbek question"
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The previous chapters have shown that an analysis of the structural factors offers
valuable insight in explaining the emergence or absence of mobilization. The
political opportunity structure and the structural preconditions have significantly
shaped the course of Uzbek mobilization. A discussion of the Soviet legacies and of
the political opportunity structure suggests that Uzbeks in both countries have faced
significant constraints both in terms of the form of their political participation and
also the possibility of voicing their demands and having them met.
However, what structuralist explanations do not provide is convincing evidence
to make sense of variations in forms and strategies of mobilization across and within
cases. In my study of Uzbek political mobilization I found Jamilya Ukudeeva-
Freeman's concept of a "mobilising idea" ("an action-oriented set of beliefs that
unifies people around itself for a common goal. [It] inspires people for action,
legitimates leaders' actions, and expresses conviction about how things should be",
2003) a useful analytical tool to explore the extent to which an idea or a set of ideas
are shared by members of a group as well as their readiness to mobilize around that
very same idea. A mobilizing idea is both an action plan and also a solution to
problems (which makes it similar to Gorenburg's understanding of cultural frames,
2003). The movement would be over, Ukudeeva-Freeman contends, when leaders
can no longer recruit people because their ideas and goals do not resonate among the
people.
What needs be taken into account is therefore (1) the extent to which the
movement (particularly its leaders) is able to create an idea or set of ideas among its
target population that it has been subject to past injustices, or that taking part to the
movement is worthwhile because of future positive payouts, and (2) the extent to
which the interpretation of ideas, perceptions and beliefs ("frames") resonate across
the group itself and are appropriated.
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In this chapter I also develop and apply to the study of Uzbek mobilization the
concept of a "de-mobilizing idea". By "de-mobilizing idea" I refer to a "set of
perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes which shape the direction of mobilization towards
integration with the institutions and other groups of the country of residence, de facto
going against the commonly held expectation that political mobilization is in its own
nature confrontational with authorities". The concept also emphasises how ideas and
frames are quintessentially relational. The same set of beliefs can simultaneously act
as a powerful "mobilizer" in one direction, and demobilize the very same group in a
different respect. The case of Islam and the relation between religion and nationality
experienced from the Uzbek population illustrates well the way in which mobilizing
and de-mobilizing ideas are intertwined and operate: on the one hand Islam
constitutes a potentially powerful mobilizing idea (as religion), while at the same
time representing a constraining force for mobilization along national lines (as anti-
national or supra-national ideology).
As Ukudeeva-Freeman (2003) and Gorenburg (2003) have shown in their
research, these "visions" (mobilizing ideas) do not come out of nowhere. Because
they need to be popularized among the target population, they need to be familiar to
resonate. "To be successful, nationalist leaders had to frame their demands in
language and imagery that could resonate with the population" (Gorenburg, 2003
p. 12). This means taking into full account the legacy of seventy and more years of
Soviet political order, which throughout the twentieth century "decisively moulded
the perceptions, beliefs, and identities of minority ethnic group members" (ibid.).
The successful nationalist leaders would be those who crafted their message in a way
to (correspond to the political ideas of the population.
The scope of this chapter is first to explore the type of ideas which throughout the
post-independence period have emerged in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and second to
determine which among these have resonated across the group. Drawing on
qualitative interviews and specific questions asked as part of a broader survey among
Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, the following issues are discussed:
What type of (mobilizing) ideas are developed by the Kyrgyzstani/Tajikistani
Uzbek leadership?
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How are they received? Are they appropriated by and do they resonate across
the larger Uzbek community?
In short, how is the Uzbek question framed?
The chapter argues that a mobilizing idea is more likely to emerge in a pre-
conflict environment, while the legacy of conflict favours the emergence of frames
emphasizing the search for stability and moderation. Additionally it is shown that
political mobilization is likely to emerge following the emergence of a resonating
mobilizing idea. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one and two
discuss the emergence and resonance of a set of mobilizing or de-mobilizing ideas in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively, and section three looks comparatively at the
findings and highlights the similarities and discrepancies between the two cases.
6.1 Kyrgyzstan
6.1.1. The legacy and memory of the 1990 Osh conflict
The Osh conflict framed the form and the content of political relations between
ethnic communities in the country and the way that these have contributed to
political life ever since. In the aftermath of the conflict those informal organizations
more actively involved in the riots, namely "Osh Aimagy" (among the Kyrgyz) and
"Adolat" (Uzbeks), were disbanded and ethnically based political movements banned
from public life. However, the events have had a different impact on the two
communities. On the one hand there is no organization among the Uzbek population
that explicitly advances Uzbek political interests in the shape of an ethnic political
party or equivalent (ie associations of Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan and the
Baltics lobbying for influence). The two main Uzbek cultural organizations (the
Uzbek national-cultural centre and the Society of Uzbeks) portray themselves and
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their programmes as "cultural" and explicitly "non political" . On the other hand,
the situation appears remarkably different in the case of political parties such as the
nationalist Asaba party (Party of National Renewal), one of the oldest in the country,
as well as Kyrgyz language publications, where nationalist-oriented newspapers (i.e.
135Activists and leading figures of the Uzbek National-Cultural Centre and of the Society of Uzbeks
systematically maintain that the organization's goal is exclusively related to cultural preservation and
has nothing to do with political matters.
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Tribuna, Agym, or Asaba) have circulated relatively undisturbed since independence.
The situation within the Uzbek community may have changed in recent years, as a
new party was established in the southern town of Jalalabat in 1999: the "Party of
National Unity and Concord"136. Although the leaders of this party137 vigorously
deny it being an Uzbek party, the leaders themselves admit that 95% of its
membership is in fact Uzbek.
6.1.2. The missing frame? Autonomy for Uzbeks
The 1990 Osh conflict did not bode well for the integrity of the Kyrgyzstan SSR.
Requests for land swaps with Uzbekistan (with Uzgen been ceded to the
neighbouring country) or even autonomy if not outright secession escalated before
and in the immediate aftermath of the tragic events in June that year138. The fact that
the entire Uzbek population reside on the Kyrgyz side of the Ferghana Valley, and in
some border districts constitute the majority, meant an autonomist or separatist
scenario was not totally unrealistic. Despite emerging before the conflict and being
promoted by the Adolat organization, autonomy as a mobilizing frame soon faded
away, both under the stabilizing role of Uzbekistan's president Karimov, and
accordingly, the perception of the local Uzbek population that their present and
presumable future would lie within the boundaries of Kyrgyzstan. Pragmatism
certainly prevailed, but conversations with local Uzbeks who experienced these
events also show a negative connotation associated with the very concept of
"autonomy". The autonomist issue has virtually disappeared from the agenda of
Uzbek organizations and more broadly from the Uzbek mindset. Outright secession
has virtually turned into a "taboo" topic, but a similar fate was reserved for autonomy
as well. The number of Uzbeks who openly support the thesis of institutionalizing
Uzbek autonomy - and autonomy would then be territorial rather than cultural -
appears marginal at best. The following are commonly held views on the topic from
members of the Uzbek community:
136See chapter 7 for more on this.
'"interviews with Mr. Azamjan Azimov, the party's founder, and Mr Abildjan Abildov, the Osh
representative and former head of the UNCC (July 2003).
138Pravda (1990) and Sovetskaya Kirghizia (1990) quoted in Asankanov (1996).
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"We do not need autonomy. Acknowledging our cultural demands is enough. Autonomy is dangerous.
Autonomy leads to secession."
One should note, however, that although in the early 1990s the Uzbek population had
not mobilized en masse and had provided the incumbent with constant loyal support
this does not foreclose alternative future developments such as an increase in
mobilizational activity or withdrawal of support for the authorities should failure to
address Uzbek grievances continue.
6.1.3. Memory as mobilizing idea
As Faranda and Nolle have shown in a recent study on ethnic relations in
Kyrgyzstan, relations between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, though not tense, are still marked
by some degree of suspicion and each group considers the other as the "significant
other" (2003). Fear that the conflict may repeat itself appears to be a constant theme
and a real concern for Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks:
"This is still an open wound in the relations between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz". "Remembering the 1990
conflict does not help". "The memory of such events is very painful". "What happened in 1990 has
defined Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations for the following decade". "Uzbek behaviour has been significantly
affected from what happened in 1990. Uzbeks do not do politics anymore". "Uzbeks are afraid of
politics now. Uzbeks fear something like that [the conflict] may repeat itself."
The memory of the Osh conflict represents a frame that has greatly resonated across
the Uzbek community. What is distinctive about this frame is that it acted as
powerful mobilizer in favour of the political incumbent, President Akaev. Akaev
emerged as a compromise candidate on the Kyrgyzstani political scence in late 1990
whose agenda focused on the introduction of political and economic reforms. What is
more relevant here, is that Akaev made of the necessity of preserving inter-ethnic
harmony (advancing a moderate nationalising agenda without alienating ethnic
minorities) the cornerstone of his policy agenda. The slogan 'Kyrgyzstan is our
common home' is the well-known catch-phrase.
To the eyes of minority groups and Uzbeks in particular, Akaev has
represented the guarantee of stability on the one hand and a sort of political insurance
that would prevent nationalist-oriented Kyrgyz from coming to power on the other.
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In the absence of Uzbek candidates and in light of a new minority status, the Akaev
option emerged as a "relative gain" for Uzbeks. Concessions to ethnic minorities (i.e.
veto on land legislation proposals from nationalist organizations, pressure for a more
inclusive language law and introduction of Russian as an official language in 2000,
establishment of the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan have played a major role
in Akaev's policy of maintaining ethnic stability in the country, and in return the
Uzbek leadership has never concealed its support for the current president.
Even more populist figures among the Uzbek leadership such as the Osh-
based businessman and politician Davron Sabirov have through the years softened
their inflammatory tones, re-directing criticism towards the competing Uzbek
organization (UNCC). In my research I could hardly detect any criticism of the
president coming from the Uzbek population:
"We support Akaev". "Akaev has maintained stability in the country".
Further comments illustrate how support for the incumbent goes hand in hand with
the need to distance oneself from the "opposition", understood by Uzbeks as
"Kyrgyz nationalist opposition". This implies a rejection not just of the ideas
advanced from opposition movements, but more crucially the rejection of the very
idea that there may be a legitimate opposition to Akaev.
"We have nothing to do with the opposition". "Akaev may be weak but is better than others [Kyrgyz
nationalists]; What happens if Akaev goes? Who knows who will come after him?"
From these comments it is possible to detect two underlying sentiments beneath the
veil of support: support exists because of a lack of alternatives and the serious
concern for the future successor to his post. Akaev, in this sense, is not supported for
the success of his policies (most in fact recognize him being a rather "weak president
who does not have real power to implement his decisions"), but is preferred because
of the lack of an alternative (the lesser of two evils?)139. The frequently asked
question "Who will come after Akaev?" reveals strong concern that a more
nationalist-oriented political figure might emerge and replace the current president.
139Khamidov (2000).
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In this sense, Akaev represents an inevitable choice for the Uzbek population in the
south. For this reason the frustrations and grievances among the Uzbek population
are often left aside when it comes to the political domain. Indeed, the concern for the
prospects of inter-ethnic stability has shaped a self-reinforcing myth among Uzbeks
that a future president might necessarily be a nationalist. This has de facto mobilized
Uzbeks behind the current president and paradoxically demobilized them.
Fear and stability have emerged as concerns of paramount importance to the
Uzbek population and have constituted a powerful mobilizing idea(s), in the way
Ukudeeva-Freeman conceptualized it. What makes the frame peculiar, however, is
the direction towards which this mobilization operates. The following section
illustrates the way a particular form of mobilization takes place among the local
Uzbek community by reference to an Uzbek mahalla in Osh.
"Mahalla mobilization"
Though representatives of the UNCC maintain that their organization is strictly
cultural, they concede that during elections they engage in electoral campaigning
("agitatsiya"). Electoral mobilization takes place on two occasions: parliamentary
and presidential elections. As to the latter, the Uzbek community has traditionally
supported the incumbent, President Akaev. It did so in the early 1990s being
convinced that he could deliver protection of the Uzbek language and culture in the
face of a perceived rising and aggressive ethnic Kyrgyz nationalism (Huskey, 2002).
Following Akaev's increasingly authoritarian turn, there have been signs that this
faith is being eroded and that the Uzbek community is starting to develop an "agenda
of its own" (ICG, 2002c) that may not necessarily overlap with that of the state
leadership. Publicly, however, Uzbek representatives have never failed to provide
Akaev with statements of support. During the electoral campaign for presidential
elections in 2000, the two Uzbek cultural centres in Osh issued a joint declaration of
support for the incumbent, inviting the Uzbek population to express their preference
for Askar Akaev in the forthcoming elections140. With regard to parliamentary
elections, given that the leading figures of the two centres are deputies at the
Parliament in Bishkek, one cannot help noting that electoral mobilization equates to
140Kabar (2000).
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self-promotion by the Uzbek organizations, who draw on their resources to
campaign. Critical to electoral mobilization are Uzbek mahallas.
Mahallas, the neighbourhood communities where Uzbeks (and Tajiks)
typically tend to live, play an important role in the process of mobilization of the
Uzbek community. This role is largely informal, and mostly derives from practice.
Ba'rno-opa, a local Uzbek woman living in an Osh mahalla, illustrated the way
"mahalla mobilization" works with reference to the 2000 parliamentary elections.
Would-be deputies are introduced by representatives of the Uzbek cultural
organizations to the elders of mahallas (aksakal) and ask for permission to meet the
neighbourhood community. Although the leading figures of the mahalla can on paper
refuse to present a candidate to the community, this is an unlikely event. Typically a
meeting is arranged where the whole mahalla gathers to listen to and meet with the
candidate. What is interesting in this regard is not so much the technical aspect of the
meeting itself, but the possible options that are available to the members of the
mahalla and ultimately to the Uzbek organizations as well. Under elections three
situations can occur: no Uzbek candidate; presence of an Uzbek candidate and non
Uzbek candidates; multiple Uzbek candidacy. In the first and third case the outcome
is similar, as the community does not express open support for any of the candidates.
In practice, freedom of choice is left to the voters, although personal links, favours or
'incentives' may tilt the balance towards one or other candidate. The second case is
more interesting, as it shows that beneath the surface mobilization along ethnic lines
plays a role in electoral politics. In the case of presidential elections, however, the
situation differs. Because the language requirements for the candidate require
him/her to pass a Kyrgyz language test, this makes it particularly hard for an ethnic
Uzbek to run for president, let alone have any chance of success. Support for the
"second best option" becomes inevitable.
6.1.4. Memory as de-mobilizing idea
Concern about potential destabilization of inter-ethnic relations appears to have
played against the decision to be more active politically and more confrontational in
making demands to state authorities.
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"Why should we get involved in politics? What difference does it make? Uzbek problems should be
solved within the community, not from outside. Uzbek themselves can solve them. People are afraid
that by becoming active in politics, political struggles become a matter of us against them, of Kyrgyz
against Kyrgyz. You see, they struggle between themselves nowadays (northern versus southern
regions), but as soon as we get involved, they will all unite and divert their problems against us. This
is why during the Aksy riots, we told our people; Do not go there, stay home. Don't go, they will
blame us".
Fear of becoming involved combined with political apathy or general distrust for
politics appear paradoxically to have paid off more than active political engagement
in the Uzbek case, insofar as the state leadership is perceived to "protect" ethnic
minorities, or at least not to "harm" them. An often mentioned reason for the lack of
mobilization, or even interest in politics from the Uzbek population is "Uzbek
mentality'" (mentalitet), indicated by about one in four respondents (23.3%) as a
cause of the perceived Uzbek political inaction. The term refers to the social
conservatism of the Uzbek population, which seems to entail a sort of passivity in
public life. "Ne meshay!" (do not get involved!) seems to be a self-imposed order
that Uzbeks give themselves. Uzbeks do not appear keen to participate actively in
public life. There are of course reasons which have nothing to do with politics: state
employment, a job in politics or the security services (e.g. army, secret services) do
not appear to appeal to Uzbeks. The salary is much lower than that of a job in the
trade sector. This clearly raises the question as to whether it is possible to speak of
marginalization or even discrimination of minorities in some sectors of the state
structures, or if instead Uzbeks operate some form of "self-censorship", as one
respondent put it to me. On the other hand, Uzbeks claim that employment in the
army, judiciary, and secret services are "off limits" to them.
"They [Kyrgyz] think we are all [members of] Hizb-ut Tahrir!" "They do not trust us, they
think we can not be loyal. But we citizens of Kyrgyzstan, this is our homeland!"
There is actually a creeping suspicion among Kyrgyz, that underground militant
Islamic movements may be particularly popular with Uzbeks. This does create a
serious problem of mutual trust between the two peoples. While the sentiment is not
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widespread (Faranda and Nolle, 2003), I did occasionally come across instances of
"ethnic othering":
"You should not be surprised if you find an Uzbek working in the army and his brother a
member of Hizb-ut Tahrir. Then what do we do? What does he do? Do you think he would
give up his brother for the state?"
The question of mutual trust and loyalty is crucial for inter-ethnic stability. As long
as minorities feel unwelcome and distrusted they will unwillingly (perhaps as last
resort) contribute to the formation of state institutions. In turn, as long as members of
the titular group perceive even a shadow of ambiguity in terms of loyalty from the
minority, it is unlikely that it will ever concede control of positions at a senior level.
One of the possible explanations for the overall "passivity" or "lack of
activism" lies in the lack of a widespread perception of marginalization (e.g. lack of
political representation, inadequacies in cultural protection - language, education) to
be articulated into an effective mobilizing idea. It seems, on the contrary, that
grievances remained just that. A local (Kyrgyz) analyst crudely put it as follows:
"They [Uzbeks] complain, but what do they do? If they think there is something wrong, then
why do they sit and do nothing?"
A widespread sense of frustration has recently emerged among southern Kyrgyz due
to the fact that, despite sharing common grievances and perceptions of being "left
out" from the redistribution of power by the northern clans, Uzbeks and southern
Kyrgyz have failed to coalesce their efforts to bring about political change141. The
unfolding of events that led to the incidents in Aksy (Jalalabat province) in early
2002142 illustrates well the stance that Uzbeks have taken vis-a-vis the domestic
political process. Uzbeks tend to view Kyrgyzstani politics as a quintessentially
"(intra-)Kyrgyz affair", in which Uzbeks - a minority group and without clan ties
traditionally shaping local politics - are increasingly marginalised. The 2002 Aksy
events have contributed to make this covinction even more entrenched in Uzbek
I4II am grateful to Almaz Kalet for discussing this point in length with me.
142ICG (2002c).
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political imagination. In March 2002 Kyrgyz from the southern regions gathered the
town of Aksy to protest against the arrest of the Jogorku Kenesh deputy Azimbek
Beknazarov, who had previously demanded the resignation of the country leadership
guilty of having conceded parts of Kyrgyz territory to foreign countries through
secret agreements143. The protest turned into a series of riots that left a dozen people
dead and eventually showed the depth of the political rift between northern and
southern Kyrgyzstan. A striking absence from the demonstrations was that of the
Uzbek population. While issues of state sovereignty may have not ranked high in the
priorities of the local Uzbek communities, more concerned about more immediate
issues such as language and education, for southern Kyrgyz the protests were not
simply about the arrest of Beknazarov, but about a perception of unfair distribution
of resources and represenation between northern and southern areas of the country.
What happened was that Uzbeks were advised by leading members of the
community against taking part in demonstrations144, as doing so would have
heightened ethnic tensions. What was feared was not so much the fact of protesting
per se, but that Uzbek protest would have been used as a way of soothing tensions
between Kyrgyz by refocusing the attention on "Uzbek disloyal behaviour". The lack
of participation was not without consequences however, as interviews with local
Kyrgyz in the south pointed to the disillusionment towards the local Uzbeks, seen as
a 'fifth column' not of the Republic of Uzbekistan, but of the Akaev regime! What
the Aksy events show is that lack of Uzbek protest is not a product of structural
passivity of the Uzbek population, but a strategic calculation by the Uzbek leaders
about the impact of their actions.
6.1.5. Are Uzbeks a diaspora? Soviet frames and discourses of
integration
Chapter 4 has shown that Uzbeks possess a strong sense of common belonging to the
ethno-national group. Data presented in the same chapter also suggest an equally
strong degree of attachment to the state. Whether out of resignation or genuine
support, Uzbeks have accepted their condition as citizens of Kyrgyzstan. This also
emerged from the extent of the appropriation of the frame adopted by the Uzbek
U4Ibid-144Interviews with activists of Uzbek organizations in Osh and Jalalabat (June and July 2003).
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community to define itself vis-a-vis the state. Uzbek presence was articulated not as
a temporary presence, but as a permanent one.
In order to understand the way Uzbeks imagine themselves and their role in
Kyrgyzstan, I explored the following set of questions. First, respondents were asked
to express their opinion as to whether or not they perceive themselves as constituting
a national minority. Subsequently, they were given a series of options from which
they could choose the label that would best represent the community of belonging
(i.e. national minority, diaspora, titular nation, historical (indigenous) nation145,
ethnic community, other). Finally, respondents were asked whether the label elicits
positive or negative feelings. In the follow-up interviews I returned to some of the
key issues that emerged from the survey data and discussed them further, specifically
the understanding of the concept of diaspora, and more generally the significance of
the group's self-categorization.
A plurality of respondents (45.5%) rejected the idea that the Uzbek
community might be categorized as a national minority, whereas a slightly lower
percentage seemed instead to share this thesis (40.2%), with one in six respondents
undecided (14.4%). The label national minority is, with large exceptions, refused by
representatives of the Uzbek community, arguing that this label applies to "very
small groups, of a few thousands people or even less". National minority also
implicitly refers to a diminished status with which Uzbeks find it difficult to
reconcile themselves to, especially in areas of compact Uzbek settlement in the
south. Contrary to the issue of the use of the term diaspora (see following paragraph),
the question of whether or not Uzbeks do represent a national minority is extremely
controversial and raises a series of perplexities among the titular group:
"They tell you [me] and us [Kyrgyz] that they are not a national minority. They say they have always
been here, which is true, and that they have the same rights as Kyrgyz. They say they do not want
quotas or any particular treatment of favour. Then they go to the OSCE and start saying that they are a
national minority, that they are discriminated. Why do they do that?"
145I did not insert this type of identification in my pilot study in Bishkek, but it emerged from my
initial conversations with local Uzbeks that referred to themselves using this expression
(istoricheskaya natsiya). As the concept appears quite vaguely undefined, I further inquired about how
I should understand it, and it later emerged that the meaning of this should be "indigenous".
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Referring to local Uzbeks as a "diaspora/diasporic community" is considered more or
less a term of abuse or, at best, as a pejorative term. When elicited on the topic,
respondents overwhelmingly rejected any association between the Uzbek community
and the label diaspora (only 3.3% of the sample considers Uzbeks to be a diasporic
community). One in four respondents (23.6%) assigns the label a negative
connotation, more or less the same proportion of the sample is indifferent to the
question (25.5.%), and one in three (36.4%) does not have any opinion in this regard.
One in six associates a positive meaning to the term diaspora (14.5). This does not
mean much per se. I then explored what meaning respondents attach to the term, in
order to understand the rationale behind the massive rejection of the term "Uzbek
diaspora" (which I also tended to use in earlier stages of my research146). This
overwhelmingly negative attitude toward the term is not well captured from survey
data, but the follow-up interviews seem to give a better grasp of the extent to which
Uzbeks do not wish to be identified as such (a mere 3.3.% did so). On no occasion, in
individual interviews, did I find an Uzbek willing to consider his/her community of
belonging as diasporic. Reactions tended to include comments such as the following:
"We are not a diaspora! Nobody should refer to Uzbeks as diaspora. We are no diaspora, we
did not arrive from anywhere. We are not like Germans or Koreans. They are small peoples,
we are more than a million."
Diasporic communities and the idea of trans-national communities with links both in
the state of residence and in distant areas have become more "acceptable" in recent
years. This does not seem to apply to the post-Soviet space, where terminology
remains not only politically charged, but firmly rooted in Soviet understandings of
nationalities. This appears clearly when seeking to explore the meanings and
perceptions associated with the term diaspora. Typically, respondents had difficulties
to explain what one should understand by the concept. However, they were able to
provide plenty of examples of diasporic communities, such as the Chechens,
Koreans, Poles, and Germans. These were not mere examples, but references to what
in the Stalinist period were considered (and on this basis deported) "enemy peoples"
146I am grateful to Alisher Khamidov for making me more aware of the implications of the use of the
term with regard to Osh Uzbeks.
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(read: anti-Soviet and disloyal)147. What made things worse from the Uzbek
perspective, was that these peoples were small in size and lacked a key pre-requisite
for aspiring to status and territory (and the resources and prestige associated with the
claim to national territories): indigenousness. Similar considerations were made with
regard to the term minority (10.7% of respondents referred to the Uzbek community
as such). The fact that a few miles away from the border Uzbeks constituted the
titular nation only accentuated the sensitivity of the question, which was clear about
more than just terminology.
More marginal percentages emerged for other answers, among which were
diaspora and ethnic community (7.4%)148. What appears to be the most popular form
of self-categorization is "historical nation" (67.2%). I came across this term
(istoricheskaya natsiya) during the explorative phase of my research, and in
particular during my visit to Bishkek. On the basis of an overwhelming rejection of
the label diaspora or even national minority from the Uzbek population, I asked my
respondents what term they would use to define the (status of the) Uzbek population
in the country. Historical nation is used as synonymous for indigenous (korennoi):
this fits well with what said above about the ideas that Uzbeks attach to the term
diaspora. The ideas underlying the concept (that Kyrgyzstani's territory is as Uzbek
as much as it is Kyrgyz or belonging to other indigenous populations) stands in stark
contrast to attempts from some nationalist elements in the administration to pass
legislation (later vetoed by Akaev) that would favour ethnic Kyrgyz in land
ownership thereby implying that Kyrgyzstani territory is first and foremost Kyrgyz
land (Spector, 2004 p. 12).
6.1.6. "Millatchilik xaram" 149
Religion was not erased during Soviet times, but survived in disguised forms. In the
aftermath of the Soviet collapse Islam provided one of the possible identity
trajectories for the local population. Other factors, less related to concerns with
mankind's destiny and to more earthly factors such as economic collapse, crisis in
l470n the deported peoples of the Soviet Union see Hirsch (2005).
1480ther results include "titular nation" (4.9%) and "other" (6.6%).
149Within Islam codes of behaviour are divided into haram (forbidden, spelt xaram in Uzbek) and halal
(allowed).
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the social fabric and political repression, contributed to the rise in significance of
Islam not as a matter of private faith, but as a political project. As far as Central Asia
is concerned, a variant of Islam was used by two groups in particular: the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan and the Hizb-ut Tahrir150. Membership of such
organizations arises from religious principles, and not out of common ethnic bonds,
which are transcended by the Islamic faith.
The relational side of the Islamic frame lies in the simultaneous mobilizing
potential as a non-national frame as well as a de-mobilizing frame for mobilization
along ethnic lines. Chapter 4 has shown that religion and nationality constitute strong
foci of allegiance for local Uzbeks. Given a choice, Uzbeks tend to opt for religious
identification. This is particularly significant for those Uzbeks with a high religious
sentiment, as is the case of those living in the Ferghana Valley, an area where
religious sentiment appear particularly strong, at least compared to the rest of Central
Asia. Local reports have repeatedly noted the strength of religion as a form of
collective identification. This is not exclusive to the local population, but for the
purposes for this study the impact that Islam has on local Uzbeks is of particular
relevance. Should religion rather than ethnicity continue to be the primary form of
identification, the chances for local Uzbeks to mobilize along ethnic lines would
appear strongly reduced.
"Being Muslim is a million times more important than being Uzbek."
As the conversation took place in Russian, the editor of 'Demos Times (Osh)
Makhmud Kazakbaev could have choosen a different term to convey the same
message. However the deliberate choice of the term xaram (haram), of Arabic
origins, immediately pointed to the irrelevance of national differences within Islam.
Mr Kazakbaev's comment captures well the sentiments of the Uzbek population.
I50ln the early 1990s two other organizations emerged and gained rapidly popularity: the Party of
Islamic Renaissance (at ail-Union level), and Adolat, in Uzbekistan. Adolat was soon banned by the
Karimov administration, whereas the PIR soon fragmented along national lines, and continues to exist
in Tajikistan only (Naumkin, 2003).
176






The slogan above was used by the Uzbek businessman Davron Sabirov during the
2000 parliamentary electoral campaign in the city of Osh. While the message is no
more or less threatening than any other populist slogan, what caused alarm at the
time was the style of the electoral campaign152. This sparked wide-scale protests and
heightened tensions between ethnic groups in the south of the country where
Sabirov's organization is based and where he was campaigning. The slogan, with the
letters "U" and "Z" of the word "uzing" (you yourselves, in Uzbek) in capital closely
reminded to the word Uzbek, with some even seeing a reference to Uzbekistan, from
where Sabirov was reported to be receiving money and political support. These two
allegations have always remained unsubstantiated. None the less the question of the
political backing which Sabirov received from Uzbekistan was a matter of dispute
throughout the entire 1990s.
Regardless of the origins of Mr. Sabirov's funding, what is less subject to
dispute (Sabirov himself openly admits it) is the cross-border links that he has
maintained with officials in the local administration and the gas sector in Andijan (it
is useful to recall that Sabirov himself chairs the Osh branch of the company
KyrgyzGas). When Uzbekistan periodically interrupted the provision of gas to
Kyrgyzstan (this has happened more or less regularly from 1999 onwards, possibly in
retaliation to the alleged incompetence and lack of effectiveness of Kyrgyzstani
authorities to prevent IMU militants from entering Uzbekistani territory), gas
supplies were re-activated within a few days in some areas of town after Sabirov's
1
intervention with "acquaintances and friends" in Andijan. Although this is
something Sabirov has never kept secret, some Kyrgyz resent the fact that Sabirov
151"You yourselves are right, you yourselves are the people, you yourselves are the scale - my
people!"
152Megoran (2000c and 2000d).
'"interview with D. Sabirov, July 2003.
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was all too quick to provide gas to Uzbek-inhabited areas of town, leaving other
districts still without supply.
In 2000 Mr. Sabirov campaigned in the electoral district no. 34 in the north¬
eastern outskirts of Osh, known among the locals as the Amir Temur district, a
deeply impoverished area, almost entirely inhabited by Uzbeks. Mr. Sabirov's
candidacy was withdrawn for months by the electoral authorities as he was taken to
court for allegedly inciting ethnic hatred. The spark that initiated the controversy was
a brief electoral advertisement broadcast on the local TV station Osh TV. The
broadcast staged the following: a man dressed with the traditional Uzbek hat was
seen being mobbed and robbed by a group of people riding horses and wearing the
black and white Kyrgyz hat (kalpak). The metaphor of Uzbeks being attacked from
Kyrgyz did not require a sophisticated interpretation. Towards the end of the
programme one could hear a voice reading Mr Sabirov's electoral slogan. As Mr
Sabirov was taken to court, Osh TV was briefly suspended and Mr Sabirov's
candidacy withdrawn (only to be re-admitted, suspended again and finally re¬
admitted). Davron Sabirov eventually won 62% of votes in his district and was
elected (Megoran, 2000a and 2000b).
Mr. Sabirov's electoral campaign did not come as a total surprise to the local
population. From 1997 to 2000 Davron Sabirov had systematically framed the Uzbek
question in nationalistic terms, as many Uzbeks and himself openly acknowledge.
Continuous references to Uzbekistan and proposals to shift the script to Latin, for
example, were not viewed favourably by many even within the Uzbek community.
The editor of Jalalobod Tongi newspaper (the Dawn of Jalalabat) dismissed Mr
Sabirov's campaign as "sheer nationalism and populism. Mr Sabirov represents
himself and no-one else in the Uzbek community"154. What matters here is the role
that the style and content of Mr Sabirov's political ambitions had on inter-ethnic
relations in town. The framing of the Uzbek question in a way that heightened
tensions (playing the nationalist card) was a cornerstone of his electoral campaign.
This phase started in 1996 when Mr Sabirov was essentially ousted from the UNCC
and established his own separate organization, and culminated in 2000, when he was
elected to the Jogorku Kenesh.
154Jalalabat, 11 July 2003.
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This brief, though tense, phase marked a departure from the calming down of
tones following the inward turn of Uzbekistan's foreign policy in the mid-1990s and
the vocal support of local Uzbeks for the Akaev administration. What happened then
was a "bifurcation" of Uzbek voices, with the official Uzbek national-cultural centre
presenting itself as moderate and openly pro-government, and the other (Mr Davran
Sabirov's) "closer to the people than to those in power", as he put it to me. Through a
series of moves Sabirov sought to play on some open wounds and other themes dear
to the Uzbek community:
the naming of the new organization: Society of Uzbeks as opposed to
national-cultural centre. The decision of the official centre to opt for a
denomination which many Uzbeks see as appropriate for Koreans or
Russians, but not for themselves (a typical comment being: 'small
nationalities or diasporas need national-cultural centers, not us. We are not a
minority. We are the majority here!');
the emphasis on the importance of (cultural) links with Uzbekistan, expressed
in terms of the support of a script shift in favour of Latin (a move which the
UNCC opposes);
the provision of textbooks and the broader issue of schooling in Uzbek
language155;
a more critical stance towards the Kyrgyzstani leadership.
Sabirov did not benefit only from the support of the Society of Uzbeks, the
organization he had founded in the mid-1990s. He could also count on a supportive
voice in the local media. Mezon (newspaper) and Mezon TV, which Mr Sabirov does
not own officially, constituted a new, less complacent voice towards state authorities,
voice for the Uzbek population until 2000. Many would regard them as vehicles of
nationalist propaganda, others as instruments of Mr Sabirov's own ambition. The
latter view has become more popular since the closure by Mr Sabirov of the
newspaper and the change in focus of the programmes broadcast on Mezon TV
(more Brazilian soap operas and less politics156).
155Mr Sabirov has recently (2003) funded and built a brand-new school in the heart of the Amir Temur
district.
156This may also be move to respond to the preferences of the public. As Deputy B. Fattakhov told me
(Bishkek, June 16, 2003): "Uzbeks are more interested in Esmeralda [a Brazilian soap very popular at
the time of my visit in Kyrgyzstan in 2003] than they are in politics".
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Over the years the activities of the O'zbeklar Jamiyati have become less regular,
with the leader of the organization looking increasingly detached from its own
organization. Sabirov's tone has become less aggressive and more conciliatory
towards the authorities. If Sabirov's change of tones has certainly been beneficial to
the political stability of the country, the reputation of the leader in question has been
damaged by the widespread perception that he may have become too interested in
improving his financial situation through closer links with state authorities.
Alongside dealing in the gas sector, Mr Sabirov has recently focused on the
construction sector, funding a series of projects in close proximity to the main Osh
bazaar.
6.1.8. Summary
In sum, it appears that several visions have competed for the attention of the Uzbek
public in Kyrgyzstan:
the memory of the Osh conflict and the overarching concern for stability;
discourses of civic integration and the associated (Soviet-inherited) claims of
indigenousness;
and nationalist frames.
Certainly structural factors have played a role in this process: government imposed
limits on the use of nationalist propaganda have obviously hindered the creation of a
resonating message to possibly mobilise the Uzbek population around its own
Uzbekness and the perceptions of threat and siege (from the titular group). The
absence of an ethnic political party has hindered the resonance of a primarily Uzbek
voice, let alone its representation in national institutions. Some frames emerged and
were appropriated by the larger community: among these the more moderate
messages - with two exceptions aside, 1990-1992 and 1997-2000, - seem to have
prevailed.
6.2. Tajikistan
6.2.1. The "Republic of Leninabad"?
Although its traditional dominance of Tajikistani political life (as well as the culture
and economy) and the threat to this position were undoubtedly among the causes for
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the outbreak of hostilities, Sughd remained by and large unscarred by the hostilities.
The possibility that the northern province of Sughd might opt for outright secession
has haunted the country's post-Soviet transition. Just how real was this possibility?
Muriel Atkin (1997 p.295) recalls that in the very early years of the 1990s (in
1992 particularly) Leninabad appeared on the verge of secession. Officials banned
transmissions of radio and television programmes from Dushanbe, and took a range
of institutions out of central control following the power struggle that since 1992 has
embroiled centre-north relations. In addition, a separate provincial militia was
established that year. Leninabad's obstructionism lasted until the end of 1992. The
role ethnicity (i.e. the links between cross-border Uzbeks and the role of Uzbekistan)
may have played in all this is disputed, but as John Schoeberlein has noted,
Leninabad's secessionist bid may be explained by its refusal to accept Kulyabi
domination rather than by its alleged loyalty to Tashkent (1996).
A second wave of separatist tendencies emerged in the second half of the
1990s, when elements of the northern opposition coalesced under Abdullajonov's
Movement for National Revival, appeared to join forces with a renegade of the Tajik
army, Col. M. Khudoyberdiev. On several occasions from 1996 to November 1998
disturbances and uprisings took place in different locations in the Sughd province.
The final uprising was meant to lead Khudoyberdiev to take control of the whole
province, whereas it ended up with him being forced to retreat into Uzbekistani
territory, from where the insurgent militia allegedly crossed into Tajikistan. The
insurrection failed, and Abdullajonov and Khudoyberdiev were expelled from
Tajikistan in a seemingly definitive way. Various respondents (both Tajiks and
Uzbeks) noted how ethnicity had little to do with Khudoyberdiev's actions and
emphasized how looking at his ethnic background (Uzbek, although he is actually
an ethnic Lakay and Lakays do not peacefully accept to being considered Uzbek)
does not advance the understanding of his actions and the motives behind them.
Some of the comments on Khudoyberdiev I came across during my interviews
reflected similar feeling:
"He [Khudoyberdiev] did not care about Uzbeks or others. He cared about himself and his money".
"What did he come here for? He came here, took hold of a deposit guarded from the military where all
the heroin seized from officials had been stored and took it with him
about us."
181
- this is how much he cared
In addition, many recalled the outcome of his last appearance in Khujand in 1998.
1 C'7
According to Validjon Ahmedov , Khudoyberdiev met fierce resistance from the
republican army which would eventually overcome his militia. Also, the only
building he could successfully took control of was interestingly the deposit of the
drugs seized from the Tajikistani authorities in town.
"He took the drugs and fled. Nobody ever saw him again here."
This version of events is widely accepted by all respondents, regardless of their
ethnic background and of their political orientation. Even among the most fiercely
1 CO
critical circles of Uzbek intellectuals Khudoyberdiev is not remembered as a hero.
A direct fallout of these secessionist bids and/or uprisings lies in the caution
with which people, especially Uzbeks, have addressed the question of autonomy for
the Sughd province. In fact, autonomy is rarely indicated as a focus of Uzbek
demands and even more rarely advanced as a possible solution to the province's
problems. This is similar to the situation of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, where the memory
of conflict had operated as a de-mobilizing idea and has pushed all parties involved
towards moderation and support for authorities as guarantors of civil order.
Additionally the outbreak of hostilities, reminiscent of analogous situations in the
neighouring republic, was strongly associated with the presence of ethno-federal
institutions. From my previous visits to Central Asia I have gathered the impression
that autonomy is not associated with concepts such as devolution or local
governance, but with secession, conflict, and war. Again, similarly to the
Kyrgyzstani case, this has meant that the broad issue of political-territorial claims has
completely disappeared from the agenda, paving the way for a monopolization of the
Uzbek agenda by cultural demands.
Overall, though Leninabad was actually more integrated with Soviet
Uzbekistan, in the post-independence era the idea of a 'republic of Leninabad'
157Centre for Democratic Transformations, Khujand, August 2003.
15sInterviews held at "Chetvertaya Vlast' - NPO", a local NGO in Khujand (August 2003).
182
(Martin, 1997), appeared untenable to a large segment of the population. As
Fatimakhon Ahmedova (Centre for Democratic Transformations in Khujand)
explained:
"Especially in the first half of the 1990s there seemed to be a possibility for Leninabad to break away
from the rest of Tajikistan. It was the richest and most developed region (culturally) and it
traditionally dominated the political life of the republic. Once the country descended into chaos, some
were left wondering about the future prospects. From a practical point of view the region could be
self-sufficient, but politically no-one could imagine an independent Leninabad. Realistically speaking.
Uzbekistan would expect it to be absorbed within its borders, and Tajikistan would never be keen to
lose the engine of the country. Rather than becoming a satellite of Uzbekistan, people prefer to stay
within Tajikistan."
Similar to the case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks the fact that an autonomist frame does not
dominate the Uzbek agenda does not diminish the extent of popular discontentment,
"fueled by anger over the economic crises and by indignation over the influx of
Kulyabi officials" (Akiner, 2001 p.65). Uzbekistan's presence in the province in the
early 1990s (with Uzbek police and troops maintaining order in Khujand's streets)
has been documented, though this does not lead to the conclusion that Uzbekistan's
presence came out via invitation of the local population. Rather, the potential loss of
a traditional area of influence during Soviet times - hence power politics concerns -
convinced the Uzbekistani authorities to meddle with the Tajik events. Whatever
separatist sentiments may have been present then, these faded in the following years.
A separatist and even an autonomist agenda appear now not only unrealistic
politically, but the very idea of establishing an independent state being annexed to
Uzbekistan, or even just institutionalizing autonomy, are options rarely put forward
in the north.
6.2.2. Discourses of indigenousness: "We are not a diaspora! We are
locals, we didn't come from anywhere!"
The previous chapters have suggested that ethnicity has little bearing on the way the
local population perceives itself and its relation with neighbours. This is confirmed
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not only by survey data159, but also by an analysis of the possible frames that have
resonated across the Uzbek population. Among this is a strong frame of civic
integration, particularly significant given that Tajikistan is a post-conflict society and
this certainly bodes quite well for the reconstruction of the social fabric. This section
explores different means of group self-categorization and relates them to more
widespread discourses of indigenousness (as opposed to migrant or newcomer's
identity), and attempts to overcome dychotomist images of majority and minority.
Similar to the Kyrgyzstani case, Uzbek self-definition in Tajikistan draws on Soviet
language and rejects terms such as diasporas and minority.
About one in two Uzbeks do not perceive themselves as constituting a
national minority in Tajikistan (50.4%). About one third of respondents by contrast
tended to share the opposite view (34.6%), whereas one in six (15%) did not express
any opinion. As in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the question as to whether or not one
community may be categorized as national minority is more a matter of status than
mere statistics. No-one even advances the idea that on a strictly numerical level
Uzbeks might not constitute a minority. What is subject to dispute among Uzbeks are
the implications of this labeling. First, it entails a diminished status vis-a-vis Kyrgyz,
not only the country's titular group, but above all a numerical majority. A minority
status might also lead to a smaller role in public affairs. Finally, it might also
generate an encirclement syndrome, a feeling of being isolated from kins in
Uzbekistan, and from fellow citizens because of a typology which de facto divides
the citizenry into first and second class citizens. The idea of being seen as a national
minority is largely rejected on the basis that Uzbeks are the largest community in the
country after the titular group, but also constitute the majority in some areas - e.g.
rural areas in the Sughd province.
Similar perceptions are common also with regard to the idea of being
considered as a diasporic community. As already observed in the case of Kyrgyzstani
Uzbeks, respondents in Tajikistan appeared to reject being categorized as a diasporic
community. Negative feelings associated with this type of label were even more
conspicuous (36.8%), to emphasise even further the claim to indigenousness and the
fact that Uzbeks "did not migrate here [Tajikistan] from anywhere". Only a very
159 Bozrikova (2003 and 2004) and Ifes (1996a).
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marginal percentage (7.5%) tends to associate positive feelings with the term
diaspora, whereas one in five (20.3%) and one in three (35.3%) are either indifferent
or have no feelings about the question (35.3%) respectively. Again, individual
interviews followed a pattern similar to the case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, where many
more showed objections, allegedly based on historical or etymological grounds, to
the appropriateness of the use of the term. Comments such as the following are
common:
"Uzbeks have been here forever". "We did not come from anywhere! This is our land".
Having established that Tajikistani Uzbeks do not see themselves as either a diaspora
or national minority, I then sought to understand how they actually perceive
themselves. This was not just a matter of a pedantic drive for categorization.
Although there were certainly practical concerns for finding a "label" (in order to
avoid referring to Uzbek people all the time), there was a more serious motive.
Opting for one term (diaspora, for example) rather than another (member of the
Kyrgyzstani nation) reveals how the new state and the new state identity are
perceived from potentially marginal groups and the ideas about the state that the
group might be forming. In northern Tajikistan the majority of Uzbeks perceived
themselves as historical nation (60.8%)160, and via this advancing a claim of
indigenousness and symbolic ownership of the territory (locale). Given the
opportunity to choose among many options, one in two Uzbeks changed his/her mind
with regard to the option national minority (the percentage decreasing form 40.2 to
the first question to 19.2% in the following). Only a very marginal number responded
diaspora (0.8%), whereas one in ten opted for ethnic community (etnicheskaya
obshchina)161.
As Foroughi (2002 p.45) - among the others - noted, ethnicity is not a clear-
cut phenomenon when it comes to Uzbeks and Tajiks. They may speak different
languages (although in areas of mixed settlement they tend to speak both fluently),
but "no clear differences exist between Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups'" (ibid.). In
most cases, members of either community tend to agree with this view. Furthermore,
I60The term historical nation is understood in similar ways in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
16lIn addition, 3.8% answered titular nation (titul'naya natsiya) and 4.6% indicated other.
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the case of Uzbeks and Tajiks demonstrates how ethnicity per se is an extremely
complex phenomenon and is not considered a relevant cleavage among ordinary
peoples. As Olimov and Olimova (2002 p.249) have noted, Uzbeks are "nearly as
proud as Tajiks of their country's newly acquired independence"162. A survey
conducted by the authors in the mid-1990s reveals that 47% of Uzbeks are proud of
their citizenship, 30.4% are dissatisfied with it, whereas only 8% are indifferent to it
and 1.9% are dissatisfied with or ashamed of it. This is no minor achievement for a
country with so brief and turbulent an history as Tajikistan. Moreover this also
confirms that that dual loyalties (ethnic cultural identities and political allegiances)
can co-exist without being seen as problematic. This does not apply to all
communities in the country, though, as in a similar study conducted on Russians then
appears in a counter-tendency, with just about 14.5% of Tajikistan's Russians proud
of their citizenship, 21.6% not proud at all, and 39.1% indifferent to it (Ifes, 1996).
Olimov and Olimova do not underestimate the sources of tensions among the
two groups (e.g. tense bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and a
negative fall-out on state-group relation; problems with border demarcation, visa
regime, labour competition and political representation, ibid., p.250). However,
Olimov and Olimova suggest that overall there has been a trade-off between the
economic and political realm between Tajiks and Uzbeks. Uzbeks may have lost
something in terms of political influence, but this has been composed by the strength
gained by the Uzbek economic elite, which has better adapted to the new post-Soviet
and economic environment.
6.2.3. Summary
Separatism and indigenousness/integration have been the only two themes that have
to different extent resonated among the local population. However, at the present
stage the former has not been framed into an articulated mobilizing idea, that is a set
of core beliefs sufficiently powerful to rally members of the group in a
mobilizational process. The latter, by contrast, has contributed to de-mobilizing the
Uzbek population. Depoliticisation of ethnicity has resonated across the Uzbek
community. What seems to be missing is a vision in some way reminiscent of the
162This view is confirmed also by Bozrikova (2003) and the Ifes survey (1996).
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"UZ campaign" orchestrated by Davron Sabirov in southern Kyrgyzstan. This should
not come as a surprise given that Tajiks and Uzbeks have a tradition of long and
peaceful, indeed integrated, co-existence on the the Tajik side of the Ferghana
Valley. A high degree of intermarriage, bilingualism, and cultural similarities (from
traditions to food, from weddings to funeral rites) make the two groups at times hard
to distinguish.
6.3. Conclusion
The way particular issues are framed by movement leaders (typically) or by ordinary
members of a group (perhaps less frequently so) guides political action by creating
an idea which resonates across the community itself and around which the group
unifies and sets to act. From a discussion of data presented in this chapter it is
possible to infer three main conclusions.
First, both cases suggest that a pre-conflict situation is more likely to assist in
the emergence of a mobilizing idea than a post-conflict one. A mobilizing idea
resonating widely across the community emerged in the late Soviet and early post-
Soviet period (1990-92) when changes in the Soviet and republican opportunity
structure were taking place. The aftermath of the Osh conflict brought an end to a set
of ideas which included a separatist agenda or the possibility of establishing an
autonomous region in the south of the country. The memory or legacy of the conflict
de facto hindered the development of a similarly powerful mobilizing idea thereafter.
A similar situation took place in Tajikistan, where the two most powerful and radical
set of ideas (the splitting of Leninabad from the rest of the country) took place in two
different contexts. However, while a crucial distinction should be drawn between the
two phases (early 1990s and late 1990s), the latter period saw an increase in the use
of nationalist frames, but this was arguably due more to personal interests than to
anything related to ethnic issues.
Second, the case of Kyrgyzastan points to the fact that the emergence of a
mobilising idea precedes action. Widespread perceptions of disadvantage and a loss
in status contributed to the heightening of tensions which in the end led up to the Osh
conflict in 1990. The use of nationalist frames in 1997-2000 supports this thesis.
Since the establishment of the Society of Uzbeks on the one hand, and of two media
outlets as vehicles for propaganda on the other, Davron Sabirov has been able to
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frame a set of grievances, needs, and demands of the Uzbek population which also
increased the level of tensions in the southern regions, culminating in his electoral
success in 2000. In Tajikistan, however, it appears that rarely was the outbreak of a
significant action related to a previously articulated vision. The separatist phase in
the early 1990s was preceded by a mobilizing idea, which included perceptions about
possible loss of political influence and economic power were actually present. The
second phase in 1996-98 was completely different in nature, and although a
separatist sentiment was still present, the uprisings were based on completely
different grounds (power politics).
Third, perceptions and ideas about the Uzbek question underwent several
phases. It is possible to associate one or more (de-)mobilizing idea to each phase.
The changes in the political structure at Union level and the reconfiguration of the
power structure across regions in the country opened a window of opportunity for the
formation of new ideas. Perceptions of economic disadvantage and loss in status
generated a highly pervasive mobilizing idea (Uzbeks under siege) which lasted well
beyond the conflict, although were not articulated to become a significant mobilizing
idea. Whatever separatist or autonomist bids there might have been, these were
prevented by state actors from combining with the grievances into a potentially far
more explosive mobilizing idea. The intervention of both state actors and individual
leaders replaced an emerging mobilizing idea with a de-mobilizing idea: the
perception that for a similar conflict not to repeat itself, support should be given to
whoever appears willing to and capable of maintaining ethnic stability. Alongside
these ideas a more nationalist one developed, the exception rather than the norm,
framed by the local businessman and politician D. Sabirov in the period 1997-2000.
The softening of tone from his side in 2000 (following his election) greatly
contributed to a decreasing level of tension, although some still persist.
Tajikistani Uzbeks did not seem to develop a similar set of competing ideas.
Quite the contrary, the lack of any articulated vision appears to be one of the factors
behind the lack of political action among Uzbeks living in the northern region. The
perceived change in the political opportunity structure in 1990-1992 with the
unfolding power battle between regions contributed to the development of a possible
separatist idea which was much more regional than national in essence. The 1992-
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1997 war left Leninabad de facto isolated from the rest of the country and the Peace
Accords signed in 1997 also failed to re-integrate the region in the political and
economic system. The wave of uprisings from 1996 to 1998 owed more to power
politics than to separatist bids, and in any case ethnicity played little part in those
events. Similarly to the Kyrgyzstani case, concern for possible new outbreaks of
conflict have constituted a form of mobilizing idea where concern for stability
translates into support for the ruling faction (although Uzbeks in Tajikistan feel less
guaranteed from Rakhmonov than Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks from Akaev).
Overall, ideas in Kyrgyzstan also appear to unify the members of the
community in a much tighter way than they happen to do in the neighbouring
republic. Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks have assisted in developing the presence, from the
second half of the 1990s, of two distinct (de-)mobilizing ideas: the memory of the
1990 Osh conflict and the necessity to preserve ethnic stability and to support
whoever is perceived to guarantee that stability (until recently Askar Akaev), and
Islam. Sporadically a third - more powerful and potentially more destabilizing - idea
has emerged: that Uzbeks might be "under siege", as framed by the deputy Davran
Sabirov, especially in the 1997-2000 period.
A striking similarity concerns the formation of a very significant set of beliefs
among Uzbeks in both countries: the formation of the idea of being part of a
citizenry, where ethnicity is an important dimension of one's identity, but has no
necessary political implications. Particularly emphasised was the rejection to adopt
what seems a confrontational terminology of "us vs. them" such as that of majority
and minority. This finding is important because it confirms the thesis advanced in
chapter 4 that, while ethnicity may well continue to play a role as a source of
collective identification, it is accompanied by other forms of identification, namely a
civic one, which accepts Kyrgyzstani citizenship as a permanent condition with the
attached obligations (loyalty to the state, political identities that transcend ethnic
boundaries) as well as the rights (expectations of fair treatment and equal
opportunities). It is therefore possible to conclude that at the moment ethnicity does
not appear to be used as a resource or framed as a mobilizing idea by any political
actor until now. Concern for ethnic stability is of critical importance for both
Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks.
CHAPTER 7
Uzbek Political Actors
Leadership, elite fragmentation, and popular perceptions
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This chapter is about Uzbek actors, individual and collective, and their strategies.
Following Hay, agency refers to "the ability of an actor to act consciously and [...] to
attempt to realise his or her intentions" (2002 p.94). Agency therefore implies the
possibility of choice between different courses of action. Though Hay associated
rationality ("the capacity of the actor to select modes of conduct best likely to realise
a given set of preferences", ibid, p.95), with the concept of agency, He does not
adopt a rational choice approach. Rather he emphasises how interests are not fixed
(as rational choice theorists would instead assume), but vary according to the
changing identities, interests, motivations and the strategic calculation of the actor
himself/herself. Finally the actor's reflexivity allows him/her to "reflect upon the
consequences of previous action", and adapt the strategy accordingly, ibid.).
First I look at collective actors, namely the official - though by no means
exclusive or representative, as will be shown - Uzbek organizations: the national-
cultural centres. Second I introduce individual actors: the Uzbek elites and
particularly their leadership. This includes the "official" Uzbek leadership, possible
challengers, and what I call the "un-heard voices", the views of those actors w.ho for
different reasons have so far remained marginal to the Uzbek mobilizational process.
The chapter does not stop at the elite level. As Dmitry Gorenburg has correctly
observed with regard to minority nationalism in the Russian Federation, ethnic
entrepreneurs cannot mobilise the masses if they do not relate themselves to them
(2003). While it is certainly important to understand who the actors are and their
strategies, it is equally important to look at the popular perceptions of these leaders.
In other words: what do the rank and file think of them? This is the scope of the third
and final section of this chapter.
In the pages to come I discuss the following factors:
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Identity and type of leadership: who are the leaders and what type of leaders
are they (i.e. task-oriented or people-oriented)?
Strategy16'': What is their strategic goal? How do they intend to achieve it and
what type of relationship do they develop with the ruling elite (ie
confrontational or co-operative)?
Relations between followers and leaders: How are leaders and their actions
perceived by the wider Uzbek population?
The chapter argues that an agency-based approach sheds light on the dynamics of
Uzbek political mobilization. In particular, it shows that leadership matters: the
extent to which a community presents or is represented by a unified leadership makes
a difference. No cohesive leadership has emerged among Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani
Uzbeks. However, the chapter shows that there are significant differences between
the two cases, characterised by a lack of leadership in the former case and by intra-
elite struggles in the latter. Though the current leaders have managed to retain their
privileged status as the only officially sanctioned legitimate actors within the
community, criticism - private rather than public - has emerged, suggesting a de¬
coupling of rank and file from the elites, and possibly also from the strategy of close
co-operation with the state administration that has come to define Uzbek political
behaviour since independence.
7.1. Collective actors and mobilising structures: The national-cultural
centres
Officially promoted by members of the groups itself, but de facto a top-down
organization benefiting from the support of state institutions, national cultural centres
represent the "official voice" of Uzbek communities in both countries.
163As noted in chapter 3, strategy here refers to "the selection of objectives and the search for the most
appropriate means to achieve those objectives within a particular context at a particular moment in
time" (Hay, 1995 p. 190).
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7.1.1. Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is home to two organizations established to promote Uzbek interests: the
National-Cultural Centre (O'zbek Milliy Madaniyat Markazi) and the Society of
Uzbeks (O'zbeklar Jamiyati).
The "Uzbek National-Cultural Centre" (UNCC)
The National-cultural Centre is the Uzbek community's official voice in Kyrgyzstan.
It is also the elder of the two groups (the other being the Society of Uzbeks, see
below), as it was established in September 1990 following the June clashes in Osh
and Uzgen. It is structured along regional lines (there are branches in Osh, Jalalabat,
Batken, and Chui provinces) and the association is co-ordinated at a national level in
Bishkek. Along with other (minority) cultural centres it is represented in the
Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan. I illustrate the nature of the organization and
its objectives by referring to the proceedings of a recent Kurultai (Assembly), held in
Osh on 17th May 2003, and through conversations with Uzbek respondents also
indicated themselves to be representing the general aims of the organization. The
Kurultai (Qurultoi in Uzbek) is a gathering where the leaders of the Uzbek
community meet to discuss the conditions of the Uzbek people living in Kyrgyzstan
and debate the agenda of the organization.
As the following discussion shows, attention focused on primarily cultural and
political issues, leaving economic questions on the sideline of the debate (as shown
in chapter 5 economic grievances are not at the top of the Uzbek agenda). Of
paramount concern was instead the necessity to preserve and improve the relations
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz peoples in Kyrgyzstan ("nash rodnoi dom", was often
noted), so that episodes of discrimination are reduced to a minimum. The question of
the denomination of the Uzbek community also received considerable attention: the
label "diaspora", often used in the state media and official publications was rejected
("People must not speak of an Uzbek diaspora. We are a majority here, we are a
titular and indigenous nation"164). The term "national minority" was also considered
unsuitable, given what said mentioned above about the demographics of the country.
164Interestingly, Mamasaidov refers to Uzbekistani Kyrgyz as a diaspora in his contribution to
Etnicheskii Mir (1995), whereas within a few lines he mentions simply "Uzbeks", without feeling the
need to qualify the term.
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The debate included two more specific demands, one of which was the inclusion
of more Uzbeks in the police and secret services, where they are under-represented.
The other, due to the introduction of a visa regime between Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan, was to seek the establishment of a consulate of Uzbekistan in Osh and
was deemed a particularly pressing issue (though this demand was not directly posed
to the Kyrgyzstani authorities, but the Uzbekistani ones)165.
The discussion then shifted to more cultural issues. First the question of schools
and textbooks was discussed, and references made to the precarious situation in the
border town of Kara-suu, where the number of schools offering tuition in Uzbek was
considered insufficient. Second, the issue of the script in which the Uzbek language
should be written was addressed. The UNCC has repeatedly argued that Uzbek
should be written in Cyrillic so as not to alienate the Uzbek population from the rest
of the population (in Kyrgyzstan it is written in Cyrillic). Also, the Kurultai
recommended the establishment of an Uzbek theatre in the city of Jalalabat, in
addition to the one ("Babur") already existing in Osh, de facto the centre's longa
manus in the arts.
Finally, the question of intra-Uzbek factionalism was briefly mentioned: the fact
that in Osh there are two cultural centres constituted an "element of concern" and the
assembly unanimously recommended that tribalism among Uzbeks be avoided"
(endless animated discussions followed the Kurultai between the two Uzbek
organizations as to whether the Society of Uzbeks, discussed below, had been invited
and decline to participate, or whether this organization had been deliberately
excluded from the works of the Kurultai).
While more "political demands" have not been met over the years, in the fields of
education some progress has been made. Under the pressure of the UNCC a Kyrgyz-
Uzbek University was established in the early 1990s, where tuition would be
provided in the two Turkic languages and Russian. Within the same institution a
printing house was opened, that would help solve (partially) one of the thorniest
issues in the relations between community and state authorities: the shortage of
educational material in Uzbek language (following the shift of Uzbekistan to Latin
script and the interruption of the provision of textbooks).
165Uzbekistan finally agreed to open a consulate in the city of Osh in July 2003 (ASR-Asia, 25 July
2003), though it has not given any following to this statement.
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The "Society of Uzbeks"
The Society of Uzbeks was founded in 1996-97 by the Osh-based businessman and
politician Davron Sabirov in order to create an organization that would appear less
closely associated with state authorities that were perceived as increasingly
unresponsive to Uzbek demands. Davron Sabirov is probably the closest Osh has to a
media tycoon (he owns Mezon newspaper and, until 2004, Mezon TV166). However,
in striking contrast with most representatives of the UNCC, Sabirov has never sought
to mask his political ambitions or the political nature of his organization.
During 1996 Davron Sabirov was nominated chair of the UNCC, which he
intended to rename "Society of Uzbeks" and re-position it as less openly supportive
of state authorities167 in order to break away from the official denomination and thus
broaden the appeal of the organization and make it more inclusive of the broader
Uzbek community. Another key element of discord between D. Sabirov and the local
leadership in Osh regarded the Uzbek NCC's position on the matter of script. Mr D.
Sabirov supported the shift to Latin alphabet following Uzbekistan, whereas many
saw this as a pro-Uzbekistani and therefore de-stabilising manoeuvre. Senior leaders
of the organization feared these moves would threaten government support and
endanger the policy of inter-ethnic stability.
Although not formally expelled, D. Sabirov was left with no choice but to
leave the organization. He would shortly thereafter establish a parallel organization
under a new denomination. The Society of Uzbeks now claims a formal membership
of 10,000 members168, although active members amount to only a few hundred. The
structure of the Society is similar to that of UNCC (although less articulated, given
its local dimension - it is present in Osh only), with a president, and a presidium. An
assembly (a Kurultai parallel to that of the UNCC) should have been convened
already, but Mr Sabirov himself maintained that this "would happen some time in the
near future". The construction of a new building for the organization, supposedly at
166Until 2004 Mr Sabirov used to chair the company KyrgyzGas in Osh. Mezon newspaper was
suddenly closed in March 2000, soon after the parliamentary elections in which Mr D. Sabirov was
elected to the Jogorku Kenesh after a long controversy regarding a racist political commercial
broadcast on Osh TV (see later). It reappeared earlier in 2005 before and during Mr Sabirov's
electoral campaign, only to see its publications newly suspended right after his election.
167Conversations with students at the Department of Uzbek Philology at Osh State University,
members of the UNCC from Karasuu, Osh June-July 2003.
I68lnterview with Davron Sabirov, Osh 16 July 2003.
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the foot of Mt Solomon in Osh, has come to a halt in recent years and Mr Sabirov
seems to have turned his attention elsewhere (to the construction sector). With his
involvement in Uzbek politics fading, his rhetorical tone has also been moderated.
A small survey conducted by the author among 54 Uzbek respondents belonging
to local political, cultural and economic elite, suggests that more than half of the
respondents cannot be identified with any of the two organizations. The perceptions
of local Uzbeks on such centres is presented below, and it suffices here to say that
most respondents show scepticism with regard to the effectiveness of either
organization. Second, while D. Sabirov tends to make realistic claims with respect to
the membership of his association, UNCC activists claimed that "all Uzbeks are
members of the UNCC". To my requests for more specific details on the exact
figures, a typical response was "the UNCC is the organization of all Uzbeks and all
Uzbeks of the town are members". Considering that no such a thing as automatic
membership, this seems instead to suggest that membership is probably at a much
lower level than perhaps hoped.
Both organizations claim to be dealing with cultural issues and demands.
Members of the UNCC systematically underscore how politics lies beyond the scope
of the organization. These statements are highly problematic, for a number of
reasons. First the leading figures of these groups are also well known politicians,
active at both local and national level. Even those who most vehemently reject any
political involvement (i.e. K. Batyrov, founder and head of the Batyrov University in
Jalalabat and among the wealthiest men in the country) find it hard to convincingly
portray themselves as non political. Mr Batyov is head of the Jalalabat UNCC, has
hosted repeated conferences of the UNCC and has created his own institutions
providing higher education to Uzbek students. This is politics in all but name. The
organization itself (UNCC) is represented in a national institution (Assembly of the
People of Kyrgyzstan). This clearly poses a serious question as to the political/non-
political divide, which appears extremely blurred, especially in non-democratic
settings. After all, the proceedings of the various Kurultais consist of demands to be
addressed by the country's national leadership.
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7.1.2. Tajikistan: The tyranny of structurelessness?
Even in Tajikistan, the task of promoting and representing Uzbek interests has so far
been appropriated by the local national cultural centre. Uzbek action is framed within
the Society of Uzbeks (better known with its Russian name, the Obshchestvo
Uzbekov). Established in September 1990 under the denomination of "Cultural
Centre of Uzbeks of Tajikistan", it re-named itself in 1992. The Society of Uzbeks
has branches in Dushanbe, Khujand and the Sughd region (established in 1991),
Qurghonteppa, Penjikent, and Khatlon region.
The Society of Uzbeks was founded and chaired for most of the past decade
by Mr. Qurbon Sattarov, a former Komsomol' and party executive169. During the
mid-1990s the Society claimed to have a formal membership of 530,000
170individuals . This is undoubtedly old information, but due to more recent
developments which have left the Society lacking national co-ordination, it seems
that no-one possesses this sort of information any more. The Khujand branch claims
a membership of 900 as of August 2003. Similarly to its counterpart in Kyrgyzstan
the goals of the organization are "to promote the interests of ethnic Uzbeks and [also]
to promote ethnic co-operation"171. The Society aims primarily at achieving
"political stability, overcoming the effects of the period of stagnation, protection of
rights and interests of the Uzbek and Uzbek-speaking population, strengthening the
centuries-long friendship between Tajiks and Uzbeks, and other ethnic groups of
Tajikistan"172. More practically, the Society is mainly concerned with cultural issues,
most notably in the educational field (provision of textbooks, literature, and staff for
Uzbek pupils). As known, during Soviet times, material published in Uzbek language
used to be supplied by Tashkent. Due to the severing of links with the Uzbekistani
government during the past decade, however, these duties have been shifted to local
companies. Lack of funding (excessive cost of printing paper is one of the key
problems) leaves local printing houses stranded.
With regard to higher education the closure of the border with Uzbekistan has
meant that the teaching staff would have to be trained in Tajikistan. The entire
Asia-Plus (1996).
170Ibid.
I71Gurr et al. (2000).
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educational system in Tajikistan therefore needs to be re-designed to accommodate
these demands. The presence of a department of Uzbek philology and of some Uzbek
classes in other subjects constitutes only a palliative in an area of critical importance
to the Uzbek community: the development of adequate means for delivering
information to the Uzbek population. This includes adjustment of broadcasting time
in Uzbek language (on state TV and radio) and the establishment of local newspapers
edited in Uzbek language.
Finally the exodus of Uzbeks from Tajikistan was a key concern in the early
years of the Society. During the civil war the Society estimates that about 70,000
Uzbeks left Tajikistan173. Again, Uzbekistan's strict border regime has unilaterally
brought a solution to this problem, as it has de facto made (legal) immigration from
Tajikistan nearly impossible.
The Society of Uzbeks does not depend on state funding, but derives its budget
from individual donations and revenues from events such as music festivals or other
public activities174. Similarly to other cultural organizations (co-ordinated at national
level by the Congress of the Peoples of Tajikistan), it has very close relations with
state authorities. In fact it can be argued that the Society is an "appendix" of state
administration, as it is more accountable to it than to the community it claims to
11 c
represent (see below) . The Sughd branch of the organization has a central office in
Khujand and another twelve local representations in the province's districts, the most
significant of which are clearly those where Uzbeks are concentrated: Nau, Jabbor
Rassulov, Shakhristan, Bobojon Ghafurov, and Kanibadam176.
Besides being isolated from the rest of the country in many other respects, the
Sughd region is itself internally divided along sub-regional lines. Despite the fact
that the centres in the Hissar Valley, most notably Penjikent, formally belong to the
Sughd province, they tend to operate separately. This is mostly due to one of the
long-lasting and unresolved problems affecting and hindering Tajikistan's national
integration: the lack of communication and transport links within the country. Many
have noted how Khujand and its surrounding are more closely connected to
"iibid-174Interview with Mr Ismatov (Khujand branch of the Society of Uzbeks), August 2003.
I75For similar sceptical views on the representativeness of this kind of organization see Fane (1996).
176No office has been opened in the district of Isfara (Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border).
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Uzbekistan than to the rest of Tajikistan. In light of problems with communication
links and regional relations, the Society of Uzbeks was better conceived as an
"umbrella organization"177, supervising rather than leading regional organizations.
The role was fulfilled by the chairman of the organization in Dushanbe, Mr Sattarov,
but since his retirement from political life in 2000 central co-ordination has waned.
Though regional branches are still operational, they are by and large unrelated to
each other, the central office has all but imploded. The position of chairman is
currently vacant, and there is no rush to find a replacement178. This, some argue, is a
good thing as each national cultural centre can more flexibly address the concerns of
the local population. "Demands and Uzbek problems are different in Khujand and
Kulyab", according to Mr Ismatov, a leading figure of the local Society of Uzbeks In
Khujand:
"Here [in Khujand] Uzbeks and Tajiks live side by side peacefully, whereas in the south there are
more tensions. There (in the south) there was war, while here we did not have any. We are very well
integrated".
The northern branch of the Society of Uzbeks deals primarily with cultural matters.
"These organizations are not political. We deal with cultural questions, and we do
not interfere with the government in political affairs". "Our primary concerns lie in
the safeguarding of Uzbek customs (obichie) and cultural spirituality (kul'turnaya
dukhovnost')". The claimed non political nature of the organization clashes with
what some local Uzbeks see as a "sell out" to the ruling elite. The official position of
the organization is one of good relations with the government (Mr Sattarov's office
in Dushanbe used to be located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs179) and the
president in particular. In fact, support for the state administration is among the
topics any respondent from the organization regularly emphasises. "We do not side
with the opposition". "We support the administration". The organization in Khujand
publishes its own newspaper, Kadriyat, which has close links with the oblast
khukumat (province administration). Other local newspaper in Uzbek language,
"'Gurr etal. (2000).
178Interviews with members of the Society of Uzbeks in Khujand, August, 2003
179Fane (1996).
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include Leninobod Khaqiqati (The Truth of Leninabad); the two newspapers share
the same building and office as well as political orientations.
A final caveat is necessary. The Society of Uzbeks should not be linked with
the so-called "third force" (Akbarzadeh, 2001), the power faction led by the former
prime minister Abdumalik Abdullajonov (at least until this movement was allowed to
operate on Tajik territory). Two questions seem to have severely hindered the
creation of a cohesive organization promoting Uzbek interests: the 'national revival'
of groups such as the Lakays, which Uzbeks perceive as a sub-group of ethnic
Uzbeks. In recent years Uzbeks have resented government policies aimed at
enhancing Lakay self-consciousness to the detriment of Uzbek identity and
numerical relevance (census). A second issue lies in the retirement of the former
leader Sattarov from politics, leaving a void at the top of Uzbek organization (see
next section).
7.1.3. Level of organization and group cohesion
Except for the Society of Uzbeks led by Davron Sabirov, which is an exclusively
Osh-based organization, the other two centres in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
similar in structure and organization, at least on paper. In practice however, they
could hardly be more different. The Kyrgyzstani organization has a capillary
presence throughout most of the Kyrgyzstani territory, or at least in those areas
where Uzbeks are concentrated. Although the regional branches can organize
autonomously, the Bishkek office exercises functions of co-ordination and
leadership, setting the main guidelines and strategy. The occasion for delineating
such a strategy is the Kurultai, where representatives from all centres and sections
1 OQ
gather in what resembles more a display of loyalty to the administration than a
forum for strategic discussions.
The Tajikistani organization, by contrast, has gone through a process of
fragmentation along regional and sub-regional lines. Since its foundation in 1990 and
until the late nineties the organization maintained a level of organization and
1^Conversation with Mr Adiljan Abidov, former head of the UNCC and now Osh representative for
the PNES ("The Kurultai was absurd", he said, Osh, 18 July 2003), the correspondent of the Uzbek
newspaper DDD Ba'rno-opa (15 July, 2003), and the Osh-based journalist Almaz Ismanov (Osh,
June, 2003).
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strategic co-ordination similar to that of the Kyrgyzstani UNCC. The Kurultai and
the figure of Sattarov provided the regional branches with the main guidelines. The
second half of the nineties, with the end of the civil war (paradoxically) and the
sanctioned marginalisation of the northern political faction led to a loss in efficacy of
the organization. As already noted, each regional branch now operates in complete
autonomy from the centre181. The regional branch in Khujand now operates as a co¬
ordinator for part of the Sughd region (the area located in the Hissar Valley and
Penjikent are out of reach due to both practical (difficult communications) and
possibly political reasons (the state administration are reported to stir up divisions
1 R9
between factions across the northern province ). This means that at a regional level
the organization still operates and maintains close links with branches in the districts
(most of which are within one or two hours' drive from Khujand). However, the lack
of close links with other regions183 and the absence of a central referent who sets
strategy and deals with the government in Dushanbe adds to the perception of
isolation from Uzbeks in the north (perceptions shared by many Tajiks).
For the purpose of this section I mainly relied on interviews with local
members of the Uzbek organization or local journalists. I then sought to make my
findings more robust by comparing them with those contained in the database on
minority mobilization created by the "Minority at Risk Project" (University of
Maryland). I took into consideration one single variable, which appeared as the most
suitable to measure the degree of group organization: "group organization and
cohesion" (label: GOJPA, table 7.1)184. The value of organization for political action
among Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks is reported as low in the four time periods in which that
variable was measured (1995, 1998, 1999, and 2000). The value 2 indicates that
interests of the group in question are promoted by one or more conventional
organizations, which draw their support primarily from members of the group itself.
181Interview with Mr Ismatov of the Khujandi branch of the Society of Uzbeks (August, 2003).
182Martin (1997).
183The absence of links with the Khatlon organization is particularly lamented by members of the
Khujand centre.
184More precisely, the variable GOJPA measures the group's organization for political action in terms
of type and strategies of organizations representing the group. Values range from 0 (no organizations
representing the group) to 5 (militant organizations) through 1 (group interests promoted by umbrella
organizations), 2 (group interests are promoted by one or more conventional political
movements/parties drawing their support mainly or primarily from the group), 3 (conventional and
militant organizations that have limited support), and 4 (mainly promoted by militant organizations,
and marginally by conventional organizations).
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Unlike Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, the level of organization among Tajikistani Uzbeks is
weak at best (1), indicating that group interested were mostly promoted by umbrella
organizations (such as the Society of Uzbeks), rather than by more cohesive and
internally institutionalised organizations.






The institutional form through which mobilization is expressed is one of the most
significant dimensions of ethnic mobilization (Barany, 2002b p.72). Though in
ethnically divided societies groups tend to organize along ethnic lines (Horowitz,
1985 p.291-297), this is not always the case, especially in non democratic settings
where political participation and representation are restricted. In fact, in neither
Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan are ethnic parties allowed. Tajikistan has introduced a ban
on regional parties as well, requiring all political organizations to have a branch in
each of the four provinces. This de facto prevents the formation of parties with a base
in one region (a sensitive issue in a regionally divided society such as the Tajik one).
In addition, both regimes have banned ethnically-based parties. In a way this could
also be defined as a Soviet legacy or better as a lesson from the Soviet collapse. The
role that ethnic institutions have played in leading to the demise of the Soviet Union
through nationalist mobilization has been widely recognised in the literature. This
has informed the mindset of the post-Soviet state elites and their normative adversity
to the formation of any institution or mobilising structure which the group may use
as a resource to mobilise support. A notable exception is constituted in both cases by
the national-cultural centres. This study has shown that these organizations, which
thus far provide an outlet for airing Uzbek demands, have not acted as autonomous
mobilising structures, but as structures of legitimation of the regime. The regime, in
other words, sets the limits of what is legitimate and what is not. Rather than as
vehicles of mobilization, NCCs act as funnels, through which a selection of Uzbek
voices are channelled whilst others are marginalized and silenced.
185There are only four years for which data are available.
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This section has outlined the main vehicles for mobilization available to the
Uzbek population in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two organizations are
similar in many respects. They are both top-down structures, not accountable to the
local population and closely associated with the state authorities (with the notable
exception of the Society of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan). The organizations are also
similar in that they are formally present nation-wide and operate through regional
(oblast' and city) branches, though - quite understandably - they tend to concentrate
in areas of strong Uzbek settlement. They are primarily concerned with cultural
issues (education, information, language), and are quite wary of advancing explicitly
political demands, though language has become such divisive and politicised issue in
Kyrgyzstan that arguing that the issue of languages status constitutes a cultural
demand appears questionable at best. A critical difference between the two cases lies
in the state of near collapse into which the Society of Uzbeks in Tajikistan has
4
descended in recent years, which has made the whole organization virtually
inoperative. By contrast Kyrgyzstani Uzbek organizations appear more articulate and
operative, arguably because of competition for the attention of the Uzbek population,
but also for state attention, between the two.
7.2. SEARCHING FOR LEADERS
7.2.1. Kyrgyz Republic: Leadership fragmentation
In Kyrgyzstan intense competition for leadership among Uzbeks has given rise to
leadership fragmentation - too many leaders that are too divided, more concerned
with disturbing each other than in co-operating for a common goal.
The beginning
Rather than mobilising against authorities in a similar way to other instances of
nationalist contention that were taking place all across the Soviet Union, Uzbeks
have sided with state authorities and maintained this strategy throughout the whole
post-independence period. In fact, one of the defining elements of the newly
established Uzbek cultural centre was the concern for stability and inter-ethnic
harmony. This appeared as a particularly pressing issue in the early 1990s, following
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the Osh events. Also, this strategy serves the purpose of countering the belief that
Uzbeks in the south of the country had an agenda aiming at a land swap or outright
annexation to neighbouring Uzbekistan. The fear among Kyrgyzstani authorities that
Uzbeks in the south might play the role of a "fifth column" never actually vanished,
despite the Uzbek community's commitment to the state-building project of the
Kyrgyzstani state under President Akaev's leadership.
The tie between Uzbeks and Akaev became a cornerstone, a goal in itself, of
Uzbek organizational policy: stability for the sake of stability. This task appeared
particularly urgent at a time when debates between advocates of a civic Kyrgyzstani
nation and a more ethnic interpretation of the nation started to question the role of
ethnic minorities in the country. Despite Akaev's commitment to building an
inclusive Kyrgyzstani nation, this appeared easier said than done, and balancing
different regional and clan interests led the state leadership down a difficult and
deeply contradictory path where two competing ideologies were simultaneously
promoted: reviving Manas (enhancing ethnic Kyrgyz) and advancing an idea of
nation based on citizenship (Megoran, 2002d). The debate over language and the
enhancement of the status of Kyrgyz in a country where not even the titular nation
appeared fluent in its own language, threatened the position of minority groups. The
transcript of the speech of the then chairman of the UNCC Adikjan Abidov illustrates
well the program and demands of the centre in the early 1990s186: "free development
of language for all nationalities; opportunities in higher education for the Uzbek
population; cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; scarce representation
of Uzbeks in power state structures. In addition, the following demands were
advanced: provision of information in Uzbek and Tajik languages187; creation of a
higher education institution of the sort of the Kyrgyz-Slavic University in Bishkek, in
order to fulfil the intellectual potential of the Uzbek youth; solution of the issue of
the dual citizenship". With regard to the latter question, the solution advanced by the
UNCC was un-ambiguous:
Abidov (1994).
187At the time there was no Tajik cultural centre and the Uzbek supported this demands of the Tajik-
speaking population in the southern provinces (especially in rural areas of the Batken and Osh
regions).
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"we have only one homeland, the land where we were born. We were born here, in Kyrgyzstan and
that is our homeland"188.
The representatives of the organization do not conceal that they share and fully
support the administration's goal of a stable multi-ethnic state built on peaceful
relations between the more than a hundred ethnic groups living in the country. Uzbek
leaders appropriate President Akaev's slogan of "Kyrgyzstan is our common home"
and share his concern that "preserving civic peace is the most important goal, more
1 RQ
critical than surviving cold and famine" . Almost every conversation I had with
members of the UNCC started with the sentence: "We fully support the goals of the
state's leadership". The next sentence was a statement of self-positioning in the
power struggle taking place in Kyrgyzstan since independence: "we do not have
anything to do with the Kyrgyz opposition". Support for the president has become
not a means to achieve a specific objective, but a strategy per se, indeed one of the
defining characteristics of the official Uzbek cultural centres. As Eugene Huskey has
defined it (2002), this has become an "act of faith" in the capacity of the Kyrgyzstani
leadership's capacity to maintain inter-ethnic stability.
Public meetings of the organization include frequent references to political
under-representation and to the cadre policy, particularly to the lack of Uzbeks in
specific sectors of state structures, namely army, secret services, but also
government, where currently only one Uzbek is represented (as deputy minister for
transportation). Even other 'more cultural' demands regarding higher education in
Uzbek language, provision of textbooks and especially language status have over the
years become increasingly politicised in Kyrgyzstan, whose authorities, Bhavna
Dave notes, have been unable not only to address the question of which language be
granted official recognition (and Uzbek has never been on the agenda), but to de-






Over the years the programme of the UNCC has remained substantially unchanged.
Mr Abidov recalls that the split occurred under his successor, the Osh-based
businessman Davron Sabirov. To the great dismay of the Uzbek community, the
cultural centre split in two in the mid-1990s. The causes of the rift were personal as
well as ideological. As Mr Sabirov himself recalls190, there were four main reasons
for the split. Officially the cause of the split was the question of the denomination of
the organization. As soon as Mr Sabirov was elected chairman in 1996, he made it
clear that it was his intention to rename the cultural centre in a more distinctive way:
Society of Uzbeks (O'zbeklari Jamiyati), which would avoid placing the
organization in the same "cauldron" together with the national-cultural centres of
other minorities. There was clearly about much more than the name. It was a matter
of self-perception. Uzbeks have never come to terms with being called diaspora. The
fact is, however, that official publications in the country refer to them in this way191.
Also rejecting labels such as diaspora or minority, the UNCC leadership opted for
retaining the original denomination as it fitted into the institutional framework
provided by the authorities (the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan), which
constituted a forum for policy input and advising the president.
Among the main actors involved in the break up were the businessman
Davron Sabirov, elected president of the national-cultural centre in 1996, but "forced
to break away" one year later (see below), his predecessor as head of the
organization, Adikjan Abidov, who soon thereafter also left the UNCC to join the
Party of National Unity and Concord in 2000, and finally, Sabirov's successor, the
rector of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University and Academic Professor Mukhammadjan
Mamasaidov. A second thorny issue was the attitude the Uzbek community should
adopt towards authorities. One of the main disagreements between Mamasaidov and
D. Sabirov concerns the excessively loyalist attitude (to state authorities) of the
former, and the confrontational position of the latter. Sabirov's charge is that the pro-
government stance of the Uzbek organization has not paid off. While providing
''"interview with Davron Sabirov, 17 July 2003, Osh.
191See for example newsagencies (Kabar), newspapers (Slovo Kyrgyzstana), or the house organ of the
Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan, Etnicheskii Mir. In the Kyrgyzstani public discourse Uzbeks
are a diaspora, whether they like it or not (and they do not).
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Akaev with the necessary electoral support whenever sought and required,
Mamasaidov's centre has obtained nothing in return. The possibility of Uzbeks being
granted official status has never been put on the agenda, Uzbek political
representation has significantly decreased over the years, and no solution has been
found to the questions of education and information in Uzbek language. A third
divisive issue was that of the script. Ironically, the language issue did not only divide
the state elites, but national minorities as well. The issue does not concern elites only,
but the broader Uzbek community. While the question of language status is
recognised as being of paramount importance192, there is no consensus among the
Uzbek population as to which script may suit the Uzbek language best. While
shifting to Latin would emphasise the cultural ties with neighbouring Uzbekistan, it
would isolate Uzbeks from Russians and Kyrgyz who would continue to use Cyrillic.
From whichever perspective one looks at this issue, it does not have an easy solution,
and certainly none is in sight. Mamasaidov has over the years insisted that
Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks continue to use of Cyrillic script for two reasons193. First,
shifting to Latin would be a costly move which neither the Uzbek community alone
nor state authorities could ever afford to support given the present economic
difficulties. Second, following Uzbekistan's path to Latin script would risk being
read as a political move, raising concern or suspicion among ethnic Kyrgyz and the
associated potential for destabilization. By contrast, Davron Sabirov has argued for
the adoption of the Latin script on the basis that Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks would be "cut
off from their brothers in Uzbekistan and from their literature. It would be like
speaking different languages"194. In addition, Sabirov refers to the problem of
provision of textbooks as a case for adopting the Latin alphabet. As both the UNCC
and Kyrgyzstani authorities face increasing difficulties in providing Uzbek students
with the sufficient number of textbooks195, the only option would be to require local
Uzbeks to follow Uzbekistan's script shift, in order to avoid being cut off from the
192See chapter 5.
193Ferghana Valley Listserver Archive 'Osh Uzbek newspaper stopped', www, friends-
partners.org/lists/ferghana-vallev/1999/0169.html.
194Interview with Davron Sabirov, 17 July 2003.
I95Though Mamasaidov claims that 37 textbooks have already been provided by the new CTP and
another 150 are scheduled for 2005 (Mamasaidov and Khudaberdiyev, 2003), this still runs short of
the requirements of Uzbek schools.
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supply of books from the Uzbekistani Ministry of Education196. Finally, the
relationship with Uzbekistan divided the Uzbek leadership. Sabirov's personal
connections on the either side of the border (gas companies in Andijan197) played
well into the hands of both himself and his political opponent. Uzbekistani
authorities never made a secret of their intentions to use gas supplies as a political
weapon to "punish" Akaev's perceived weakness in cracking down on Islamic
militants. The power and personality struggle ended with Mr Sabirov breaking away
(something which many Uzbek now resent and complain about) from the official
organization and setting up a parallel cultural centre, under the name he had planned:
the more inclusive - at least in his intentions - Society of Uzbeks., founded in 1997.
A two-men-race? The personalization of Uzbek politics (1997-2000)
The competition between the two leaders and the centres they chair has yielded two
sets of unhelpful implications for local Uzbek politics. First is the marginalization of
other actors and, by extension, of alternative discourses. Uzbek politics appears to
have become an affaire a deux. The two personalities overshadow the rest. In
addition, the way the two centres are led makes any significant challenge or contest
for the respective leaderships simply unthinkable for the time being. Elections and
routine meetings are held, but no serious chance exists for outsiders or even insiders
to mount a challenge. Alisher Sabirov, regarded by many a more effective figure than
Mamasaidov, has decided not to challenge the older leader and rather enjoys
considerable popularity in the community. Both centres are elitist organizations,
strongly personalised and with a pyramidal structure. Mamasaidov and Davron
Sabirov represent two very different type of leader: the task-oriented and dull
academic, and the maverick people-oriented, charismatic businessman. Though
competing in many ways with each other, their leadership appears to have brought
the Uzbek community some benefits. The channels through which these benefits
have come show the diverse nature of their leadership, the different strategies
employed and stances taken vis-a-vis the authorities.
196In an interview held in Tashkent a high official at the Ministry of Higher Education noted that
Uzbekistani never ceased supplying textbooks to Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks (June 10, 2003). However, I
never found anyone able to confirm this claim among Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks.
197Interview with D. Sabirov, 17 July 2003.
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As already noted, Mukhammadjan Mamasaidov's emphasis has been on the
higher education sector, where his contribution has been more evident. Professor
Mamasaidov is the rector of the Osh-based Kyrgyz-Uzbek University (KUU), a joint
project of the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, established in 1997, for
which he had strongly lobbied the authorities. The KUU provides tuition in
secondary and higher education and is host to more than 14,000 students in 47
subjects198. Linked to the UNCC is also the particularly active Uzbek theatre "Babur"
(the head of the theatre was the leader of the Osh branch of the UNCC in 2003), the
Centre for Textbook Production, a printing house (established in 1998) based at the
KUU which seeks to address one of the most pressing concerns of the Uzbek
population: the lack of textbooks in Uzbek language.
Mamasaidov's style of leadership can be characterised as task-oriented and
he is less interested in playing on the emotions of the rank and file of the Uzbek
community, and aimed more at achieving practical results. His main concern is
cultural protection and promotion. In particular, he has noted in a recent conference
(2003 p.37) that among the key problems affecting local Uzbeks is the lack of access
to higher education institutions, which inevitably leads to the absence of specialists
among the Uzbek population. In particular, Mamasaidov refers to the necessity of
establishing Uzbek branches of Kyrgyzstani higher education institutions, for
example the Kyrgyz National University named after J. Balasagyn (ibid.). What
Uzbeks resent is the fact that admission exams are often held in Kyrgyz and Russian
only. Also, the leader of the UNCC suggests the production of the CTP should be
expanded in particular to address the question of the provision of pre-school
textbooks (ibid.).
The UNCC is more institutionalised and capillary present across the country
(there are no branches in Talas, Ysyk Kul and Naryn provinces, though, given the
scarce Uzbek presence there). By contrast the Society of Uzbeks, while having a
broadly similar structure (with chair, deputy chair, and a series of councils/Soviets) is
by and large dependent on one person: the leader. It is no wonder then, that a lack of
attention and involvement by the leader in the activities of the organization has led to
paralysis. This stand-still reflects a shift in priorities for Davron Sabirov. As will be
l98Mamasaidov and Khudayberdiev (2003).
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discussed in more detail later in this section, many point to the instrumental nature of
the Society of Uzbeks, which has practically been the vehicle of propaganda for Mr
Sabirov during the electoral campaign. Once elected, Mezon newspaper ceased its
publications, Mezon TV re-organised its schedules and the content of its programmes
downplaying the political matters and giving more space to entertainment (Latin
American soap operas). While in the end both leaders strive to achieve the same
objective (enhancing the political, cultural, and economic conditions of the Uzbek
population), they have adopted different emphases and different strategies.
I illustrate this by examining two short texts produced by Professor
Mamasaidov for the house publication of the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan
Etnicheskii Mir (1999) and the transcript of his intervention at a conference on multi¬
lingual education organized by the Switzerland-based international organization
Cimera (2003), in recent years greatly and effectively involved in enhancing the state
of education in Kyrgyzstan. A glance at these documents immediately reveals how
the Uzbek leadership is still deeply entrenched in a Soviet language:
"During the Soviet times borders were transparent. The achievements of the Soviet period reflected in
the culture, mode of life of Kyrgyz and Uzbek people can't be forgotten. Thanks to the Great October
Socialist Revolution the Kyrgyz and Uzbek people succeeded in building their states. Since
independence inter-state relations have also improved. Cultural and national centres were created in
both Republics [Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan] in order to keep their culture and language and to solve
their problems. So, a Kyrgyz Diaspora in Uzbekistan has its own Kyrgyz national centre [...]. For
Uzbek people living in the territory of Kyrgyzstan all conditions were created for the development of
their culture and nation, newspapers in Uzbek, Uzbek musical and dramatic theatres and schools with
Uzbek language education. As a good example of the cooperation of both republics can serve the
opening of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University - the University of Friendship"199.
This enthusiastic tone congratulating the government for its concern for and support
of the development of Uzbek language and culture tends to give way to other
perspectives when the audience changes. While criticism never makes an appearance
and support for President Akaev is re-iterated at every possible juncture, the
shortcomings and demands occupy a more central place during the Kurultai. In front
of an audience which included local authorities, but was self-evidently mostly
199Etnicheskii Mir (1999).
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Uzbek, Mamasaidov pointed to some of the issues that have remained un-addressed
throughout the whole post-independence period200:
Benefiting from the presence of not insignificant personal financial
resources, Sabirov's initial steps in Kyrgyzstani politics date back to the 1990 Osh
conflict, when he was reported to have crossed the border from Uzbekistan leading a
group of Uzbeks willing to defend the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. One of the
founding members of the UNCC in 1990, Sabirov became chair of the organization
in 1996 campaigning for the re-naming and repositioning of the organization. Less
loyalty to the state, more to the Uzbek people, captures his political orientation. As
already noted, Mr. Sabirov's financial resources are considerable. These include not
only financial resources. During the elections of 2000 he turned Mezon Tv and
newspaper into instrument of personal propaganda, portraying himself as the
"authentic representative" of the Uzbek people. In addition, his close personal and
business contacts in Andijan allowed him to portray himself as an effective leader
when during 1999 and 2000 Uzbekistan regularly cut the gas supply off. Drawing on
personal networks he was able to open an informal channel with local Gas companies
in Andijan, which allowed him to provide gas supplies again. What is deeply
resented by local Kyrgyz is the fact that somehow only Uzbek districts were re-
supplied with gas, leaving Kyrgyz ones in the cold. Increasingly critical of both
authorities and complacent Uzbek representatives, Sabirov founded his own
organization, which many suspected was little more than an additional vehicle of
electoral propaganda. As his nationalist rhetoric increased with the approaching of
elections, the whole propaganda machine worked at full capacity, with Mezon TV
broadcasting electoral slogans in favour of Davron Sabirov. As mentioned in chapter
6, Sabirov's nationalist rhetoric framed Uzbek grievances in confrontational terms
and conveyed an image of Uzbeks as victims which eventually paid off by getting
him elected, despite trials and re-trials. As many within the Uzbek community
suspected, Sabirov's rhetoric had a rationale: personal ambition. This is something
which Mr Sabirov himself now openly acknowledges:
200Isakova (2003). Interviews with Ba'rno Isakova, Almaz Kalet, and Adikjan Abidov, who all
attended the sessions at the May 2003 Kurultai (June and July 2003, Osh).
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"I know I said things that were quite extreme. I made use of populist rhetoric, I acknowledge that. It
was done on purpose"201.
One should distinguish two phases of D. Sabirov's political life: before and after the
parliamentary elections of the year 2000. With hindsight, it all made sense. After
securing his seat in the national parliament, Sabirov signed a joint declaration with
the UNCC in support of Akaev's re-election bid in October 2000. During the
following years Mezon newspaper was closed as it probably did not serve its purpose
anymore and Mezon TV modified the content of its broadcasts, shifting from
political propaganda to Brazilian soap-operas. The construction of a new building for
the Society of Uzbeks was never completed and the long announced Kurultai of the
SocUz has not been held yet. In short, Sabirov's organization has fallen asleep.
While this has certainly been beneficial to the state of inter-ethnic relations, one is
left to wonder whether when new parliamentary elections were held in 2005, local
Kyrgyzstanis will have to adaot to a new version of Mr. Sabirov's style of
campaigning.
Osh vs. Jalalabat?
Following the local government and decentralization reforms implemented in
Kyrgyzstan over the last few years, power has been redistributed and the balance of
power between centre and regions has shifted towards the latter. Osh's visibility and
status in particular have increased due to its upgrading to the status of capital of the
south. While what this entails in practice in terms of bargaining power vis-a-vis the
centre is still unclear, reforms have certainly enhanced the position of Osh, and Osh-
based politicians. Crucially, the reforms have made Osh the privileged interlocutor of
the centre. As the editor of the Jalalabat newspaper Tong Batyrjan Gazibayev points
out, Jalalabat Uzbeks resent the attention that Osh systematically receives.
"You see, everything is about Osh: Osh the new capital of the south, Osh has the only Uzbek deputies,
they have the national leader who is based there, other leaders of the cultural centre there, even the
'other' centre [D. Sabirov's] is there. They take all the decisions there. There are Uzbeks in Jalalabat
too! But they do not seem to count".
201 Interview with D. Sabirov, 17 July 2003, Osh.
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Uzbek politics in Kyrgyzstan has traditionally been dominated by Oshliklar (people
from Osh). Only recently has the balance of power been challenged by Jalalabat. In
fact, there is a sort of ferment that seems to be absent now among Osh Uzbeks, who
appeared exhausted in a way (see later on the inertia characterising the Society of
Uzbeks in Osh). Two organizations are present in Jalalabat: the local branch of the
Uzbek national-cultural centre, headed by the local businessman Kadyrjan Batyrov,
and a newly formed political party, the Party of National Unity and Concord, chaired
by A. Akbarov. Kadyrjan Batyrov is in many ways very similar to Davron Sabirov,
head of the Osh Society of Uzbeks. Batyrov is the head of the Jalalabat branch of the
Uzbek national-cultural centre and one of the deputies at national level. Batyrov and
D. Sabirov are the closest figures Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks have to charismatic leaders.
There is the impression that balance of power within the Uzbek community is
gradually shifting from Osh, more content with its newly acquired status of capital of
the south (and the subsequent spoils to be distributed), to Jalalabat, excluded from
the bargaining game. Though largely critical of Uzbek under-representation, K.
Batyrov does not appear intentioned to take a confrontational stance vis-a-vis the
authorities, as this is a position which does not pay off. In fact, in a meeting with the
author Batyrov emphasised his distance from politics:
"We are not doing politics here [in Jalalabat]. We are not interested [in it]. What we do is protecting
Uzbek traditions, language and culture. We do not have political aims".202
If Kyrgyzstani politics is characterised by conflicts between clans and personalities,
Jalalabat's Uzbek politics is even more so. There is the impression that nothing
moves without the approval of Batyrov who has developed a centralised and
personalised control of the local cultural centre. This does not suit everyone, as an
Uzbek woman in Jalalabat has noted:
"He [Batyrov] thinks that no-one else exists. He establishes his own school, he provides money for it,
he chairs the cultural centre, he provides textbooks. Is there anything he can't do? He is like
[Turkmenistan's president Saparmurat] Turkmenbashi. He is developing a sort of cult of personality".
202Conversation with Kadyrjan Batyrov, Jalalabat 12 July 2003.
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Batyrov's position can be illustrated by the document produced by the Kurultai
(assembly) held in Jalalabat on 20th July 2002 by the local branch of the national-
cultural centre. While the strategy (enhancing visibility and representation of the
Uzbek population) is shared overall by all the organizations claiming to represent the
Uzbek community, tactics tend to vary. Jalalabat Uzbeks have become increasingly
dissatisfied with the official leadership based in Osh, which is perceived as too
passive toward the authorities. Continuing with the same tactics, the argument goes,
will change nothing. Separatism is strongly rejected and relationships with
Uzbekistan vehemently denied. The agenda, however, seems to focus on political
issues as well as cultural demands, thereby representing a significant break with the
past practices and rhetoric of maintaining a safe distance from politics. "We don't do
politics" seems to be the mantra of Uzbek organizations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
alike. Ethnicity is a sensitive issue and a politicisation of the issue can carry
unpleasant consequences for the broader community, in case it were perceived to be
mobilizing along ethnic lines. While the Jalalabat organization does not intend - or
at least, does not seem - to be "going political", more attention has been paid to the
question of political marginalization and the under-representation of Uzbeks in
power structures.
On 20th July 2002 an all-Uzbek congress (Kurultai) convened in the southern
city of Jalalabat as a forum to discuss some of the pressing issues of major concern
for the country's Uzbek population. The discussions in the Kurultai resulted in a
petition, addressed to President Akaev, containing both political and cultural
demands. First, the level of political representation among Uzbeks, which has
decreased over the years, was mentioned. While in the first parliamentary assembly
after independence ten deputies were Uzbek, in the Jogorku Kenesh elected in 2000
only five Uzbeks sit in the national parliament (between the two chambers). Uzbek
frustrations have soared following the publication of the 1999 census which has seen
Uzbeks becoming the second largest ethnic group replacing Russians, most of which
had left the country soon after the Soviet collapse. This has heightened the sense of
marginalization on the one hand, and contextually raised expectations on the other.
Though the situation at local level differs from that of the country as a whole,
Jalalabat Uzbeks feel particularly under-represented. There are no Uzbek deputies
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currently elected to the parliament from the Jalalabat province. Even the Jalalabat-
born Alisher Sabirov, a leading figure of the UNCC and intellectual has turned to
Osh in order to win a seat in the parliament. The situation appears to be less dramatic
at a local level, with Uzbek representatives elected to both city and provincial
assemblies. Regardless of the number of deputies, the contentious issue regards the
question of the boundaries of the electoral districts, allegedly "corrected" to increase
the share of ethnic Kyrgyz, thereby making it virtually impossible for Uzbeks to elect
an Uzbek representative (ICG, 2002b).
Equally important in the petition to Akaev are cultural issues. Indeed, the
large majority of requests focus on cultural issues. Most significantly, and
controversially considering that not all among Uzbeks agree with the idea, is the
request that Uzbek be declared an official language. The cultural centre also asked
for more space to be conceded to Uzbek language programs on national and regional
TV and radio. Currently border regions in the Jalalabat province receive the signal
from different Uzbekistani channels (TV-1, Yoshlar Telekanali, Andijan TV,
Namangan TV). Unlike Osh, there is no TV channel broadcasting in Uzbek in
Jalalabat, and given that state television broadcasts almost exclusively in Russian
and/or Kyrgyz, this leaves the Uzbek population with little or no access to Uzek-
language information about Kyrgyzstan. A similar situation applies to the printed
media. Until Summer 2003, when it was closed due to financial reasons, the
newspaper Ferghana was published in two languages, Uzbek and Kyrgyz, by
separate groups of journalists. The newspaper Sosedy (Neighbours) and the news
agency Fergana.org represent independent attempts to address issues raised by
domestic and international actors.
"Uzbeks are the majority in the south, they live compactly and why are they not allowed to speak their
language? We are a titular nation, the second group in the country according to the last census, so why
should we not be allowed to speak our own language? Uzbek is not a minority language".
The impression is that Jalalabat Uzbeks are less complacent towards authorities than
their kins in Osh. The Jalalabat UNCC, the PNUC - and the Society of Uzbeks in
Osh - have not, so far, hijacked the discourse of stability and inter-ethnic harmony
imposed as hegemonic on Kyrgyzstani politics. Though Akbarov refers explicitly to
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national discrimination when discussing the type of problems faced by local Uzbeks,
his voice does not resonate across the whole Ferghana valley.
Osh Uzbeks have adopted a more cautious approach to advancing their
demands than their brethren in Jalalabat203. The differences per se are no big surprise.
Uzbeks tend to have a very localised form of identity based on town/village level
alongside Uzbek national consciousness, which explains why, among the other
things, Osh and Jalalabat Uzbeks feel at once both the same and different. While Osh
Uzbeks side openly with Akaev's administration, Jalalabat Uzbeks appear less
enthusiastic about it, which is confirmed by reports that the 2002 Aksy riots saw
Jalalabat Uzbeks sympathising with the protesters, whereas the official Osh
leadership 'urged' the local population to "stay home" and not to take part in what
would be depicted as potentially provocative actions. What seems a fair
representation is that local Uzbeks shared the concerns and grievances of southern
Kyrgyz, but appeared fearful of the consequences of their actions. This soured the
relations between Uzbeks and southern Kyrgyz further, as the latter felt "betrayed" at
the last moment:
"Southern Kyrgyz have not forgotten. We agreed, we were all going to Aksy, because the situation is
bad for everyone here in the South, whether you are Uzbek, Kyrgyz, that doesn't matter... Uzbeks
were marching onto Aksy already and they gave up at the last moment. You see, the north has
managed to split the south. By dividing us, they manage to retain their control and leverage".
The boundaries of electoral districts have recently undergone "adjustments", which
many among the local population have perceived as detrimental to various ethnic
communities. Uzbeks emphasise the deliberate anti-Uzbek nature of such policies:
"They are doing this because they do not want more Uzbeks, especially not in Jalalabat. They are
afraid of having more Uzbeks in the parliament, they are splitting up the districts where Uzbeks form
a majority so that Kyrgyz will control them."
Kyrgyz on the other, note that in the end redrawing electoral districts damages
everyone, not only Uzbeks:
203A recent ICG report (2002c p.19) also confirms that Jalalabat Uzbeks have been more "forthright in
asserting their political agenda".
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"That has nothing to do with ethnicity. It is political. According to the new electoral districts, neither
Uzbeks or Kyrgyz would form a firm majority. This would allow the centre to control the districts. It
is part of a design of the north to split the south in two so that it can control it easily and more
effectively". Uzbeks are part of this design". "At least they are co-opted, they are made to believe that
they are important and that the administration cares about them".
7.2.2. Leadership deficit in Tajikistan
As noted in the previous section the Uzbek organization's strategy develops along
two tracks: political and cultural. The former includes "achievement of political
stability, protection of rights and interests of Uzbeks and Uzbek-speaking population
[this presumably includes groups like Lakay, Barlos and others, who refuse to call
themselves Uzbeks], the strengthening of the centuries-old friendship between Tajiks
and Uzbeks, promotion of ideas and principles of humanism, internationalism and
democracy"204. These are extremely broad principles and any individual with
common sense would without hesitation subscribe to them. How they are carried out
in practice is quite another matter and this is where rifts within the Uzbek community
appear. The rationale of the organization is primarily cultural (promotion and
preservation of Uzbek culture and traditions), although this does not preclude an
increase in activities during electoral campaigns (similarly to the cultural centres in
Kyrgyzstan). The "society" presents its candidates to the local (city and provincial)
and national assemblies, and since independence thirteen of its members have been
elected to the national parliament (only one Uzbek candidate sits in the current
parliament, a representative from Nau), where the number of Uzbek representatives
has steadily decreased over the years. On a cultural level the organization seeks to
lobby authorities for the opening of more Uzbek schools (though this is an issue not
exclusively pertaining the Uzbek community), and especially for the provision of
textbooks.
"That of textbooks is an issue of paramount importance for us. How can we teach our children our
language if we do not have books? We need the state to provide us with textbooks or to allow us to
open a printing house to publish them. We do not have money for it, so the state has to do it. We are
citizens of Tajikistan too, and we have the same rights. Besides, how can Uzbeks stay without their
language?"
204Interviews with members of the Society of Uzbeks (Khujand, August 2003).
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Rather than inspiring potential followers and framing issues in a way that could
mobilise them, the organization's leadership appeared more concerned with two
other questions: self-preservation and open support of the presidential administration.
The fact that for the entire tenure of his office, Mr Sattarov's working place was in
the same building as the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Dushanbe certainly did not
help convey an image of autonomy from the administration. Although the current
leaders strive to portray themselves as the true representatives of the Uzbek
community, their legitimacy is far from quietly accepted.
If publicly there is no open contestation of leadership authority or legitimacy,
privately things are different. The widespread perception is that the leadership's
legitimacy derives from above (being an instrument of control of the community),
rather than from the below (as expression of the Uzbek community). The common
understanding between the organization and state leaders and local authorities stems
from a common background of involvement in the communist youth organization
(Komsomol'). These types of connections from the past, personal as well as political
(the two intertwine), continue to exert a crucial influence on today's political games.
Leaders and organization activists belong to the same generation and are
predominantly male. As Tajikistani society is more traditional than Kyrgyzstan's,
women, Tajik and Uzbek alike, tend to be confined to more peripheral roles in public
life. This is certainly changing, especially in non-governmental organizations, but
one can not help noticing the gender imbalance in public life. A common past in the
Komsomol' has created bonds and mindsets which span across regional and ethnic
lines, shaping the way leaders and elites relate to each other. More often than not,
this occurs in a co-operative manner. Unsurprisingly, the few active women also
have a history of being active members and leaders in this organization. Similarly to
the case of Kyrgyzstan, both organization and leadership in Tajikistan are elitist and
more oriented to monopolising the discourse than openly discussing Uzbek demands
and grievances, let alone critically assessing what strategies and tactics may be more
appropriate to pursue Uzbek interests.
The outcome in Tajikistan is a condition of hegemony of a "phantom
leadership". The Uzbek official leadership's relation to the state can be easily and
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concisely summarised as one of "strong support for the administration". One should
note however that Uzbek support for the Rakhmonov administration appears to be
90S
eroding" and should therefore not be taken for granted. During the civil war,
Uzbeks tilted towards the Kulyabi-Leninabadi faction (Horsman, 1999b). This was
essentially due to two reasons. On the one hand the widespread assessment from the
Uzbek population was that support for the ruling elite would ensure that privileges
and benefits acquired during the Soviet era would continue. On the other, the Tajik
opposition - despite proclaiming itself as Islamic (hence, non national) was
perceived by the Uzbek community as more nationalist in orientation than the Soviet
faction, which had its ideological roots in Soviet internationalism and not in Tajik
nationalism. In fact the so-called Tajik opposition also included more secular and
more nationalist-oriented intellectuals, and not just Islamic elements. In brief,
Uzbeks feared that a victory for the Tajik opposition would translate into a
marginalization of non-Tajiks from public life206.
The absence of credible leaders (or the dearth of leaders tout court) inevitably
affects the strategy used to deal with state authorities. As already mentioned, the
Uzbek organization has virtually imploded. It still formally occupies a seat in the
Council gathering all minority groups in Dushanbe, though no one operates there in a
practical sense. The organization is still officially awaiting the election of a new
leader and the organization of a formal assembly (Kurultai) which would elect the
new chair. However, the post has been vacant since 2000, when the then leader Q.
Sattarov left office to move to a more lucrative position as advisor to the OSCE. In
addition, Sattarov's leadership is not remembered for its strong vision or activity,
though the legacy of Sattarov's departure has been a de facto fragmentation of the
organization along regional lines207.
A lack of funding is another hindrance to the activities of the organization. As
the organization is not funded from the state, it relies on the contributions of private
individuals. It can certainly be the case that rather than a lack of interest in politics,
businessmen may simply not find themselves adequately represented by the available
205And as recent ICG reports underline, this erosion of support for Tajikistan's leadership seems to be
extending to the society at large, regardless of both ethnic or regional affiliations.
206Interview with the deputy leader of the Party of Islamic Renaissance in Dushanbe (18 August 2003)
and the leader for the Sughd province (Khujand, 22 August 2003).
207Interview with leading members of the Society of Uzbeks in Khujand (August, 2003).
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organizations, which would then explain their current political apathy and their
restraint in becoming involved in public activities. There is reason to believe,
however, that while this factor can play a role, a self-imposed distance from public
affairs follows a pattern of privileging private business to public employment and
engagement by the Uzbek population. This lack of funding eventually limits the
range of events and activities that can be organized. In practice this means that the
community is mobilized for popular events, such as national or religious holidays, or
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concerts. Concerts by the well known Uzbekistani singer Yulduz Usmanova" draw
large crowds and are enjoyed immensely by the local community. That the
community participates en masse in this type of event should not lead anyone to
assume the existence of strong support for the organization.
7.3. Civil society: An alternative voice for Uzbeks?
Debates, discourse, as well as of course activities about civil society and democracy
promotion have spread in Central Asia over recent years. This is not the place to
discuss the heuristic usefulness of the concept or even the applicability to the Central
Asian context, or the implications of foreign donors for the creation of civil society
in the two cases under investigation209. A discussion of the impact of the action of
foreign donors on the domestic scene and state-society relations lies outside the
scope of this research, as noted in chapter 1. Instead, what this section aims to
achieve, is to go beyond the voice of official organizations and present alternative
voices. These are voices of actors who because of the monopoly of resources by
official organizations, cannot have their voice heard because of lack of means
(channels) to do so. And in some cases they do not even aspire to.
The section is structured as follows. First I briefly discuss the concept of civil
society, particularly with regard to the Central Asian context and look at some of the
problematics that NGOs have encountered in their activities in the region. I then
introduce the voices of local Uzbeks who to different extents have become involved
in civil society. The portrait that will emerge will be multi-faceted. The group, in
208Anon (2004). Yulduz Usmonova is among the most popular singer and actually show-woman in
Central Asia, whose fame and popularity go well beyond the borders of Uzbekistan where she is
based. Despite singing in Uzbek, her appeal spans across ethnic lines, especially in ethnically mixed
areas such as the valleys of Zarafshan, Hissar, and Ferghana.
209On this see Jones Luong and Weinthal (1999), McMann (2004), Roy (2005).
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fact, is far from homogenous, both in composition and in terms of the agenda. What
the various individuals share is the refusal to be associated closely with the state.
Finally, some speculative ideas on the participation of ethnic minorities in civil
society are advanced.
Civil society, Olivier Roy argues, consists of "networks of free citizens, such
as associations, unions, political parties and NGOs, which establish a political space
as a prerequisite for building democracy and a state of law" (2005 p. 1004). As John
Anderson underlines (2000 p.77), the debate about civil society has moved beyond
simplistic accounts that located it in "a distinctive realm intermediate between state
and citizen". Most authors now accept the interdependence of the three spheres:
state, citizens, and civil society.
There are a series of problems that have emerged over the years with regard
to civil society promotion, the applicability of the concept, and the role of context
(the Soviet legacy in particular) in Central Asia. A particular type of civil society
promotion, most notably conflict prevention, has turned into a sort of industry in
Central Asia. Not only have western tools and conceptualization been imported to the
region without paying attention to the historical context and the actual actors present
in loco (Megoran, 2005; Roy, 2005), but there seems to be no coherent strategy in
terms of promotion of civil society in Central Asia at all. Problems include the
decline in political activism in favour of emphasis on education and grant
applications (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 1999), the extent of local NGOs'
dependency on the state and the risk of losing autonomy from it (McMann, 2004),
and the proliferation of organizations to the detriment of their qualitative significance
(Wiktorowicz, 2001). While all of the above apply to some extent to the Central
Asian context, Roy's thesis that involvement of foreign actors may ultimately lead to
"internal brain drain effects" (2005 p. 1009) well captures the situation of civil
society in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Roy warns against the prospect of "creating
some sort of artificial reserve for a new endangered species: the democratic
intellectual or the independent free woman, who may ultimately find a safer and
better position by becoming a development professional, with more ties and links
with western institutions than with his or her own country, leading sometimes to
exile" (ibid., p.1010).
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This happens because Uzbek cultural organizations, which are by no means
exhaustive of the positions of the Uzbek community in either state, operate as
microcosms of repression by monopolising the access to state attention and (limited)
resources and de facto preventing other actors - potential challengers - from entering
the political arena. In both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there are voices which remain
unheard, because of lack of means for airing them or because those actors are not
keen on becoming more closely involved in and exposed to the political struggle.
Hereafter I illustrate the (com)positions of three groups which tend to dissociate
themselves very strongly from the two official organizations: Uzbek women, young
male intellectuals, and local journalists working as "local experts" and consultants to
NGOs and IGOs.
Uzbek women appear particularly active in civil society in Kyrgyzstan. By
Uzbek women I do not refer to a discrete group: they do not constitute a cohesive
social group or coalesce around one organization. Many among them work as
journalists for independent newspapers, but also occupy leading positions in local
NGOs, in the judiciary, or as private businesswomen. The group appears particularly
lively, especially when compared with the static male-dominated official
organizations. When I asked Aziza Yo'ldasheva, for example, a successful
businesswoman in Osh, whether she thought Uzbeks were passive or apathetic, she
replied by emphasising that:
"I do not think Uzbeks are passive. You can find Uzbeks at any level in Osh. Of course, they are not
many, but if you think that the chair of the Osh Regional Parliament is Uzbek [Isabaeev], the speaker
of the city parliament is Uzbek [Azimov], the rector of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University is Uzbek, then
you see that Uzbeks are more or less everywhere".
However, she added, while representation per se does not constitute a problem,
Uzbeks do not occupy key positions endowed with decision-making power:
"Uzbeks are not in positions of power, that is the problem. I do not feel any pressure, though. If you
are capable and show initiative, no-one will bother you then, whether you are Uzbek, Kyrgyz, man or
woman. If you show initiative, you can succeed".
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This is mainly due, she pointed out, to the self-referential nature of Uzbek
organizations, who are mainly concerned with showing how close they are to state
authorities without actually benefiting from this closeness. Though she made clear
that becoming the leader of an Uzbek organization did not rank high in her priorities
and that she was content with her own work at a local NGO (alongside her private
business), Aziza-opa clearly referred to the more general condition of Uzbek women,
who are often limited by the constraining psychological barriers of traditional Uzbek
mahallas (neighbourhood communities). Other Uzbek women, like Aziza-opa (same
name) and Ba'rno-opa, both employed in the local judiciary in Osh as public
defendants share similar views. They note how the number of Uzbeks working in the
judiciary is low, but emphasise that no-one has given them any problem, either as
women or as Uzbek.
"I am interested in politics and I follow current affairs. I have always done since when I was a leader
in the Komsomol. But look at the two organizations in Osh: they talk and talk between themselves,
but... who is listening? They are very far from the community, they do not represent their needs or
demands".
In general, this group tends to show more optimism in terms of the prospects for
Uzbek involvement in public life. If anything, they tend to be more critical of the
constraints coming from within the Uzbek community. In this regard they frequently
note how the current leadership is totally self-referential, with the goal of preserving
its privileged status, and subsequently marginalising any possible challengers.
A second social group that has had its voice marginalised by the hegemony of
the two Uzbek organizations is that comprising "more nationalist-oriented
intellectuals" and includes cultural elites, namely academics and students. In
Kyrgyzstan the positions of this group overlapped with those advocated by Mr.
Davron Sabirov before being the 2000 elections. Following his moderation, this
group has found itself essentially "without voice". Although no-one openly goes as
far as to advance autonomist or even separatist claims, there seems to be no love lost
for either Kyrgyzstan's leadership or Uzbekistan's leadership. Typically this group
involves academics and students at Osh State University's Pedagogical and Uzbek
Philology Departments, arguably the departments where the number of Uzbek
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students is highest. The issues on the agenda are generally the same as those of any
other group. The tone, however, is remarkably different and decisively more
confrontational:
"Mamasaidov [the UNCC leader] is a Kyrgyz. He is not Uzbek. Why does a Kyrgyz lead an Uzbek
organization? Of course we can't expect anything from him".
This way of dismissing the political opponent by depicting him as the "ethnic other"
is strikingly similar to the approach of an analogously nationalist fringe of
intellectuals in northern Tajikistan. This group does not plan to enter the political
arena, and given their position it would not be difficult to envisage problems both in
registering their candidates and during the electoral campaign (see events during
Sabirov's campaign in 2000). However, it would be incorrect to dismiss this group as
the typical fifth column of a kin state. Komil, a young graduate from Osh University
and local journalist, makes no secret of his distaste for Uzbekistan's President
Karimov's policies. It is noteworthy to observe that while Akaev tends to be referred
to as weak, comments are not so magnanimous when it comes to Uzbekistan's
president. Despite the frequent reference to the common cultural ties existing
between Uzbeks on either side of the border, no sign of separatism or even
autonomism has emerged.
A similar group of peoples is also present in Tajikistan. This group also
comprises members of the local cultural elites Though it would be incorrect to
consider this as a cohesive, let alone organized or institutionalised, group, it
resembles a small network of like-minded people who tend to meet regularly and
maintain their own internal dynamic. The grouping is informal as there is no official
leader nor any sign of structure, hence it is difficult to assess its size or even its
broader impact on Uzbeks outwith the main urban centre of Khujand. They tend not
910
to express their critical views openly when in public" and almost always try to
arrange separate meetings where one condition is met: that the interviewer alone is
210I noticed this when visiting a local NGO in Khujand, where some respondents had no hesitation to
comment publicly in a common room. Others, namely those voicing more critical views, asked for
separate meetings. While it may well be the case that there were other potential respondents who
simply did not wish to be identified or contacted and therefore did not ask for separate meetings and
kept aside, the number of individuals (of Uzbek nationality) usually present did not allow me to divide
the group further.
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present. Conversations, in the form of spontaneously organised focus groups,
spanned across a wide range of topics, from the role of Uzbekistan, to that of Uzbeks
in Tajikistan.
Members from this group are very critical of the current Uzbek leadership
and official representatives in general, which they see as "feeble, weak, and
complacent with authorities". They are seen as "too loyal and puppets in the hands of
the administration" and, above all, "largely ineffective". The closeness of "self-
proclaimed Uzbek leaders" to state authorities has brought no benefit to the
community, the argument goes. In essence the official representatives of the Uzbek
community are regarded as contrary to Uzbek interests because "they are not really
Uzbek". Hence they should be replaced.
In this regard there is a worrisome practice among members of this group
toward constructing the political opponent as an ethnic other. Depicting political
opponents in ethnic terms excludes them from the Uzbek community and questions
their legitimacy as representatives. What this marginal group seems to be engaged in
is building a stereotype of the current Uzbek representatives as "non Uzbek", "selling
out Uzbek interests to state authorities".
"[The current chair of the Sughd branch of the Society of Uzbeks] Pulatov is not really Uzbek, you
know. He is Tajik. His sons are all married to Tajik girls".
This type of comments involves even deputies at Parliament in Dushanbe. Asked to
comment on the effectiveness of Uzbek deputies:
"[Deputy to the Majlisi Oli from the town of Nau] Zulfiya Isakova? We are not going to say anything
about her [showing contempt]! Besides, she is not Uzbek at all!"
The strategy of this group is not openly confrontational, as they maintain a low
profile, arguably in order to avoid being questioned by authorities. But the
orientation remains strongly critical of the attitude of both state authorities and
official Uzbek organizations. It is difficult to predict how the situation will evolve,
especially if core demands are not addressed, but for the time being this group
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constitutes a very peripheral voice among Uzbeks and its positions do not seem to be
widespread shared throughout the larger Uzbek community.
A third and final group remained on the fringes of the debate within the
Uzbek community is the one situated somewhere in the middle between the members
of the official organization and the radical intellectuals. I illustrate the dynamics,
strategies and beliefs of this group by referring to Mirzo Khakim, editor of the Uzbek
newspaper Tong (Dawn) in Khujand, as I think he embodies well the positions and
dynamics of this emerging group of Uzbeks who occupy a sort of middle ground
between those harshly critical of the authorities and whose who instead co-operate
closely with them. Mirzo-aka shows no interest whatsoever in active political life:
"What does the 'Society' do? Nothing. They publish one newspaper [Kadriyat]. And do you
know who reads that newspaper? No-one, because it is boring. It has four pages, but there is nothing
to read. And this is what they do. They say: oh, Uzbeks have no newspapers, there is an information
void, they speak and speak, but all they do is publishing four boring pages. It is true that there is no
information available in Uzbek. But if you want Uzbeks to read, then give them something interesting,
at least!"211
Mirzo-aka tends to avoid openly discussing state policy and focuses mostly on the
lack of initiative (inertiya) shown from the Uzbek community. The case of Mirzo-
aka and Tong is also representative of the complexities and contradictions associated
with the sudden arrival of NGOs (and funding, often erroneously assumed to be
unlimited) in a society where previously there were none. It poses the problem of the
agenda of such organizations and the rising expectations of some domestic groups
who see in the presence of foreign donors a sort of heavenly manna. These
contradictions are present even in the case of Tong, where conversations with Mirzo-
aka seem to suggest rising expectations from such donors, contributing to the
blurring of boundaries between donors, local organizations, entire communities, and
international organizations such as the OSCE that are not donors, but are
nevertheless perceived as such.
This sub-group of the Uzbek elite is developing into the closest thing
Tajikistani Uzbeks may have to a lobby. While it may not lobby the ultimate
21'interviews with Mirzo Hakim, Khujand, August 2003.
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decision-maker (the Tajikistani authorities), it does have close relationships with a
wide range of international organizations, which in turn have a certain degree of
leverage on the central government. Raising demands and concerns at the local field
office of the OSCE about the conditions of the Uzbek community is considered as an
effective way to get one's voice to reach the government's ear via a third and more
influential party. Overall, the position of this group is that of a careful balance
between mild criticism of the authorities (in order to avoid being labelled as
nationalist) and the necessity of working together with them.
Overall there seems to be a trade-off between occupational niches and
marginal political influence. Not everyone within the Uzbek community in Tajikistan
(though this by and large applies to Kyrgyzstan too) are interested in political affairs
or in cultural issues. Quite the contrary: the case of the Uzbek economic elite to
which Olimov and Olimova refer to in a study on ethnic relations and local self-
government in Tajikistan (2002) illustrates well the situation of that part of the
Uzbek population that is more interested in integrating into the new economic system
being formed than getting involved in politics, in which they show little interest or
place little trust. Olimov and Olimova emphasise how Uzbeks have overall adapted
well to the new economic situation, relying less on the state for help and support,
being more private business oriented, in fact "better than any other ethnic group" in
the country (2002 p.249). This can be ascribed to their minimal dependence on the
state, which has made the Soviet collapse to some extent "less painful". Olimov and
Olimova explain Uzbek economic "independence" by referring to the pecularities of
the social structure of Uzbek communities (based, like the Tajik ones, on the avlod
structure, the avlod being the extended patriarchal family possessing a considerable
degree of autonomy and acting like a cushion or social parachute to the Soviet
collapse) and especially the presence of economic and occupational niches (2002
p.249). Community and tribe also helped soften the drop in living standards (ibid.,
p.250). Olimov and Olimova argue that the Uzbek economic elite gained strength,
though this was accompanied by an almost simultaneous drop in political prospects
(ibid., p.250; see also Atkin, 1997). The precarious economic situation of the
country, where more than 80% of the population lives below the poverty level,
concerns the whole populace regardless of ethnic belonging. The "real problem is
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poverty, how to get to the end of the day and feed your family". While this is
undoubtedly true, one may wonder whether perceptions of economic disadvantage
may be interpreted or construed in ethnic terms. This does not appear to be the case.
Even in cases where respondents refer to political difficulties or "unofficial
discrimination" in the work place (the position being given to a Tajik rather than
someone from a minority group), this does not appear to fuel ethnic resentment.
Comments such as "the situation is difficult for all, Uzbeks, Tajiks, everyone" are
common. A preference for economic activities over political careers or engagement
among Tajikistani Uzbeks is to some extent reminiscent of the situation in
Kyrgyzstan, where Uzbeks are also very active in the trade and retail sectors. In
Tajikistan, however, this has been to the detriment of political influence and
participation of the Uzbek population (Olimov and Olimova). Being cut off from
politics has significantly impacted on Uzbek interest in it.
"Why wasting your time if the highest you can get is a deputy position?" "There is no point in
working for the administration, the salary is very low, better to set up your own business or work in
the bazaar, you have better chances [to improve economic conditions]".
This section has shown that in both countries there is an embryonic space outside
state reach and control, where individuals - Uzbeks in this case - who do not wish to
work within or with the state have the possibility to do so. There is something
beyond officialdom. What matters then is understanding the implications of this
choice. Are Uzbeks becoming involved in civil society in order to challenge the
existing regime (using NGOs as a Trojan horse) or, as it seems the case, they view it
as a vehicle for a less constrained (by the state) social participation?
7.4. Of followers and leaders: The un-coupling of elites and rank and file
What do the rank and file and ordinary Uzbeks think of "their" leaders? Do they
share their strategy and goals? This is a crucial question because of the commonly
held assumption that Uzbeks show a deferential attitude towards authority (hurmat)
and are a particularly disciplined and conservative people. The rank and file of the
Uzbek community feel increasingly distant from the group's leadership. Ironically,
the distance in some instances appears so huge that it seems that the two groups,
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leaders and rank and file, ignore each other's existence. According to ordinary
Uzbeks, the state and the leaders appear particularly distant from the needs of the
community:
"They remember of us only before elections". "When they need your vote, then they come out and
look for you and they notice that you exist". "They say they care about ordinary Uzbeks, how they
live, and about their problems, but then they only come and listen during elections". "They come to
the mahalla, they speak to the elders, organize a meeting, make promise and make sure they get their
votes. After the elections, they forget about us again".
Discussing the question of unity (of the Uzbek leadership and of the Uzbek
community in general) and how it is perceived by ordinary Uzbeks appears
particularly appropriate to show the dynamics internal to the Uzbek community and
the potential for mobilization. In the end, if successful mobilization is to take place,
masses will have to be included and in order to be included they have to feel
connected to their leaders212. So the fundamental question appears to be: would
ordinary Uzbeks be willing to mobilize, after all? And would they follow the current
leadership? What emerges from conversations with ordinary Uzbeks is a sense of
progressive "un-coupling" between ordinary people and the elites.
Uzbek leaders, where available, are seen as too closely co-operative with the
state authorities. The perception of state institutions as ineffectual and un-democratic
tends therefore to extend to whoever is seen as cooperating too closely with them.
The sharp demise of the official Uzbek organizations has certainly not enhanced the
opinions ordinary Uzbeks may have of them. Official organizations are not just seen
as ineffective, but also as redundant. Ordinary Uzbeks lament the fact that they are
given leaders which they did not choose.
"Who chose them? They chose themselves!" "Whom do they represent?" "They do not listen to
ordinary people, they do not know what people need, they are only interested in their status [as official
leaders]".
Leaders and organizations by extension are seen as self-referential power groups,
who owe their legitimacy more to the state administration than the community of
212For a similar argument on the centrality of rank and file to the mobilizational process see
Gorenburg (2003).
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whose interests they are allegedly representing. It is noteworthy to point out that
while some respondents question the usefulness or efficacy of the Uzbek
organization, many among them are not even aware of the existence of such an
organization.
7.4.1. Tajikistan
As previously noted, the situation in Tajikistan is one of an absence of leadership.
However, very few are nostalgic for the past leader of the Society of Uzbeks Qurban
Sattarov:
"He left the organization to work for the OSCE"213. "Good for him, he gets paid now, but who do we
have now in Dushanbe?"
The problem then does not lie with a nostalgia for an inspirational leader (as Sattarov
in fact was not), but in the absence of a figure connecting the regional branches and
guiding the Uzbek community.
"Who stands up for Uzbeks? No-one. There is no leader". 'Uzbeks are passive because they have no
leaders. They are like the Russian bear. They are sleeping now that they are without leaders. Better not
to wake the bear up'.
The question of who may lead the community and especially who "may stand up to
Dushanbe" raises serious concerns among ordinary Uzbeks. This should not be seen
as a sign that Uzbeks may be waiting for a "khan" to mobilize the entire community
or as a sign of dissatisfaction with the situation. Grievances do not translate
automatically into political action. Neither should one read in this a strong support
for the opposition, as this is not the case.
Participation in political and public life appears low among Uzbeks. As the
tables below show, only one in five respondents is a member of a political party. Of
the thirty-eight respondents who acknowledged a party affiliation, about a half did
not wish to share this information. Among the remaining respondents, the ruling
People's Democratic Party appeared as the most popular, followed by the
213Sattarov has been working as 'expert' for the Dushanbe office of the OSCE since the mid-1990s.
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Communist Party. In no instance did the respondent join the party of choice on ethnic
grounds. No political party is perceived as specifically addressing ethnic issues, but
then again inter-ethnic relations do not rank high among state priorities.









People's Democratic Party 12
Socialist Party 1
No answer 17
I then investigated whether the candidate's ethnicity is considered a relevant factor
when it comes to elections. With the exception of a very marginal percentage (3.7%)
this did not appear to be the case (as in the case of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks). Neither did
respondents look at the candidate's party belonging, which is deemed as largely
irrelevant (also 3.7%). Quite surprising was the finding that voters did not look for
candidates from the same region (zemlyachestvo). This is surprising because it
questions the so far dominant view that territorial affiliations rather than political
ones determine voting behaviour and political support. On the basis of the survey
two in three respondents indicated professional qualities delovoye kachestvo) as the
main factor their choice. Whether the candidate was Tajik, Uzbek or other, did not
seem to matter, which sets the case of Tajikistani Uzbeks in striking contrast to that
of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks for whom a candidate's ethnicity plays a great role, though
not officially, where the rhetoric of professional quality over ethnicity is strongly
emphasised.
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Participation in events organised by the local cultural organization is higher. This
should not lead one to conclude, however, that participation in public events such as
concerts or Navruz (lunar new year) are signs of support for or approval of the
organization's handling of other issues in the public arena. As I did not distinguish
between events organized for the community at large (concerts) or for activists only
(periodical meetings) in the survey, data can be partially misleading and one should
therefore be cautious in inferring level of support for the cultural organization from
what may be more aptly defined as participation in the events organized by it. About
three in five respondents attend events or activities organized by the Uzbek society
on a regular basis. A significant segment of the sample does not appear to be
involved in any such activities at all (28.9% of the sample hardly ever takes part to
them). The reasons for this are many-fold.







On the one hand is the wish, rather widespread, not to be associated with the official
organization, seen as the "longa manus" of the authorities to control more than
represent the Uzbek community. In addition, the very existence of an Uzbek cultural
organization is known to few, and among ordinary people in particular, many are not
aware of it. Nor do they need to be, as they have other priorities, as respondents
themselves point out.
"People here have other problems other than what this Society of Uzbeks does. Parents need to look
after their children, work and buy food. They do not have time for this kind of things".
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On the other hand what emerges is the impression that ordinary Uzbeks do not feel
the need for this type of organization. This is not so much for its perceived inefficacy
(this appears of little relevance, given that all public institutions are seen in the same
light), but due to doubts concerning its very use and purpose. I then planned to
understand the attitudes towards this organization: why people decided to join it,
whereas others did not and did not intend to.
Table 7.6 Why did you decide to join it?
%
Duty of every Uzbek 61.6
To fight discrimination 6.9
To improve conditions of Uzbeks 26.9
Other 14.6
Table 7.7 What is the function of Uzbek cultural organizations?
%
Essential part of the life of every ethno-national community 51.6
Avoiding national discrimination 6.9
Improving conditions of the Uzbek community 26.9
Other 15.6
In general Uzbeks show a remarkable scepticism with regard to the usefulness of
cultural organizations. When asked to indicate the function this type of organization
plays or should play, respondents including leading members of such organizations,
showed hesitation and trouble in providing a justification for the existence of these
types of organizations. While a small minority see cultural centres as a means to
prevent national discrimination (6.9%) or to improve the social and cultural
conditions of the Uzbek community (26.9%), about one in two respondents (51.6%)
considered them an "essential part of the life of every ethno-national community".
What this means in practice was not only unclear to me, but to respondents
themselves as well!
The impression left is that although there is a growing awareness that perhaps
alternative means of advancing the community's interests should be researched and
developed, for the time being cultural organizations are still very much taken for
granted. This also hints at the fact that most people wonder whether there is any
purpose at all in having this type of organization, particularly given their close ties to
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state authorities. This is the way it has been so far, and no-one sees why the situation
should change, regardless of the fact that very few perceive them as effective. This
confirms the determinant of Uzbeks' passivity, as indicated by respondents
themselves: the social conservatism of the Uzbek people.
Despite the officially recognised aim of representing Uzbeks and Uzbek
interests, very few among respondents (indeed hardly anyone) would indicate this as
the authentic rationale of the organization. While it is unsurprising that the leaders of
such organizations tend to depict themselves as representatives of the Uzbek people,
Uzbeks themselves do not associate themselves too closely with official cultural
organizations. There are different reasons for this.
In fact, there is a significant section of the population that openly questions
their purpose. This does not mean that the very same individuals would be ready to
set up a separate organization. However it must be noted that no one wants to be seen
as a cause of divisiveness and conflict, even if only political. Open disagreement is
not encouraged - though this does not mean debate does not take place. Others
question instead the very existence of this type of organization:
"We don't need cultural centres. We are not a diaspora! Small ethnic groups, like Germans or Koreans
need them. They are few and these organizations can help them safeguard their traditions and their
language. What do we need these for? We are not a minority, we are a majority. Here everyone speaks
Uzbek. Cultural centres are not for us, they are for diasporas".
I found that Tajikistani Uzbeks do not feel the need for an organization to explicitly
represent them, essentially because they do not perceive ethnicity as a relevant
cleavage, as has been constantly emphasised. In addition, if an organization is
required at all, it need not be a cultural centre as this type of organization is
associated with smaller groups and having an Uzbek cultural centre is interpreted as
a sign that Tajikistani authorities understand the place of Uzbeks in the same way as
they see Koreans, Poles, or even Russians; as diasporas, a category which Uzbeks
reject in toto.
Alongside the scarce political representation of the Uzbek community at a
national level (one deputy in the parliament, no Uzbeks in key administrative
positions, a few deputies to the local governors), Uzbeks also show a low level of
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participation to public life and interest in political affairs. This can be ascribed to
different sets of factors: the lack of possibilities for channelling and airing demands
can certainly lead the population to apathy by fuelling the perception that their
'voices will never be heard anyway'. Alternatively, political insulation can be a
choice rather than an imposed condition (see a previous section on the behaviour of
economic elites). Remarkably, the large majority of Uzbek respondents pointed to
one specific reason explaining what they described as passivity of the Uzbek people,
the cause being Uzbeks themselves (!).
Perceptions of efficacy of Uzbek organizations
Interviews, focus groups, and survey data with Uzbeks who are not actively involved
with the activities of the cultural organizations but have a broad interest in the affairs
of the (Uzbek) community, all seem to suggest that outside the circle of members,
Uzbek organizations are not perceived as effective. Moreover their rationale is
openly questioned. Although the national-cultural centre claims to represent and
promote Uzbek interests, this claim is shared by very few respondents.
Only one respondent in ten in Kyrgyzstan (10.1%) or even less (6.8%) in
Tajikistan thought that it is the duty of national cultural organizations to actively
promote and defend Uzbek interests. About half of the respondents considered this
(defense and promotion of Uzbek interests) to be a task/duty of state institutions
(table 5.10). A further 20% in Kyrgyzstan and approximately 28% in Tajikistan
expected all citizens of the country where they live to defend Uzbek interests, not so
much because of their peculiarity or of their being Uzbek, but as equal citizens of
Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan (this seems to be consistent with other findings on group
self-definition, see chapter 4).
It is interesting to note that in some cases criticism stems from a real
disagreement over what the organization represents and does. In other cases,
however, it is its closeness to power (without any perceived positive implication) that
causes concern and frustration. This is not just a problem for the organization led by
Professor Mamasaidov, although this organization does appear to be a preferred
target of criticism given its close relation with the state administration and the
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president in particular. In fact, even Davron Sabirov's organization is the target of
popular criticism:
"Look at what [Davron] Sabirov does: he goes to Amir Temur [a completely Uzbek district at the
periphery of Osh, arguably the poorest area in town], he brings a bus there and takes people to vote].
Who do you think they vote for?" "He only cares about his personal interest: he founded his own TV
and newspaper [Mezon TV and Mezon] and after being elected he shut his own newspaper because he
did not need it anymore".
These comments build on those of a number of other respondents who showed no
awareness of the existence of Uzbek organizations, and thought than when I asked
them about the O'zbeklar Jamiyati I actually meant the whole Uzbek community
0obshchina). It appears that the claims from the UNCC especially to represent the
whole Uzbek population are at best un-substantiated as they have failed to make the
organization visible (let alone popular) with the broader public and potential
followers. As will be shown in the final section, this is not necessarily contradictory,
as representativeness was never actually meant to be the goal of the organization, as
a rather top-down structure best reflects its nature.
In the case of Tajikistan only one in three respondents considers the Society
of Uzbeks as either effective or very effective (35%). About two in five respondents
(41.7%) consider it 'not very effective'. In the case of Kyrgyzstan perceptions were
investigated with respect to the two competing organizations operating in the
country (the Society of Uzbeks is based in Osh only, whereas the UNCC has a
capillary presence in most province. Both organizations are perceived as not very
effective by about half the respondents (49.6% in the case of UNCC, and 47.8% for
Society of Uzbeks). About one in four respondents considers the national-cultural
centre as effective or very effective.
Table 7.8 How effective is the UNCC in dealing with Uzbek-related issues?
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Very effective 4.3 0.8
Effective 20.0 34.2
Not very effective 49.6 41.7
Don't know 26.1 24.2
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Not very effective 47.8
Don't know 17.7
Two are the most significant findings when it comes to leadership among Tajikistani
Uzbeks. While there is a significant degree of variation within the Uzbek
community, the official leadership has de facto marginalized alternative voices.
Second, despite a de facto hegemony over Uzbek discourse, the official leadership
has proved ineffectual over the years and has eventually all but imploded. Earlier
chapters have shown that Uzbeks are not a monolithic bloc. This is why leadership
matters. Attention to agency and leadership (personality and elite groups) helps us
highlight the rifts, and the different interests and agendas of the many power groups
within the Uzbek community and the eventual emergence of some actor who may
coalesce and mobilize the community. At present, this type of actor does not exist.
Second, the presence of leaders who articulate the demands of the masses is essential
for the success of the mobilizational process. "Inertia" seems to define Tajikistani
Uzbeks at the moment. A weakly institutionalised organization and a lack of national
cohesion have been accompanied since the second half of the 1990s by a state of near
collapse of the existing organizations and the practical fragmentation thereof among
the regional branches. The few leaders have unclear strategies and even less clear
tactics to achieve them. The Uzbek community in Tajikistan has gone through a
process of gradual, but steady internal fragmentation and marginalization from public
life. The lack of capable and effective leadership has played a role in the process of
increased marginalization of Uzbeks from public life, where no-one is left to
articulate their demands or represent them.
7.4.2. Kyrgyzstan
Participation to public and party life
The level of participation in public life is low among the Uzbek population. The
Uzbek population is particularly wary of exposing itself and tends to privilege
engagement in business activities to political activities. Only 14.8% of respondents
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declared membership of a political party. Of those who did, almost all were members
of the newly established Party of National Unity and Concord. In line with research
on the weakness of political parties in Central Asia, party affiliation does not appear
to be a relevant factor shaping individual preferences.
Table 7.10 Are you a member of a political party?
Yes 14.8
No 85.2
Table 7.11 What factors determine your voting behaviour?
Factor %
Nationality 14.6




Political preferences appear to be determined by the qualities and capacity (delovoye
kachestvo) of the candidate, whereas nationality seems to play little role. This
appears a controversial finding, as it is partly disproved by follow-up individual
interviews where given the choice between Uzbek and non-Uzbek candidates, Uzbek
respondents show little doubt and opt for the former. It seems that the question of
capacity comes into play when two or more candidates are Uzbek; at that stage
voters may start considering other factors. Considering that the Party of National
Unity and Concord, though still untested in national or local elections, is widely
believed to be an Uzbek party, it will be interesting to see how it performs in the
2005 elections. Anyway, the fact that Kyrgyzstan's political parties, more than a
decade after independence are still predominantly mono-ethnic with minorities
experiencing difficulties in finding their way in a Kyrgyz political party is illustrative
of the ethnicization of Kyrgyzstani politics, where (pseudo)democratic procedures
are often perceived by minority groups not as an instrument for them to achieve
representation, but as a tool in the hands of the ethnic majority to legitimise its
dominant status. Involvement in cultural events (ie festivals of Uzbek language,
theatre rehearsals, concerts) is higher, as confirmed by the fact that three in four
respondents indicated taking part in cultural events organized by the local Uzbek
organization(s). However, only about half of the respondents attends them more or
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less regularly, whereas there is a significant number of respondents who rarely or
hardly ever participate.











Attitudes towards cultural centres
Having established that the level of public involvement among Uzbeks is at best
mixed, I then explored in more detail the reasons for this phenomenon and looked at
the attitudes of ordinary Uzbeks towards their leaders and their organizations.
Findings convey an image of a heterogeneous community, a small segment thereof
espouses the orientations of the official leadership. There is a significant portion
however which does not wish to be associated with either organization, though they
may trust individual leaders. The level of involvement in cultural events organized
by Uzbek cultural centres may be misleadingly interpreted as an indicator of support
of the population for cultural centres. This is not the case, as the tables below show.
About one in two respondents is not a member of any Uzbek cultural organization,
whereas one in three appears to be member of the UNCC. The Society of Uzbeks
appears less popular, although further survey data point to the fact that an
organization's popularity is not synonymous with the leader's popularity. The level
of support broadly follow membership lines, though this should not have been taken
for granted.




Society of Uzbeks 6.3
Neither 51.6
Other 6.3
Table 7.15 What cultural organization (if any) do you support?
Organization
UNCC 30.0
Society of Uzbeks 6.7
Neither 63.3
Uzbek organizations are not perceived as effective. In fact only a very small
percentage indicates the UNCC and the Society of Uzbeks as very effective in
dealing with Uzbek demands (4.3% and 7.1% respectively). By contrast two in three
respondents have a very critical view of these centres, which may explain the low
level of both support and membership. Moreover, the very purpose of such
organizations is also questioned. In most cases cultural centres are associated with
smaller nationalities, possibly non indigenous. Uzbeks tend to show uneasiness to be
associated with these, as they emphasise their indigenousness and attachment to the
territory. Being associated with a cultural centre would imply, in other terms,
acknowledging that "Uzbeks came from somewhere else", like Germans or Koreans,
and that in the end it would be legitimate to ask them to leave a country they do not
belong to. The reasons for joining such organizations range from the desire to
improve the conditions of the Uzbek community (22.6%) and fight discrimination
(7.5%), to the belief that it is duty of every Uzbek to be actively involved in
organizations aimed at the protection of Uzbek language, culture, and traditions
(60%). Surprisingly, in light of the comments discussed in section B, respondents
tend to consider Uzbek cultural organizations as necessary (83.2%).
Table 7.16 How effective are the UNCC and the Society of Uzbeks in dealing with
Uzbek demands?
UNCC SocUz
Very effective 4.3 7.1
Effective 20.0 27.4
Not really effective 49.6 47.8
Not effective at all 26.1 17.7
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Table 7.17 Why did you decide to join it?
Kyrgyzstan
Duty of every Uzbek 60.3
To fight discrimination 7.5
To improve conditions of Uzbeks 22.6
Other 9.7
Table 7.18 Are national-cultural centres necessary to the Uzbek population?
Yes No
83.2% 16.8%
Respondents were asked to indicate a possible reason behind the lack of political
involvement and/or interest, let alone action, of the Uzbek community. Mentality
(social conservatism), which Tajikistani Uzbeks have also indicated as the main
source of the population's passivity, is indicated by one in four respondents. It seems
instead that a lack of leadership (46.7%) is considered as a plausible explanation. In a
way, this is in line with findings from Tajikistan, where the absence of available
leaders is lamented by local Uzbeks. It is interesting to note that this is not the case in
Kyrgyzstan where leaders, even if self-proclaimed ones, are definitely not a scarce
resource. The fact that one in two respondents ascribed Uzbek passivity to the lack of
leadership indicates the level of dissatisfaction with the current available leaders,
who, it seems, are not perceived as such.
Table 7.18 How do you explain the low level of political action among the Uzbek
population?
%
Lack of interest 6.7
Lack of leadership 46.7
No need, complete agreement with authorities 6.7
Mentality 23.3
Economic interests prioritised over political ones 16.7
Perceptions of leadership
The two tables below show the level of trust in and popularity of some of the most
well-know personalities within the Uzbek community. The most trusted and popular
figure by far is Davron Sabirov. Not only is Davron Sabirov the most popular among
the current deputies at the national parliament, but he is also indicated as the most
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suitable person to lead the Uzbek cultural centre (which he used to chair until he
broke away in 1996-1997). He is also indicated as worthy of sitting in the parliament
and worthy of re-election, whereas some other 'big names' in the Uzbek community,
such as the UNCC leader, enjoy far lower support.
Table 7.20 Trust in and popularity of local Uzbek personalities214
Name Who should be Who should be re¬ Who deserves to




M. Mamasaidov 87 178 104
B. Juraev 39 139 78
D. Sabirov 181 362 174
A. Sabirov 83 234 60
I. Abdurasulov 29 - 189









The fragmentation of leadership which most respondents ascribe to personal
ambitions and interests rather than to real ideological differences is one of the
defining characteristics of the Kyrgyzstani Uzbek community. As many indicate this
factor as a cause for the lack of mobilization, it is not surprising that most wish the
two organizations to merge (84.4%). By doing so, it is hoped, personal interests will
2l4The questions were: 1. MMMni kim boshqarishi mumkin? 2. Kimi qayta Oliy Kengash saylash
mumkin? 3. Kim Oliy Kengash deputaligiga munosib? Survey conducted from Alliance-Press in the
Osh area, June-July 2003.
215
Survey conducted by Alliance Press, June-July 2003. These data have been kindly passed to me
and are here reported in agreement with Al'yans Press.
216Mukhammadjan Mamasaidov is rector of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek university in Osh and head of the
republican (country-wide) Uzbek National-Cultural Centre.
217Alisher Sabirov and Davron Sabirov are not related.
218Davron Sabirov is head of the break-away Society of Uzbeks, chair of the Osh branch of the state
company 'Kyrgyz Gas', and in all but officially owner of Mezon TV and formerly of Mezon
newspaper.
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be put aside for the sake of the advancement of superior interests, those of the Uzbek
community as a whole, not just those of one or two of its ambitious leaders. Unity
and cohesiveness come first and foremost in the priorities of members of the Uzbek
community.
Table 7.22 Should the Society of Uzbeks and the National-Cultural Centre merge?219
Yes No
84.4% 15.6%
From the state perspective a sort of tactical alliance between these two groups of
actors is not an optimal scenario as this would present a unitied Uzbek front voicing
grievances and demands. A divided group is certainly more amenable to control, as it
has been the case over the past fifteen years (though control is clearly not the only
reason for continued Uzbek support of the ruling elites). There are reasons to believe,
however, that this scenario is not likely to materialize in the foreseeable future.
1X9'O'zbeklar Jamiyati bilan O'zbeklar MMMni birlashtirish kerakmi?'. Sample: 540 respondents.
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7.5. Conclusion: Is there an Uzbek agenda?
In this chapter I have disaggregated the unit of analysis (the Uzbek community).
Rather than looking at it as an amorphous and undistinguished bloc I examined the
internal dynamics and identified the main actors within the Uzbek community. This
has shown that rather than speak of a single Uzbek agency one should more
appropriately speak of a multiplicity of agencies. The chapter suggests four main
findings.
First, leadership matters. Among the most crucial differences between
Uzbeks living in the two countries is the type of leadership shown by the elites of the
two communities. In short, Uzbeks have shown two opposite forms of leadership:
lack of leadership tout court in Tajikistan, and leadership fragmentation in
Kyrgyzstan. Inevitably regional and personal factionalism has made the situation of
too many leaders unsustainable and the Uzbek community has split between Osh and
Jalalabat, and within Osh itself. Ironically, different causes have led to an identical
outcome: inefficacy of the Uzbek leadership.
Second is the importance of intra-elite power struggle over access to and
distribution of power and resources. National policy has been the prism through
which the struggle between elite groups can be interpreted. On the eve of the Soviet
collapse the situation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan showed some strong similarities.
More than a decade after independence these strong similarities remain: perceptions
of a weak national leadership on the one hand, and pervasive fragmentation of the
country's political, economic and social life along regional lines on the other.
Third, findings suggest that the Uzbek community, in both countries, is far
from monolithic. That the Uzbek community is represented as one cohesive unit is a
process of social construction which largely distorts reality. There are different
groups with various interests and agendas. What is resented by ordinary Uzbeks is
that these disagreements and discussions are shown to the outside world, whereas
unity, especially the formal appearance thereof, is a key feature of Uzbekness.
Paradoxically this has turned Uzbek discontent not so much towards state authorities,
but against their own leaders, whose authority is contested, not publicly, but in
private conversations. Unity is a myth that Uzbeks themselves are striving to re-vive,
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blaming the personal ambitions and interests of the leaders (however corresponding
to reality). While the political landscape among Tajikistani Uzbeks appears less
variegated, political orientations in Kyrgyzstan are better articulated. What is crucial
is that official organizations and leaders are not exhaustive of the attitudes and
perceptions of the Uzbek community. Regional fragmentation has led to inactivity
among Tajikistani Uzbeks, whereas regional fragmentation has emerged as a
consequence of ideological as well as personal feuds among Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks.The
lack of a cohesive leadership is not without implications for the mobilizational
process. Zoltan Barany (2002) has emphasised the importance of a united leadership
and organization for successful, sustained and effective political action. The more
divided a community is or appears, the less likely it is that it will develop a coherent
and cohesive, let alone successful political action. This appears to be the case, with
intra-Uzbek factionalism dominating the Uzbek public discourse more than any
debate over how to realistically achieve what appears to be by and large common
goals.
Finally, there is an apparent un-coupling between elites and ordinary people.
Leaders, where available at all, seem to follow their own course of action and are
perceived as self-referential, leading elitist organizations more interested in dealing
with authorities than promoting and channelling demands coming from within the
community. Although not completely ineffective (by contrast, Uzbek leaders in
Kyrgyzstan have "all done their part", separately220), Uzbek leaders are seen as
puppets in the hands of the central elites, engaged and fully participating in the intra-
elite power struggle at a national level, and more concerned with marginalizing
alternative voices coming from within the Uzbek community. There is a significant
segment of the Uzbek population that does not wish to be associated with the official
leadership or state authorities that are perceived to be ineffective. How their interests
will be channeled in the long term will shape the future trajectories of Uzbek
political behaviour and ultimately of state stability. Leaders talk... but who's
listening?
220Some have built schools, other funded universities, others established newspapers and TV stations.
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8. CONCLUSION
Opportunities, Leadership and Ideas among 'Uzbeks Abroad'
The study has sought to answer one main empirical question: how Uzbeks living in
the post-Soviet republics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have adjusted to being "at
home abroad". It has done so by comparing the process of ethno-political
mobilization in the two countries, paying special attention to the forms and strategies
adopted by the Uzbek community.
How best to capture the conditions of the Uzbek population living in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan? Do they find themselves "at a cusp" between two
nationalising and marginalizing states (Liu, 2002), or are they rather beginning to
start feeling part of the civic community similar to an increasingly larger part of the
Russian diasporas, as Kolstp has observed (1999, 2000)? To some extent both views
are correct. The strategies adopted by Uzbeks in their political behaviour, the frames
they use, and the complexity of their collective allegiances, cultural as well as
political, suggest that they have begun adjusting to their new post-Soviet condition of
being citizen of a new polity which is no longer supra-national and is not culturally
defined by their ethnicity of belonging or choice (Uzbekistan in this case). The
Soviet Union to a large extent provided both. Despite being officially supra-national
(socialist) and hindering nationalism, it created and reinforced national divisions. All
this clearly changed with independence and the emergence of nationalising states in
Central Asia. Domestic and external factors combined to channel (or funnel) Uzbek
mobilization in the direction of choice of the country of residence. This should not be
interpreted as a sign that all problems have been solved or that demands and
grievances have been addressed in any sort of definitive way. The increasingly
authoritarian tendencies and the narrowing of a space for autonomous political action
have, over the years, further restricted the possibilities for groups to channel their
demands and possibly their dissent. The politics of memory keeps alive the thoughts
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of when Tajikistan used to be "hetero-directed" from Moscow via Tashkent, and
from Tashkent via the elites in the north. Similarly, about fifteen years later, the
pains of the Osh conflict remain fresh and continue to haunt the local population. The
result of these memories combined with the widespread use of authoritarian practices
by the ruling regimes in the region have had the effect of both mobilising and de¬
mobilizing the Uzbek community. Out of both genuine concern (that conflict may
repeat itself) and strategic calculation Uzbeks began to side with the incumbent
owing to fear of any potential successor. The next section summarises the main
arguments of this study, and is followed by a broader consideration of the prospects
for state-group relations in the near future as well as an outline of the key theoretical
and methodological contributions this research has sought to make.
8.1. SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENT
8.1.1. Framing Uzbek mobilization
A study of the frames ("interpretive schemes that condense and simplify a person's
experience by selectively highlighting and encoding certain situations, objects,
events and experiences", Gorenburg, 2003 p. 11) that group leaders have adopted to
define the condition of the Uzbek communities in either country and the extent to
which, along with the time frame during which they resonated has shown that only a
particular set of frames, with the notable exception of a brief nationalistic frame in
the case of Osh's Davron Sabirov in 1997-2000, have been articulated and have
resonated across the Uzbek population.
Nationalist-oriented frames have emerged periodically for short intervals and
have been overshadowed by more conciliatory ones. Whilst in the early and late
1990s in Tajikistan such frames have arguably played little role in the conflict that
opposed the northern province to the rest of the country, nationalist frames have
emerged in southern Kyrgyzstan among local Uzbeks, in the early 1990s (before and
in the immediate aftermath of the Osh conflict), and later on in the decade. These
frames have not resonated across the political imagination of the Uzbek population
who have by contrast appropriated integrationist frames. This does not mean that
grievances are not widespread or that they do not matter in the process of Uzbek
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mobilization. An analysis of demands and grievances shows that cultural issues have
been a core concern of the community, which has remained systematically dis¬
satisfied with the response of the state. Issues of language, education and information
have been articulated by local leaders and have resonated across the population.
However the Uzbek question has been framed by the leaders of the community
within a discourse of indigenousness (in both cases), that alongside the articulation of
demands advanced the image of civic integration of the Uzbek community in the new
polity. Because of the overarching role that the memory of conflict has played in
both countries integrationist and civic frames have resonated across and have been
appropriate by the wider Uzbek community. The emergence of such frames also
emphasises the significance of the common Soviet legacy. The language adopted by
the Uzbek elites to mobilise the community and to frame Uzbek issues is rooted in
the Soviet experience and discourses on internationalism and inter-ethnic harmony.
They also build on Soviet nationality policies (outlined in chapter 2) where Uzbeks
express utter rejection for labels such as diasporas and minorities. In Soviet times
these terms were associated with diminished cultural rights at the very best, and
possibly with the experience of the "enemy peoples", those ethnic groups deported
for their alleged disloyalty to the Soviet state. Claims are made instead on the basis
of Uzbek indigenousness or even titularity, for some. Being local, in short, means
being able to aspire to a higher status and access to resources. Being "from
somewhere else", by contrast, is associated with marginality.
Different frames have alternated in Kyrgyzstan and the increase in activities and
mobilization have corresponded to the presence of a competition between the two
frames and particularly the resonance of the nationalist one. A particularly useful
concept has been Ukudeeva-Freeman's "mobilizing idea", which she defined as
"[...] an action-oriented set of beliefs that unifies people around itself for a common
goal" (2003 p.99). The emergence of a set of ideas around which the community can
coalesce, Ukudeeva-Freeman suggests, is an essential pre-requisite for group
mobilization. The trajectory of mobilization (i.e. a confrontational or amicable type
of mobilization) largely depends on which of these frames resonate across the
population. A crucial argument of this study has been that ideas are quintessentially
relational. The same set of ideas can be used to either mobilise or indeed de-mobilise
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the population. For this reason I argue that the concept of mobilising ideas should be
accompanied by that of de-mobilizing ideas. The concept of de-mobilizing idea (a set
of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes which shape the direction of mobilization
towards integration with the institutions and other groups of the country of
residence), not only disputes the commonly held expectation that political
mobilization is by its way confrontational with authorities, but has also helped
emphasise how depending on the use the framers decide to make of it, a particular
set of frames can simultaneously act as powerful "mobilizer" in one direction, and
demobilize the very same group in a different respect. The examples of past
experiences of conflict, but also of Islam appear particularly appropriate to illustrate
the way mobilization and de-mobilization can be activated by the very same idea.
One the one hand Islam constitutes a potentially powerful mobilizing idea (religion),
while at the same time representing a constraining force for mobilization along
ethnic lines (as an anti-national or supra-national ideology). The memory of the Osh
conflict constitutes an additional example, where the politics of memory can either
activate the population on the basis of grievances and perceptions of discrimination
or - as it has happened - de-mobilise it on the grounds that Uzbeks have been
marginalized from the political process (increasingly perceived as either a Kyrgyz or
a Tajik affair), hence political mobilization would yield no practical effect. While
frames may explain the trajectory of mobilization of the Uzbek community, it is only
by paying attention to leaders' strategies and choices and the way they relate with the
potential followers that a complete picture of Uzbek mobilization emerges.
8.1.2. Uzbek actors, leadership and strategy
An analysis of Uzbek agency has pointed to four main findings. First, leadership
matters. As mentioned earlier in this study, leaders are "strategic decision-makers"
that "inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities,
devise strategies, frame demands and influence outcomes" (Morris and Staggenbrg,
2004 p. 171). It is the contention of this study that attention to types and strategies of
leaders can enhance our understanding of Uzbek ethno-political mobilization.
Apparent lack of mass mobilization cannot be explained by apathy or lack of
political opportunities alone. Instead, Uzbek mobilization in Kyrgyzstan and
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Tajikistan is the product as much of elite strategic calculation as of the structural
context. The main goal of Uzbek organizations and the Uzbek community at large
revolves around the promotion of some core interests (language, education,
representation etc.). How best to achieve them has been the terrain upon which intra-
Uzbek contestation has taken place. The defense and promotion of Uzbek cultural
interests, a commonly shared objective, has traditionally been associated with the
support for the current state leadership. Concern that this leadership may be replaced
by more nationalist-oriented actors has shaped Uzbek strategy as essentially "risk-
adverse". Stability at all costs has defined the Uzbek strategy since independence. It
remains clear that the enthusiastic support of the early days for the Akaev
administration and to a lesser extent the Rakhmonov administration has not waned.
What has made a difference is that Uzbek leaders have framed the current situation
as preferable to any other alternative and that this strategy has been accepted, at least
until very recently, by the wider Uzbek community.
Second, the Uzbek leadership now resembles a "microcosm of repression",
where different actors compete for attention not (just) of the Uzbek community itself,
but of state leaders. Greater visibility and recognition would enhance the status of
organizations and individual leaders, thereby diminishing other potential challengers
in what in practice is a competition for status, positions and influence as well as a
struggle to have one's demands met. This has generated the situation where instead
of open debates or even open conflict over the appropriate strategy, whoever is in
position of power dominates the discourse and seeks to marginalize and de-legitimise
the other, as either nationalist (various intellectuals and young graduates in both
countries, but also Davron Sabirov in Kyrgyzstan) or irrelevant (ie Uzbek women
who are also active members of NGOs, but whose voice in politics is particularly
feeble).
Third, as the discussion on leaders-followers relations suggest, the former are
seen as increasingly ineffective in advancing Uzbek interests. Signals of
dissatisfaction with the Uzbek and state leadership were already evident in the early
2000s in Kyrgyzstan where the progressive un-coupling of elites and followers
within the Uzbek community started to become apparent. Regime and group leaders,
to whom credit goes for having framed the post-Soviet transformation preserving
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inter-ethnic stability (the former) and for having framed Uzbek mobilization in a non
nationalist and non violent way see their legitimacy increasingly eroded. The
political capital they accumulated in the early stages of independence is about to
vanish, even if cases of open contestation have thus far remained limited to a few
sporadic cases (e.g. Aksy riots in March, 2002. Chapter 7 has shown that the position
of the group leaders should not be taken for granted. This does not bode well for the
stability of the regime. How long that will refuse to open up will bear crucially on the
stability of the state. Given the importance that minority groups have assumed for the
stability of the regime over the past decade or so, a further alienation of ethnic
minorities would leave the regime's power base narrower. Integration rather than
reliance on a narrower power base is the more urgent (though unlikely in the short
run) way out of the current impasse.
Finally, despite the hegemonization of the public discourse in both Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan one should more appropriately refer to Uzbek actors, since Uzbeks are
far from being a cohesive group. This has emerged both in chapters 4 and 7. A key
difference that has emerged with regard to the two case studies. While similar
structural and ideational factors have shaped Uzbek mobilization, attention to agency
has allowed the detection of variation between the two. This is a difference in degree
rather than kind, though and can be explained by the presence of a more articulate
leadership among Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks and the corresponding absence of any form of
leadership in Tajikistan. Though this does not mean that Uzbek actors are absent in
the country, a collapse in the national leadership, structural regional divisions in the
country and intra-Uzbek heterogeneity as to how best to promote Uzbek interests
have left the community in a state of semi-paralysis in recent years. This contrasts
with the situation in Kyrgyzstan, where higher levels of organization of Uzbek
collective actors and the emergence of more vocal individual actors have made intra-
Uzbek debate livelier, though not necessarily more interesting to the ordinary
population.
8.1.3. Uzbekistan's role
This study also suggests a lack of support from the ethnic patron (Uzbekistan) for
Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. In fact, after an initial involvement in the neighbours'
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domestic affairs (particularly Tashkent's meddling with the Tajik civil war from
1992 to 1994), Uzbekistan has restrained from supporting Uzbek communities in the
neighbouring countries. While the possibility of Uzbekistan's support for Uzbeks
abroad has often been indicated as one of the de-stabilising factors in the region, little
evidence has been provided to justify this claim. Overall, if anything, Uzbekistan has
played a stabilising role in this respect. This, it was argued, can be ascribed to three
main factors.
First is the emphasis that Uzbekistan has placed on state-building and the
concept of O'zbekchilik (Uzbekness). Compared to other ethno-national groups in the
region, Uzbeks presented a comparatively higher degree of national consciousness.
Strengthening the state, its institutions, identities and security, has certainly been an
ambiguous and contradictory process, but the practical effect has been a stabilising
effect on Uzbekistan's attitude towards Uzbeks abroad. Given Tashkent's propensity
for unilateral solutions to regional problems, one would have in fact expected a
higher degree of involvement from Uzbekistan in the domestic affairs of its
neighbours. With security concerns paramount and the construction of a public
discourse that sees Uzbekistan as a "fortress" encircled by a series of threats to the
integrity and stability of the state, the country's leadership has severed its links with
Uzbek co-ethnics in the neighbouring republics. Suspicion towards the Ferghana
Valley Uzbeks is particularly acute in Uzbekistan, due to the alleged association
between the profound religious sentiment of the valley's dwellers and their
involvement in militant activities. Occasional incursions by Islamic militants over the
years (from the Adolat and Islom Laskharlari in the early 1990s in Namangan and
Andijan to the 1999 and 2000 IMU insurgencies) have been constructed as the
presentation of an Islamic face. While there is no doubt that Uzbekistan has faced
mounting opposition and threats to stability (Horsman, 2005), there is no sign that
that this has a distinctively ethnic Uzbek mark. Nonetheless the Islamic threat,
imagined or real, by and large informs Uzbekistan's Weltanschauung and its
relationships with the neighbours.
A second possible factor for Uzbekistan's reluctance in dealing with Uzbeks
abroad, lies in the priority given by Uzbekistan to inter-state bilateral relationships.
Not only has Uzbekistan eschewed any form of regional arrangement and shown
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wariness towards any collective security regime, the regime of Tashkent has also
systematically ignored any request for direct relationship with the organizations of
Uzbeks abroad. Uzbek co-ethnics, Uzbekistan's President Karimov has often
maintained, are citizens of other countries and therefore it is their responsibility, not
Uzbekistan's to deal with their demands (and I suppose similar conclusions should
be drawn with respect to Uzbekistan's Tajik minorities, for example). Related to this
aspect is the tacit agreement that exists between the region's regimes. A support for
one's own co-ethnics could, with all probability, ignite the region, causing a domino
effect of support for co-ethnics beyond state borders. The region would soon descend
into chaos.
A further explanation for the lack of active links may be found in the views of
Uzbeks abroad themselves. All the political, economic, and cultural limitations and
problems notwithstanding, Uzbeks living there have enjoyed a limited degree of
pluralism. At the very least, authoritarian control and repression have not reached
levels anywhere close to those perceived to be the norm in Uzbekistan. The current
political situation in Uzbekistan does not appear particularly appealing to Uzbeks
abroad. A liberalization of the political climate in Tashkent might exert a greater
appeal to Uzbeks abroad, but at the moment the more open political, economic and
cultural environment in countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
does not suggest any move for migration, let alone requests for annexation to
Uzbekistan. As a leading figure of the Uyghur minority in Tashkent put it clearly to
me221, given the current conditions, "no-one is interested in coming to Uzbekistan...
the reality is that all those who can, leaves it!" One should also note that their sense
of civic belonging (to the states of residence) is increasing. Expectations are rising
vis-a-vis Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani authorities, but this, I argue, supports the view
that Uzbeks now accept their permanent status as citizens of these new republics.
Overall, this has set Uzbekistan apart from other post-communist states like
Russia222, Kazakhstan, Hungary or Serbia which have actively supported co-ethnics
abroad, militarily (Serbia) or through repatriation policies (Kazakhstan). The case of
221Interview held in Tashkent, 8 June 2003.
222I am clearly aware of the distinctiveness of the Russian case, where the Russian diasporas are
descendants of colonial settlers, whereas in the Uzbek case, co-ethnics have been diasporised by the
movement of borders. This, however, does not detract from the possibility of drawing comparison
between the political behaviour of the alleged ethnic patron towards co-ethnics abroad.
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the relationship between Uzbeks abroad and Uzbekistan suggests that the latter does
not think of the former as a community it has a responsibility to protect. As
Gorenburg has correctly noted (2001), although the motherland may be calling, the
"diaspora" may not be listening. In light of this, it seems necessary to qualify Rogers
Brubaker's triadic nexus framework as a way to conceptualise the relationships
between state (of residence), minority, and alleged 'external homeland'. While no
doubt some among the Uzbek population may continue to look to Uzbekistan as a
cultural homeland, or a country with whose citizens they may have special cultural
and family bonds, the relationship between Uzbekistan and Uzbeks abroad appears
much weaker than the one, say, between Russia and Russians abroad.
8.1.4. An ever narrowing space for Uzbek ethno-political mobilization
Overall the path undertaken by Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani authorities has converged
since the mid-1990s and until the recent developments in March 2005 that have led
to the ousting of Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan. Initial openings notwithstanding,
which took place in the context of regime weakness corresponding to the initial
phases of regime formation (collapse of previous order, institutional weakness,
search for legitimacy, conflict prevention) where broad cross-ethnic alliances were
formed out of necessity more than enthusiasm, the consolidation of autocracies in
Central Asia has made the regime's reliance on minority groups (so crucial in the
early 1990s especially in Kyrgyzstani politics) less central to domestic factional
politics. Kyrgyzstani politics has become to a large extent a Kyrgyz affair. Similarly
Tajikistani politics has turned into a Tajik-affair. The "others" (Russians and Uzbeks
especially) have become ever more peripheral as they have come to be less necessary
to the regime strength and stability. How has this affected the legitimacy of the
regime and the position, status, and legitimacy of the group's leader whose political
capital lay essentially in their political proximity to the "king's ears"?
Chapters 4 and 5 have confirmed the significance of context as a set of
constraints and opportunities which not only shapes the course of Uzbek
mobilization, but gives meaning to it (as is clearly shown by the way post-Soviet
frames are built in the Soviet nationality policies). The study of variations in the POS
has been particularly important in understanding how small changes in authoritarian
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countries have led to the opening of possibilities for dissent and contestation, and
more broadly the development of contentious politics. After an initial opening of the
window of opportunity (the most pluralistic societies in late Soviet Central Asia),
such windows were abruptly closed by an increasing tendency to authoritarianism
which came to define the post-Soviet transformation in both countries223. Spaces for
dissent and more generally for autonomous (not state-driven, funded, or arranged)
political action became narrower and narrower.
Structural preconditions and the political opportunity structure certainly
shaped the course of Uzbek political mobilization by making some choices available,
but not others (both in organizational terms, such as the ban on ethnic parties, as in
terms of strategies, such as granting Uzbek official language status). The impression
that Uzbeks faced overwhelming structural barriers to successful mobilisation is
correct. Context, as Colin Hay has noted, is structurally selective, and defines the
ranges of strategies available to agents. By privileging some courses of action over
others, state actors in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have increasingly restricted the
chances for minority groups to mobilise and the forms that such mobilisation might
take.
At the same time the study has also shown that there are limits to what a
structural model can achieve in non open political systems. Problems arise when
trying to make sense of the variation within and between the two cases or when
looking for suitable methodological tools. Other sets of factors provide a more
convincing explanation than structural accounts. This is in line with analogous
arguments made by scholars of Islamic activism in non open societies, such as
Wiktorowicz (2004) and Smith (2004). An important insight from the social
movement literature lies in the attempt to look beyond traditional forms of political
organizations, which in the case of ethnic mobilization naturally means ethnic
political parties. Cultural organizations are the main collective agents and vehicles of
Uzbek political mobilization and therefore they are the actors one should look at. At
the same time, it is only by looking at how the condition of the community is framed
and the strategies adopted by the leaders that one can fully understand the logic
behind Uzbek political behaviour
223See Spector (2003), Huskey (2002) for research on Kyrgyzstan's authoritarian turn, and Atkin
(2002) for a similar analysis on Tajikistan's "weak authoritarianism".
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8.1.5. Beyond ethnic vs. civic: Uzbek identity is both
A broader consideration follows from the discussion on the ties between Uzbekistan
and Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. The dichotomy between ethnic and civic conceptions
of nation and the implications thereof for post-Soviet state-building has been a
primary concern in scholarship on post-communist Eurasia. To different extents all
the Central Asian states have been categorised to fit into the category of nationalising
states, defined by Rogers Brubaker (1996) as states of and for the nation after which
the republics were called (titular nation). It has not been my intention to dispute this
categorization - which I largely agree with - given the emphasis on practices more
than policies that state authorities have given to the necessity of enhancing the status
of the titular group. However, the study has emphasised that a dichotomy of ethnic
and civic is not always useful. To some extent, data seem to support Taras Kuzio's
(2003) critique of the dichotomy, where he argues that similarly to the Western
European case all states have to pass through different stages, from an initial more
ethnic idea of nation to a more civic one. While I am not convinced by the linearity
of the process, I argue that both views can and do co-exist in the same polity. This is
clearly not without contradictions, and these contradictions deeply affect the way
minorities can be accommodated and possibly integrated as full members of the
citizenry.
The case of the Uzbekistani state points well to a condition where both
conceptions are present in the regime's approach, and where policies aimed at
strengthening the state have been accompanied by others which have privileged the
Uzbek community to the detriment of non-Uzbeks. The study of the Uzbek case
contributes to a more nuanced understanding of nation-building in Central Asia,
which does not rely on a focus on the condition of a particular group situated within
the eponymous republic. Deprived of formal and informal policies and practices to
support and enhance their position in a given state, how do minorities relate to the
new state of residence? Additionally, a discussion of Uzbek self-perception and
mobilising frames (chapter 4, but also 6) has shown that Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan have adopted multiple and overlapping forms of loyalties. Depending on
the specific context, one may or may not emerge as dominant, but the crucial point
is that different forms of identifications are not perceived as exclusive. Data suggest
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that Uzbeks are increasingly aware of their national identity, which accompanies, but
does not replace or supersede civic allegiance. Uzbek national identity is not found to
be detrimental to other forms of loyalty. Quite the contrary, when asked to rank
different forms of identity, state identity tends to be the form of identity adopted.
Alongside national, state, and supra-national identities, research found that local
loyalties retain their importance too. Attachment to the locale, the proximate
territory, is particularly evident in southern Kyrgyzstan. Local Uzbeks do not see any
problem with multiple allegiances and the overlapping nature thereof. Uzbekness is a
very diverse form of identity, which encompasses many regional variations, and in
this it is no different from Italian, or Spanish identity, where regional variations are
also strong. Being Uzbek means different things to different people, and these need
not be mutually exclusive. This points in both cases the picture of an Uzbek
community less cohesive than perhaps originally envisaged and often assumed. This
confirms not just Gorenburg's observations with regard to the Russian-speaking
communities in the former Soviet space, that the various Russian diasporas may not
be speaking with one voice, but also Barany's thesis that the lack of group
cohesiveness translates in the lack of a critical social capital for collective
mobilization. While Uzbeks in Osh, Jalalabat, Bishkek, Khujand, Dushanbe and in
the outskirts of these cities undoubtedly share a sense of commonality and all
perceive themselves to be Uzbek, their degree of attachment to nationality tends to
vary significantly across regions.
8.2. PROSPECTS
While one should not be tempted toward excessive generalizations from an analysis
of two case studies, the research invites some broader considerations on the
dynamics of political transformation and change in post-Soviet Central Asia:
the fragile and eroding bases of regime legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan;
and the need for political reform and a broader societal integration before the
unaddressed demands and grievances slip out of hand.
How minorities react to the nationalising policies and interact with state
institutions tells us a lot about how far the latter have gone in integrating or
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accommodating the non-titular groups and how these imagine themselves in the new
states. In other words, to use Walker Connor's crucial distinction, state-group
relations and particularly a study of minority groups can highlight the degree of
224
legitimacy enjoyed by the state, the regime, and the government (Connor, 2004)*" .
The reason for this was that the urge for legitimacy which, not deriving from an
independence struggle framed as a national liberation from the Soviet imperial yoke
(as happened in the Baltics or Georgia, for example), had to be sought elsewhere.
The search for legitimation, popular or self-granted, has become a key
concern for the state leaders who, unlike elsewhere in the former Soviet Union,
cannot boast participation in anti-colonial and independence struggles. Void of any
popular legitimation arising from an independence struggle, the post-Soviet elites
have been forced to look elsewhere. This has been a contradictory process, the very
ambiguity of which is becoming all the more evident. On the one hand the post-
Soviet elites have portrayed themselves as guarantors of inter-ethnic stability,
harmony and of minority rights (especially in the case of Askar Akaev and his
ideology of Kyrgyzstan our common home). On the other hand domestic
factionalism has forced the leaders to deal with competing power groups from within
their ethnic community (Kyrgyz or Tajik). The necessity to negotiate and agree with
those groups has come at a price: the marginalization of ethnic minorities. The most
troubling findings concern (1) the eroding legitimacy of state and group leaders and
(2) the narrowing space available as outlets of collective grievances and demands,
product of the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the region's regimes. The
restrictions imposed on the means and outlets for airing views have contributed to the
general sense of apathy and distrust of institutions across the whole citizenry. If this
has been balanced by persisting concern for political successions and the
implications thereof in terms of more nationalist-oriented policies, then there are
signs that the consensus and legitimacy that the regime has enjoyed since
independence is eroding.
The apparent un-coupling of leaders and followers does not bode well for
Central Asian transformation. Data suggest that ordinary citizens feel increasingly
detached and less represented by their leaders. Thus far open contestation has been
224Though, because of the personalistic and authoritarian nature of the Central Asian regimes, the
difference between government and regime legitimacy appears blurred.
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limited to sporadic cases. Episodes such as the 2002 Aksy events and the riots that
took place in northern Tajikistan between 1997 and 1998 have fortunately been the
exception rather than the norm. The consequences of a lack of reform and openness
on the one hand (linked to the elites' primary consolidation of power position and
status) with an illusory legitimacy on the other have already started to radicalise the
ordinary population left with no other channel to voice its demands with the only
effective mobilising structures operating underground: radical islamic organizations,
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut Tahrir. I have not
conducted research specifically on those movements or on the popularity they enjoy
among Uzbeks (they are often associated with the Uzbek population, among the most
traditional in the region) and non Uzbeks alike. The sense is that the persistence of
closure is creating the very threat the regimes are dreading. The only alternatives
appear the establishment of an open society and the integration, rather than the
exclusion or marginalization of the 'other'.
While the issue of the legitimacy of the current state leadership has begun to
be an object of study (Atkin, 2002; Cummings, 2002a; Huskey, 2002), the
significance of the regime-group leadership nexus for regime stability has been
neglected overall in scholarship. Neil Melvin (2001) and Pauline Jones Luong (2002)
have noted how the Kyrgyzstani leadership has relied on a divide and rule approach
to establish its dominance and consolidate its position. To this end the support of
minority groups have been of critical importance. The Uzbek community's support
for the Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani regimes has been a trademark of the first decade
(and more) of transition. Data from this research and reports from the region indicate
that this should not be taken for granted any more. Though the Uzbek community's
general integrationist stance is not in doubt, the lack of progress of Uzbek leaders
(indeed their perceived inefficacy) and the lack of response from the authorities to
cultural and political demands suggest that Uzbeks may be starting to withdraw their
"blank cheque" to the state administration. It is far too soon to advance any
hypothesis as to what path post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan will decide to take with regard to
state-minority relations. The fact that unlike 2002 (Aksy events) the Uzbek
community has more actively sided with southern (Kyrgyz) political factions and
more broadly the "opposition" suggest that the risk-adverse strategy has been
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significantly reviewed. How the "new leaders" will respond to Uzbek (and other
minority) calls is likely to shape Kyrgyzstan's immediate and long-term future and
stability. Broader societal integration is among the most pressing issues facing the
post-Akaev authorities.
8.2.1. Contributions and suggestions for future research
This study has attempted to contribute filling in a gap in the literature on ethnic
mobilization in at least three areas. First, scholarship on the topic has thus far paid
marginal attention to post-communist Eurasia, with the notable exception of an
expanding body of literature on the Russian diasporas225. This study has provided an
in-depth empirical investigation of two cases often referred to in the literature
(Melvin, 1998 and 2001; Bohr, 1998; Hunter, 2001; Olcott, 1994; especially
Khamidov, 2000-2005; Tabyshalieva, 1998 and 1999; Gretsky, 1997; Khudonazarov,
1997; Liu, 2002; Megoran, 2002d), but rarely subject to separate investigation.
This study has also adopted an innovative approach to ethno-political
mobilization (strategic-relational approach). It has built on the important insights of
Beissinger's research on late Soviet nationalist mobilization (most crucially the
importance of the dynamic interplay between structure, agency and ideas), and
Jessop (1990) and Hay's (2002) conceptualizations of a SRA to political analysis to
develop a theoretical framework to explain the strategies and forms of Uzbek
mobilization. And third, such an approach with its emphasis on the actor's strategic
capacity has allowed me to shed light on the rationale behind the choices of the
Uzbek community in both countries over the period from 1991 to 2003. Why
widespread grievances have not turned conflict potential into actual conflict can
only be understood by shifting the attention from structure to agency and ideas -
frames, specifically - and how these feed back into structure.
Finally in terms of directions for future research three issues seem to be
1
awaiting investigation. First is the broad question of the "silent dogs" of nationalism.
This can be done both through a comparative research strategy which looks at a
larger number of cases, both across and within countries. Looking at two cases,
however illustrative of broader tendencies, is a clear limitation of this study. Adding
225Exceptions to this include Foltz (1996) and Horsman (2001) on Tajiks, Gorenburg on minority
mobilization in Russia, 2003), and more recently Atabaki and Mehendale (2004).
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further within-country and cross-group cases would show the degree of interaction
between the state and different groups. Second is the relationship between minority
groups and civil society, in particular the use that such groups make of NGOs as
vehicles for social and political participation (as these may be seen as more effective
channels than state ones) as well as instruments for influencing the state itself in an
indirect way. A third and final path for future research was opened when this
research was close to completion. The quick demise of the Akaev regime raises the
question of how Uzbeks and other minority groups will respond to this sudden
change in the political opportunity structure. This rapid and still confused process
offers challenges and opportunities to researchers on ethno-political mobilization and





This chapter discusses some methodological questions in addition to those already
outlined in chapter 1 and wherever appropriate throughout each of the following
chapters. Hereafter I first outline the sources used and the methods adopted to collect
and analyse data during and after fieldwork. I then turn to ethical and practical
issues, namely the role of the researcher working on sensitive topics, conducting
research in difficult settings, and the choice of language in which research was
conducted. Samples of the questionnaire used in the survey and of the topic guides
used during interviews and focus groups in the three countries are listed at the end of
the chapter.
9.1. General methodological questions
Field research was conducted over a period of seven months between Winter 2002
and Summer 2003. This first stage of the study, conducted in Uzbekistan during
November and December 2002, aimed at understanding how the local population
related to Uzbek co-ethnics living outwith Uzbekistan and the latter's policies
towards them. In this phase I relied on the works of Uzbekistan's President Islam
Karimov, daily media or other national publications in order to make sense of the
official policy of the state. History books offered interesting insights on how state
ideology is being predicated across the younger strata of the population. I also
conducted a number of individual semi-structured interviews and focus groups in two
different cities of Uzbekistan: Tashkent, which lies at the very centre of the regime's
modernization project, where attention and resources are concentrated; and
Samarkand, a city in many respects radically different from Tashkent, as not only it
escapes official attention, but it is traditionally home to a multi-ethnic population,
where ethnicity has very little meaning for the way Samarkandis perceive themselves
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(Schoeberlein, 1994). Respondents included members of the local cultural elite
(academics, graduate students, local experts), as discussed in chapter 5. On
completion of this first stage I returned to Edinburgh to process my preliminary data
and prepare for the following - and central - phase, which took place from May to
August 2003 in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The stay in Uzbekistan was
designed to conduct some further interviews with local experts in order to make the
findings of the previous visit more robust. I then turned to the two case studies, the
second of which (Tajikistan) replicated the format adopted in Kyrgyzstan.
Small-scale surveys
First, a small-scale survey was conducted. It was administered by myself in
Kyrgyzstan, whereas for time constraints I relied on the Centre for Democratic
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Transformations in Khujand for administering it on my behalf in Tajikistan . I
conducted further surveys and individual interviews in parallel, while the survey was
being conducted. The survey comprised 136 respondents in Kyrgyzstan and 137 in
Tajikistan. Because the sample is both too small in size and sampling techniques
were non-random no claim to statistical representativeness is made here. However
every effort was made to gather a sense of various social and geographical groups, so
that it is possible to draw an impression of broader trends. Aggregate figures can be
broken down as follows.
Table 9.1 Disaggregation by area
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Bishkek: 8 Khujand: 39
Tokmok: 1 Sughd (not inch Khujand): 63
Osh: 61 Dushanbe: 35
Osh province (not including Osh city): 10
Jalalabat city: 11
Batken: 45
226The Centre of Democratic Transformations is an NGO based in Khujand which conducts its own
empirical research as well as assists foreign organizations and/or individual researchers in conducting
research in Tajikistan. While the organization is based in Khujand it relies on an extensive network of
contacts elsewhere in the north of the Tajikistan and in Dushanbe.
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No answer 4 1
Table 9.4 Elite/non-elite
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Elite 91 (political: 25; economic: 19; cultural:
47)
















The questionnaire comprised an average of thirty questions and was administered in
Russian. After conducting a pilot study in Bishkek in early June 2003, I then re¬
visited the format of the questionnaire (as well as the type of questions to be asked in
the follow-up interviews) to take into account issues that the preliminary findings
had shown were relevant to the local Uzbek community (including phrasing of
questions as well as topic areas to be addressed). Questions covered five main issue
areas: Personal details (place of birth and residence, age, education, profession);
attachment to various type of identity (ethnic, state, religious, local, regional);
identification of specifically Uzbek problems and evaluation of political, economic
and cultural conditions of the Uzbek population in the republic; identification of
homeland, self-perception as member of ethnic minority (or else); attitude towards
state of residence and perceptions of effectiveness of various institutions in dealing
with Uzbek issues; attitude towards Uzbekistan (assessment of policy thereof
towards Uzbek co-ethnics; desire to migrate there); participation to and interest in
Uzbek organizations.
For obvious reasons some questions appeared in one country only. In Tajikistan
respondents were asked about the perceived discrimination from state authorities vis-
a-vis the northern province and in case to indicate what they believed the rationale
behind this was (ie regional, ethnic or other motivations). In Kyrgyzstan questions
focused on the dualism between the two Uzbek organizations and the respondents'
perceptions on the matter. Survey data were then coded into and analysed through
SPSS 11.5.
Semi-structured elite interviews and focus groups
While I do believe that survey data contributed to make the findings more robust and
give an idea of broad trends, working in Central Asia relying on quantitative data
only presents inevitable limitations, exposing research findings to crucial
weaknesses. Deniz Kandiyoti (1999) has noted how standard indicators commonly
used to measure poverty may not be suitable to understand the specificities of Central
Asian societies. Similarly, familiarity among the respondents with some of the
concepts and indicators (to measure them) adopted in the survey may not be
widespread, or consensus may not be established on what a term precisely means.
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This weakness of quantitative methods can be balanced through extensive and in-
depth fieldwork where the researcher gets to know the meaning that local
respondents attach to concepts. While I could not count on time and financial
resources to conduct an even more extensive ethnographic study, I did rely on
qualitative semi-structured individual interviews to explore perceptions, attitudes
and beliefs with regard to particular events or processes. As table 9.7 shows, 29
individual interviews and 7 focus groups (comprising 29 respondents) were
conducted in Uzbekistan. Follow-up interviews also took place in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan with members of the local Uzbek elite to discuss the findings that emerged
from the survey and explore additional issues such as individual involvement in
public life, leaders' actions and strategies and popular perceptions thereof.
Similarly to surveys, interviewing also faced the issue of sampling. With
regard to this I adopted a snowballing technique in order to overcome the problem.
Snowballing is a particularly useful way to gain access to social groupings where
other more common techniques to do so are unavailable (electoral rolls, phone
directories). Because access to the group is granted through an insider the group's
perception of the researcher as alien can be significantly reduced. There are obvious
downsides with this technique as well, such as the risk arising from respondents
pointing to other potential informants whose views they share - thereby creating a
bias through the elimination of potential alternative or marginal views. I sought to
tackle this risk by relying on as many gatekeepers as possible, so that chances for
group-thinking would be minimised. This proved a successful strategy as a wide
range of views emerged during the interviews and surveys.
I conclude with a note on focus groups, a relatively new technique in political
science (Harrison, 2001). I made use of this method during my visits to Uzbekistan
to explore how local Uzbeks make sense of their identity and O'zbekchilik (whether
this is a concept with ethnic or state-based underpinning) and how they relate to
Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. While I am satisfied with the quality of data gathered, I
became increasingly concerned about two issues. Focus grops are extremely difficult
to organise (arranging for a time and venue suitable to participants) and this process
can be time-consuming. Also, because the presence of a dominant figure in the focus
group can derail the whole enterprise, eventually the advantages presented by
265
individual interviews, adopting a semi-structured format (a topic guide allowing for
variations in order of questions and for a degree of control by the interviewee -
should he or she consider one issue more relevant than another) led to a preference
for this method over focus groups. Interviews and focus groups were recorded on a
small tape recorder, after constent had been established, and data were later
transcribed. In all cases guarantees for anonymous and confidential use of personal
data were ensured.
Table 9.7 Interviews and focus groups
Interviews Focus groups
Total 109 7 (29 respondents)
Uzbekistan 29 (in Tashkent, in Samarkand) 7 (3 in Tashkent, 4 in Samarkand)
Kyrgyzstan 50 (9 in Bishkek, 7 in Jalalabat, 34 in Osh city) -
Tajikistan 30 (23 in Khujand, 7 in Dushanbe) -
9.2. Ethical and empirical issues in field research
Language
As mentioned earlier in this study I began to familiarise myself with Central Asian
languages in 2001, before starting my doctoral program. The question of what
language research would and should be conducted in is a central concern in
designing and conducting research. For the purpose of this study I relied primarily -
though not exclusively - on the Russian language. On the surface this could appear a
counter-intuitive choice: after all, research on Uzbeks, partly conducted in
Uzbekistan could well be conducted in the Uzbeks' own language. I do not dispute
the validity of this claim, and in fact during my stay in Uzbekistan I tended to rely
more on the use of the Uzbek language, though with the invaluable help of an
interpreter, as I did not feel confident enough to proceed alone. This also contributed
to making me re-consider the choice of language in a way that allowed me to conduct
research independently (the implications of relying on a third party, however reliable,
also played a role). There are two further events that helped me make up my mind.
During my 2003 visit to Uzbekistan I was asked to lecture on nationalism issues at
the "Academy under the President of Uzbekistan" in Tashkent under invitation of the
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then Tashkent office of the Open Society Institute. The event brought to my attention
how consensus among the local Uzbek audience would soon be reached over the
meaning of central concepts in nationalism studies in the Russian language
(nationalism, nation, self-consciousness), but not in Uzbek, where endless
discussions followed over which term would best capture the English or Russian
equivalent. Furthermore, Uzbekistani authorities have actively promoted the use of
Uzbek language, and hence the familiarity of almost all ethnic Uzbeks with the
Uzbek language, Uzbeks abroad have by contrast had to deal with nationalising
policies aimed at enhancing the position of Kyrgyz and Tajik, but not of minority
languages. Additionally, countries like Kyrgyzstan are culturally more Russified than
neighbouring Uzbekistan. This has meant that on some occasions members of the
local Uzbek elites were more fluent in Russian than in Uzbek. Therefore I resorted to
conducting research in Russian for purposes of comparability of the two cases, using
for example questionnaires in Russian language and conducting interviews in
Russian as well.
The relationship between researcher and researched: Research on or
for national minorities?
This research has addressed a politically sensitive topic. The study has focused on
marginal groups and attention from an outsider in an authoritarian setting might have
put them in danger, if not physical, possibly psychological, due to increased or un¬
due attention. A period of pre-doctoral research in Uzbekistan in Summer 2001
taught me a great deal in terms of how to approach the study of the conditions of the
'ethnic other' in a non open political system" . During my research I always
maintained an open and honest approach, making it unmistakable who I was and
what I was doing. The only occasion on which this approach "backfired" was in the
Spring of 2003 when I naively informed the authorities in Uzbekistan that I would
need to visit the country again as part of my research on cross-border minorities.
Unsurprisingly, my visa application was rejected at the time and it was only thanks to
"7I must make clear that I am decisively unhappy with this terminology which assumes the fixation of
only one type of identity to the detriment of others, and which in the end is un-necessarily
confrontational.
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the intervention of the Open Society Institute in Tashkent that I would be able to go
back to Uzbekistan over that summer.
There are also broader considerations arising from conducting research on
ethnic minorities, particularly with regard to the relationship between the research
and the researched. While ethnic or religious self-awareness may be on the rise
among some elements within ethnic minorities in the region, an excess of attention
may be counter-productive and eventually turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nick
Megoran has rightly commented on the excesses of analysts, international
organizations and even some scholars in emphasising the conflict potential of the
Ferghana Valley region (2000). Undue attention may ultimately de-stabilise the
situation because of the emphasis on a particular security discourse. This also applies
to research on ethnic identification, as respondents were asked to think of themselves
in ethnic terms, even though in some occasions they made clear that ethnicity was of
little relevance to them (chapter 4).
Additionally, research conducted on ethnic minorities should lead the
researcher to greater reflexivity in how he or she is conducting research. Laura
Adams very insightfully discusses this in her reflection on her experience as a
"mascot" researcher during fieldwork in Uzbekistan (1999). Though distinct (I
tended to alternate living in my own flat with living with local families - both
Uzbeks and non), Adams's experience reminds me of my condition of being
approached by some members of the Uzbek community as their advocate. I
remember my conversations with the editor of the Uzbek-language newspaper Tong
in Khujand in August 2003 about the difficulties that the Uzbek community has
experienced in Tajikistan since independence. At some point he mentioned the
perceived imbalance in treatment from the Tajikistan office of the Organization for
the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) towards the various ethnic
communities living in the Sughd province in light of the decision to fund Russian
and Tajik language newspapers, but not the Uzbek language one. Mirzo-aka, and
with him some others among the local community, asked me to go the Dushanbe
office of the OSCE and inquire on their behalf about this. This forced me to consider
my status as researcher. Was I conducting research on or for ethnic minorities? I
often felt expectations from members of ethnic minorities that would require a
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higher degree of involvement than perhaps a researcher should have had. Certainly
empathy and sympathy were never lacking on my part, but how far should one go?
When does one stop being a researcher on ethnic minorities and become a researcher
for them? This also had its downsides, as it occurred to me - rarely I must say - that
officials from state authorities belonging to the titular group would look at me with
some degree of suspicion as if I were trying to spot some error from their side. I
'solved' the issue by being as open as I could about the nature and scope of my
research and about my commitment to report back my findings once research had
been completed.
Researching sensitive topics in post-conflict environments
The Tajikistani is a post-conflict society, where civil war has left scars, physical as
well as psychological. Similarly southern Kyrgyzstanis experienced a brief, but
bloody conflict in June 1990 which - as explored in chapter 6 - has shaped the way
local peoples relate to public life and mobilize politically. In Osh, for example, the
local population were not eager to discuss openly and freely the origins and
aftermath of the conflict, which is still in many respects an "open wound". From my
previous visits to Kyrgyzstan, and to Osh in particular, I had the impression that this
is still very much a "taboo topic" for southern Kyrgyzstani people, regardless of
their ethnic background. In light of this, I adopted an indirect approach to explore the
salience of the Osh conflict in the mindset of both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. I did not
address the question directly and did not raise the issue myself. This clearly
prevented me from having a larger sample covering different views, beliefs, and
perceptions on this specific question. What I did instead was much more a semi-
structured approach to interviews, so that whenever the Osh conflict was mentioned
by the respondent himself/herselfwithout being elicited I allowed the conversation to
flow and memories to re-surface. This meant that respondents at times did not refer
to the conflict to make sense of the way Uzbeks have behaved throughout the whole
post-independence period. Even when simply declining to discuss the question
further, the respondents' attitude was significant to show how deeply entrenched the
memories still are. In addition, I also relied on more informal conversations with
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members of the Uzbek community, during which the topic emerged and was
discussed.
Terminology - cities and country names
Because names of cities, regions, and even historical figures have changed - at times
radically - since the Soviet collapse, choosing which term to use has not just been a
matter of convenience, but also a political choice. I opted for remaining as neutral as
possible, adopting the official name of cities, provinces and countries. Hence, I used
the term Khujand as opposed to a more Uzbekified - and as common - Khojent,
Jalalabat reflecting Kyrgyzstan's recent official change, and not a more Russified
Jalal-Abad. However I use Tashkent and Samarkand and not Toshkent and
Samarqand, simply because the previous spelling is the international one and these
two cities are internationally known using that spelling. Similarly I opted for Osh
(international and country spelling), and not O'sh (Uzbek) and Sughd, rather than a
less common - though closer to the original pronunciation - So'g'd.
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Appendix 1. Sample questionnaire (Kyrgyzstan)
1. I am a member of X (specify) nationality
2. My nationality is very important/important/neither important nor not
important/not important/absolutely not important
3. I feel only Uzbek/more Uzbek than Kyrgyzstani/equally Uzbek and
Kyrgyzstani/more Kyrgyzstani than Uzbek/neither/only Kyrgyzstani
4. How often do you identify with one of the following (always, sometimes,
rarely, almost never): Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Kyrgyzstani, from the Ferghana
Valley, southerner/northerner
5. To which of the following do you feel closer: Uzbek nationality/my city or
village of origin/state of residence/region/Ferghana Valley/other
6. What is your passport nationality?
7. What is your homeland? (Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan/Central Asia/Ferghana
Valley/city/region/none/other)
8. How would you refer to your national community? (diaspora/national
minority/titular nation/historical nation/ethnic community/other)
9. What type of influence does Uzbekistan have towards Uzbeks living in the
neighbouring states? (Positive/negative/don't know/does not make any
difference)
10. Does Uzbekistan defend the interests of Uzbeks living in the neighoubouring
republics? (yes/no/don't know)
11. What is Kyrgyzstan to you?
12. Who should protect the rights of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan? (the
Kyrgyzstani state, Uzbekistan, International organizations, Uzbek
organizations in Kyrgyzstan, all Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan, all citizens of
Kyrgyzstan, other)
13. How effective are the following institutions to deal with Uzbek-related issues
(very effective, effective, not really effective, not effective at all)?
Administration, parliament, Uzbek NCC, Society of Uzbeks
14. How effective is the Uzbek organization(s) in dealing with political,
economic, cultural qurstions (very effective, effective, not really effective,
not effective at all)?
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Appendix 2. Topic guide for interviews and focus groups in
Kyrgyzstan228
Opportunities and discrimination: What types of obstacles to participation do
Uzbeks face, if any? Are they subject to discriminations? Are opportunities equal for
all ethnic groups in the public and private sphere?
Self-perception: What term would you use to refer to the Uzbek community? Are
they a diaspora? Or a minority?
Attitude toward Kyrgyzstan: What is Kyrgyzstan to you? How do you view the role
of the administration in dealing with Uzbek questions? Who promotes and defends
Uzbek interests in Kyrgyzstan?
Attitude towards Uzbekistan: What are your views about Uzbekistan? Does
Uzbekistan have a policy towards Uzbeks living in the neighbouring republics, or
should it have one? If so, why? If not, why not?
Mechanism of mobilization: What mechanisms of mobilization are available to
Uzbeks? Do you find them effective? What form of state control are they subject to?
How does mobilization function during elections? Should there be Uzbek political
parties? Are cultural centres necessary to Uzbeks?
Uzbek Organizations: What are your views about the local Uzbek organizations? Are
they effective? What about their ties with the state?
Leadership: Can you tell me how you became involved in this acftivity? What did
you do before that? What did you do during the Soviet period? What are the main
problems/challenges facing the Uzbek community? How do you think they should be
addressed? Who are the leaders within the Uzbek community?
Perceptions of leadership: Who are the leaders within the Uzbek community? Why
do you refer to them as leaders? Are they effective? Do you share their goals and
228This guide is indicative of the topics regularly discussed during interviews in both Kyrgyzstan and,
duly modified, in Tajikistan. Because the format was semi-structured, the order in which questions
were posed could vary according to the circumstances. Additional questions which appeared relevant
to the particular interview could also be added. Appendix 2 contains the topic guide with sample
questions discussed during fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan. The topic guide for Tajikistan differed only in
that some questions addressed issues that were applied to that country only (legacy of the civil war;
change in the balance of power between regions; rationale behind the marginalization of the "north"
from Tajikistani politics). The same applies with regard to the choice of presenting the questionnaire
used in the survey in Kyrgyzstan.
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strategies? How could they be more effective? What issues are most relevant to
Uzbeks?
Appendix 3. Sample topic guide for interviews and focus groups in
Uzbekistan
Are Uzbeks living outwith Uzbekistan of concern to Uzbekistan? Should they be?
Should Uzbekistan support more actively Uzbeks living in the neighbouring
Republics?
What do Uzbeks in Uzbekistan have in common with those living in the
neighbouring republics?




1.1 Riots in 1989-1990: Bleak prospects for Central Asia?
2.1 Uzbek distribution in Central Asia and the former Soviet Union
2.2 Distribution of Uzbeks in Soviet and post-Soviet Central Asia
2.3 Ferghana Valley provinces - Composition by nationality
4.1 Ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan
4.2 Ethnic composition of Tajikistan
4.3 Poverty and inequality in the late Soviet era
4.4a Degree of urbanization (Kyrgyzstan)
4.4b Degree of urbanization (Tajikistan)
4.5a Women in labour force (Kyrgyzstan)
4.5b Women in labour force (Tajikistan)
4.6 Human Development Index and Human Poverty Index (Kyrgyzstan)
4.7 How important is nationality to you?
4.8 How often do you identify yourself as Uzbek?
4.9a How often do you identify yourself as Farg'onalik (Kyrgyzstan)?
4.9b How often do you identify yourself as Farg'onalik (Tajikistan)?
4.10a How often do you identify yourself as a southerner/northerner (Kyrgyzstan)?
4.10b How often do you identify yourself as a Leninabadi/northerner (Tajikistan)?
4.11 How often do you identify yourself with your city/village of origin?
4.12a Main focus of loyalty (Kyrgyzstan)
4.12b Main focus of loyalty (Tajikistan)
4.13a Attachment to nation and state (Kyrgyzstan)
4.13b Attachment to nation and state (Tajikistan)
4.14 What is homeland to you?
5.1a How do you rate the political situation of the Uzbek population in
Kyrgyzstan/Taj ikistan ?
5.1.b How do you rate the economic situation of the Uzbek population in
Kyrgyzstan/Taj ikistan?
5.1c How do you rate the cultural situation of the Uzbek population in
Kyrgyzstan/Taj iki stan?
5.2 Are Uzbeks adequately represented in state structures of government?
5.3 Do Uzbeks enjoy less rights than than Kyrgyz/Tajiks?
5.4a Do you think that northern Tajikistan is politically discriminated/marginalized?
5.4b If so, on what basis?
5.5a How effective are the following institutions in dealing with Uzbek-related issues
(Kyrgyzstan)?
5.5b How effective are the following institutions in dealing with Uzbek-related issues
(Tajikistan)?
5.6 How do you assess Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan?
5.7 Does Uzbekistan defend the interests of Uzbek co-ethnics in Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan?
5.8 Who should defend the interests of Uzbeks abroad?
7.1 Group organization for political action (GOJPA)
7.2 Are you a member of a political party (Tajikistan)?
7.3 Party affiliation (Tajikistan)
7.4 How often do you take part to the activities organized by the local Uzbek cultural
organization?
7.5 Why did you decide to join it?
7.6 What is the function of Uzbek organizations?
7.7 How effective is the UNCC in dealing with Uzbek-related issues?
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7.8 How effective is the Society of Uzbeks in dealing with Uzbek-related issues (Kyrgyzstan
only)?
7.9 Are you a member of a political party (Kyrgyzstan)
7.10 Do you take part to cultural events organized by the local Uzbek organization (i.e.
theatre, music festival, etc.) (Kyrgyzstan)?
7.11 How often do you take part to activities organized by the local Uzbek organization
(Kyrgyzstan)?
7.12 Are you a member of an Uzbek cultural organization (Kyrgyzstan)?
7.13 What cultural organization (if any) do you support (Kyrgyzstan)?
7.14 How effective are the UNCC and the Society of Uzbeks in dealing with Uzbek-related
issues?
7.15 Why did you decide to join it (Kyrgyzstan)?
7.16 Are national-cultural centres necessary to the Uzbek population?
7.17 How do you explain the low level of political action among the Uzbek population?
7.18 Trust in and popularity of local Uzbek personalities
7.19 Popularity rating of deputies of the People's Assembly
7.20 Should the UNCC and the Society of Uzbeks merge?
9.1 Disaggregation by area
9.2 Sex
9.3 Level of education
9.4 Elite/non-elite
9.5 Urban/rural distribution
9.6 Age bands of respondents
9.7 Interviews and focus groups
List of charts
5.1 Demands and grievances among the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan
5.2 Demands and grievances among the Uzbek population in Tajikistan
List of maps
1.1. Uzbekistan and Uzbeks abroad
1.2. The Ferghana Valley
Figures
3.1 Visualization of the strategic-relational approach to Uzbek mobilization
Acronyms
AO: Autonomous oblast' (province)
ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
GBAO: Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast'
GRP: Gross Regional Product
HDI: Human Development Index
HPI: Human Poverty Index
MGA: Morphogenetic approach
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SRA: Strategic-relational approach
TaSSR: Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic
UzSSR: Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic
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